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M I P T: FALKLANDS

283

1. DURING MY TALK TODAY WITH HAIG A NUMBER OF ISSUES EMERGED THAT I WILL RECORD SEPARATELY AS FOLLOWS, BECAUSE THEY DO NOT QUITE FIT IN WITH THE DISCUSSION OF IDEAS ABOUT THE FUTURE.

2. HAIG SHOWED, AT THE BEGINNING OF OUR TALK, CONSIDERABLE CONCERN AT WHAT HAD BEEN DESCRIBED TO HIM AS A HARDENING OF THE BRITISH ATTITUDE. THE REPORTS HE HAD RECEIVED FROM STREATOR IN LONDON OF HIS TALKS WITH THE HOME SECRETARY AND THE PUS HAD LED HIM TO FEAR THAT WE WERE HEADING FOR A REAL PROBLEM IN U.S./U K RELATIONS. THE PERUVIAN FOREIGN MINISTER HAD BEEN ON TO HIM DIRECT, AS HAD DE CUELLAR, BOTH OF WHOM HAD TALKED ABOUT NEW QUOTE BRITISH CONDITIONS DELIVERED TO THE ARGENTINIANS UNQUOTE.

3. I SAID I DID NOT KNOW WHAT THIS WAS REFERRING TO. WE HAD NOT BEEN IN TOUCH WITH THE ARGENTINIANS. NOR HAD WE REPLIED TO THE ARGENTINE CEASEFIRE TERMS (UKMIS NEW YORK TELNO 884).

4. HAIG SAID THAT WE FACED AN IMMEDIATE AND SERIOUS PROBLEM THAT COULD COME TO A HEAD IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON MONDAY OR TUESDAY. DE CUELLAR WOULD ANNOUNCE THAT HE WAS UNABLE TO PROCEED. ACCORDING TO HAIG, HE WOULD BLAME LONDON FOR THIS, ACCUSING THEM OF INTRANSIGENCE. THERE PROBABLY WOULD BE A RESOLUTION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL CALLING FOR A CEASEFIRE AND MUTUAL WITHDRAWAL.

5. I SAID THAT WE DID NOT HAVE THE SAME READING OF PEREZ DE CUELLAR'S ATTITUDE. SIR ANTHONY PARSONS HAD JUST HAD A PERFECTLY STRAIGHT-FORWARD CONVERSATION WITH HIM IN WHICH NO ACCUSATIONS HAD BEEN MADE AGAINST US. THIS LED TO A DISCUSSION ON THE MARKED DIFFERENCE BETWEEN WHAT DE CUELLAR TELLS THE AMERICANS AND WHAT HE SAYS TO US. HAIG'S VIEW, AS YOU PROBABLY KNOW, IS THAT DE CUELLAR IS VERY MUCH MORE AT THE BECK AND CALL OF THE PERUVIAN GOVERNMENT THAN WE THINK HE IS. HAIG DOES NOT THINK THIS IS SURPRISING BUT IT IS SOMETHING THAT WE SHOULD TAKE ACCOUNT OF. AS FOR THE PERUVIAN GOVERNMENT, HAIG DOES NOT THINK THAT THEY CAN ANY LONGER BE REGARDED AS OTHER THAN COMPLETELY PRO-ARGENTINIAN, (THEY HAVE SUPPLIED THEM WITH MIRAGES) WITH THE RESULT THAT HE DOES NOT SEE THEM CAPABLE OF PLAYING ANY USEFUL NEGOTIATING ROLE.

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6. ONE OF THE INCIDENTS THAT HAS MADE HAIG SUSPICIOUS OF DE CUELLAR WAS HIS LEAPING IN WITH A REQUEST FOR AN ANSWER FROM US AND THE ARGENTINIANS WITHIN 24 HOURS ON CEASEFIRE PROPOSALS FOLLOWING RESOLUTION 505. THIS RESOLUTION HAD GIVEN HIM SEVEN DAYS. WHY THEN HAD HE ACCELERATED THE PROCESS IF IT WAS NOT IN RESPONSE TO ARGENTINE WISHES CONVEYED THROUGH THE PERUVIAN GOVERNMENT? I SAID THAT SIR ANTHONY PARSON'S BELIEF WAS THAT PEREZ DE CUELLAR ATTACHED IMPORTANCE TO THE PROBITY OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S ROLE. HE COULD NOT BECOME AN INSTRUMENT FOR DRAGGING THINGS OUT AT THE BEHEST OF ANY PARTY. HIS LEGITIMACY REQUIRED HIM TO SEEK SOLUTIONS AND NOT SIMPLY LET TIME PASS IN A WAY THAT COULD BRING DISCREDIT UPON THE U N AND THE OFFICE OF SECRETARY GENERAL. I CANNOT SAY THAT HAIG WAS WON OVER BY THIS ARGUMENT, THOUGH ENDERS, WHO ENTERED THE ROOM AT THAT MOMENT, TENDED TO GIVE PEREZ DE CUELLAR THE BENEFIT OF THE DOUBT, SAYING THAT THE FACT THAT HE LIFTED HIS 24-HOUR TIME LIMIT SHOWED HIS GOOD FAITH.

7. RETURNING TO THE QUESTION OF A LIKELY SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION EARLY NEXT WEEK, HAIG IMPLORING US NOT TO DEVIATE FROM THE THEME OF RESOLUTION 502. I SAID THAT I WAS SURE THAT WE WOULD WISH TO STICK TO 502. HAIG SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN FRIGHTENED BY WHAT HE HAD LEARNED FROM LONDON ABOUT OUR TOUGHER LINE AND ASKED ME WHETHER WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO ADHERE TO THE THIRD CLAUSE OF THIS RESOLUTION, WHICH CALLED FOR THE TWO GOVERNMENTS TO SEEK A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION TO THEIR DIFFERENCES. I REPLIED THAT WE HAD ALWAYS BEEN READY TO SEEK A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION AND THIS WOULD NOT CHANGE.

8. HAIG THOUGHT THAT THE BRITISH AND AMERICANS WOULD HAVE A DIFFICULT TIME IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL BECAUSE NOBODY ELSE WOULD STAY WITH THEM.

9. HAIG SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THE PRESENT INSISTENCE BY THE ARGENTINIANS ON A CEASEFIRE REFLECTED A MORE REALISTIC INTERPRETATION IN BUENOS AIRES OF THE MILITARY OUTLOOK. IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE ATTACK ON THE ATLANTIC CONVEYOR, THE ARGENTINIANS HAD PERSUADED THEMSELVES THAT THE BRITISH LOSS OF EQUIPMENT IN THAT SHIP WOULD SERIOUSLY INTERFERE WITH PROJECTED MILITARY OPERATIONS ON THE ISLANDS. HOWEVER, OUR RECENT MILITARY ADVANCES APPEARED TO HAVE HAD A HEALTHY IMPACT. HAIG THOUGHT THAT THE MAIN ARGENTINE AIM NOW WAS TO AVOID HUMILIATION. THEY WERE CONCEDING NOW, FOR THE FIRST TIME, THAT THEY COULD NOT WIN BUT THIS DID NOT MEAN OF COURSE THAT THEY WOULD BE REASONABLE OR FULLY FACE REALITIES ANY MORE THAN THEY HAD DONE IN THE PAST.

10. HAIG SPOKE OF LAMI DOZO AS THE HEIR-APPARENT TO GALTIERI. HE WAS A MODERATE AND WANTED ARGENTINA TO REMAIN PRO-WESTERN. FROM THE WAY HE SPOKE I GATHERED THAT THIS INFORMATION ABOUT CURRENT ARGENTINIAN ATTITUDES HAD BEEN DERIVED FROM A TALK THAT AMBASSADOR WALTERS HAS JUST HAD HERE IN WASHINGTON WITH ONE OF THE THREE MILITARY WATCHDOGS WHO HANG AROUND COSTA MENDEZ.

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11. WHEN I HAD ASSURED HAIG THAT YOU UNDERSTOOD IN LONDON THE PROBLEM THAT THIS FALKLAND ISSUE WAS CAUSING FOR U.S. RELATIONS WITH LATIN AMERICA GENERALLY, HE REPLIED THAT HIS GREATEST CONCERN WAS THE IMPACT ON CENTRAL AMERICA. THE QUOTE WHOLE PLACE IS IN JEOPARDY UNQUOTE. HE FEARED FOR THE PRESIDENT'S CARIBBEAN BASIN INITIATIVE. VENEZUELA'S OUTLOOK WAS OUTRAGEOUS. COLOMBIA, WHICH HAD BEEN AMONGST THE MOST MODERATE, WAS NOW FACING ELECTIONS AND THE NEXT GOVERNMENT WOULD PROBABLY BE WORSE THAN THE PRESENT ONE.

HENDERSON

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LIMITED  
HD/EMERGENCY UNIT  
HD/S AM D  
HD/DEF D  
HD/PLANNING STAFF  
HD/UND  
HD/NEWS D  
HD/ERD  
HD/EOC (E)  
HD/FUSD  
DEF HD/FUSD  
HD/RES D  
PS  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/MR ONSLOW  
PS/LORD BELSTEAD  
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MR BULLARD  
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MR GILLMORE  
MR URE  
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COPIES TO  
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