

German

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FM EAST BERLIN 06 1300Z NOV 80

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 197 OF 6 NOVEMBER

INFO PRIORITY BORN AND BMG BERLIN

INFO ROUTINE WARSAW MOSCOW UKD EL NATO AND VIENNA

INFO SAVING WASHINGTON PARIS PRAGUE BUDAPEST SOFIA BUCHAREST

BELGRADE MADRID (FOR CSCE DELEGATION)

mt

INNER GERMAN RELATIONS

1. DURING A TETE A TETE LUNCH TODAY (ARRANGED OVER A WEEK AGO) MY GERMAN COLLEAGUE GAVE ME AN ACCOUNT OF A TWO HOUR INTERVIEW WITH HONECKER TO WHICH HE WAS SUMMONED ON 3 NOVEMBER.

2. HONECKER BEGAN WITH AN HOUR'S UNBROKEN DISSERTATION ON THE BACKGROUND TO THE CURRENT DIFFICULTIES IN INNER-GERMAN RELATIONS AND BY IMPLICATION OF THE INCREASE IN THE MINIMUM EXCHANGE REQUIREMENT (MER) AND OTHER MANIFESTATIONS OF GDR POLICY SUCH AS HIS GERA SPEECH. HIS COMPLAINTS AGAINST THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND THE CHANCELLOR IN PARTICULAR CAME UNDER TWO BROAD HEADINGS, FOREIGN/DISARMAMENT POLICY AND ALL-GERMAN POLICY, BOTH TO BE SEEN AS ACQUIRING ADDED SHARPNESS IN THE LIGHT OF DEVELOPMENTS IN POLAND.

2. UNDER THE FIRST HEADING HONECKER COMPLAINED THAT FOR SOME TIME FEDERAL POLICY HAD NOT IN PRACTICE LIVED UP TO BONN'S PRETENSIONS OF WISHING TO PRESERVE AND DEVELOP DETENTE BOTH IN THE WIDER INTERNATIONAL FIELD AND MORE PARTICULARLY WITHIN THE INNER GERMAN RELATIONSHIP. HE MENTIONED IN PARTICULAR THE LEAD WHICH SCHMIDT HAD GIVEN TO THE ALLIANCE IN RESPECT OF THE TNF RENEWAL, CULMINATING IN THE BRUSSELS DECISION, AND HIS HARD LINE IN VIENNA, WHERE THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN AMONG THE FRONT RUNNERS PRESSING REMORCELESSLY FOR DATA. HONECKER CLAIMED THAT HE HAD PLAYED A PERSONAL PART IN PERSUADING BREZHNEV TO ENSURE THE SUCCESS OF SCHMIDT'S VISIT TO MOSCOW, BY GIVING HIM SOME BACON TO BRING HOME IN THE FORM OF THE PRECEDING ANNOUNCEMENT OF A REDUCTION OF THE SOVIET MILITARY PRESENCE IN AFGHANISTAN AND MORE ESPECIALLY THE WILLINGNESS OF MOSCOW TO ENTER INTO NEGOTIATIONS ON MEDIUM RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE WITHOUT INSISTENCE ON THE PRIOR REVERSAL OF NATO'S TNF DECISION. BUT SCHMIDT'S ATTITUDE AND SOME OF HIS SUBSEQUENT PUBLIC STATEMENTS HAD DISAPPOINTED MOSCOW AND EMBARRASSED HONECKER. (IN OTHER WORDS SCHMIDT HAD BEEN TOO LOYAL TO HIS ALLIANCE.)

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/4. IN INNER

4. IN INNER GERMAN RELATIONS SCHMIDT'S PERFORMANCE HAD BEEN EQUALLY DISAPPOINTING. HONECKER MADE NO SECRET OF HIS IRRITATION OVER BOTH THE FACT AND THE MANNER OF THE CANCELLATION OF THE AUGUST MEETING, EVEN THOUGH HE HAD HELD HIS FIRE TILL AFTER THE FEDERAL ELECTIONS. MORE GENERALLY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT HAD FOR SOME TIME BEEN PROVOCATIVELY TRUMPETING ITS ALL GERMAN POLICY, WHICH WAS INCONSISTENT WITH LONG TERM PEACE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE. IT HAD FOR EXAMPLE BEEN LARGELY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE GRATUITOUS INCLUSION IN THE ANKARA COMMUNIQUE OF REFERENCES TO THE REUNIFICATION OF GERMANY. IT WAS WELL KNOWN THAT THE GDR HAD LONG STANDING REQUIREMENTS FOR THE NORMALISATION OF RELATIONS WITH THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC, AS HE HAD MENTIONED IN HIS GERA SPEECH. (THE FOUR "CONDITIONS") FAR FROM RESPONDING TO THESE REQUIREMENTS BONN HAD CONTINUED TO PROPAGATE A POLICY AND DOCTRINE INCONSISTENT WITH THE ONLY BASIS ON WHICH RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO GERMANYS COULD BE CONDUCTED AND DEVELOPED. (HE IMPLIED THAT ALL THIS HAD NOT ONLY IRRITATED HIM PERSONALLY BUT SHOWN LITTLE SENSITIVITY FOR THE CONSTRAINTS IMPOSED UPON HIM FROM MOSCOW.)

5. WHEN GAUS WAS FINALLY ABLE TO REPLY, HE ASKED WHETHER HONECKER'S EXPOSE INDICATED A BASIC CHANGE OF COURSE ON THE PART OF THE GDR GOVERNMENT OR WHETHER IT SHOULD BE SEEN IN THE LIGHT OF A HOPEFULLY TRANSITIONAL SITUATION. THIS ELICITED A RECAPITULATION IN SUMMARISED BUT NO LESS VEHEMENT FORM OF HONECKER'S COMPLAINTS AGAINST FEDERAL POLICY AND SCHMIDT'S BEHAVIOUR IN PARTICULAR. THEREAFTER HONECKER INDICATED THAT:

- (A) IT WAS USELESS TO EXPECT ANY SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENT IN INNER GERMAN RELATIONS, FOR EXAMPLE A RESUMPTION OF HIGH-LEVEL POLITICAL CONTACTS, UNTIL THE POLISH SITUATION HAD BEEN STABILISED. HE LINKED THE MER DECISION TO THIS CONTEXT AND IN AN ASIDE GAVE GAUS A FAINT HINT THAT IT MIGHT IN DUE COURSE BE NEGOTIABLE,
- (B) IN PRINCIPLE, SUBJECT TO (A) ABOVE, HE WISHED TO RESUME INNER-GERMAN CONTACTS, INCLUDING A MEETING WITH SCHMIDT, AT WHICH LONG-STANDING GDR DEMANDS (EG THE FOUR "CONDITIONS") WOULD HAVE TO BE DISCUSSED. THEY WERE NOT HOWEVER PRIOR CONDITIONS FOR A RESUMPTION OF CONTACT.

6. HONECKER ADDED THAT DETENTE IN EUROPE REMAINED THE GDR'S AND WARSAW PACT'S POLICY. HE ALSO INDICATED (WHICH GAUS HAS UNDERLINED TO BONN AS SIGNIFICANT) THAT IT WAS NOT THE INTENTION TO RAISE THE TEMPERATURE IN BERLIN. HE DID THIS BY SAYING THAT HE HAD A LONG LIST OF INSTANCES OF VIOLATIONS OF THE TRANSIT ARRANGEMENTS AND OTHER INFRINGEMENTS OF THE QUADRIPARTITE AGREEMENT ON THE PART OF THE FRG WHICH HE HAD DELIBERATELY SOFT PEDALLED.

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7. GAUS HAS OF COURSE SENT A VERY FULL ACCOUNT TO BONN. (HIS ACCOUNT TO ME CONTAINED MORE DETAIL THAN REPRODUCED ABOVE, BUT I WAS NOT ABLE TO MAKE NOTES OVER THE LUNCH TABLE). AS REGARDS THE TIMING OF THE INTERVIEW, HE BELIEVED THAT HONECKER ATTACHED THE HIGHEST IMPORTANCE TO HIS COMING VISIT TO AUSTRIA, WHERE HE WILL PRESUMABLY BE SPEAKING, IN PART AT LEAST, ON BEHALF OF THE EAST BLOC AS A WHOLE, AND WILL WANT TO MAKE THE BEST POSSIBLE IMPRESSION ON KREISKY AS BEING STILL A MAN OF DETENTE. HE MAY THEREFORE HAVE WANTED TO ANTICIPATE THE QUESTION WHETHER HE HAD ALREADY GIVEN SCHMIDT AN EXPLANATION OF HIS POSITION.

8. I SHOULD ADD THAT, ALTHOUGH THE FRG INTENTION WAS TO KEEP HONECKER'S CONVERSATION WITH GAUS STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL, THE FACT OF THE INTERVIEW TOGETHER WITH A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF GLOSS ON IT LEAKED THROUGH THE BONN CORRESPONDENT OF THE "BERLINER MORGENPOST". THIS LED TO GAUS HAVING TO TELEPHONE BACK HERMANN (POLITBURO) URGENTLY BEFORE WE STARTED OUR LUNCH AND MAY PRESAGE A FURTHER GDR REACTION.

9. FCO PLEASE PASS TO ALL SAVING ADDRESSEES.

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