


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D.N. Plans 6/31/3



Supplementary Brief for First Sea Lord
Future Garrison of the Falkland Islands
and Dependencies

(Attachment to COS(Misc)259/742/1 of
4th June 1982)

Introduction

This supplementary brief contains amplifying and additional points to those in my brief D.N. Plans 6/31/3 of 7th June 1982.

Discussion

2. AFD Proposal for Sea Harriers. It is probable that CAS will raise the subject of the employment of Sea Harriers in the Falklands in terms of an earlier AFD input to the garrison study, which read (1):-

"It would be foolhardy to rely solely on Port Stanley airfield. The aircraft might be taken out and as AM2 matting is vulnerable to blast as well as weapon effects which damage concrete. Thus under all options (my emphasis) where no CVS will be present a small number of Sea Harriers (I understand they are thinking of 6-8), or, less desirably, AIM 9 fitted Harrier GR3, should be shore based elsewhere. Similarly to reduce vulnerability when a CVS is present some of its Sea Harriers and helicopters should be shore based".

3. The first part of the proposal makes military sense in the context of the Falklands, and strengthens our long standing point about the vulnerability of airfields. However the implications of transferring Sea Harriers ashore for all options (ie for the foreseeable future, including under the "slimline" garrison option) are serious for the carriers. Assuming that there are no more losses, the remaining Sea Harriers total 22. Several permutations are possible, but if 8 were left in the Falklands, 4 in the Training Squadron and 2 spare there would only be 8 for the operational carriers. It might be possible to juggle the numbers to produce 5 in each of 2 CVS, but the more likely contingency would be 1 CVS fully operational with 5-8 Sea Harriers, and the other with reduced numbers or even none at all; apart from the loss in capability, she would have to be declared as a helicopter carrier. This situation would ease slightly when replacement

/in the
last
case



aircraft for those lost in the Falklands are received, which could not be for a couple of years. On balance, I recommend that you agree to the AFD proposals but point out the serious implications for our other commitments. (This would also help the early procurement of the Sea Harrier follow-on buy). It would have to be clear that the aircraft would remain available for early redeployment to the CVS should circumstances require.

4. The second part of the AFD proposal - that when a CVS is present some of its Sea Harriers and helicopters should be shore based - should not be supported. The deployment of aircraft is an operational matter to be left to the Commander to decide in the light of circumstances at the time; on occasions he may wish to disembark some of his aircraft, but this is most unlikely to be on a permanent basis.

5. Views of other Chiefs of Staff on the Paper

- a. CDS is generally content with it and recognises that it is difficult to take a firm decision on the eventual size of the garrison; on the other hand he sees the force of the argument for planning or something. I understand that he believes firmly that if his "slimline" garrison had been in the Falklands the invasion would not have occurred, and thus he is inclined to favour a garrison of this size in the future. (I do not accept this argument because we cannot revert to the status quo ante; a totally new situation has occurred and it would be imprudent to plan on anything other than the worst case with a hostile and bitter Argentine in at least the initial stages). That said, I understand that CDS is still open minded and open to persuasion on the garrison size.
- b. CAS is being briefed on similar lines to yourself although he feels the first priority should be to resolve command and communication.
- c. CGS is also being briefed on similar lines. His main concern is that further studies - such as on warning time and reinforcement capability - are conducted quickly, and that command and control is resolved. His briefers are stressing the need for a firm planning assumption for the logisticians, and that this should not be delayed to await the outcome of further studies.



6. ODO(SA) Paper. ODO(SA) discussed the subject of possible future expenditure in the Falkland Islands last week. A MOD paper was called for, setting out broad force levels for various scenarios. I understand that a draft has been produced, drawing these scenarios into two basic situations which are then related directly to the force levels at Annexes B and C of the garrison paper. The paper is, I believe, being held until after your discussion tomorrow on the garrison paper so that it can reflect your views. My understanding is that the draft does not address the implications of the garrison levels for our commitments elsewhere, both in NATO and on other possible operations out of area; this is a significant omission particularly for the Navy. The Secretary of State is aware of the lines along which this work is proceeding, but not necessarily the detail of the force levels. He will of course be involved if the paper is translated into one for OD(SA) consideration; this may affect the timing of any submission from the Chiefs of Staff (Recommendation 11b of my main brief) on the proposed garrison size.

7. Command and Control Paper. The ACDS(Pol) paper on command and control (para. 11d of my main brief) will be available for 2 star clearance tomorrow (Wednesday) and Chiefs of Staff on Thursday. I understand that it will be very short and will recommend maintaining the present arrangements until some stage during the transition period; it will then suggest that UKCICC(C) should be invited to propose command arrangements for the garrison, and thus a further detailed paper will be produced for your consideration in due course.

8. Force Levels. For convenience I attach a table setting out the main force level proposals:-

- a. In Annex B to the garrison paper (with ND amendments).
- b. The higher level in VCDS(P and L)/ACDS(Pol)'s earlier work (this is the level on which logisticians are currently planning).
- c. The lower level in VCDS(P and L)/ACDS(Pol)'s earlier work.



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The higher level (b) has been costed at about £140m. a year additional running costs, the low level (c) at £100m. Broadly, they also equate in cost terms to Annexes B and C of the current garrison paper.

JSW
Director of Naval Plans
8th June 1982

Copy to:- VCNS
ACNS(P)
ACNS(O)
ACNS(OP)
COS/CGRM
DNAW
DNW
DNAP
DNCT
DNOR
DS4
DS5

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Comparison of Garrisons

RN

"Annex B" level in Current Paper (as amended by B.N. Plans brief)	ACDS(Pol)/VCDS(P and L) higher level	ACDS(Pol)/VCDS(P and L) lower level
<p>(For South Atlantic)</p> <p>1 CVS (with 8 SHAR and 9 SK5) if Port Stanley airfield not available for strike/AD aircraft.</p> <p>2 SSN</p> <p>1 LPD/ESL</p> <p>6-8 DD/FF</p> <p>1 OSS (Summer only)</p> <p>1 Ice Patrol Ship (winter only)</p> <p>3-4 RN manned trawlers</p> <p>1 Forward Repair Ship</p> <p>3-5 ASW Sea Kings (if CVS not present)</p> <p>Up to 6 Wessex 5</p>	<p>(For Falkland Islands only)</p> <p>1 CVS (until airfield improved)</p> <p>2-3 SSN/SSK (2 SSN after airfield ")</p> <p>1 LPD</p> <p>6-8 DD/FF (3-5 after airfield ")</p> <p>1 Ice Patrol Ship</p> <p>5 RN manned trawlers or equivalent</p> <p>1 Forward Repair Ship</p> <p>1 Accommodation Ship</p> <p>Afloat support</p> <p>3-5 ASW Sea Kings if no CVS</p> <p>5 EDATS trawlers for MCM (Until task complete)</p>	<p>(For Falkland Islands only)</p> <p>1 SSN/SSK</p> <p>2 DD/FF</p> <p>1 Ice Patrol Ship</p> <p>1 LSL</p> <p>3-5 RN manned trawlers or equivalent</p> <p>1 Forward Repair Ship</p> <p>1 Accommodation Ship</p> <p>Afloat Support</p> <p>3-5 ASW Sea Kings</p> <p>5 EDATS trawlers for MCM (until task complete)</p>
<p><u>Afloat Support</u></p> <p>a. Tankers</p> <p>Support of maritime element</p> <p>- 2AO, +1 STUFT - on station</p> <p>16 AOT months per year resupply (necessitating one year's commercial tanker charter, to release AOT for the task)</p>	<h1>SECRET</h1>	

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(2) Support of shore element
- 1 x 30,000 ton tanker
every 3 months for
resupply.

- 1 STUFT - base support
tanker

b. Solid Support - maritime and
land

2 AFS(H) on station

3 STUFT on roulement for
resupply.

2 Hunt class MCTN
FSU

(Note: MCM forces not included
as task assumed complete
before garrison force
level initiated).

*Full & food
for garrison*

ACNS(Poll)/W/SEAF and L3
higher level

ACNS(Poll)/W/SEAF and
lower level

1 MCM Group with 1 Coy
Group detached to
South Georgia.

1 MCM Group with
1 Coy Group detached
to South Georgia.

1 Squadron Army Explorer
or 1 RAF Regiment
Explorer

1 Sq Explorer

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ARMY

Annex B level in Current Paper (un-amended by any Army proposals)	ACDS(Pol)/VCDS(P and L) higher level	ACDS(Pol)/VCDS(P and L) lower level
<p>Bde HQ 2 Troops. CVR(T) 1 Regiment RE 3 Infantry battalions 1 Regiment RA 1 Battery Rapier RA 1 Squadron Rapier RAF 1 Squadron AAC</p>	<p>1 BDE Group with 1 Coy Group detached to South Georgia. 1/2 Squadron Army Rapier or 1 RAF Regiment Rapier</p>	<p>1 Bn Group with 1 Coy Group detached to South Georgia. 1 Tp Rapier</p>

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Annex B level in Current Paper (un-amended by any Air Force proposals)	ACDS(Pol)/VCDS(P and L) higher level	ACDS(Pol)/VCDS(P and L) lower level
3 GCI/EW radars, comms. and ADCO 12 Phantoms 4 Buccaneers 2 Hercules (Tanker/ MR fit) 8 Chinook 4 MPA (reducing to 2) 8 Hercules resupply flight/ week	<p><u>Before Airfield improved</u></p> 12 Harrier GR3 with AIM 9 2 Hercules EW/GCI radar 8 Pumas or 4 Chinooks or 6 RN Wessex 5 or 3 SK4s	<p><u>Before Airfield improved</u></p> 12 Harriers with AD capability Mobile EW/GCI radar 2 Hercules 6 Puma or 3 Chinooks or 6 RN Wessex 5 or 3 SK4s
	<p><u>After Airfield improved</u></p> 12 Phantoms 4 Buccaneers 3 Nimrods for ASW EW/GCI radar 6 Pumas, or 3 Chinooks or 6 RN Wessex 5 or 3 SK4s 4-6 ASW Sea Kings (no CVS)	<p><u>After Airfield improved</u></p> 6 Phantoms replace 12 Harriers 2 Nimrods replace 2 Hercules