

LIST OF SECONDARY SOURCES3
66/1

1. Report on Accuracy of DIS Assessments in Lead-Up to the Falklands Crisis. D/DIS(C)21/52 of 3 May 1982.

Rehearses DI4 view (DI4A/6618 of 10 March 1982) that well into March, while the Argentine Navy was pressing for a military solution, secret reporting indicated that all other elements of the Argentine Government favoured diplomatic action and that the military option was at that time not under active consideration. First concrete sign of military action was judged to be the Sigint report (received on 30 March) of a possible beach reconnaissance mission by an Argentine submarine. Concludes, inter alia, "that the decision to invade the Falklands was indeed taken only late in March". Current Intelligence Group (CIG) did not formally discuss Argentina/Falklands between July 1981 and the end of March; there were limited resources available (including relatively little CX/Sigint reports) to cover the area in question. Also concludes that, with hindsight, it would have been better to review JIC(81)(N)34 when Galtieri assumed the Presidency.

2. Letter from Director GCHQ to Sir Antony Duff giving background to the Sigint Operation on the Falklands between 1975 and 1977 - D/3630 DQ/2304/14 of 15 June 82.

Describes small Sigint operation mounted in Falklands between late 1975 and April 1977 the object of which was to detect Argentine intentions and any long-term build-up of forces. Station was closed essentially for two reasons:

- a. It had not produced any material of outstanding importance and
- b. There were higher priority operations elsewhere.

Closure decision recorded in JIC(77)12th Meeting, Minute 4 of 25 March 1977.

3. Appreciation by JIC of Events leading up to the Invasion of the Falkland Islands - JIC(82)(N)29 of 6 April 1982.

Concludes that Argentine Government became increasingly impatient after the New York talks in February; that the South Georgia incident was exploited but not contrived; that the decision to assemble a task force was probably taken by the Navy alone, but that all 3 Services appear to have been involved by about 28 March; and that the decision to invade was almost certainly not taken earlier than 28/29 March.

4. Informal Report by the Naval Attache to Argentina of 14 April 1982.

This report tends to confirm the intelligence assessment that the decision to invade was taken very late in the day. States specifically that Attache visited all Argentine naval bases in 1982 and saw no material preparations for an invasion up to the end of February. Mentions, in the context of the South Georgia incident (but without dates), the sailing of submarines from Mar del Plata and of the fleet from Puerto Belgrano. Also mentions information from American sources that the plan for invasion was started some 3 weeks before the invasion. Finally concludes that apart from the evidence of ships sailing, there was no overt evidence available of an intention to invade and that Argentine officers met during the period were unaware of any intention to invade.

5. Reconstruction of events leading up to invasion of Falklands prepared by Director Naval Operations and Trade (DNOT) in May 1982.

A straight factual account of key events (mainly in 1982) seen through Naval Staff eyes, which contains nothing of note which is not already included in the Catalogue of relevant documents prepared by the Review Team.

6. Views of HM Ambassador to Argentina on the events leading up to the invasion recorded in Diptel Number 174 of 6 April '82. An interesting account which opines that the decision to invade developed in 4 phases. Phase 1 was marked by increasingly Argentine impatience at the progress of negotiations in June 1981. Phase 2 concerned the run-up to the New York talks and was also marked by secret reports indicating that the use of force was being considered by the Navy at least. Phase 3 began with the unilateral communique issued by Buenos Aires on the outcome of the New York talks and an increasing press campaign which referred to the use of force. The final phase was marked by the South Georgia affair where the Ambassador voices the belief that "the high tone we adopted in our notification and public announcement of 22 March about measures being adopted to remove the Argentine workmen" provided the final trigger to the decision to invade.

7. Report by Mr D R Nicoll on "UK Intelligence and the Argentine Invasion of the Falkland Islands July 1981 - 2 April 1982" published in May 1982 by the Cabinet Office. This is a comprehensive report seeking to answer questions on when the Argentine force was assembled and when the final decision to invade was taken. It is well worth reading in full and any summary risks being misleading, with that caveat, the main conclusions are:

- a. the Argentine communique of 2 March on the New York talks was a turning point in the crisis;
- b. though the South Georgia incident "was the trigger" the available evidence suggests that it was not deliberately contrived at high level by the Navy;

- c. the main part of the invasion force put to sea on 28 March.
- d. the decision to invade was made by the Junta during 1 April;
- e. the JIC should have been asked to assess the significance of the escalating press campaign and should certainly have reviewed the position after the Argentine statement of 2 March;
- f. CX reporting presented a generally accurate position of the developing attitude of the Argentine Government. The most significant items of intelligence began to come in from 29 March onwards.

14 June 1982