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[HD/DEF DEPT] *WEB* (2) already advanced

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RESIDENT CLERK

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IMMEDIATE

PS/MO (2)

CONFIDENTIAL

FM MOSCOW 021500Z JUL 81

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 403 OF 2 JULY

INFO BONN, PARIS, WASHINGTON, UKDEL NATO

VISIT BY BRANDT TO MOSCOW

1. BRANDT ARRIVED IN MOSCOW ON 29 JUNE. HE HAD NEARLY 3 HOURS OF TALKS WITH BREZHNEV ON 30 JUNE. ON 1 JULY HE HAD A MEETING WITH PONOMAREV.
2. THE TASS REPORT OF BRANDT'S MEETING WITH BREZHNEV DESCRIBED THE ATMOSPHERE AS "FRINDLY AND CONSTRUCTIVE". IT MENTIONED THE MAIN POINTS TOUCHED ON DURING THE CONVERSATION. THE FRG EMBASSY HAVE GIVEN US THE FOLLOWING ACCOUNT.
3. BREZHNEV OPENED WITH A LENGTHY PRESENTATION OF THE THESIS THAT DETENTE HAS BEEN ENDANGERED BY THE WEST AND IN PARTICULAR BY THE US SEARCH FOR MILITARY SUPERIORITY. HE PLEADED FOR DETENTE TO BE PRESERVED. HE SPOKE AT LENGTH ON THE, WHICH WAS THE DOMINANT SUBJECT OF THE MEETING. WESTERN PLANS WERE NOT MODERNISATION BUT A NEW THREAT REPRESENTING A CHANGING SITUATION. THE SS23 DID NOT CHANGE THE MILITARY

3. BREZHNEV OPENED WITH A LENGTHY PRESENTATION OF THE THESIS THAT DETENTE HAS BEEN ENDANGERED BY THE WEST AND IN PARTICULAR BY THE US SEARCH FOR MILITARY SUPERIORITY. HE PLEADED FOR DETENTE TO BE PRESERVED. HE SPOKE AT LENGTH ON TNF, WHICH WAS THE DOMINANT SUBJECT OF THE MEETING. WESTERN PLANS WERE NOT MODERNISATION BUT A NEW THREAT REPRESENTING A QUALITATIVE CHANGE. THE SS20 DID NOT CHANGE THE MILITARY BALANCE. HE CLAIMED THAT FIGURES SHOWED THAT IF NATO IMPLEMENTED ITS 1979 DECISION IT WOULD ACHIEVE A POSITION OF SUPERIORITY. NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD INCLUDE ALL SYSTEMS INCLUDING FORWARD BASED SYSTEMS, MEDIUM RANGE ROCKETS AND BRITISH AND FRENCH FORCES. IF THE NATO DECISION WERE IMPLEMENTED THE USSR WOULD BE COMPELLED TO TAKE COUNTER MEASURES. IT HAD SHOWN WILLINGNESS TO TALK BY PROPOSING SIMPLE AND CONSTRUCTIVE MEASURES DESIGNED TO REDUCE AND LIMIT NUCLEAR AND MEDIUM RANGE WEAPONS, INCLUDING THOSE HELD BY THE UK AND FRANCE. THE MORATORIUM SHOULD COVER QUANTITY AND QUALITY. TALKS SHOULD NOT BE USED AS A COVER TO INTRODUCE NEW US SYSTEMS. THERE HAD BEEN NO WESTERN REACTION TO SOVIET PROPOSALS. THE SOVIET SIDE DOUBTED WHETHER THE AMERICANS INTENDED TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY ON TNF.

4. BREZHNEV CLAIMED THAT SOVIET IDEAS ON A NORTHERN NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE ZONE WERE A NEW EXAMPLE OF SOVIET DEVOTION TO PEACE. BRANDT GOT NO EXEGESIS, BREZHNEV USED A DIFFERENT FORMULATION FROM THE PUBLIC ONE, BUT THE FRG EMBASSY SAW NO SUBSTANTIVE DIFFERENCE. BREZHNEV SAID THE SOVIET UNION WANTED TO DEVELOP ITS RELATIONS WITH THE FRG. HE CRITICISED US POLICIES TOWARDS CHINA. ON NORTH/SOUTH HE SAID THE PROBLEM WAS NOT THE FAULT OF THE SOVIET UNION BUT OF THE COLONIAL POWERS. THE SOVIET UNION DID A GREAT DEAL TO HELP THE UNDERDEVELOPED. ~~BOOTHBY~~ THE EXCLUSUMMIT IDEA WAS CONCERNED X SOME FORM OF SOVIET REPRESENTATION. (THIS HAS BEEN INTERPRETED IN PRESS BRIEFING TO MEAN THAT BREZHNEV HIMSELF MIGHT GO TO MEXICO. IT SEEMS MORE LIKELY BREZHNEV WAS BEING AS POLITE AS POSSIBLE TO BRANDT BECAUSE OF HIS PERSONAL INTEREST IN NORTH/SOUTH PROBLEMS).

5. BRANDT STRESSED THE DANGERS OF THE PRESENT SITUATION, AND REGRETTED THE FACT THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO MILITARY FOLLOW-UP TO DETENTE. THE FRG'S ROLE WAS LIMITED. SOVIET MEDIA CRITICISM, FOR EXAMPLE, IN THE POLISH CONTEXT, DID NOT HELP. SCHMIDT'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON HAD CONFIRMED THAT THE US WERE PREPARED TO TALK ON THE BASIS AGREED BY NATO. SS20'S HAD BEEN A LONG TERM PREOCCUPATION OF THE WEST AND OF SCHMIDT IN PARTICULAR. THERE WERE BIG DIFFERENCES IN THE

TALK ON THE BASIS AGREED BY HATO. SCRO'S HAD BEEN A LONG TERM PREOCCUPATION OF THE WEST AND OF SCHMIDT IN PARTICULAR. THERE WERE BIG DIFFERENCES IN THE DATA BASE USED BY EACH SIDE WHICH SHOULD BE DISCUSSED AT THE NEGOTIATING TABLE. THE ZERO OPTION WAS A DESIRABLE OUTCOME. IT WAS NECESSARY TO CLARIFY WHAT THE RUSSIANS HAD DONE WITH THEIR SS4'S AND SS5'S AND WHAT THEIR INTENTIONS WERE ON DEPLOYING FURTHER SS23'S. TALKS SHOULD CONCENTRATE ON THE MOST DANGEROUS PROBLEM, THE ROCKETS, LEAVING FBS TO A LATER STAGE. BREZHNEV COMPLAINED OF A "TENDENCY TO INTERFERE" IN POLAND AND MENTIONED THE SALE OF PRINTING EQUIPMENT TO SOLIDARNOSC. BRANDT SAID THAT IF THIS COMPLAINT WAS TO BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY SPECIFIC DETAILS WERE NEEDED, WHICH THE SOVIET SIDE HAD NEVER BEEN WILLING TO GIVE.

6. MY TEL NO 401 INCLUDED WHAT WE KNOW OF THE EXCHANGES BETWEEN BRANDT AND PONOMAREV ON AFGHANISTAN. THE TWO ALSO DISCUSSED ARMS CONTROL, WITH PONOMAREV RESTATING THE SOVIET POSITION ON TNF. PONOMAREV SAID THAT THE US-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP WAS NOW SUCH THAT THE SOVIET SIDE DOUBTED US READINESS TO NEGOTIATE. THE PROPOSED GROMYKO/HAIG MEETING IN NEW YORK WAS NOT EQUIVALENT TO NEGOTIATIONS.

7. BRANDT HAS DESCRIBED HIS VISIT AS "FACT FINDING". BREZHNEV SEEMS TO HAVE TREATED HIM WITH RESPECT AND EVEN FRIENDSHIP, AND POSSIBLY FOR THIS REASON BRANDT'S AIDES HAVE BEEN INCLINED TO GIVE THE PRESS AN OPTIMISTIC INTERPRETATION OF WHAT WAS SAID.

KEEBLE

PARA 4 LINE 10 SO FAAR AS THE CANCUN SUMMIT IDEA WAS CONCERNED HE DID NOT EXCLUDE SOME FORM OF SOVIET REPRESENTATION.

IMMEDIATE

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