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Mr Giffard

RJA. Acland

FALKLANDS: POSSIBLE OUTCOMES.

1. As agreed at the meeting of your strategy group this morning, I attach a list of possible circumstances surrounding an Argentine withdrawal from the Falkland Islands, without the use of force, in roughly descending order of desirability, as requested by Sir A Acland earlier in the morning.
2. The list is probably not exhaustive, and there are various permutations among the options.
3. Ministers will need to decide which of these options are acceptable and which unacceptable. If it appears that the Argentines will not accept any of the solutions Ministers regard as acceptable, Ministers will need to decide whether the use of force is preferable to agreeing to an option regarded as unacceptable.
4. Considerations relevant to a decision on the best course to follow would include:
 - (i) the wishes of the Islanders;
 - (ii) public and parliamentary opinion in the UK;
international
 - (iii) the extent of/support for HMG, and condemnation of Argentina, over the dispute; and an assessment of how international opinion would be affected by the use of force by HMG to recapture the Islands;
 - (iv) an assessment of Argentine intentions;
 - (v) the likelihood of the present Argentine government falling, to be replaced by a more moderate one, if international opinion is strongly opposed to Argentina, and if the threat of force by HMG is seen to be real;
 - (vi) the ability and willingness of HMG to bear the cost of keeping a naval force in the vicinity of the Falkland Islands after their recapture, sufficient to deter another Argentine invasion;
 - (vi) the likely casualties among British and Argentine forces of a naval engagement and an opposed landing on the Islands; and the likelihood of civilian casualties;
 - (vii) the likelihood of reprisals, official or unofficial, against the British passport holders in Argentina, in the event of a military engagement;

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- (viii) the possible effects of various options on wider British interests: eg. the effect on other dependent territories, and the effect of possible economic sanctions against the UK by Latin American countries.

M H Jay

5 April 1982

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cc: PS/PUS^m
Sir A Acland ←
Sir I Sinclair
Mr Bullard
Mr Wright
Lord Bridges
Mr Ure
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LIST OF POSSIBLE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL FROM THE FALKLAND ISLANDS, WITHOUT THE USE OF FORCE, IN ROUGHLY DESCENDING ORDER OF DESIRABILITY.

1. Unconditional withdrawal of Argentine forces, and the re-establishment of British administration.
2. Withdrawal of Argentine forces and re-establishment of British administration conditional upon negotiations through an intermediary, eg. USA or UN Secretary-General, which might take the form of:
 - i) mediation by the intermediary himself in relation to the substance of the dispute;
 - ii) mediation by the intermediary leading to:-
 - a) reference by the Security Council to the ICJ for an advisory opinion on the sovereignty issue;
 - b) reference of the dispute to the ICJ by Argentina and ourselves (which would result in a binding decision).
3. Withdrawal of Argentine forces on same conditions as (2) above but with temporary administration of the Islands by neutral authority, eg. temporary United States or UN Administrator or Commissioner.
4. Withdrawal of Argentine forces following agreement on cession of sovereignty over South Georgia and Sandwich Islands, with Falkland Islands remaining British.
5. Withdrawal of Argentine forces following agreement on transfer of sovereignty to Argentina, with the Islands leased back to and administered by UK for indefinite or fixed period.
6. Withdrawal of Argentine forces, but continuing Argentine administration, ^{following} evacuation to UK, other Commonwealth country or dependent territory, of those Islanders who wished it. (Evacuation might be an element in other solutions too).
7. Withdrawal of Argentine forces following formal cession of sovereignty by HMG (this would require an Act of Parliament).