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LONDON SW1A 2AA

18 September 1986


From the Private Secretary

Dear Tony,

ANGLO-GERMAN SUMMIT

The Prime Minister commented unfavourably on what she regarded as the unnecessarily large number of officials attending the Anglo-German Summit in Bonn this week. She wishes numbers to be restricted more severely in future. You and other recipients of this letter will wish to bear this in mind for the next Anglo-German consultations (and indeed for the Anglo-French consultations in November). A Minister plus a single official and a Private Secretary should be the maximum necessary.

I am copying this letter to Departments most likely to be involved in these bilateral summits: thus to Alex Allan (HM Treasury), Timothy Walker (Department of Trade and Industry), John Howe (Ministry of Defence), Robin Young (Department of the Environment), Stephen Boys Smith (Home Office), Ivor Llewelyn (Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food), Tim Abraham (Office of Mr. Pattie, Department of Trade and Industry), Barbara Jones (Office of Mr. Waldegrave, Department of the Environment) and to Michael Stark (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,


(C. D. POWELL)

A. C. Galsworthy, Esq., C.M.G.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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From the Private Secretary

18 September 1986

ANGLO-GERMAN SUMMIT

My letter of today's date recorded the main points of the Prime Minister's talk with Chancellor Kohl at the Anglo-German Summit. This letter amplifies some aspects of the discussion of South Africa for much more restricted circulation. The reason is that the Chancellor stressed that his remarks were strictly personal and that he did not want his views reported to the German Foreign Ministry. The Prime Minister gave him an undertaking on this which we must honour.

In essence, Chancellor Kohl is keen to launch a further initiative to help achieve a peaceful solution in South Africa. This would be a tripartite effort by the UK, FRG and US. He claims that the South African government remained open to discussion, on the basis of the following formula (whose ingredients will be familiar to you):

"In return for willingness on the part of the South African government to consider a binding commitment to release Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners, to unban the ANC, and to embark on a peaceful dialogue, the Front Line States would use their influence with the ANC to ensure a commitment on their part to call for an end to violence and to enter peaceful negotiations" (translated from the original German!).

He would like to see the scope for making progress on this basis explored further with the UK and the US, and then by all three of them with the South African government. He did not want to work through the Auswaertiges Amt, whom he regarded as unreliable on this issue. It was important to proceed very discreetly. He suggested that there should be contacts between Herr Teltschik and me.

The Prime Minister took the Chancellor through the difficulties, pointed out that this particular route had been thoroughly explored both by the Eminent Persons Group and by the Foreign Secretary, and discouraged any early approach to the South Africans. But she agreed that a further initiative