

FALKLAND ISLANDS: FCO SITREP (DETAILED VERSION): 0700 HOURS 1 JUNE

UN

(a) Sir A Parsons' Meeting with the Secretary General

1. Sir A Parsons delivered the Secretary of State's message. The Secretary General told Sir A Parsons privately that, in an attempt to avert a bloody battle for Port Stanley, he was disposed to make a final attempt over the next two days to bring about implementation of operative paragraphs 1 and 2 of SCR 502 (the Secretary General fully understands that there is now no question of parallel British withdrawal).

(b) Argentine Views

2. The Argentines have not come up with anything new. They are seeking clarification of references in the Secretary of State's message to 'the longer term' and 'alternative international security arrangements'.

(c) Secretary General's Five Point Plan

3. (i) At Time T a ceasefire would come into force and be monitored by UN observers;
- (ii) At Time T plus 24 hours, Argentine withdrawal would begin in implementation of SCR 502 (ie total Argentine withdrawal);
- (iii) At Time T plus 24 hours, token British withdrawal would begin. [Secretariat thought that 'token' might mean the removal of one battalion];
- (iv) (2) and (3) above would be completed within 'X' days;
- (v) Negotiations would begin under the auspices of the Secretary-General within the framework of SCR 505.

The plan has been given to both Argentina and the UK. According to a member of the Secretariat, the Secretary General believes that points (2) and (4) would give us total Argentine withdrawal, whereas point (3) on token British withdrawal would amount to the restoration of British administration. In the Secretary General's view, if accepted by the Argentines, this package would amount to the transformation of the situation mentioned in the last sentence of the Secretary of State's message.

(d) Sir A Parsons' Assessment

4. Sir A Parsons judges that the Secretary General is acting in good faith; (The Secretary General may have been encouraged to some extent to have a last try by his meeting with Dr David Owen on 31 May). Sir A Parsons believes the Secretary General's proposals are unacceptable: if UN Observers were in situ under a mandatory resolution, and the Argentines found pretexts not to withdraw, it would be very difficult for us to resume military action: the plan involves some British withdrawal: it could also resuscitate the whole idea of UN interim administration, target dates and UN provision on negotiations for a final solution.

5. But Sir A Parsons suggests that the Secretary General's proposals pose greater difficulties for the Argentines than for us. The proposals also allow us to buy a little more time, since the Secretary General is thinking of delaying his report to the Council until 2 June in order to explore his ideas. Sir A Parsons recommends that he should be instructed to give the Secretary General a reasoned response, pointing out the genuine objections, drawing attention to positive elements, and seeking clarification of those points which are obscure, eg the relationship in time between points (4) and (5) and what is meant by 'token'. If possible, Sir A Parsons would wish to give the Secretary General a response by 1900Z.

E (Washington telno 1985)

(e) Rio Treaty Meeting Resolution

F (UKMis New York telno 897)

6. The Argentines have circulated this as a document of the Security Council. Sir A Parsons recommends that we reply in reasoned terms and asks for comments by 1400Z on his draft of a possible reply.

G (UKMis New York tel no 898)

(f) Libyan Arms for Argentina

7. We have received information that Libya is supplying Argentina with French-made arms, including air to air missiles and that these have been shipped by Aerolineas Argentinas via Cape Verde/Las Palmas and Brazil. Action is being taken to stop these flights with Brazilian, Portuguese, Moroccan, Spanish and Cape Verde authorities. We have also asked the French and the US respectively to put pressure on the Libyans and the Brazilians to stop these supplies.

(g) Comment

8. Although the Secretary-General's new proposals have delayed further Security Council action, they pose in themselves new difficulties for us. It is likely that the Argentines will reject them. But we are required to give a response today, though this could be by way of seeking clarification. Sir A Parsons will need instructions by 1900Z.

9. The main difficulties are:

- (a) A UN presence on the Islands;
- (b) the lack of clear linkage between ceasefire and irrevocable Argentine withdrawal;
- (c) a 'token' British withdrawal;
- (d) a commitment to immediate negotiations on the future of the Islands with, though this is not clearly spelt out,


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a probable UN interim administration.

10. The text of SCR 505 is attached for reference.
11. Further action is required on Sir A Parsons' proposed comments on a reply to the Argentine~~s~~ introduction of the Rio Treaty Resolution as a Security Council document.



R Fearn
Emergency Unit

1 June 1982

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