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FM BONN 121625Z NOV 81

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 896 OF 12 NOVEMBER

INFO ROUTINE MOSCOW UKDEL NATO MOD(DS12) CICC(G) PARIS BMG BERLIN
EAST BERLIN WASHINGTON AND UKDEL MADRIDINFO SAVING ANKARA ATHENS BRUSSELS COPENHAGEN THE HAGUE LISBON
LUXEMBOURG OSLO OTTAWA REYKJAVIK ROME AND UKDEL VIENNA

(95) (16) (18) MY TELS NOS 879, 880 AND 885 AND MIPT (NOT TO ALL):

BREZHNEV'S VISIT TO BONN.

1. VON DER GABLENTZ (CHANCELLOR'S OFFICE) TOLD ME YESTERDAY THAT CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT WAS HEAVILY PREOCCUPIED WITH THE PREPARATIONS FOR THIS VISIT. HE SAW IT MAINLY IN TERMS OF PROMOTING MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING IE. HELPING BREZHNEV UNDERSTAND WHAT THE WEST WANTS AND FINDING OUT MORE ABOUT WHAT THE RUSSIANS ARE AIMING AT. HE DID NOT SEE THE FRG AS AN INTERMEDIARY: HE WOULD BE MAKING IT CLEAR TO BREZHNEV THAT THE FRG WAS FIRMLY IN THE WESTERN CAMP, INCLUDING OVER LRTNF. BUT HE FELT THERE WAS A JOB OF INTERPRETATION TO BE DONE BETWEEN THE WEST AND THE SOVIET UNION, AND THAT HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH BREZHNEV ENABLED HIM TO PLAY A ROLE IN THIS. AT THE SAME TIME, HE WAS REALISTIC ABOUT THE LIMITATIONS IMPOSED BY BREZHNEV'S HEALTH AND HIS ABILITY TO CONTROL HIS OWN BUREAUCRACY.

2. THE RUSSIANS TOO, SAID GABLENTZ, WERE CONCERNED TO HAVE A SERIOUS DIALOGUE, THOUGH THEY ALSO HAD AIMS WHICH THE GERMANS DID NOT SHARE. THE GERMANS WERE STRUGGLING TO KEEP THE VISIT A WORKING ONE THOUGH OF SPECIAL IMPORTANCE AND STATUS. THE CHANCELLOR INTENDED TO DISCUSS EAST-WEST RELATIONS GENERALLY, AND TO PRESS FOR A REAGAN/BREZHNEV MEETING AT AN OPPORTUNE MOMENT (HE WAS IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN). HE WOULD LAY GREAT EMPHASIS ON THE IMPORTANCE OF ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS, AND ESPECIALLY OF ACHIEVING AT LEAST SOME ACTUAL REDUCTIONS IN LRTNF BY SUMMER 1983. HE WOULD ARGUE THAT THIS WAS THE BEST WAY TO INFLUENCE THE EXTENT OF WESTERN DEPLOYMENT OF TNF (AND COULD EVEN, IF THE ZERO OPTION WAS TAKEN SERIOUSLY, OBLVIATE THE NEED FOR ANY WESTERN

CONFIDENTIAL

/ DEPLOYMENT).

DEPLOYMENT). IT WOULD ALSO GIVE THE RIGHT SIGNAL FOR FUTURE ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS AND WOULD THUS MEET SOVIET CONCERNS ABOUT LIMITING FUTURE US PROGRAMMES. HE WOULD STICK TO THE LINE AGREED AT MONTEBELLO, AND WOULD ARGUE THE NEED FOR WORLD WIDE RESTRAINT AND MODERATION AS A PRE-CONDITION FOR A CONSTRUCTIVE EAST-WEST DIALOGUE.

3. SCHMIDT WOULD REPEAT WHAT HE SAID TO BREZHNEV ABOUT AFGHANISTAN IN JULY 1980, AND WOULD URGE THE MERITS OF YOUR

PROPOSALS AS THE RIGHT WAY TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM.

4. ON BILATERAL ISSUES, GABLENTZ SAID THE CHANCELLOR WOULD STRESS THE IMPORTANCE OF LONG TERM BILATERAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION. THOUGH THE GAS PIPE LINE DEAL WAS NOT YET FINALLY CONCLUDED, THE GERMANS NOW EXPECTED IT WOULD BE READY FOR SIGNATURE DURING THE VISIT. NO FORMULA FOR THE SIGNATURE CEREMONY HAD YET BEEN AGREED, BUT LAMBSDORFF MIGHT ATTEND FOR THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. ALL THIS HAD BEEN EXPLAINED TO THE AMERICANS DURING RASHISH'S VISIT (FCO TELNO 490 TO BONN, PARA. 2). SCHMIDT WOULD RAISE THE QUESTION OF ETHNIC GERMANS LEAVING THE SOVIET UNION, AND WOULD STRESS THE IMPORTANCE OF PERMITTING THIS BOTH IN HUMANITARIAN TERMS AND FOR THE SAKE OF THE SOVIET IMAGE IN THE FRG. (IN A BUNDESTAG DEBATE YESTERDAY, ALL POLITICAL PARTIES STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE THEY ATTACHED TO THIS).

5. HE WOULD IMPRESS ON BREZHNEV THE FUTILITY OF TRYING TO CHANGE THE FRG'S POSITION IN NATO THROUGH PROPAGANDA IN SUPPORT OF THE PEACE MOVEMENT OR THE PROMOTION OF ANTI-GOVERNMENT DEMONSTRATIONS IN THE FRG. THIS WOULD MERELY RESULT IN CHANGING THE POLITICAL CLIMATE HERE IN A DIRECTION HOSTILE TO SOVIET INTERESTS (FROM WHICH I TOOK HIM TO MEAN BRINGING DOWN THE COALITION AND LETTING IN THE CDU/CSU).

6. THE FOLLOWING POINTS ADDITIONAL TO THOSE IN TURS HAVE EMERGED FROM DISCUSSION ABOUT THE VISIT WITH OTHER OFFICIALS. PARA 5 OF MY TELNO 592 (NOT TO ALL) REPORTS WHAT WE HAVE BEEN TOLD ABOUT THE

CONFIDENTIAL

HANDLING OF MBFR.

(A) LRTNF

THE GERMANS CLEARLY EXPECT A SOVIET INITIATIVE IN THIS AREA BUT HAVE NO INDICATION WHAT IT WILL BE. THEY THINK IT LESS LIKELY TO BE A NEGOTIATING PROPOSAL TO SCHMIDT THAN AN IDEA DIRECTED AT PUBLIC OPINION, E.G. IN BREZHNEV'S DINNER SPEECH:

(B) ON MADRID, THE GERMANS BELIEVE THE RUSSIANS WILL CONTINUE TO INSIST ON A GEOGRAPHICAL RATHER THAN FUNCTIONAL APPROACH TO CBMS, AND THAT THE WEST WILL EVENTUALLY HAVE TO MODIFY ITS POSITION ON THIS. THEY SEE LITTLE REAL POSSIBILITY OF SECURING FURTHER RUSSIAN CONCESSIONS OVER HUMAN RIGHTS AS WELL AS OVER CDE:

(C) THOUGH NO CULTURAL AGREEMENT IS IN PROSPECT, THERE WILL BE VARIOUS CULTURAL MANIFESTATIONS IN THE MARGINS OF THE VISIT. THE SOVIET DEPUTY MINISTER FOR CULTURE WILL BE HERE IN CONNECTION WITH A SOVIET EXHIBITION IN COLOGNE ON 20 NOVEMBER, THE DEPUTY MINISTER FOR HIGHER EDUCATION WILL BE HERE AROUND THE SAME TIME (POSSIBLY TO DISCUSS INTENSIFICATION OF BILATERAL ACADEMIC EXCHANGES) AND LEADING BOLSHOI SINGERS WILL BE PERFORMING IN AN OPERA IN COLOGNE ON 23 NOVEMBER:

(D) THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT THE RUSSIANS MAY BE PRESSING FOR FURTHER BILATERAL ENERGY COLLABORATION, ESPECIALLY IN THE FIELD OF NUCLEAR POWER. THEY ARE RUMOURED TO HAVE RESPONDED WITH INTEREST WHEN RAU (SPD PREMIER OF NORTH-RHINE-WESTPHALIA) DURING HIS RECENT VISIT TO MOSCOW RAISED THE POSSIBILITY OF SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN THE HIGH TEMPERATURE REACTOR AT SCHMEHAUSEN. THERE WAS TALK OF A JOINT FRG/USSR ENERGY SYMPOSIUM AND EXHIBITION AT NOVOSIBIRSK. THE SOVIET ENVIRONMENTAL MINISTER PROMOTED THE CAUSE OF NUCLEAR POWER IN A SPEECH IN MUNICH THIS WEEK. THE GERMANS

CONFIDENTIAL

SAY IT IS HIGHLY UNLIKELY THEY WILL RAISE THIS QUESTION, BUT THE RUSSIANS MAY:

(E) THE GERMANS REGARD REUNIFICATION OF ETHNIC GERMAN FAMILIES AS ONE AREA WHERE THEY COULD POCKET ANY RUSSIAN CONCESSION WITHOUT EXPOSING THEMSELVES TO PRESSURE. BUT THEY SEE NO EVIDENCE THAT A CONCESSION WILL BE OFFERED:

(F) THE GERMANS ARE ONLY JUST ON THE POINT OF TABLING THEIR DRAFT FOR THE COMMUNIQUE, BECAUSE OF DELAYS IN GETTING MINISTERIAL AGREEMENT. IT IS LIKELY, FOR TACTICAL REASONS, TO BE LESS ACCEPTABLE TO THE RUSSIANS THAN THE RUSSIAN DRAFT, GIVEN TO VON STADEN IN MOSCOW, IS ACCEPTABLE TO THE GERMANS.
FCO PASS SAVING ABOVE

GOODALL

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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