

Copy No 1 of 6  
Page No 1 of 3

D/DS5/9/9/46

REPRODUCTION SERIES C

REPRODUCTION SERIES A

COPY NO. 01 COPY

COPY NO. 4 1 copy

29 March 1984

TO SECRETARY OF THE  
CABINET

P. Ricketts PS/FC, SEC

6 FEBRUARY 1985

PS/Secretary of State

REPRODUCTION SERIES B

Copy to:  
PS/Minister(AF)  
Sec/CNS  
PS/PUS  
MA/DCDS(I)

COPY NO. 01 COPY

5/21/1

TO PS/PUS FOR  
TRANSMISSION TO THE DPP  
17 JANUARY 1985.

SINKING OF THE BELGRANO

Thank you for your minute of 22 March.

2. Because of the sensitivity of the material in this reply I have pruned the distribution list, in the hope that the interests of other addressees of your minute can be met by sight of the one copy in their area.
3. You told me earlier this week it was necessary to bring forward the revised deadline of Friday 30 March to as soon as practicable today. This means that I have not been able to show a draft to DCDS(I) and First Sea Lord. I hope they will give you any additional comments they have in parallel.
4. Attached is a detailed chronology of the key events in the BELGRANO affair, together with supporting documentation. Although it is extensive, it concentrates exclusively on events central to or touching on the BELGRANO. It inevitably therefore gives a narrow view of the events of the time, and the other military and political developments should not be forgotten.

RETAINED UNDER  
SECTION 3(4)

RETAINED UNDER  
SECTION 3(4)

9. The following answers can be given to the specific questions in your minute.

a. See Serials 5, 13, 14, 40-43.

- c. See Serials 34 to 48.
- d. See Serials 44, 58, 59, 62-67, 72, 73, 76.
- e. There is no such indication in the records we have examined. Indeed, there are indications to the contrary, eg Serials 35A, 78A.

f. Clearly there was considerable uncertainty and confusion at the time, and specific information was hard to come by. Mr Nott apparently felt, however, that he had to give details to the House, and did the best he could.

10. In general the arguments put forward by Dalryell and his supporters can be refuted by the story set out in the attached log. But because of the classification of the material it is not possible to use it in public to refute detailed allegations. However, the nature of the ROEs (which has never been revealed) over this period are politically and presentationally the most difficult area. The details of these ROEs, as exemplified by the stern chase and attack of BELGRANO, the attempt to sink the CVA and all other Argentine warships outside the TEZ do not sit easily with the terms of the warning given on 23 April. This point was made by the FCS and Attorney-General at the time (Serial 24).

11. It is a difficult judgement whether to make even the limited admission that BELGRANO was first detected on 1 May and even this might be considered hair-splitting given the sonar detection of the group on 30 April. There is no longer any security objection to so doing, since Odr Wreford-Brown, the Commanding Officer of CONQUEROR has himself confirmed it. On the other hand, an admission made under pressure might only increase the pressure for further disclosures, rather than satisfy the Government's critics. As I said in my minute of 16 March this is essentially a political judgement. The attached draft reply to Mr Dalryell is simple because whatever general line is taken these issues relate to detailed operational and intelligence information. On the other hand, it might be necessary to modify very slightly the draft to Dalryell if it is decided to admit in reply to Denzil Davies that the BELGRANO was detected on 1 May. The inclusion of the square-bracketted section would then be sufficient.

*C S P*

C S PONTING  
Head of DS5

DRAFT LETTER TO TAM DALYELL MP

Thank you for your letter of 19 March.

As I expect you know the Prime Minister has, in a letter to Denzil Davies, confirmed that the BELGRANO was sighted on 1 May.

However, The other questions you have raised in your letter all concern detailed operational and intelligence matters on which I am not prepared to comment.

Serial	Day	Time Z (local)	Event	Source	Class	Authentication	Comments
1	7 April	21.30Z	Debate in House of Commons: Defence Secretary winding up	Hansard 7 Apr 82 Coll 045	U/C	DS5	Intention to proclaim Maritime Exclusion Zone (MEZ) announced.
2	12 April	04.00Z	Maritime Exclusion Zone in force				
3	23 April	14.45Z	UK message to the Argentine government emphasising that any approach that would amount to a threat to interfere with the mission of British forces in the South Atlantic would meet the appropriate response	FCO Tel no 64 of 23 April	U/C (but FCO tel CONF)		This warning has been quoted to justify the attack on BELGRANO outside the TEZ.
4	28 April		Announcement of Total Exclusion Zone (TEZ) to come into force on 30 April. Extends MEZ to cover all aircraft and ships supporting the illegal occupation (ie present in the zone without HMG permission)	Hansard 28 Apr No 105 Vol 22 Col 296-7	U/C	DS5	
5	28 April		ROEs as of this date permit attacks on Argentine warships within MEZ	ROE/57/82	S UKEB	DS5	The full statement in this document should be consulted for accuracy. These ROEs originally established on 23 April did not change in substance before 30 April

Serial	Day	Time Z (local)	Event	Source	Class	Authenti- cation	Comments
6	29 April	00.01Z	HMS CONQUEROR reported own position as 53.10S 045.30W	CTG 324.3 War Diary	TSU UKEA	DS5	
7	29 April	09.04Z	CONQUEROR informed that BELGRANO task force (TF or TG 79.3) due to have formed up in Falkland Area Green on 28 April	CTG 324.3 War Diary	TSU UKEA	DS5	
8	29 April	12.00Z	CONQUEROR reports own position as 53.26S 050.31W	CTG 324.3 War Diary	TSU UKEA	DS5	
9	29 April	18.23Z	CONQUEROR instructed to locate and remain with BELGRANO group, patrolling between Isla de los Estados and Burdwood Bank	CTG 324.3 War Diary	TSU UKEA	DS5	
10	29 April	19.00Z	GCHQ reports that TF 79.3 ordered to draw out UK forces and test reactions within TEZ	GCHQ 3/AA/07713	TSU		See Serial 11 for full statement

RETAINED UNDER  
SECTION 3(4)

Serial	Day	Time Z (local)	Event	Source	Class	Authenti- cation	Comments
12	30 April	11.00Z	Total Exclusion Zone in force				See Serial 4
13	30 April	?14.00Z	OD(SA) authorises attack without warning on Argentine aircraft carrier 25 DE MAYO outside TEZ, within certain geographical limits	OD(SA)(82) 22nd Meet- ing	S		
14	30 April	15.26Z	MOD authorises amendment to ROEs to allow 25 DE MAYO to be attacked at earliest possible opportunity outside TEZ	MOD 301526Z Apr 82	S	DS5	See Serial 13
15	30 April	16.45Z	CONQUEROR makes passive sonar contact with oiler PUERTO ROSALES at a range of 50 miles	HMS CONQUEROR's Report of Proceedings (ROP)	S UKEB	DS5	

17	30 April	18.00Z	CONQUEROR reports own position as 54.20S 062.10W. Sweep continuing	CTG 324.3 War Diary	TSU UKEA	DS5	
----	----------	--------	--	------------------------	-------------	-----	--

**RETAINED UNDER  
SECTION 3(4)**

Serial	Day	Time Z (local)	Event	Source	Class	Authenti- cation	Comments
19	1 May	010010	HMS SPLENDID receives CTG 302048Z authorising attack on 25 DE MAYO	HMS SPLENDID ROP	S UKEB	DS5	CTG 324.3 repeated Serial 14 on submarine comms network
20	1 May	00.14Z	CTG 324.3 instructs CONQUEROR to intercept and attack BELGRANO gp, assessed as intending to penetrate TEZ	CTG 324.3 War Diary	TSU	DS5	ROEs permit attack within TEZ, if BELGRANO penetrates as expected
21	1 May	04.00Z	HMS SPLENDID to periscope depth. No sighting	HMS SPLENDID ROP	S UKEB	DS5	CO comments in record that there had been several sonar contacts, possibly some warships among them. But nothing to indicate the presence of an aircraft carrier

**RETAINED UNDER  
SECTION 3(4)**

Serial	Day	Time Z (local)	Event	Source	Class	Authenti- cation	Comments
23	1 May	09.00Z	CO of SPLENDID comment on log that there are no contacts in this area.	HMS SPLENDID ROP	S UKEB	DS5	
24	1 May	Time unknown	Foreign & Commonwealth Secretary, after discussion with Attorney General, minutes Prime Minister urging warning message to Argentine government before 25 DE MAYO attacked	PM/82/31	S	DS5	Copy attached
25	1 May	12.54Z	CONQUEROR first sights BELGRANO Gp, identified as BELGRANO, PUERTO ROSALES, and two DD (probably BOUCHARD & BUENO). BELGRANO conducting RAS from PUERTO ROSALES - Course 130 Speed 8 Knots. CONQUEROR decides to remain in close contact with Group	HMS CONQUEROR's ROP	S UKEB	DS5	See attached account
26	1 May	14.00Z	CONQUEROR reports BELGRANO RAS from PUERTO ROSALES, in company DD BOUCHARD and PIEDRA BUENO. 54.07S 64.24W. Course 125. Speed 8 knots	CINCFLEET O11450Z May 82	S	DS5	
27	1 May	16.15Z	RAS completed, PUERTO ROSALES alters course to West. BELGRANO Gp increases speed to 13 knots, course 130	HMS CONQUEROR's ROP	S UKEB	DS5	

Serial	Day	Time Z (local)	Event	Source	Class	Authenti- cation	Comments
28	1 May	(am local) ?15.00Z	HMA LIMA calls on Peruvian Foreign Minister. Foreign Minister asks if Peru can help break diplomatic deadlock	Lima Telno 134			Gives no indication that specific proposals had been formulated or conveyed to Argentina or US
29	1 May	011824	CO of HMS SPLENDID notes in record that CONQUEROR has her target in sight and following her. "I wish we were in the same situation."	HMS SPLENDID ROP	S UKEB	DS5	
30	1 May	18.40Z	HM Ambassador Lima reports on conversation with Peruvian Foreign Minister	Lima Telno 134			See Serial 28
31	1 May	(pm local)	Foreign & Commonwealth Secretary arrives in Washington, dines privately at British Embassy				Nothing to indicate that Mr Haig contacted Foreign & Commonwealth Secretary about US/Peruvian proposal

RETAINED UNDER  
SECTION 3(4)

Serial	Day	Time Z (local)	Event	Source	Class	Authenti- cation	Comments
33	2 May	04.00Z	CONQUEROR reports BELGRANO group at 55.20S 060.14W, course 090, speed 13 knots. Skirting TEZ at 20nm. No attempt to penetrate TEZ yet	CTG 324.3 War Diary	TSU UKEA	DS5	First report of detection in this source

RETAINED UNDER  
SECTION 3(4)

36	2 May	06.30Z	CO of HMS SPLENDID reports in record that TG 317.8 (British task force) are said to have detected the CVA group heading SE to attack them. Intends to close on position of 79.1 (25 DE MAYO Gp)	HMS SPLENDID ROP	S UKEB	DS5	SPLENDID did not detect the 25 DE MAYO
----	-------	--------	---	------------------------	-----------	-----	--

Serial	Day	Time Z (local)	Event	Source	Class	Authenti- cation	Comments
[REDACTED]							
38	2 May	08.11Z	CTG 317,8 orders CONQUEROR to attack BELGRANO	CTG 324.3 War Diary	TSU UKEA	DS5	Not yet permitted by ROEs, therefore countermanded by CTG 324.3 at Serial 39
39	2 May	09.04Z	CTG 324.3 informs CONQUEROR that BELGRANO not to be attacked until allowed by ROEs	CTG 324.3 War Diary	TSU UKEA	DS5	Countermanding Serial 38
40	2 May	09.15Z	COS hear intelligence update. CDS says he will seek OD(SA) agreement as soon as possible to extend the ROEs to allow attacks on all Argentine naval ships, auxiliaries outside the TEZ as had already been authorised against the Argentine aircraft carrier	COS 40th Mtg/82	S	DS5	This reflects earlier telephone conversations with CTF 317 and CTF 318
41	2 May	11.00Z to 12.00Z (estimate)	Impromptu OD(SA) at Chequers approves CDS's proposal to extend ROE to all Argentine vessels outside TEZ				

RETAINED UNDER  
SECTION 3(4)

Serial	Day	Time Z (local)	Event	Source	Class	Authenti- cation	Comments
42	2 May	12.07Z	MOD signals CTF 317 authorising extension of ROEs to permit attack on all Argentine vessels outside TEZ, except for 12 mile coastal strip	MOD 021207Z	S	055	
43	2 May	12.38Z	CTG 324.3 relays change in ROEs	CTG 324.3	TSU UKEA	055	
44	2 May	13.30Z -15.30Z (0930- 1130)	Foreign & Commonwealth Secretary meets Mr Haig for 2 hour discussion. Mr Haig outlines "a possible diplomatic solution which had originated in a Peruvian initiative, but had been modified by Americans in the light of their knowledge of our position. President Belaunde had discussed the 7 point peace plan with General Galtieri the previous night. US had since heard that Argentina might be able to accept something like them". Mr Pym replies: "it might well be that something on these lines would prove useful at the appropriate time. But further pressure was needed ...". Mr Haig agrees that it was too early to bring any greater precision to the discussions.	Washington Telno 1566	S		First UK knowledge of Peruvian Peace Plan

Serial	Day	Time Z (local)	Event	Source	Class	Authentification	Comments
45	2 May	14.00Z	CONQUEROR reports BELGRANO Group at 55.16S, 060.18W on course of 270, speed 14 knots, having reversed course at 0805Z in position 55.20S, 057.22W and increased speed	CTG 324.3 War Diary	TSU UKEA	DS5	
46	2 May	14.10Z	CONQUEROR returns to periscope depth after trailing BELGRANO Group from deep for 8½ hours. Attempts to read submarine broadcasts, but messages garbled. Aware however that ROEs have been changed. Force is proceeding Westward at 10 knots	HMS CONQUEROR ROP	S UKEB	DS5	Presumably this is simultaneous with Serial 45
47	2 May	16.10Z	CONQUEROR attacking, involving stern chase of BELGRANO Gp	CTG 324.3 War Diary	TSU UKEA	DS5	
48	2 May	16.25Z	CONQUEROR now understands ROEs and orders. CTG apprised of intention to attack. Torpedo tubes loaded with 3 Mk 8 and 3 Mk 24 torpedoes	HMS CONQUEROR ROP	S UKEB	DS5	CO comments that his intention is to conduct a Mk 8 attack on the BELGRANO. This weapon selected because it was considered to have a better chance of penetrating the Cruiser's thick armour and anti-torpedo bulges. The fact it required a closer firing position was

Serial	Day	Time Z (local)	Event	Source	Class	Authentication	Comments
							accepted. If this could not be achieved the Mk 24 would be used
49	2 May	18.13Z	CONQUEROR takes up firing position and goes to action stations	HMS CONQUEROR's ROP	S UKEB	DS5	
50	2 May	18.52Z	Salvo of 3 Mk 8's fired at a range of 1400 yds. 2 hits observed. 3 explosions heard. Submarine went deep and evaded to E at 22 knots	HMS CONQUEROR's ROP	S UKEB	DS5	See attached extract from HMS CONQUEROR's Report of Proceedings
51	2 May	19.04Z	HMS CONQUEROR hears active sonar followed by two depth charge type explosions	HMS CONQUEROR's ROP	S UKEB	DS5	Assessed as from one of the escorts
52	2 May	19.30Z	CONQUEROR reports BELGRANO with PIEDRA BUENO and BOUCHARD in 55.27S 061.25V on a course of 280 speed 11 knots at 021856Z. Successfully attacked BELGRANO with two hits from Mk 8 torpedoes. Then evaded to the East.	CTG 324.3 War Diary and original signal	S UKEB	DS5	See attached copy of signal from CONQUEROR
53	2 May	1930Z	BOUCHARD reports being hit by torpedo which did not explode	GCHQ 030015Z	TSU	DS5	Intercept

Serial	Day	Time Z (local)	Event	Source	Class	Authenti- cation	Comments
55	2 May	20.52Z	CONQUEROR hears 3 depth charge explosion and evades further to SE	HMS CONQUEROR's ROP	S	UKEB	DS5
56	2 May	21.03Z	CONQUEROR hears further depth charge explosions within 5000 yds	HMS CONQUEROR's ROP	S	UKEB	DS5
57	2 May	22.00Z	CONQUEROR returns to periscope depth to transmit attack report	HMS CONQUEROR's ROP	S	UKEB	DS5
58	2 May	22.15Z (1815 WASH)	Reporting Telegram on Serial 44	Washington Telno 1566			First knowledge in London of the 7 point peace plan
59	2 May	(pm local)	Telephone conversation Haig/Pym			055	Haig called to press Pym on US/ Peruvian propose

RETAINED UNDER  
 SECTION 3(4)

Serial	Day	Time Z (local)	Event	Source	Class	Authenti- cation	Comments
61	2 May	23.00Z	Reporting Telegram on Serial 59	Washington Telno 1569		055	No record of conversation. At Foreign & Commonwealth Secretary's request, HM Ambassador Washington speaks to Mr Haig: "too sudden for us to be negotiating new proposals." Mr Pym did not want to be rushed, but had not consulted London
62	2 May	23.00Z (1800)	Press Conference by President Belaunde. Existence of 7 point peace plan announced: "There was as yet no agreement on it by the Argentines were considering it and he hoped to make an announcement later that night"	Lima Telno 139		055	
63	2 May	23.30Z (1830)	Peruvian Foreign Minister calls on HMA Lima. State that after their previous conversation (serials 28, 30) he had telephoned Costa Mendez to press on him a new formula, modified as a result of discussions Belaunde/Haig (7 point plan). Galtieri was "well disposed" but had his "Senate" to consult and convince. Foreign Minister	Lima Telno 137		055	

Serial	Day	Time Z (local)	Event	Source	Class	Authenti- cation	Comments
			had reason to believe that Haig's proposals had been conveyed with the knowledge on a least (sic) the consent of Mr Pym				
64	3 May	01.03Z	Reporting telegram for Serial 63	Lima Telno 137		065	
65	3 May	01.44Z	Reporting telegram for Serial 64	Lima Telno 139		065	
66	3 May	05.00Z (0100 WASH, 0001 LIMA)	Mr Haig speaks to Peruvian President, who complains that the British action had the chances of peace. Mr Haig relays this to HMA Washington	Washington Telno 1574		065	
67	3 May	05.01Z (0101 WASH)	Telegram to HMA Lima on 7 Point Plan. HM Ambassador instructed to contact Peruvian Foreign Minister to ensure that no announcement is made in Lima implying British acceptance of the 7 point peace plan or that it had been formally presented to the British Government. HMA given discretion to tell Peruvians of basic British requirements for a settlement	UKMIS New York Telno 4		DS5	


Serial	Day	Time Z (local)	Event	Source	Class	Authenti- cation	Comments
68	3 May	06.55Z	<p>CONQUEROR reports her position as 56.10S 062.15W. BELGRANO was attacked with 3 x Mk 8 from 1200 yds. Two hits were observed below the Main Mast and AFT and a third explosion was possibly heard. Loud and continuous explosions and breaking up noises heard from target and datum bearing for an hour. CONQUEROR then evaded to the East for a distance of 11nm. While preparing to return to periscope depth at 2000Z, both DD's accompanying BELGRANO were detected within 10K yards. Two sets of depth charges explosions were heard. The second set was close but no damage was sustained and no active transmissions were heard</p>	CTG 324.3 War Diary	TSU UKEA	DS5	<div data-bbox="1243 218 1343 484" style="border: 2px solid black; padding: 5px; text-align: center; width: fit-content; margin: auto;">           RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4)         </div>
[REDACTED]							
70	3 May	0622	<p>CTG 324.3 asks CONQUEROR to confirm if she hit BOUCHARD with a torpedo which did not explode</p>	CTG 324.3 War Diary	TSU UKEA	DS5	

Serial	Day	Time Z (local)	Event	Source	Class	Authenti- cation	Comments
[REDACTED]							
72	3 May	11.30Z (0630)	HMA Lima calls on Peruvian Foreign Minister to carry out instruction as per Serial 67. Informed that "late last night the Argentine military junta had rejected the Peruvian peace proposals as a result of the torpedoing of the Argentine cruiser. Argentines had not entirely closed the door but needed more time to review the proposals in the light of most recent developments on the naval front"	Lima Telno 141		055	Reported 031340Z
73	3 May	21.35Z	HMA Washington reports that Mr Haig had spoken again to President Belaunde. Argentine generals Iglesias and Maga had arrived in Lima. President Belaunde believed that "Argentina would accept the 7 proposals".	Washington Telno 1575	S	055	Maga = Adm Araya

RETAINED UNDER  
SECTION 3(4)

Serial	Day	Time Z (local)	Event	Source	Class	Authentication	Comments
74	4 May	00.45Z	CONQUEROR reported at 030100Z(?) that she did fire one Salvo but hit on BOUCHARD was not intentional. At the time of torpedo discharge DD BOUCHARD was known to be on the other side of BELGRANO. CONQUEROR has searched the Los Estados/Burdwood Bank gap and SE of her present position for the DDs but no contact gained. [.....]	CTG 324.3 War Diary	TSU UKEA	DS5	
75	4 May	08.34Z	CONQUEROR informed that she is not to attack warships engaged on the rescue of survivors from BELGRANO until further orders are received	CTG 324.3 War Diary	TSU UKEA	DS5	
76	4 May		OD(SA) considers US/Peruvian proposals				First consideration of 7 point peace plan following Mr Fym's return from New York on 3 May
77	4 May		PM's Questions BELGRANO sinking raised	Hansard 4 May Cols 14-18			
78	4 May		Statement in House of Commons by Defence Secretary	Hansard 4 May No108 Vol 23 Cols 29-37			First Full Parliamentary statement, copy attached. Contain a number of inaccuracies

rial	Day	Time Z (local)	Event	Source	Class	Authenti- cation	Comments
79	5 May		Statement by Defence Secretary on loss of HMS SHEFFIELD	Hansard 5 May Cols 155 - 166			BELGRANO raised by Mr Healey
30	7 May		MOD Statement: Argentine war-ships or military aircraft found more than 12 nm from the Argentine coastline will be regarded as hostile and treated accordingly	FCO Telno 91 of 7 May		055	Gives explicit definition to the warning of 23 April, Serial 3
31	17 May		Commons debate on Falklands. Defence Secretary summing up, discusses BELGRANO	Hansard 13 May Col 1030			

DEPARTMENT/SERIES ..... DEFE13 ..... PIECE/ITEM ..... 2505 ..... (one piece/item number)	Date and sign
Extract details: Enclosure 19 attachment pages 19 and 20, two pages extracted	
CLOSED UNDER FOI EXEMPTION .....	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	<i>sj</i> 10/04/18.
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
MISSING AT TRANSFER	
NUMBER NOT USED	
MISSING (TNA USE ONLY)	
DOCUMENT PUT IN PLACE (TNA USE ONLY)	

Serial 3

A.

ENCL No. 28

11/15/82  
D2 file  
cc: Lt J...  
3000

C O N F I D E N T I A L

CWG143 23/1813 113B3618

FOR CWG

IMMEDIATE 231445Z APR 82

FROM COMMCEN FCO LONDON  
TO MODUK  
CINCFLEET

C O N F I D E N T I A L

SIC A3A/A2N/19F

CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO 231445Z APR 82

TO FLASH BERNE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 64 OF 23 APRIL

INFO IMMEDIATE TO WASHINGTON (FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY)

THIS NEW YORK, UKDEL NATO, ATHENS, BONN, BRUSSELS, COPENHAGEN, DUBLIN, THE HAGUE, BRASILIA, MONTEVIDEO, SANTIAGO, OTHER NATO POSTS, MODUK, PARIS, ROME AND UKREP BRUSSELS.

1. PLEASE ASK THE SWISS TO CONVEY URGENTLY TO THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT THE FOLLOWING COMMUNICATION FROM HMG:-  
BEGINS

" IN ANNOUNCING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A MARITIME EXCLUSION ZONE AROUND THE FALKLAND ISLANDS, HMG MADE IT CLEAR THAT THIS MEASURE WAS WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE RIGHT OF THE UK TO TAKE WHATEVER ADDITIONAL MEASURES MAY BE NEEDED IN THE EXERCISE OF ITS RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENCE UNDER ARTICLE 51 OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER.

IN THIS CONNECTION, HMG NOW WISHES TO MAKE CLEAR THAT ANY APPROACH ON THE PART OF ARGENTINE WARSHIPS, INCLUDING SUBMARINES, NAVAL AUXILIARIES, OR MILITARY AIRCRAFT WHICH COULD AMOUNT TO A THREAT TO INTERFERE WITH THE MISSION OF BRITISH FORCES IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC WILL ENCOUNTER THE APPROPRIATE RESPONSE. ALL ARGENTINE AIRCRAFT INCLUDING CIVIL AIRCRAFT ENGAGING IN SURVEILLANCE OF THESE BRITISH FORCES WILL BE REGARDED AS HOSTILE AND ARE LIABLE TO BE DEALT WITH ACCORDINGLY. ~~W~~  
ENDS

2. YOU SHOULD ADD THAT HMG REGARD THE TERMS OF THIS COMMUNICATION AS HAVING IMMEDIATE EFFECT. PLEASE REPORT WHEN THE SWISS HAVE DELIVERED THE COMMUNICATION TO THE ARGENTINES. WE SHALL THEREAFTER CONSIDER WHETHER TO ANNOUNCE IT PUBLICLY AND TO DELIVER IT MORE WIDELY VIA THE DIPLOMATIC CHANNEL.

PYM

BT

DISTRIBUTION A3A

ROE/S7/82

Copy No ... of 21 copies

MARITIME RULES OF ENGAGEMENT STATE AT 280600A APR 82

## References:

- A. Operation CORPORATE Rules of Engagement for SSNs. (Forwarded as Annex A to 190600A APR STATE REPORT ROE/S1/82).
- B. Rules of Engagement for Operation PARAQUET. (Forwarded as Annex B to 190600A APR STATE REPORT ROE/S1/82).
- C. Rules of Engagement for Operation CORPORATE - HIGH SEAS SOUTH (Forwarded as Annex S to 210600A APR STATE REPORT ROE/S3/82).
- D. Rules of Engagement for Operation CORPORATE - HIGH SEAS NORTE (Forwarded as Annex N to 210600A APR STATE REPORT ROE/S3/82).
- E. Rules of Engagement for Operation CORPORATE - SSN Outside MEZ. (MODUK AAA/19F/JEE 241929Z APR 82).
- F. Rules of Engagement against Surveillance Aircraft (MODUK AAA/19F 241030Z APR 82 and MODUK AAA/19F/JEE 252008Z APR 82).
- G. Rules of Engagement for Enforcement of Falkland Islands Total Exclusion Zone (MODUK AAA/19F/JEE 261531Z/261533Z/261535Z Apr 82). (Forwarded as Annex A to 270600A APR STATE REPORT ROE/S7/82).

FALKLAND ISLANDS

1. SSN Within Total Exclusion Zone. ROE authorised by Reference A - 3, 5, 10, 13. (NO CHANGE).
2. SSN Outside Total Exclusion Zone. ROE authorised by Reference E - 1, 5, 13. (NO CHANGE).
3. Enforcement of the Total Exclusion Zone. ROE approved and signalled 26 April to be enforced when ordered (Reference G):
  - a. Surface Ships and Aircraft - 104, 123 (Applicable to targets within Exclusion Zone only) (I/J/L/P/S/T/U), 202 (Merchant Ships within Exclusion Zone) (Commercial aircraft within Exclusion Zone) (If application of Rule 202 is ineffective resort should be made to Rule 104), 205 (J), 206 (ARGENTINIAN), 207, 208, 403.
  - b. SSN - 4 (Applicable to targets within Exclusion Zone only), 5, 12, 13 (Discretion) (ARGENTINIAN).

Surface Ships and Aircraft En Route to the Maritime Exclusion Zone. (NO CHANGE).

- a. South of 35°S (Reference C) - 104(H/I/J), 202, 205 (I/J), 206(ARGENTINIAN), 207, 208, 403, 506.
- b. North of 35°S (Reference D) - 102(H/I), 103, 205(I), 207, 208, 302, 403, 506.

OPERATION PARAQUET5. All Units Outside the Argentinian 200NM "Defence Zone" (Reference B Annex A). (NO CHANGE).

- a. Surface Ships and Aircraft - 102, 103, 207, 208, 302, 403, 506.

6. All Units Inside the Argentinian 200 NM "Defence Zone" (Reference B Annex C). (NO CHANGE to ROE but Aim changed to "Maintain possession of South Georgia").

- a. Surface Ships and Aircraft - 104(J/M/N), 202 (Merchant ships), 205 (ARGENTINIAN), 207, 208, 403, 508.
- b. SSN. - 4, 5, 13.

SURVEILLANCE AIRCRAFT

7. MODUK AAA/I9F/JEE 252008Z APR 82 (Ref F). (NO CHANGE).

8. UNDER CONSIDERATION

- a. An Exclusion Zone to counter the Operations of the Argentinian Aircraft Carrier "25 Man".
- b. An Exclusion Zone around SOUTH GEORGIA.
- c. ROE for forces in support of ASCENSION ISLAND.

28 April 1982

*B/Carr*  
B J CARR  
Commander, Royal Navy  
Maritime ROE Cell

Distribution:

CDS	ACDS(Ops)	HD of DS 5
CNS	ACNS(O)	SECCOS
CGS	ACNS(P)	DNW
CAS	ACAS(Ops)	COS/CGRM
PUS	AUS(D Staff)	Chmn NSAG
VCNS	Hd of DS11	Navy Ops ROE Cell(2 copies)
ACDS(Pol)	Hd of DS 8	

Copy to: PSW/...  
 PC/PJS  
 ACB(P)  
 SEC/CNS  
 HQ DSS  
 PS/CAS  
 HQ DSII  
 MA/CNS  
 DSC ops  
 DVS(P)  
 tsc  
 Dubs  
 AVS(D/Sat)



PM/82/31

PRIME MINISTER

Attack on Argentine Aircraft Carrier


1. Following our decision in OD(SA) yesterday to authorise an attack without warning on the Argentine aircraft carrier outside our exclusion zone, I have been giving a further thought to the line we should take in public after the event.

2. After discussion with the Attorney General the way in which our action would have to be publicly justified and its legality defended, I believe our position would be immeasurably strengthened if we had given a warning to the Argentine Government, requiring the aircraft carrier to stay within the narrow zone which we discussed yesterday or within territorial waters South of about 41° South.

3. I attach a draft of a possible warning message which we could ask the Swiss to convey urgently to the Argentine Government. This in no way alters the substance of the decision we took yesterday. But I believe it would greatly strengthen our hand in dealing with criticism at home and abroad once an attack on the carrier has been carried out.

4. I am copying this minute to the Secretary of State for Defence, the Home Secretary, the Attorney General and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
 1 May 1982

  
 (FRANCIS PYM)

(S)

NOTIFICATION TO THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT

In announcing a Total Exclusion Zone around the Falklands on 28 April, HMG made it clear that these measures are without prejudice to the right of the UK to take whatever additional measures may be needed in exercise of its right of self-defence, under Article 51 of the UN Charter. In the light of the Argentine statement of 30 April of an intention to consider hostile British vessels within 200 miles of the Argentine mainland, the Falklands and their dependencies, the British Government has decided on the following measures. The Argentine carrier quote THE 25TH OF MAY unquote is hereby warned not to move East of a line [45° West] or South of a line [38° South] or outside a limit of 12 nautical miles from the coast of the mainland [North of [41° South]]. If the quote 25TH OF MAY unquote moves beyond these limits she will be regarded as constituting an immediate threat to British forces in the South Atlantic and will be liable to be dealt with accordingly. Further, if any attack anywhere in the South Atlantic is made upon British naval or air forces by an Argentine unit, all other Argentine naval units operating on the high seas, including the carrier quote THE 25TH OF MAY unquote, even if she is still inside the limits defined in this communication, and all Argentine military aircraft operating in air space over the South Atlantic will be regarded as hostile and are liable to be dealt with accordingly.

SECRET - UK EYES 'A'

0.1

SECRET

Serial 25 215

UK EYES 'B'

Annex A to HMS CONQUEROR's No 226/1 of 1 Jul 1962

EVENT REPORT 01 - INITIAL CONTACT WITH TG 79.

(Event 0101 May in Main Narrative - Pages B55 to B59)

COMMANDING OFFICER'S SUMMARY

1. Early on the 30 April CONQUEROR received COR 149 tasking her to locate and remain with CG BELGRANO who was probably in company with other units of TG 79.3. The best estimate of the Cruiser's position was on Patrol between ISLA DE LOS ESTADOS and BURWOOD BANK. The submarine at the time was working its way through the trench between the bank and the FALKLAND ISLANDS to set up an ASV Patrol at the eastern edge of the allocated area. A decision was made to conduct a search down the Western edge of BURWOOD Bank, to a position off its southern edge by 302000, to get between the Task Group and its likely transit route if it was ordered to deploy to South Georgia.
2. At 301645 initial detection was made on a diesel tonal to the West. This was held intermittently throughout the next twenty hours. Bearing triangulation suggested the contact to be in an area 40 miles North of LOS ESTADOS Isle. The tonal was thought to be radiated from the commercial oiler FUERTO ROSALES. This was subsequently proved correct. Broadband and Tonal search was conducted in this direction overnight 30/1st. By 010745 COR 160 was decrypted and gave excellent intelligence on TG 79.3's position and intention. Orders were also given to attack when ROE allowed.
3. Sunrise at 011140 produced excellent visibility with nothing visual. Broadband solutions suggested the contact to be at 30,000 yards. Intelligence suggested the Group would depart its present operating area and transit South East at 1600. It was decided to go deep and run in fast for one hour to close the sonar contact. At 1250 the submarine returned to periscope depth with Master Contact 02 loud on Broadband sonar. One and subsequently five ships were sighted ahead in fairly close formation, range about 10,000 yards. By 1302 these were identified as the Cruiser BELGRANO (H04) conducting an abeam RAS on the port side of the commercial oiler FUERTA DE ROSALES (H02). Two ALLEN SUMNER Class destroyers - M03 and M 05 - probably the BUENO and BOUCHARD were in company on a loose line of bearing. A further mast was possibly seen hull down in the distance. The group's movement was 170 speed 8 and ESM checks at 1322 and 1357 confirmed they were operating under EWCON silence. However this policy was somewhat ruined by the reconstructed detection range on the tanker of more than fifty miles.
4. At 1335 the DDG M03 crossed ahead of the cruiser and the force deployed on a loose line of bearing heading SE straight for the centre of area JULIAN. By 1400 the submarine was on station on the port quarter of the Task Group. Attempts to clear a locating report failed so the submarine went deep at 1515 to run in fast to 7000 yards.

SECRET

UK EYES 'B'

SECRET

26

UK EYES 'B'

4 Contd. Arrival at periscope depth at 1615 was in time to see the Cruiser break away from the tanker. Shortly afterwards PUERTA DE ROSAL<sup>ES</sup> altered course to the West and the Task Group formed on a loose line of bearing and increased speed to 13 knots. The submarine settled into the trail at ranges of between five and fourteen thousand yards on the Group's Port Quarter. Their MLA was such as to skirt the TEZ by twenty miles.


SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

1254 START EVENT 0101 - INITIAL CONTACT WITH TG 79.3

B - 285 R - 10 kyds S - 42 Unidentified Warship. Designated M - 02

1259 CO COMMENT

Five ships now in sight in fairly close formation. Disposition of the forces is



1302 FCS (Average) of Group 272/11 kyds 130/8 AOB 38 Port

CO COMMENT

CONTACTS IDENTIFIED AS:-

- T05 = S42 = M - 02 AO PUERTA DE ROSALES
- V56 = M - 03 DD ALLEN SUMNER CLASS
- M - 04 CCL BELC LHO
- M - 05 DD ALLEN SUMNER CLASS

(DD's Probably BOUCHARD and BUSHO)

I have not seen the two masts to the left of M - 02/M - 04 again - possibly I was mistaken and there are only four contacts.

M - 02 and M - 04 appear to be raising

SECRET  
UK EYES 'B'

SECRET

27

UK EYES 'B'

1322 Warner look - No rackets

CO COMMENT

TG 79.3 is operating under a passive EMCON policy

1325 C/C 350 to increase my distance off track from the TG

1329 FCS (Good) M - 03 191/4.1 kyds 130/9 AOB 119 Port

1335 FCS (Good) M - 04 193/5.1 kyds 155/10 AOB 142 Port

CO COMMENT

M - 03 has crossed in front of M - 04. The disposition is now such that there is a DD on either side of the CCL. From set ups, the indication is an MIA of 120 - 7. This will take TG 79.3 straight to the centre of Area JULIAN. Intention is to open out on the port quarter of the group and shadow

1357 Warner clearance - No racket

CO COMMENT

Intention is to remain between 9 and 14 kyds from the group

1412 B - 300 E - 63 I Band Racket 1 sweep only. No classification

1413 END EVENT 0101 - INITIAL CONTACT WITH TG 79.3

CO END OF EVENT SUMMARY

First contact with TG 79.3 was, in retrospect, T - 04 at 301645 last night. This was the diesel signature from M - 02 the AO, picked up at a range of approximately 100 kyds. This coupled with the excellent intelligence support enabled me to gain visual contact at 1249 this afternoon.

TG 79.3 consists of CCL BELGRANO (M - 04)  
DD's BOUCHARD and BUEN<sup>0</sup> (M - 03, M - 05)  
AO PUERTA DE ROSALES (M - 02)  
Possibly one tug

CCL BELGRANO and AO PUERTA DE ROSALOS were RASING on first gaining visual contact which could account for the Group's slow SOA. The Group's course will take it straight to the centre of Area JULIAN.

A - 3

SECRET

UK EYES 'B'

SECRET

28

UK EYES 'B'

COMMANDING OFFICER'S CONCLUSIONS

1. TG 79.3 conducted operations some forty miles to the North of ISLA DE LOS ESTADOS until 011630. These included an abeam Ras of CG BELGRANO from AO PUERTA DE ROSALES
2. The group was operating under a silent EMCON.
3. OA PUERTA DE ROSALES was detected at some forty miles on Narrowband sonar.
4. The group's track of 130 speed 13 knots was such as to skirt the TEZ by at least twenty miles, heading for the centre of Area JULIAN as my intelligence stated they would.

A - 4

SECRET

UK EYES 'B'

CONFIDENTIAL

SEA/AL 28

14

CONFIDENTIAL

FM LIMA 011840Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 134 OF 01 MAY

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK

ENCL No. 521

FALKLANDS

1. WHEN I CALLED THIS MORNING ON THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE MFA TO DELIVER A NOTE BASED ON YOUR TEL NO 71 TO ABIDJAN I WAS INVITED TO SEE THE FOREIGN MINISTER. DR ARIAS GAVE ME A COPY OF MR HAIG'S MESSAGE OF 30 APRIL TO HIM CONVEYING THE US GOVERNMENTS DECISION TO SUPPORT THE UNITED KINGDOM. (I ASSUME THIS TEXT IS AVAILABLE TO YOU VIA WASHINGTON) DR ARIAS ALSO GAVE ME A COPY OF THE PERUVIAN REPLY (MAIN POINTS IN MIFT).

2. DR ARIAS THEN ASKED ME IF THERE WERE ANY WAYS IN WHICH THE PERUVIANS COULD HELP TO BREAK THE DIPLOMATIC DEADLOCK. I SAID I HAD NO SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS AND SPOKE ON THE LINES OF YOUR VERBATIM 055/82 OF 30 APRIL AND ALSO PARA 5 OF YOUR TEL NO 72 TO ADIDJAN. I REITERATED OUR INSISTANCE ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF RESOLUTION 502 AND ALSO SPOKE ABOUT THE DIFFICULTIES CAUSED TO MR HAIG BY THE DIFFERENT LINES TAKEN BY SR COSTA MENDEZ, THE JUNTA, THE GENERALS AND ADMIRALS. (THIS SEEMED TO GIVE DR ARIAS FOOD FOR THOUGHT.) I ALSO SAID THAT ARGENTINA OBVIOUSLY ATTACHED IMPORTANCE TO THE PERUVIAN VIEWS ON THE CONFLICT AND THAT I HAD NO DOUBT THAT PERU COULD USEFULLY USE ITS INFLUENCE IN CONVINCING ARGENTINA TO IMPLEMENT RESOLUTION 502 AS SOON AS POSSIBLE WITHOUT PRECONDITIONS. IN REPLY TO HIS QUESTION I SAID YOU WERE FLYING TODAY TO WASHINGTON AND THAT YOU ALSO INTENDED TO SEE THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL WHEREUPON DR ARIAS SAID HE WOULD BE TELEPHONING PEREZ DE CUELLAR LATER TODAY.

WALLACE

FCO PLEASE PASS TO ALL

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

PCO

S AM D

CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION  
FALKLAND ISLANDS


COPIES TO

PS/CHANCELLOR }  
SIR X COUZENS }  
MR LITTLER }  
MR HAWTIN } TREASURY  
MR PERETZ }  
MR HETT }

SIR M PALLISER CABINET OFFICE  
MISS DICKSON (SIP DIVN) D/ENERGY  
MR A WILLIAMS DSW 60

CONFIDENTIAL

# **A** The National Archives

DEPARTMENT/SERIES ..... DEFE13 .....	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM ..... 2505 .....	
(one piece/item number)	
Extract details: Enclosure 13, one page extracted	
CLOSED UNDER FOI EXEMPTION .....	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	<i>sf</i> 10/04/18.
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
MISSING AT TRANSFER	
NUMBER NOT USED	
MISSING (TNA USE ONLY)	
DOCUMENT PUT IN PLACE (TNA USE ONLY)	

0.1a

SECRET

Serial 50

29 12

UK EYES 'B'

Annex A1 to HMS CONQUEROR's No 226/1 dated 1 Jul 82

EVENT REPORT 02 - ATTACK ON TASK GROUP 79.3

(Event 0201 May Main Narrative Pages B63- B71 )

COMMANDING OFFICER'S SUMMARY

1. After trailing the Task Group from deep for 8 1/2 hours the submarine returned to periscope depth at 021410 to check the force disposition and read the routine. A visual sitrep showed the Cruiser to be screened by one DDG to the North on its Starboard beam and the second cut ahead and slightly on its starboard bow. The force was proceeding West at ten knots. From 1410 to 1625 the submarine remained at periscope depth with the range slowly opening to twelve thousand yards struggling to read the routine from the HF broadcast and challenges of SSIXS. It soon became clear that the ROE had changed and that Argentinian Warships could now be attacked outside the TEZ. Frustration and delay were created by the fact that Signal COR 177 which promulgated the ROE was slightly garbled, while COR 174, also garbled cancelled an order to attack. However by 1625 the orders were clear, a sitrep was sent to the CTG reporting the intention to attack and the submarine went deep to run in at twenty one knots on the group.
2. The torpedo tubes were loaded with three Mark 8 and three Mk 24 torpedoes. The aim was to conduct a Mark 8 attack on the Cruiser BELGRANO from a position on its bow. This weapon was selected since it was considered to have a better chance of penetrating the Cruiser's thick armour plating and anti torpedo bulges. The fact it required a closer firing position was accepted. However if this could not be achieved then the second option of a Mark 24 from the quarter would be taken.
3. At 1701 the submarine returned to periscope depth for a visual set up and to check on the Right Wing Escorts' relative position. BELGRANO's fire control solution was 221/4.6 knds. 260/1.1. AOB 141 Starboard. The destroyer was seen to be too close to the intended firing position, so the submarine went deep to cross the stern of the cruiser and run up its port side in order to work into a firing position on the opposite side to the destroyer.
4. At 1813 after another return to periscope depth for a visual set up, when the periscope visibility was assessed as three thousand yards, the submarine went to ACTION STATIONS. The intended aim was to obtain a firing position on the port beam at 1800 yds using a 100 degree torpedo track angle and a zero gyro angle shot. At 1820 the submarine again returned to periscope depth anticipating a prefiring final set up only to find the target had zigged to starboard to a course of 275. Another two "duck and ups" were required before at 1833 undetected the submarine achieved a good position on the port bow at a range of two thousand yards for a final set up.

From then ...../...

SECRET  
UK EYES 'B'

SECRET

UK EYES 'B'

4 contd. From then until 1857 the submarine waited for zero gyro angle. At 1857 a salvo of three Mark 8's was fired on a 90° torpedo track angle at a range of 1400 yards. The mean gyro angle of the second weapon was zero.

5. Shortly after the first explosion was heard, an orange fireball was seen through the periscope in line with the main mast just aft the centre of the target. A second explosion was heard about five seconds later and a spout of water seen aft. Although a third explosion was distinctly heard on sonar nothing was seen through the periscope.

6. The submarine went deep, shut off for counter attack and evaded at twenty two knots to the East. At 1904 when four thousand yards from the datum a quick burst of active sonar transmissions were detected followed by two depth charge type explosions. These were assessed as coming from one of the Escorts in response to the attack.

7. After further evasion for 1 hour fifty minutes to the East, while the submarine was some twelve miles from the datum and preparing to return to periscope depth to send the attack report, two sonar contacts were detected closing from the West. Initial assessment was that they were the two Escorts inside ten thousand yards. At 2032 three depth charge explosions were heard again to the West. Although no active sonar transmissions were detected the submarine started turning away to evade further to the South East. At 2103 further loud explosions were heard close on the port side and the two sonar contacts were assessed as inside five thousand yards. Subsequent onboard analysis of sonar recordings gave five distinct discharge noises prior to five separate explosions. Assessment is that the Escorts were firing some form of depth charge weapon. At the time the Escorts were considered close, but it was not certain how they had achieved this, whether by chance or with the assistance of Vestac from a NEPTUNE aircraft in support. If they had simply been firing salvos indiscriminately to frighten the submarine away, the final salvo achieved the aim and the submarine evaded to the South East at twenty four knots for a further hour.

8. At 2200 the submarine returned to periscope depth to transmit the attack report.

COMMANDING OFFICER'S COMMENT

9. Having been in the trail of TG 79.5 for the last 24 hours, I had dropped astern of the group while reading my broadcast routine. On receipt of COR 177 authorising me to attack I went deep to close the group. The intention was to close to an 'ideal' firing position on the side of the BELGRANO away from the escorting destroyers. A salvo of Mk 8 Mod 4's was considered better than a Mk 24 Mod 1, because of the BELGRANO's thick armour plating and anti torpedo bulges.

The Task ...../...

21 - 12

SECRET

UK EYES 'B'

UK EYES 'B'

9 contd The Task Group were conducting a very limited zig zag plan of  $\pm 50^\circ$  approximately around  $270^\circ$ . Having manoeuvred into a firing position on the port beam of the target, the parameters on firing were:-

Own Course	010		
Own speed	6 kts		
Target Course	280	296 )	
Target speed	10 knots	10 kts )	Reconstruction
Torpedo Track Angle	90	105 )	
Range on firing	1400 yds	1200 yds)	from the LOP
Gyro Angles	1st Weapon	1 $^\circ$ Right	
	2nd Weapon	Zgro	
	3rd Weapon	2 $^\circ$ Left	
Angular Spacing	5 $\frac{1}{2}$ degrees		
Hitting Run	56 seconds	- 57 $\frac{1}{2}$ seconds	timed on Sonar Recordings

10. A 3 torpedo salvo was fired using Average Solutions because the poor visibility (3 kys) made ATB assessment and ranging difficult. The command requirement was one hit. Onboard analysis, using both the visual solution from the final set up and the LOP Solution, gives two hits from the second and third weapons, with the first weapon missing astern. This is not supported by the visual sighting of a hit, 57 seconds after discharge of the first weapon. Replaying the Sonar Recording of the attack gives two definite explosions with a possible third, although this was not confirmed visually. No visual assessment of damage to the BELGRANO was possible because evasive action was taken to clear the area from the two escorting destroyers. The submarine was not detected throughout this event.

#### COMMANDING OFFICER'S CONCLUSIONS

1. After a thirty hour covert trail of TC 79.3 the ROE were changed allowing the Group to be attacked.
2. A salvo of three Mark 8 torpedoes was fired from 1400 yards on the beam of the CG BELGRANO. Two hits were obtained that after one hour sank the cruiser.
3. At least four sets of depth charge counter attacks were heard but only one was relatively close. The submarine successfully evaded to the South East. Onboard assessment now considers these to have been random rather than against the counter detected submarine.

In the right scenario, the Mark 8 torpedo is still a successful weapon.

A Task Group that chooses to operate covertly in potentially hostile submarine waters without considered ASW countermeasures, once detected can expect to be successfully attacked. ✓

A1 3  
SECRET


UK EYES 'B'

UK EYES BRAVO

021730

EVENT 0201

021730 - 022000



Position on frame  
55° 27.2s 61° 25.4w

SERIAL 52

13

DUTY COMMANDER

2 MAY 1982

BF

COMBATS

SECRET

ENCL  
P/NOX  
B

SECRET

FLASH

HH

Z 221930Z MAY 82

FM TO 324.3.3

TO UTC 324.3

INFO 01G 317.5

BT

EXCLUSIVE UK EYES BRAVO

01G 01G/LGA

Z TO 324.3.3

L 24/02

F. S.F. LM1/4/TG 79.3/00 BELGRANO/DO BUENO AND SCUGHARD/

55 2759 61 2544/ 280/3 SPD 11/2/2185622.

C/C/SUCCESSFULLY ATTACKED BELGRANO TWO HITS WITH MARK EIGHTS.

EVASD TO EAST.

L. SUR 176. ZULU INDIA DELTA BRAVO SIERRA ALFA DELTA ZERO ONE NINE

X.Y ZERO ONE EIGHT.

1. FOR FCSH I HOPE YOU RETRIEVE YOUR BOTTLE.

EXCLUSIVE

DUTY COMMANDER ACTION

UK EYES B

SECRET



SECRET

GRS 450

SECRET

FM WASHINGTON 022300Z MAY 82  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1569 OF 2 MAY  
INFO FLA SH UKMIS NEW YORK (PERSONAL FOR SECRETARY OF STATE  
AND AMBASSADOR).

WASHINGTON TELEGRAM NO 1566: FALKLANDS, YOUR TALK WITH HAIG

1. AS YOU HAD TO CATCH THE PLANE TO NEW YORK IMMEDIATELY AFTER HAIG TELEPHONED YOU THIS AFTERNOON FOLLOWING TODAY'S DISCUSSIONS YOU ASKED ME TO RING HIM AND CLARIFY TWO POINTS.
2. THIS I HAVE DONE, EXPLAINING THAT THERE WERE A GREAT MANY POINTS THAT NEEDED CLARIFYING IN THE PERUVIAN PROPOSALS AND THAT YOU WOULD NOT WANT TO BE SUDDENLY FACED WITH A COMMUNICATION FROM HIM, HAIG, SAYING THAT THE ARGENTINIANS HAD AGREED AND THAT IT WAS NOW UP TO US TO SAY THAT WE DID LIKEWISE.
3. HAIG SAID THAT HE WAS VERY MUCH AWARE OF THIS. HE WOULD AVOID ANYTHING LIKE THAT HAPPENING. HE SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THAT THE PROPOSALS OFFERED UP A GREAT DEAL. PERHAPS THE ONLY AREA WHERE IT WAS LESS THAN IDEAL FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW WAS THE INVOLVEMENT OF THIRD PARTIES IN THE TEMPORARY ADMINISTRATION OF THE ISLANDS. ACCORDING TO HIS LATEST INFORMATION ARGENTINA WERE SAYING THAT THEY WOULD WANT THE CONTACT GROUP, WHICH WOULD CARRY OUT THIS TASK, TO BE COMPOSED OF VENEZUELA AND CANADA, AS WELL AS BRAZIL, PERU, THE FRG AND THE USA. I SAID THAT I WAS SURE THAT THIS WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE TO US. IT WOULD MEAN THERE WOULD BE THREE LATIN AMERICANS IN THE INTERIM ADMINISTRATION. IF DECISIONS HAD TO BE TAKEN BY A MAJORITY THEY COULD BLOCK IT. VENEZUELA WAS PARTICULARLY OFFENSIVE GIVEN THEIR KNOWN CLOSE ASSOCIATION WITH ARGENTINA IN THE RECENT CRISIS. HAIG SAID THAT TO HAVE AS MANY AS SIX WAS OF COURSE ABSURD BUT HE THOUGHT THERE MIGHT BE SOMETHING TO BE SAID FOR ENGAGING VENEZUELA IN THE PROCESS. HE ASKED ME WHETHER THERE WAS ANY OTHER COUNTRY OF THE AREA THAT WE WOULD PREFER. I SAID TRINIDAD WOULD BE MUCH MORE SATISFACTORY. HE SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THAT MIGHT BE ACCEPTABLE.

SECRET

/4. I

S E C R E T

4. I SAID THAT IT WAS TOO SUDDEN FOR US TO BE NEGOTIATING NEW PROPOSALS. YOU DID NOT WANT TO BE RUSHED. YOU HAD NOT CONSULTED LONDON ABOUT THEM. MOREOVER THERE WAS ANOTHER AREA OF DOUBT IN YOUR MIND. WHAT WAS GOING TO HAPPEN IN PRACTICAL TERMS IF THE PARTIES AGREED? HOW COULD WE BE SURE THAT THE ARGENTINIANS WERE GOING TO STICK BY THE SCHEME. HAIG SAID THAT IF IT CAME TO THE POINT HE WOULD GIVE THE ARGENTINIANS A SHORT SPACE OF TIME, SAY 24 HOURS, IN WHICH TO SEND THEIR FOREIGN MINISTER TO A GIVEN PLACE WITH FULL AUTHORITY FROM THE JUNTA TO SIGN UP. HAIG ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT HE THOUGHT THAT THE ARGENTINIANS MIGHT SAY THAT THEY COULD ONLY COMPLY WITH THIS TIMETABLE IF THERE WAS NO FURTHER BRITISH MILITARY ACTION AGAINST THE ISLANDS IN THE MEANTIME; AND THEY WOULD GIVE AN UNDERTAKING THAT THEY WOULD NOT ENTER THE TEZ. I SAID THAT WE COULD NOT DO ANYTHING THAT INHIBITED US FROM MAINTAINING THE MILITARY PRESSURE.

5. HAIG SAID THAT HE WOULD GET INTO TOUCH WITH ME AS SOON AS HE HEARD AGAIN FROM THE ARGENTINIANS.

HENDERSON

FCO

S AM D

CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

FALKLAND ISLANDS

COPIES TO

PS/CHANCELLOR

SIR K COUZENS

MR LITTLER

MR HAWTIN

MR PERETZ

MR ILETT

TREASURY

SIR M PALLISER CABINET OFFICE

MISS DICKSON (EIP DIVN) D/ENERGY

MR A WILLIAMS DSW 60

2  
S E C R E T

ENCL No.  
8

9

GRS 100A  
UNCLASSIFIED  
FM LIMA 030144Z MAY 82  
TO IMMEDIATE F C O.  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 139 OF 3 MAY  
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

FALKLANDS

1. AT HIS PRESS CONFERENCE AT 1900 HRS LOCAL TIME THIS EVENING PRESIDENT BELAUNDE ANNOUNCED THAT MR HAIG HAD TELEPHONED HIM LAST NIGHT TO PUT TO HIM A 7-POINT PLAN. HE DID NOT REVEAL ANY DETAILS EXCEPT THAT IN HIS VIEW IT DID NOT INVOLVE ANY CAPITULATION BY EITHER SIDE. THERE WAS NO AGREEMENT ON IT AS YET BUT THE ARGENTINES WERE CONSIDERING IT AND THE PRESIDENT HOPED TO BE ABLE TO MAKE AN ANNOUNCEMENT EITHER LATER TONIGHT OR TOMORROW MORNING.

WALLACE

FCO

S AM D

CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION  
FALKLAND ISLANDS

COPIES TO

PS/CHANCELLOR )  
SIR K COUZENS )  
MR LITTLER )  
MR HAWTHIN ) TREASURY  
MR FERETZ )  
MR ILETT )

SIR M PALLISER CABINET OFFICE  
MISS DICKSON (EEP DIVN) D/ENERGY  
MR A WILLIAMS DSW 60



GRS 5004

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FM LIMA 030103Z MAY 82

TO FLASH F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 137 OF 3 MAY

INFO FLASH WASHINGTON

FALKLANDS: NY TEL NO 134

1. THE FOREIGN MINISTER SUMMONED ME THIS EVENING. DR ARIAS BEGAN BY SAYING THAT HE MUCH HOPED HE WOULD HAVE GOOD NEWS SHORTLY. HE SAID THAT AFTER THE CONVERSATION REPORTED IN NY TUP HE HAD SPOKEN TO PRESIDENT BELAUNDE WHO HAD DECIDED TO MAKE A FURTHER ATTEMPT TO BREAK THE DEADLOCK AND BRING ABOUT AN IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE. DR ARIAS SAID THAT ON PRESIDENTIAL INSTRUCTIONS HE HAD TELEPHONED COSTA MENDEZ TO PRESS UPON HIM A FORMULA WHICH MIGHT OFFER THE BEST CHANCE OF AN IMMEDIATE SOLUTION. DR ARIAS REPEATED THAT A WAY HAD TO BE FOUND TO ALLOW THE ARGENTINES TO CLIMB DOWN WITHOUT TOO MUCH LOSS OF FACE. THEY HAD THEREFORE CONSIDERED WHETHER A TEXT WHICH WOULD INCLUDE A TOKEN REFERENCE TO THE ARGENTINE CLAIM TO SOVEREIGNTY IN THE (FOLLOWING WORD UNDERLINED) INTRODUCTORY PART MIGHT SUFFICE TO BRING ABOUT A WITHDRAWAL OF THE ARGENTINE TROOPS. PRESIDENT BELAUNDE HAD ALSO TELEPHONED PRESIDENT REAGAN (BUT HAD FAILED TO GET THROUGH) IN ORDER TO INSTILL A SENSE OF URGENCY AND TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE PRESENCE OF MR PYM IN WASHINGTON. MR HAIG HAD SUBSEQUENTLY SPOKEN ON THE TELEPHONE SEVERAL TIMES WITH PRESIDENT BELAUNDE.

2. DR ARIAS SAID THAT SOME PROCEDURAL DIFFICULTIES HAD ARISEN DURING THE COURSE OF THE VARIOUS TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS WHICH RELATED TO THE INCLUSION OF THE UNITED STATES AND/OR PERU AS MEMBERS OF THE INTERIM ADMINISTRATION. DR ARIAS TOLD ME IN CONFIDENCE THAT PRESIDENT BELAUNDE HAD NO OBJECTION TO PERU BEING EXCLUDED IF BY SO DOING A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT COULD BE OBTAINED. BUT MR HAIG HAD INTIMATED THAT THE US WOULD NOT WISH TO BE EXCLUDED FROM THE ADMINISTERING GROUP SINCE THIS WOULD OTHERWISE NOT BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE UK.

3. IN THE EVENT AND IN ORDER TO SIMPLIFY MATTERS, A 7-POINT FORMULA HAD BEEN WORKED OUT. TEXT IS IN MIFT. THERE IS A SPANISH TEXT AND AN ENGLISH TEXT WHICH DR ARIAS SAID HAD VIRTUALLY BEEN DICTATED OVER THE TELEPHONE BY MR HAIG.

CONFIDENTIAL

/4.

# CONFIDENTIAL

4. IN REPLY TO MY SPECIFIC QUESTION DR ARIAS SAID THAT THE 7-POINT FORMULA HAD THE APPROVAL OF COSTA MENDEZ SEMICOLON THAT GENERAL GALTIERI HAD TOLD PRESIDENT BELAUNDE THAT HE WAS QUOTE WELL DISPOSED UNQUOTE TOWARDS IT BUT THAT HE HAD HIS QUOTE SENATE UNQUOTE ( IE THE MILITARY JUNTA) TO CONSULT AND CONVINCED. DR ARIAS SAID THAT THE MILITARY JUNTA WAS MEETING EVEN AT THIS MOMENT TO CONSIDER THE TERMS AND THAT A REPLY WAS EXPECTED HOURLY. DR ARIAS SAID THAT HE HAD REASON TO BELIEVE THAT MR HAIG'S PROPOALS HAD BEEN CONVEYED WITH THE KNOWLEDGE OR AT LEAST THE CONSENT OF MR PYM. DR ARIAS EMPHASISED THAT PRESIDENT BELAUNDE WAS ANXIOUS NOT TO LOSE THE MOMENTUM AND THAT IT HAD BEEN CONVEYED TO WASHINGTON THAT IF THE FORMULA WAS ACCEPTABLE, THE SIGNATURE OF AN INTERIM DOCUMENT WOULD TAKE PLACE IN LIMA. DR ARIAS WARNED ME TO EXPECT INSTRUCTIONS TONIGHT AND ADDED THAT THEY WERE MAKING ARRANGEMENTS TO STAGE A GRAND SIGNATURE CEREMONY IN LIMA.

WALLACE

F C O PLEASE PASS

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

FCC

S AM D

CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION  
FALKLAND ISLANDS

COPIES TO

PS/CHANCELLOR }  
SIR K COUZENS }  
MR LITTLER } TREASURY  
MR HAWTIN }  
MR PERETZ }  
MR ILETT }

SIR M PALLISER CABINET OFFICE

MISS DICKSON (EIP DIVN) D/ENERGY

MR. A. WILLIAMS DSW 60

2

# CONFIDENTIAL

SERIAL 66

7

ZZ

CR

ONFO 24/3

WONNY 101/3

ZZ F C O ~~SECRET~~

OO UKMIS NEW YORK

GR 770

SECRET


FM WASHINGTON 032012Z MAY 82

TO FLASH F C O

TELEGRAM NO 1574 OF 3 MAY

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

B-MW



FALKLANDS

1. HAIG HAS BEEN ON THE TELEPHONE TO ME AT SOME LENGTH THREE TIMES ALREADY TODAY.

2. HE WAS ANXIOUS TO KNOW HOW YOU HAD GOT ON IN NEW YORK AND I TOLD HIM OF PEREZ DE CUELLAR'S IDEAS AND OF YOUR IMMEDIATE COMMENTS (UKMIS TELNO 631).

3 HE TOLD ME THAT HE HAD SPOKEN TO THE PERUVIAN PRESIDENT AT 1.00 AM TODAY. THE LATTER HAD COMPLAINED BITTERLY THAT BRITISH ACTION HAD TORPEDOED THE CHANCES OF PEACE. HE WAS CRITICAL OF THE USA AS WELL AS OF THE UK. THEY WOULD BOTH NOW HAVE TO PAY A HEAVY PRICE. HE HINTED THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD NOW BE INCREASINGLY INVOLVED. HAIG SAID THAT HE THOUGHT A GOOD DEAL OF JOINT THINKING WAS NEEDED ON HOW TO GET NEGOTIATIONS GOING AGAIN. THERE WAS A HEAD OF STEAM BUILDING UP IN THE AMERICAN HEMISPHERE. COSTA MENDEZ MIGHT COME BACK TO THE RIO TREATY ORGANISATION CONFIDENT THAT HE COULD GET SUPPORT FOR SANCTIONS. THE AMERICANS WOULD OF COURSE VETO IT BUT IT WOULD DIVIDE THE HEMISPHERE BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH. ACCORDING TO HIS INFORMATION THE MOOD IN BA WAS GETTING VERY UGLY BOTH AGAINST THE BRITISH AND AMERICANS. IT WAS BEING PUT ABOUT THAT THE CRUISER HAD BEEN HIT AS A RESULT OF INTELLIGENCE PASSED BY

SERIAL 66

7

ZZ

15R

INFO 24/3

WONNY 101/3

ZZ F C O ~~SECRET~~

OO UKHIS NEW YORK

GR 770

SECRET

FM WASHINGTON 032012Z MAY 82

TO FLASH F C O

TELEGRAM NO 1574 OF 3 MAY

INFO IMMEDIATE UKHIS NEW YORK

3-MAY

(111)

11  
10  
9  
8  
7  
6  
5  
4

FALKLANDS

1. HAIG HAS BEEN ON THE TELEPHONE TO ME AT SOME LENGTH THREE TIMES ALREADY TODAY.

2. HE WAS ANXIOUS TO KNOW HOW YOU HAD GOT ON IN NEW YORK AND I TOLD HIM OF PEREZ DE CUELLAR'S IDEAS AND OF YOUR IMMEDIATE COMMENTS (UKHIS TELNO 631).

3 HE TOLD ME THAT HE HAD SPOKEN TO THE PERUVIAN PRESIDENT AT 1.00 AM TODAY. THE LATTER HAD COMPLAINED BITTERLY THAT BRITISH ACTION HAD TORPEDOED THE CHANCES OF PEACE. HE WAS CRITICAL OF THE USA AS WELL AS OF THE UK. THEY WOULD BOTH NOW HAVE TO PAY A HEAVY PRICE. HE HINTED THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD NOW BE INCREASINGLY INVOLVED. HAIG SAID THAT HE THOUGHT A GOOD DEAL OF JOINT THINKING WAS NEEDED ON HOW TO GET NEGOTIATIONS GOING AGAIN. THERE WAS A HEAD OF STEAM BUILDING UP IN THE AMERICAN HEMISPHERE. COSTA MENDEZ MIGHT COME BACK TO THE RIO TREATY ORGANISATION CONFIDENT THAT HE COULD GET SUPPORT FOR SANCTIONS. THE AMERICANS WOULD OF COURSE VETO IT BUT IT WOULD DIVIDE THE HEMISPHERE BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH. ACCORDING TO HIS INFORMATION THE MOOD IN BA WAS GETTING VERY UGLY BOTH AGAINST THE BRITISH AND AMERICANS. IT WAS BEING PUT ABOUT THAT THE CRUISER HAD BEEN HIT AS A RESULT OF INTELLIGENCE PASSED BY

5. DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVE SHOULD BE TAKEN.

4. HAIG THOUGHT THAT THERE WAS A SERIOUS DANGER THAT IF FURTHER SUCCESSFUL MILITARY ACTION WAS TAKEN BY US U.S. OPINION, AND FOR THAT MATTER WESTERN OPINION MORE GENERALLY, MIGHT BECOME LESS FAVOURABLE TOWARDS US. PEOPLE MIGHT SAY WE WERE OVER-REACTING.

5. I REMINDED HIM THAT, ACCORDING TO INFORMATION THAT HE WOULD HAVE SEEN, THE ARGENTINIANS HAD ORDERED THREE FRIGATES TO ATTACK THE HERMES AND THE CARRIER HAD BEEN GIVEN INSTRUCTIONS TO ATTACK BRITISH SHIPS. IT COULD NOT THEREFORE BE SAID THAT THE ARGENTINIANS WERE BEHAVING PEACEFULLY AND THAT IT WAS ONLY US WHO WERE PREPARED FOR CONTINUED ACTION. IF THE ARGENTINIANS WANTED PEACE THERE WAS NO DIFFICULTY WHATEVER FOR THEM TO SHOW IT.

6. HAIG SAID THAT IT WAS DIFFICULT TO KNOW WHETHER BANGING THE ARGENTINIANS HARD WAS THE ONLY THING THAT WOULD BRING THEM TO NEGOTIATE OR WHETHER IT MADE THEM MORE INFLEXIBLE. I MADE THE OBVIOUS RETORT THAT WHEN FOR THREE WEEKS WE HAD NOT DONE ANYTHING AGAINST THEM THEY HAD SHOWN NO FLEXIBILITY.

7. HAIG SAID THAT HE DID NOT DISAGREE BUT HE WAS SURE SOMETHING OUGHT TO BE DONE. HE WONDERED WHETHER IT WAS NOT NOW THE TURN FOR LONDON TO SHOW AN INITIATIVE IN FAVOUR OF PEACE. HE REPEATED HIS FEAR ABOUT THE WAY THE PRESS IN THE USA MIGHT SWING AGAINST US IF WE APPEARED TOO BELLICOSE. COULD NOT MRS THATCHER COME FORWARD WITH SOME SUCH DECLARATION THAT SHE WOULD BE PREPARED TO DESIST FROM HOSTILITIES IN A CERTAIN SPACE OF TIME, PROVIDED THE ARGENTINIANS EXPRESSED A READINESS TO DO THE SAME AND TO AGREE TO WITHDRAW. I SAID THAT THE ARGENTINIANS HAD HAD PLENTY OF TIME TO NEGOTIATE AND WHAT WE COULD NOT DO AT THIS STAGE WAS TO LET UP THE MILITARY PRESSURE UNLESS THERE WAS A CATEGORICAL ASSURANCE THAT THE ARGENTINIANS WERE GOING TO WITHDRAW AND DESIST FROM MILITARY ACTION. HAIG REPEATED HIS CONCERN AGAINST JUST CARRYING ON AS WE ARE. HE DID NOT THINK PEREZ DE CUELLAR WOULD GET ANYWHERE. HE WAS THINKING OF PUTTING TOGETHER A SEVEN POINT SCHEME THAT HE HAD DISCUSSED WITH YOU YESTERDAY BUT HE WOULD CONSULT WITH US FIRST. HE REPEATED THE VIEW HE HAS PUT TO US ALREADY THAT THE ONLY ADVERSE ASPECT OF IT FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW WAS THE FACT THAT THE CONTACT GROUP WOULD COMPRISE SIX PARTIES, THREE OF THEM FROM LATIN AMERICA. THE GROUP HE IS NOW THINKING OF FOR AN INTERIM AUTHORITY WOULD INCLUDE THE USA, THE FRG, JAMAICA, VENEZUELA, BRAZIL AND PERU. I SAID THAT THIS WOULD MEAN THAT THE LATIN AMERICANS COULD BLOCK ANY ACTION. I ALSO SAID THAT ACCORDING TO OUR INFORMATION THE

HE REPEATED THE VIEW HE HAS PUT TO US ALREADY THAT THE ONLY ADVERSE ASPECT OF IT FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW WAS THE FACT THAT THE CONTACT GROUP WOULD COMPRISE SIX PARTIES, THREE OF THEM FROM LATIN AMERICA. THE GROUP HE IS NOW THINKING OF FOR AN INTERIM AUTHORITY WOULD INCLUDE THE USA, THE FRG, JAMAICA, VENEZUELA, BRAZIL AND PERU. I SAID THAT THIS WOULD MEAN THAT THE LATIN AMERICANS COULD BLOCK ANY ACTION. I ALSO SAID THAT ACCORDING TO OUR INFORMATION THE ARGENTINIANS HAD REJECTED THESE PROPOSALS, WHICH WERE THE SAME AS THE PERUVIAN PROPOSALS, ON THE GROUNDS THAT THEY COULD NOT NEGOTIATE UNDER DURESS (IE THE TORPEDOING OF THE CRUISER). HAIG SAID HE THOUGHT THAT ALTHOUGH THE ARGENTINIANS WERE BENT ON A SUICIDE COURSE SOME EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE TO REFLOAT SUCH IDEAS. HE WOULD BE PUTTING SOMETHING TO US VERY SHORTLY AND WAS MOST EAGER FOR YOUR REACTIONS. I SAID IN ANSWER TO G'S LAST CALL THAT YOU WERE ON THE FLIGHT HOME SO YOU COULD NOT BE EXPECTED TO REACT IMMEDIATELY.

8. I TRIED TO RESTRAIN HAIG FROM BEING TOO PRECIPITOUS. HE ASSURED ME THAT HE WAS NOT BEING PANICKY.

HENDERSON

MMMM



GRS 280  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 030501Z MAY 82  
TO FLASH LIMA  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 4 DATED 3 MAY 82  
INFO IMMEDIATE F C O, WASHINGTON

YOUR TELSNOs 137-139: FALKLANDS

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

1. YOU SHOULD BY NOW HAVE RECEIVED COPIES OF WASHINGTON TELEGRAMS NOS 1566 AND 1569 TO FCO, WHICH GIVE THE BACKGROUND. PLEASE GET IN TOUCH IMMEDIATELY WITH FOREIGN MINISTER AND/OR PRESIDENT'S OFFICE TO ENSURE (YOUR TELNO 139) THAT NO ANNOUNCEMENT IS MADE WHICH IMPLIES THAT WE HAVE AGREED TO THESE PROPOSALS OR EVEN HAD THEM FORMALLY PRESENTED TO US. THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S POSITION IS AS DESCRIBED IN WASHINGTON TELS UNDER REFERENCE.

2. YOU MAY AT YOUR DISCRETION ASSURE YOUR INTERLOCUTORS THAT THE SECRETARY OF STATE IS GRATEFUL FOR THE EFFORTS WHICH PRESIDENT BELAUNDE IS MAKING TO SECURE A SETTLEMENT OF THE DISPUTE ON A BASIS WHICH RESPECTS THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. WE WILL BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER CAREFULLY ANY IDEAS PRESENTED TO US WHICH SEEM LIKELY TO ENSURE WHAT MUST BE THE FIRST REQUIREMENT: A WITHDRAWAL OF ARGENTINE TROOPS WHICH UNLAWFULLY INVADDED AND OCCUPIED THE FALKLANDS. BUT WE MUST BE SATISFIED THAT THE WITHDRAWAL WILL BE PROPERLY SUPERVISED, THAT THERE WILL BE EFFECTIVE GUARANTEES THAT THE ARGENTINES WILL IMPLEMENT WHATEVER AGREEMENT MAY BE REACHED, AND THAT ANY INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS AND THE FRAMEWORK FOR NEGOTIATIONS FOR A DEFINITIVE SETTLEMENT ARE NOT SUCH AS TO PREJUDICE THE PRINCIPLES TO WHICH WE ATTACH IMPORTANCE. WE ARE PREPARED TO WORK HARD FOR A SATISFACTORY SOLUTION, BUT WE CANNOT CUT CORNERS WHEN MATTERS OF SUCH IMPORTANCE ARE AT STAKE. NEITHER CAN WE RENOUNCE THE EXERCISE OF OUR RIGHT OF SELF DEFENCE WHILE ARGENTINE TROOPS MAINTAIN THEIR UNLAWFUL OCCUPATION OF THE FALKLANDS.

PARSONS

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION  
FALKLAND ISLANDS

FCO

S AM D

CABINET OFFICE

COPIES TO

PS/CHANCELLOR }  
SIR K COUZENS }  
MR LITTLER }  
MR HAWTHIN }  
MR PERETZ }  
MR THETT }

TREASURY

SIR M PALMER CABINET OFFICE

MISS DICKSON (DEP DIR) D/ENERGY

MR A WILLIAMS DSW 60

CONFIDENTIAL

DSDO, US 11, 455  
7702 1572 (5)

SERIAL 73

3-MAY-82

119

11 12 1  
10 9 8  
7 6 5

~~WONFO 05/3~~

~~WONNY 102/3~~

ZZ F C O ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~

GR 450

SECRET

FM WASHINGTON 032135Z MAY 82

TO FLASH F C O

TELEGRAM NO 1575 OF 3 MAY

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

MY TELNO 1574: FALKLANDS

1. SINCE SENDING TUR, HAIG ASKED TO SEE ME. HE HAD JUST BEEN SPEAKING ON THE TELEPHONE TO THE PRESIDENT OF PERU. GENERAL IGLESIAS AND ADMIRAL ANAYA HAD JUST ARRIVED IN LIMA FROM BUENOS AIRES. PRESIDENT BELAUDE BELIEVED THAT SOMETHING REAL MUST BE DONE TO BRING ABOUT A CEASEFIRE. HE BELIEVED THAT THE ARGENTINIANS WOULD ACCEPT THE SEVEN PROPOSALS. HAIG SAID THAT THEY WOULD BE ADJUSTED TO PROVIDE FOR INTERIM ADMINISTRATION SIMPLY BY THE US AND PERU. THE CONTACT GROUP OF SIX WOULD BE CONCERNED ONLY WITH TRYING TO FIND A LONG-TERM SOLUTION. HAIG WAS MOST EAGER TO KNOW WHETHER WE COULD GO ALONG WITH THESE PROPOSALS OR SOMETHING VERY SIMILAR TO THEM. NO LESS PRESSING, IN HIS MIND, WAS THE NEED TO DO SOMETHING IMMEDIATELY TO TRY TO STOP THE FIGHTING. HE THOUGHT THERE WAS NOTHING TO STOP US SINKING THE WHOLE ARGENTINIAN FLEET. THIS WOULD BRING ABOUT THE COLLAPSE OF ANY AUTHORITY IN BUENOS AIRES AND THE CREATION OF CHAOS. THE LIVES OF ALL FOREIGN SUBJECTS WOULD BE ENDANGERED. THERE WOULD BE NO-ONE TO DEAL WITH IN ARGENTINA AND THE WHOLE LATIN AMERICAN WORLD WOULD BE ALIENATED. I REPEATED THE VIEW THAT I HAVE EXPRESSED TO HIM OFTEN THAT THE LATIN AMERICANS WILL NOT BE ALIENATED BY FORCE BUT THEY WILL DESPISE AND BE ENCOURAGED BY ANY SHOW OF WEAKNESS. PARTICULARLY WHEN WE HAVE THE CARDS IN OUR HANDS.

... TO DATE EVERYONE HAS THAT WE THOUGHT IT WAS DESPERATELY URGENT  
FOR THE PRIME MINISTER TO PROPOSE A CEASEFIRE TO COME INTO EFFECT  
WITHIN A CERTAIN NUMBER OF HOURS. UNDER THIS PROPOSAL FOR A  
CEASEFIRE WE WOULD UNDERTAKE NOT TO SHELL OR ATTACK THE ISLANDS,  
NOR TO CARRY OUT ANY OFFENSIVE MILITARY OPERATIONS OUTSIDE THE TEZ.  
THE ARGENTINES WOULD UNDERTAKE TO WITHDRAW ALL NAVAL VESSELS FROM  
THE TEZ AND TO UNDERTAKE NO AIR ATTACKS. IF THE ARGENTINIANS REFUSE  
THIS CEASEFIRE, HOWEVER, THEY WOULD PUT THEMSELVES IN THE WRONG  
WITH WORLD OPINION AND MRS THATCHER WOULD HAVE SHOWN MAGNANIMITY  
IN VICTORY.

3. HAIG'S IDEA WAS THAT THIS CEASEFIRE WOULD BE FOLLOWED BY THE  
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SEVEN-POINT PLAN. HE EXPECTS TO HEAR AGAIN  
FROM THE PRESIDENT OF PERU WITHIN A MATTER OF AN HOUR OR TWO AND  
IS MOST ANXIOUS TO HAVE SOME INKING FROM LONDON ABOUT HOW HIS  
IDEAS ARE RECEIVED.

4. I TOLD HIM THAT AFTER WAITING THREE WEEKS WHILE THE ARGENTINIANS  
REINFORCED THE ISLANDS WE WERE NOT IN A MOOD TO RUSH TO AN  
ARMISTICE JUST BECAUSE THE ARGENTINIANS WERE LOSING HANDS DOWN.  
BUT HAIG SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THAT EVERYBODY KNEW NOW WHERE THE  
MILITARY SUPERIORITY LAY AND HE WAS VERY WORRIED IF WE GAVE THE  
IMPRESSION OF DRIVING THINGS TOO FAR.

5 I AM SORRY IF ALL THIS SOUNDS A BIT IMPETUOUS BUT I WOULD LIKE  
TO HAVE SOME SORT OF REACTION FROM YOU IF ONLY TO GIVE HAIG A STEER  
IN HIS PRESENT EXTREMELY ACTIVE FRAME OF MIND.

HENDERSON

NNNN

13

ENCL No.  
35

4

file

CONFIDENTIAL

9R224  
CONFIDENTIAL

FM LIMA 031340Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 141 OF 3 MAY

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK (FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY)

UKMIS NEW YORK TELNO 05 TO LIMA; FALKLANDS

1. I CALLED ON FOREIGN MINISTER AT 0630 AND SPOKE TO HIM AS INSTRUCTED. DR ARIAS MADE NO COMMENT.

2. HE THEN TOLD ME THAT LATE LAST NIGHT THE ARGENTINE MILITARY JUNTA HAD REJECTED THE PERUVIAN PROPOSALS QUOTE AS A RESULT OF THE TORPEDOING OF THE ARGENTINE CRUISER UNQUOTE. THE MESSAGE TO THE PERUVIAN GOVERNMENT SAID THAT IN THE LIGHT OF THIS QUOTE REPEATED AGGRESSION UNQUOTE, THEY COULD NOT CONSIDER ANY INITIATIVES WHICH MIGHT SUGGEST THEY WERE NEGOTIATING UNDER DURESS. DR ARIAS SAID THAT THE ARGENTINES HAD NOT ENTIRELY CLOSED THE DOOR BUT THAT THEY NEEDED MORE TIME TO REVIEW ANY PROPOSALS IN THE LIGHT OF THE MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS ON THE NAVAL FRONT.

WALLACE

FCO

S AM D

CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION  
FALKLAND ISLANDS

COPIES TO

PS/CHANCELLOR }  
SIR I COUZENS }  
MR LITTLE } TREASURY  
MR HAWTEN }  
MR PEREZ }  
MR ILETT }

SIR M PALLISER CABINET OFFICE  
MISS DICKSON (REP DIVN) D/ENERGY  
MR A WILLIAMS DSW 60

CONFIDENTIAL

Dated: 4 MAYNo. 108Vol. 23

Written / Oral Answers

Column No(s) 29-37ENCL  
33  
3

## Falkland Islands

4.7 pm

The Secretary of State for Defence (Mr. John Nott): With permission, Mr. Speaker, I shall make a statement about recent naval engagements in the South Atlantic, following the operation conducted by our forces to repossess the British sovereign territory of South Georgia.

In the House on 7 April I announced that our first naval action would be to deny the Argentine forces on the Falklands the means of sea reinforcement and resupply from the mainland. British submarines have achieved that objective. With the arrival of our task force on 30 April our next move was to stop reinforcement and resupply from the air, as well as by sea. Since the passing of resolution 502 the Argentines, instead of withdrawing, had continuously reinforced the islands. We gave two days' prior warning to the Argentine Government of the imposition of this total exclusion zone, and our task force is now enforcing it.

The task force was despatched to the South Atlantic with the support of the House and, I believe, of the country. Since its arrival in these waters our overriding duty has been to protect our task force against attack by Argentine forces.

We made it very clear to the Argentine Government and to the United Nations more than a week ago, on 23 April, that the Government would exercise their rights of self-defence to the full, including the use of force under article 51 of the United Nations charter if this proved necessary to protect our fleet.

I shall now describe the military sequence of events. Our attacks by Vulcan and Sea Harrier aircraft against Port Stanley airfield were launched early on 1 May. The runway was cratered and rendered unusable by transport aircraft from the Argentine mainland. A further sortie was made today to render the airstrip unusable for light supply, communications and ground attack aircraft operating within the Falkland Islands themselves. The other main airfield on East Falkland at Goose Green has also effectively been put out of action.

On 1 May the Argentines launched attacks on our ships, during most of the daylight hours. The attacks by Argentine Mirage and Canberra aircraft operating from the mainland were repulsed by British Sea Harriers. Had our Sea Harriers failed to repulse the attacks on the task force, our ships could have been severely damaged or sunk. In fact, one Argentine Canberra and one Mirage were shot down and others were damaged. We believe that another Mirage was brought down by Argentine anti-aircraft fire. One of our frigates suffered splinter damage as a result of the air attacks and there was one British casualty whose condition is now satisfactory. All our aircraft returned safely. On the same day our forces located and attacked what was believed to be an Argentine submarine which was clearly in a position to torpedo our ships. It is not known whether the submarine was hit.

The prolonged air attack on our ships, the presence of an Argentine submarine close by, and all other information available to us, left us in no doubt of the dangers to our task force from hostile action.

The next day, 2 May, at 8 pm London time, one of our submarines detected the Argentine cruiser, "General Belgrano", escorted by two destroyers. This heavily armed

and was closing on elements of our task force, which was only hours away. We knew that the cruiser itself has substantial fire power, provided by 15 6in guns, with a range of 13 miles, and SeaCat anti-aircraft missiles. Together with its escorting destroyers, which we believe were equipped with Exocet anti-ship missiles with a range of more than 20 miles, the threat to the task force was such that the task force commander could ignore it only at his peril.

The House will know that the attack by our submarine involved the capital ship only and not its escorting destroyers, so that they should have been able to go to the assistance of the damaged cruiser. We do not know whether they did so, but, in so doing, they would not have been engaged.

On 3 May, at about 4 am London time, a Sea King helicopter keeping watch against submarine attack around the task force was fired on by an Argentine ocean-going patrol craft. This vessel was then attacked and sunk by a Lynx helicopter. A second Lynx then came under attack from another Argentine vessel, which was itself attacked and damaged.

It must be a matter of deep concern to the House that there has been loss of life from these engagements including the sinking of the "General Belgrano", but our first duty must be the protection of our own ships and men. There may be further attacks on our forces and they must be allowed to act in self-defence. We cannot deny them that right. Nor must we forget that military action began by an attack on British marines and the forceable seizure of British territory. The way of stopping the fighting forthwith is for the Argentines to withdraw their garrison from the Falkland Islands in compliance with the United Nations resolution 502.

Mr. Denis Healey (Leeds, East): The right hon. Gentleman rightly said in his press conference last night that his policy was and would always be to use minimum force under strict political control to achieve a diplomatic solution. I confess that it is not always easy to achieve that in the stress of battle. Nevertheless, on the evidence that he has just given, it seems that he has successfully achieved that objective, first, in the reoccupation of South Georgia; secondly, in the attacks on the airfields and military facilities on the Falkland Islands; and, thirdly, in the actions that he has just described within the total exclusion zone.

I shall address my questions entirely to the action against the Argentine cruiser "General Belgrano". The right hon. Gentleman said that the Government were concerned about the loss of life that had occurred. I understand that the action took place 36 miles outside the total exclusion zone. Although it appears now that there have not been 1,000 lives lost, as we feared earlier, the number must run into many hundreds. As I said in questions to the Foreign Secretary after his statement, the loss of life is already causing great concern among our friends and allies all over the world.

Almost two days after the event it should be possible for the Secretary of State to give the House more details than were in his statement. It is in both his and the Government's interest to do so if widespread international concern about the incident is to be allayed.

First, will the right hon. Gentleman say how far the Argentine ships were from the task force? He said that they

RESTRICTED

4193 - 1

ZZ BERNE

GRS 633

RESTRICTED

FM FCO 071915Z MAY 1982

TO FLASH BERNE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 91 OF 7 MAY

AND TO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKHIS NEW YORK, BRASILIA, MONTEVIDEO,

ALL NATO POSTS, DUBLIN, UKREP BRUSSELS, SANTIAGO, OTTAWA,

CANBERRA, WELLINGTON.

INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK

*file*  
*cc: T22*

FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF AN MOD STATEMENT MADE

IN LONDON THIS AFTERNOON.

BEGINS

1. THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY MADE CLEAR IN HIS STATEMENT IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS THIS MORNING THAT HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT'S HIGHEST PRIORITY IS TO ACHIEVE AN EARLY NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT OF THE CURRENT CRISIS; BUT THAT IF THE GOVERNMENT OF ARGENTINA DID NOT SHOW THE SAME READINESS AND DESIRE TO REACH A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT, IT SHOULD BE IN NO DOUBT THAT HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT WOULD DO WHATEVER MAY BE NECESSARY TO END THE UNLAWFUL ARGENTINE OCCUPATION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS.

2. IN THIS CONTEXT, HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT WISHES TO RECALL THAT ON 23 APRIL IT INFORMED THE GOVERNMENT OF ARGENTINA THAT ANY APPROACH ON THE PART OF ARGENTINE WARSHIPS, SUBMARINES, NAVAL AUXILIARIES OR MILITARY AIRCRAFT WHICH COULD AMOUNT TO A THREAT TO INTERFERE WITH THE MISSION OF BRITISH FORCES IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC WOULD ENCOUNTER THE APPROPRIATE RESPONSE. IN ADDITION, ALL ARGENTINE AIRCRAFT, INCLUDING CIVIL AIRCRAFT, ENGAGING IN SURVEILLANCE OF THESE BRITISH FORCES, WOULD BE REGARDED AS HOSTILE AND WERE LIABLE TO BE DEALT WITH ACCORDINGLY.

3. IN ADDITION, HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT HAS MADE CLEAR THAT

RESTRICTED

4193 - 1

ALL ARGENTINE VESSELS, INCLUDING MERCHANT VESSELS, OR FISHING VESSELS, APPARENTLY ENGAGING IN SURVEILLANCE OF OR INTELLIGENCE GATHERING ACTIVITIES AGAINST BRITISH FORCES IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC WOULD ALSO BE REGARDED AS HOSTILE AND WERE LIABLE TO BE DEALT WITH ACCORDINGLY.

4. FROM 1100 GMT ON 30TH APRIL HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT ESTABLISHED A TOTAL EXCLUSION ZONE AROUND THE FALKLAND ISLANDS. HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT WILL CONTINUE TO ENFORCE THIS EXCLUSION ZONE WHICH APPLIES NOT ONLY TO ARGENTINE WARSHIPS AND ARGENTINE NAVAL AUXILIARIES BUT ALSO TO ANY OTHER SHIPS, INCLUDING MERCHANT AND FISHING VESSELS WHICH ARE OPERATING IN SUPPORT OF THE ILLEGAL OCCUPATION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS BY ARGENTINE FORCES: AND THIS ALSO APPLIES TO ANY AIRCRAFT, WHETHER MILITARY OR CIVIL, WHICH IS OPERATING IN SUPPORT OF THAT ILLEGAL OCCUPATION.

5. HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT HAS CONSISTENTLY MADE CLEAR THAT THE UNITED KINGDOM HAS THE RIGHT TO TAKE WHATEVER ADDITIONAL MEASURES MAY BE NEEDED IN EXERCISE OF ITS INHERENT RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENCE UNDER ARTICLE 51 OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER. HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT WILL TAKE ALL NECESSARY MEASURES IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC IN THE SELF-DEFENCE OF BRITISH SHIPS AND AIRCRAFT ENGAGED IN OPERATIONS AND IN RE-SUPPLYING AND REINFORCING BRITISH FORCES IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC. BECAUSE OF THE PROXIMITY OF ARGENTINE BASES AND THE DISTANCES THAT HOSTILE FORCES CAN COVER UNDETECTED, PARTICULARLY AT NIGHT AND IN BAD WEATHER, HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT WARNS THAT ANY ARGENTINE WARSHIP OR MILITARY AIRCRAFT WHICH ARE FOUND MORE THAN 12 NAUTICAL MILES FROM THE ARGENTINE COAST WILL BE REGARDED AS HOSTILE AND ARE LIABLE TO BE DEALT WITH ACCORDINGLY.  
ENDS

PLEASE ASK THE SWISS TO CONVEY THIS URGENTLY TO THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT, ADDING THAT HMG REGARD IT AS HAVING IMMEDIATE EFFECT.

(OTHER INFORMATION RECIPIENTS). PLEASE BRING THE TEXT OF THIS ANNOUNCEMENT TO THE ATTENTION OF THE GOVERNMENT OR AUTHORITIES TO WHOM YOU ARE ACCREDITED. ITS MAIN PURPOSE

2

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

4193 - 41

IS OF COURSE TO REDUCE THE POSSIBILITY OF MISUNDERSTANDING ABOUT OUR INTENTIONS UNDER ARTICLE 51 OF THE UN CHARTER, TO ENSURE THAT EARLIER WARNINGS ISSUED TO ARGENTINA ARE CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD TO REMAIN IN FORCE; AND TO GIVE FURTHER PRECISION TO THE CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH ARGENTINE FORCES WILL BE REGARDED AS CONSTITUTING A THREAT TO INTERFERE WITH THE MISSION OF BRITISH FORCES IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC.  
FURTHER GUIDANCE BY SEPARATE TELEGRAM.

PY4

FAKLAND ISLANDS GENERAL  
FCO  
S AM D.  
CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION  
FALELAND ISLANDS

3  
RESTRICTED



TASIK FORLE

FALKLAND ISLANDS

