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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 187 OF 4TH APR 81

IMMEDIATE INFO PEKING (FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY) PRIORITY INFO
BONN PARIS WASHINGTON UKDEL NATO.GENSCHER'S VISIT.

1. VAN WELL GAVE A COMMUNITY BRIEFING AT THE END OF GENSCHER'S VISIT.
2. GENSCHER SPENT SEVEN HOURS WITH GROMYKO AND TWO WITH BREZHNEV. THE TONE WAS GOOD. THERE WERE NO POLEMICS ON THE SOVIET SIDE, BUT THE SOVIET POSITION ON MOST ESSENTIAL ISSUES SHOWED NO MOVEMENT.

SOVIET-FRG RELATIONS.

3. BOTH BREZHNEV AND GROMYKO MADE MUCH OF THE CONTINUING RELATIONSHIP AND IT WAS CLEAR FROM THE PUBLISHED SPEECHES (SEE MIFT, NOT TO ALL) THAT THEY WISHED TO PLACE THE VISIT IN THIS CONTEXT.

SOVIET-US RELATIONS AND AFGHANISTAN.

4. BREZHNEV AND GROMYKO SAW THE US RELATIONSHIP AS A KEY ISSUE. THEY WANTED TO MAINTAIN A DIALOGUE BUT ARGUED THAT CURRENT DIFFICULTIES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS WERE THE FAULT OF THE AMERICANS. THE SOVIET UNION FOR ITS PART WAS PREPARED TO PURSUE CO-OPERATION AND DETENTE WITH THE WEST. THEY WERE KEENLY INTERESTED IN ASSESSING AMERICAN POLICY, WHICH IN THEIR VIEW WAS BASED ON CONFRONTATION AND AN ATTEMPT TO ATTAIN SUPERIORITY. GENSCHER POINTED OUT THAT THE NEW U.S. ADMINISTRATION NEEDED TO REVIEW ALL ITS POLICIES, BUT REVIEW DID NOT NECESSARILY MEAN CHANGE AND IN THOSE AREAS WHERE POLICY HAD SO FAR BEEN DEFINED IT WAS POSITIVE. NEVERTHELESS, REAGAN'S ELECTION REFLECTED DEEP AMERICAN DISAPPOINTMENT AT THE DEVELOPMENT OF EAST/WEST RELATIONS AND SCEPTICISM ABOUT DETENTE. THE SOVIET OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN HAD BEEN A TURNZIIHOMMVTTTTT AND IF THERE WERE TO BE AN IMPROVEMENT IN RELATIONS THERE WAS NEED FOR MOVEMENT TOWARDS A POLITICAL SOLUTION IN AFGHANISTAN.

5. GROMYKO BRIEFLY REPLIED, THAT ON AFGHANISTAN THE SOVIET POSITION ON WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS WAS WELL KNOWN AND HE HAD NO MORE TO SAY. GENSCHER THEREFORE WENT ONCE AGAIN THROUGH THE WESTERN POSITION. BREZHNEV ON THE SECOND DAY REVERTED TO AFGHANISTAN, BUT ONLY TO MAKE THE ARGUMENT THAT WHEREAS THE SOVIET UNION WANTED A POLITICAL SOLUTION THE U.S. WAS UNDER-MINING ATTEMPTS BY PAKISTAN TO ESTABLISH A DIALOGUE (WHETHER BILATERAL, TRILATERAL OR IN THE PRESENCE OF A U.N. REPRESENTATIVE). THE US WANTED ONLY TO MAINTAIN TENSION IN THE AREA AS A PRETEXT FOR DEVELOPING ITS MILITARY POWER THERE. THE

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/BUILD-UP

- BUILD-UP OF FORCES IN THE GULF REGION WAS CONTRARY TO THE STABILITY OF THE REGION AND TO THE INTERESTS OF WESTERN EUROPE. THE SOVIET UNION WAS READY TO DISCUSS AFGHANISTAN AND THE GULF TOGETHER. THIS BROUGHT BREZHNEV BACK TO THE QUESTION OF SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS AS THE MOST DECISIVE FACTOR ON THE INTERNATIONAL SCENE. GENSCHER SAID THAT THE U.S. WAS INTERESTED IN THE RELATIONSHIP AND BREZHNEV INTERJECTED "ARE YOU TELLING ME THAT THE U.S. IS READY TO ENGAGE IN A DIALOGUE AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL?" SUBSEQUENTLY GROMYKO SAID THAT THERE WAS NO TIME PRESSURE. AMBASSADORS COULD MEET ALL THE TIME, BUT A SUMMIT WAS IMPORTANT. THE SOVIET UNION WOULD NOT, HOWEVER, GO CAP IN HAND LOOKING FOR IT.

6. THEATRE NUCLEAR FORCES WERE DISCUSSED AT LENGTH WITH GROMYKO AND BREZHNEV. THERE WERE SEVERAL EXCHANGES ON THE QUESTION WHETHER THE MORATORIUM PROPOSAL, WHICH GENSCHER MADE PLAIN WAS UNACCEPTABLE, WAS A PRECONDITION FOR NEGOTIATIONS. THE FIRST SOVIET POSITION AS PUT BY GROMYKO WAS THAT THE MORATORIUM WHICH WOULD COVER DEPLOYMENT AND PREPARATION OF SITES, BUT NOT PRODUCTION, WOULD NEED TO BE MADE EFFECTIVE BEFORE NEGOTIATIONS BEGAN. GENSCHER SAID THIS SOUNDED LIKE A PRECONDITION. AT A SECOND SESSION WITH GROMYKO, GENSCHER DEVELOPED THE ARGUMENT THAT WHAT WAS NEEDED WAS TO GET NEGOTIATIONS GOING AND REACH A QUICK FIRST RESULT. HE REMINDED GROMYKO OF THE ALLIANCE DECISION WHICH INCLUDED REVIEWING THE NEED FOR LONG-RANGE T.N.F. IN THE LIGHT OF RESULTS OF NEGOTIATIONS. GROMYKO SAID IT WAS RASH TO REJECT THE MORATORIUM IDEA BEFORE EVEN ASKING QUESTIONS, TO WHICH GENSCHER REPLIED THAT THE PROPOSAL HAD BEEN STUDIED CAREFULLY AND THE VIEW OF THE WHOLE ALLIANCE WAS THAT IT WAS NOT A FAIR OR HELPFUL IDEA. GENSCHER ASKED WHETHER THE SOVIET UNION STILL STOOD BY WHAT HAD BEEN SAID TO SCHMIDT, THAT THEY WERE READY TO DISCUSS T.N.F., LEAVING ASIDE THE NATO DECISION AND THE FINAL MEETING BREZHNEV REVERTED TO THIS, SAYING THERE HAD BEEN SOME "INSINUATION" THAT THE MORATORIUM WAS A PRECONDITION. HE STOOD BY WHAT HE HAD PREVIOUSLY SAID TO THE CHANCELLOR. HE WAS READY TO START TALKS WITHOUT PRECONDITIONS. THE MORATORIUM WAS SIMPLY A COMPLEMENTARY IDEA WHICH THEY THOUGHT MIGHT FACILITATE MATTERS.

7. THERE WAS A DISCUSSION OF TNF NUMBERS IN THE COURSE OF WHICH BREZHNEV ARGUED THAT LAUNCHER NUMBERS WERE AT PRESENT APPROXIMATELY EQUAL, WHEREAS THE WEST HAD A 1.5:1 SUPERIORITY IN WAR HEADS. AFTER T.N.F. MODERNISATION IT WOULD HAVE MORE THAN THIS SUPERIORITY IN LAUNCHES TOO. GENSCHER ARGUED THAT THERE WAS AN EASTERN SUPERIORITY. BREZHNEV MUTTERED TO GROMYKO THAT PERHAPS EXPERTS SHOULD MEET AND DISCUSS THE NUMBERS AND GENSCHER TRIED TO FOLLOW THIS UP, BUT GOT NO RESPONSE. IN DISCUSSION OF T.N.F. WEAPONS THE SOVIET SIDE SAID THAT THEY INCLUDED THE BRITISH AND FRENCH NUCLEAR CAPABILITY AS WELL AS F111, F4 AND CARRIER-BASED AIRCRAFT AND SUBMARINES. ON THE SOVIET SIDE THEY INCLUDED MEDIUM RANGE BOMBERS, SPECIFICALLY BACKFIRE. THEY ARGUED THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD NO WEAPONS ON THE TERRITORY OF OTHER STATES WHICH WAS CAPABLE OF REACHING AMERICAN TERRITORY AND WERE TAKEN BACK BY GENSCHER'S REPLY THAT FOR THE NATO

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ALLIANCE THE TERRITORY OF ALL MEMBERS CONSTITUTED A STRATEGIC UNITY. VAN WELL'S CONCLUSION ON T.N.F. WAS THAT AT LEAST THE MORATORIUM IDEA HAD NOW EFFECTIVELY BEEN BURIED, ALTHOUGH THE SOVIET UNION MIGHT PURSUE IT FOR PROPAGANDA PURPOSES.

CSCE.

8. GROMYKO EMPHASISED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE FINAL ACT AND SAW MADRID ONLY AS ONE STAGE IN A LONG TERM PROCESS (VAN WELL COMMENTED THAT THIS SUGGESTED SOVIET HAGGLING AT MADRID WAS ONLY FOR TACTICAL PURPOSES). THEY WANTED A SUBSTANTIVE FINAL DOCUMENT ON MADRID AND WERE STUDYING THE NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED PAPER, BUT HAD NOT YET REACHED A FINAL OPINION ON IT. GENSCHER REPLIED THAT IT CONTAINED SOME POSITIVE POINTS BUT OTHERS THAT WERE DIFFICULT AND IT WOULD NOT BE EASY TO ACCEPT IT AS A BASIS FOR DISCUSSIONS. THE FINAL DOCUMENT MUST COVER ALL AREAS OF THE FINAL ACT. ON CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES, BREZHNEV SAID IT WAS NOW UP TO THE WEST TONAUPÉ ITS CONTRIBUTION. HE COULD NOT TELL GENSCHER WHAT FORM IT OUGHT TO TAKE. VAN WELL HAD A SEPARATE DISCUSSION WITH KOVALEV AND KORNIENKO IN AN ATTEMPT TO SECURE CLARIFICATION AND WAS LEFT WITH THE IMPRESSION THAT THE SOVIET HOPE WAS FOR SOME CONCESSION RELATING TO MAJOR MOVEMENTS OF TROOPS FROM THE U.S. TO EUROPE. ON VERIFICATION GROMYKO ASKED FOR CLARIFICATION, STRESSING THAT NON-INTERFERENCE IN DOMESTIC AFFAIRS WAS A CARDINAL PRINCIPLE FOR THE SOVIET UNION. GENSCHER REPLIED THAT THE ARRANGEMENTS WOULD DEPEND ON THE NEW MEASURES AND WOULD BE NEGOTIATION. GROMYKO ASKED WHETHER THE WESTERN POSITION ON A DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE WAS FOR TWO PHASES OR FOR TWO CONFERENCES. GENSCHER SAID THE IMPORTANT THING WAS THAT THE DECISION ON A NEW PHASE OR A NEW CONFERENCE SHOULD BE TAKEN IN THE LIGHT OF THE NEGOTIATION ON CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES.

POLAND.

9. IN HIS FIRST PRESENTATION TO GROMYKO GENSCHER SPOKE AT LENGTH ABOUT POLAND, STRESSING THE WEST'S DEEP CONCERN AND THE NEED FOR NON-INTERVENTION. GROMYKO IGNORED THIS IN HIS REPLY. GENSCHER THEREFORE TOOK IT UP WITH BREZHNEV WHO AGAIN IGNORED IT. GENSCHER FINALLY REFERRED TO POLAND IN HIS SPEECH AT LUNCH.

MIDDLE EAST AND OTHER AREAS.

10. GENSCHER WENT THROUGH THE EUROPEAN POSITION. IN REPLY GROMYKO SAID IT CONTAINED POSITIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE ELEMENTS. BUT THERE WAS NEED TO PROVIDE FOR THE FORMATION OF AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE (VAN WELL COMMENTED THAT THROUGHOUT THE DISCUSSIONS HE FELT THERE WAS SERIOUS SOVIET CONCERN ABOUT THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE GULF, PARTICULARLY IN RELATION TO AMERICAN POLICY). THERE WAS SOME DISCUSSION ON AFRICA WHICH GAVE GENSCHER THE CHANCE TO REFER TO THE NEED TO CONTINUE THE SEARCH FOR A NAMIBIA SOLUTION THROUGH

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THE U.N. ON NORTH/SOUTH QUESTION GROMYKO TOOK A STANDAR LINE ABOUT WESTERN RESPONSIBILITY . GENSCHER REFERRED TO THE VIENNA MEETINGS AND GROMYKO SAID IT WAS "'NOT EASY"' FOR THE SOVIET UNION TO DECIDE WHETHER TO ACCEPT A POSSIBLE INVITATION. ON BERLIN AND INNER-GERMAN QUESTIONS GENSCHER REFERRED TO THE NEED FOR IMPROVEMENT OF THE SITUATION TO BE BASED ON THE WHOLE TREATY COMPLEX, INCLUDING THE PREAMBLE. GROMYKO IN REPLY STRESSED THE NEED TO RESPECT SOVEREIGNTY. ON BERLIN GENSCHER REFERRED BRIEFLY TO THE QUADRIPARTITE AGREEMENT AND VAN WELL COMMENTED ON THE ABSCENCE OF ANY SOVIET COMPLAINT. ON BILATERAL AND HUMANITARIN QUESTIONS GENSCHER HANDED OVER A LIST OF PERSONAL CASES WHICH GROMYKO SAID WOULD BE STUDIED.

THE GAS PIPELINE WAS MENTION ONLY BRIEFLY IN THE CONTEXT OF DEVELOPING ECONOMIC RELATIONS.

11. VAN WELL DID NOT MENTION SCHMIDT'S LETTER.

KEEBLE

FCO/WHITEHALL
EESD