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ALQ 50/3

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Mr Fearn
Head of Emergency Unit

FALKLANDS

1. Sir Anthony Parsons telephoned this evening to say that he had been asked to see the UN Secretary-General at 3 pm New York time today. He said that Perez de Cuellar had eventually decided that there had not been enough in our reply to warrant him seeing Costa Mendez either in Washington or in New York. He understood from our reply that we could accept ~~mutual~~ ^{mutuality} of withdrawal nor the near simultaneity of withdrawal that would be the consequence of British troops withdrawing immediately after Argentine ones. On the assumption that this was a fair interpretation Perez de Cuellar thought that he would probably have to throw in his hand shortly. The PUS confirmed this interpretation. The only kind of withdrawal of British troops that we were prepared to contemplate would be long ~~after~~ after the withdrawal of Argentine troops when the security of the Islands had been properly secured and normal life restored.
2. Sir Anthony Parsons said that in that case Perez de Cuellar would give him at 3 pm the formal Argentine response which would of course be very rigid. He would ask for an early British response but would not in practice demand an answer from us until Monday. Perez de Cuellar was very sympathetic to our own position and there was a pretty widespread desire in New York not to have to return to the Security Council over this holiday weekend. The PUS said that this was relatively convenient since the next Ministerial meeting would be at 4 pm on Sunday at Chequers. Ministers could then consider the Argentine text and Sir Anthony Parsons' recommendations. A reply could be sent either on Sunday evening or Monday morning.
3. Sir Anthony Parsons said that it was just possible that Perez de Cuellar might suggest that he should come to London only. He was very reluctant to go to Buenos Aires. He knew what kind of reception he would be given and might not want to go with nothing in his hand. Would it be totally unacceptable for the UN Secretary-General to pay a visit to London only. The PUS ~~might~~ ^{might} not think that such a visit would look very good. It would seem as if he were expecting a response from us whereas it was the Argentines who had given nothing. Sir Anthony Parsons said that he thought Perez de Cuellar felt the same but knew he could not go to Buenos Aires without being able to offer either mutual withdrawal or at the very least withdrawals in close sequence. If the Secretary-General gave up on Monday we should find ourselves back in the Security Council by Tuesday. The PUS said that Sir Anthony Parsons had done remarkably well so far. If we had to go back to the Security Council on Monday so be it though he could not say whether by then

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movement on the ground would have altered the situation significantly.

4. Subject to developments you may like to try your hand at a draft reply to Sir Anthony Parsons for the PUS to have up his sleeve at Chequers with a view to the telegram being despatched thereafter. Unless there are some surprises it would not be a very long one.

A handwritten signature in blue ink, which appears to read 'R A Burns'.

R A Burns
PS/PUS

28 May 1982

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