

GRS 450

COLLAR
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FM BONN

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 018

OF 121045Z JANUARY 87

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, UKREP BRUSSELS, UKDEL NATO

INFO PRIORITY EAST BERLIN

INFO ROUTINE OTHER EUROPEAN COMMUNITY POSTS

CALL ON GENSCHER: 12 JANUARY

1. I SAW GENSCHER FOR 40 MINUTES THIS MORNING. HE WAS IN VERY GOOD FORM AND LOOKED PHYSICALLY MUCH BETTER THAN HE HAD DONE AT THE PRESIDENT'S NEW YEAR RECEPTION LAST WEEK. HE SPOKE WITH COMPLETE CONFIDENCE ABOUT THE FDP GETTING BACK INTO THE BUNDESTAG, THOUGH HE WAS NOT PREPARED TO GIVE ANY FIGURES, SAYING THAT THERE WERE TOO MANY "DON'T KNOWS" ABOUT FOR THIS TO BE POSSIBLE.

EC BUDGET

2. I SAID, AS INSTRUCTED IN TELEPHONE CALL FROM WALL, THAT WE WOULD WANT TO WORK VERY CLOSELY WITH THE FRG IN RESISTING DELORS' OVER-GENEROUS IDEAS. GENSCHER NODDED, AND ASKED FOR A REPORT ON DELORS' TALKS IN LONDON BEFORE HE CAME TO BONN ON 13 FEBRUARY. I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR INSTRUCTIONS IN DUE COURSE.

EC/US

3. I GAVE GENSCHER THE FLAVOUR OF YOUR TALK ON THIS SUBJECT WITH SHULTZ, DRAWING ON YOUR TELNO 30 TO WASHINGTON, AND SAYING THAT HE HAD BEEN UNDER-BRIEFED ON THE DETAILS, QUITE TOUGH IN HIS GENERAL ATTITUDE, BUT ANXIOUS TO SEE THE ISSUE SETTLED THIS MONTH. GENSCHER AGREED, SAYING THAT HE THOUGHT THE COMMISSION WERE INCLINED TO TAKE TOO STRONG A LINE IN PUBLIC. EC RETALIATION WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY LEAD TO COUNTER-RETALIATION. BUT THE AMERICANS' CLAIMS SIMPLY DID NOT STAND UP: SPANISH AND PORTUGUESE ACCESSION WAS COSTING THE FRG ALONE MORE THAN DOLLARS 400 MILLION, BUT THE ACCESSION WAS IN ANY CASE IN THE WESTERN INTEREST INCLUDING AMERICA'S.

ARMS CONTROL

4. GENSCHER SHOWED KEEN INTEREST IN THIS PART OF YOUR TALKS WITH SHULTZ. I SAID WE WOULD TRY TO LET THE AUSWAERTIGES AMT HAVE AN ACCOUNT OF SOME KIND THIS WEEK.

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LEAST.

EAST/WEST RELATIONS

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5. GENSCHER SAID HE WAS SUSPENDING JUDGEMENT ABOUT THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CEASEFIRE OFFER IN AFGHANISTAN: SUCH OFFERS WERE ALWAYS IN THE INTEREST OF THE ESTABLISHED AUTHORITY. BUT HE WOULD KNOW FROM HIS SPEECH IN MUNICH (MY TELNO 02 SAYING) THAT HE ATTACHED GREAT IMPORTANCE TO RECENT INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIET UNION. THERE WAS ALSO THE FACT THAT SHEVARDNADZE HAD TWICE FIXED AND POSTPONED A VISIT TO EAST BERLIN. GENSCHER'S GUESS WAS THAT GORBACHEV FELT HE NEEDED ALL HIS LIEUTENANTS WITHIN REACH SO AS TO BE ABLE TO HANDLE THE MANY BALLS WITH WHICH HE WAS JUGGLING AT THE SAME TIME.

6. HE SAID HE TOOK THE MAIN MESSAGE OF THE MUNICH SPEECH TO BE THAT THE WEST SHOULD BE SEEKING TO USE THE GORBACHEV ERA AND STYLE TO MAXIMUM ADVANTAGE. THE VISITS TO MOSCOW BY MR RENTON THIS WEEK AND BY THE PRIME MINISTER IN THE SPRING SHOWED THAT WE WERE DOING JUST THIS. HOW LONG DID GENSCHER THINK IT WOULD BE BEFORE THE FRG WAS BACK IN BUSINESS WITH MOSCOW? GENSCHER SAID THE KEY DATE WAS NOT THE ELECTION ON 25 JANUARY BUT THE GOVERNMENT DECLARATION WHICH THE CHANCELLOR WOULD DELIVER TO THE BUNDESTAG SOME TIME IN FEBRUARY. AFTER THAT HE EXPECTED THE SOVIET UNION TO MOVE TO NORMALISE RELATIONS, STARTING PERHAPS WITH SIGNATURE OF ONE OR MORE OF THE OUTSTANDING TECHNICAL AGREEMENTS AND ACCEPTANCE OF VISITS TO MOSCOW BY THE GERMAN MINISTERS CONCERNED. IN DUE COURSE SHEVARDNADZE WOULD COME TO BONN. MEANWHILE THE FREEZE WAS MORE IN THE CLIMATE THAN IN THE OPERATIONAL DETAIL OF FRG/SOVIET RELATIONS.

OTHER POINTS.

7. REPORTED BY BAG.

BULLARD

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