



10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

11 April 1987

Dear Tony,

As the Foreign Secretary is aware, the Prime Minister agreed that I should attend an informal meeting with M. Attali and Herr Teltschik in Paris on 10 April. I enclose a note of our discussions. As you will see, there are three points for eventual decision:

- whether the Prime Minister, President Mitterrand and Chancellor Kohl should make a common presentation of their views on INF questions to the Americans after George Shultz' visit to Moscow. This is something we can determine only when we know the outcome of that visit and what the Russians propose;
- whether the Prime Minister should take a lead in suggesting to President Reagan that there should be a meeting of the Berlin Four at Head of Government level during his visit to Europe this summer;
- and whether Attali, Teltschik and I should meet again in about three weeks' time.

Both Attali and Teltschik emphasised that no-one other than their respective Heads of Government knew about our meeting. We shall see. But there is everything to be said for limiting knowledge of it if we can and I should be grateful if you would show this letter and my note to the Foreign Secretary only.

Yours sincerely,

C. D. POWELL

A. C. Galsworthy, Esq., C.M.G.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

SECRET AND PERSONAL

File 1229

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SIR PERCY CRADOCK

I attach, strictly for your private information, a note of a meeting which I had in Paris on 10 April with M. Attali and Herr Teltschik. Only the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary are aware that the meeting took place. The contents of the discussions were not particularly sensitive but all three Heads of Government are keen to keep knowledge of the meeting very close indeed.

CDP

C. D. POWELL

11 April 1987

SECRET AND PERSONAL

PRIME MINISTER

ANGLO/FRENCH/GERMAN CONSULTATIONS

I attach a note recording the main points from my talks with M. Attali and Herr Teltschik in Paris yesterday (which were of course held before Mr. Gorbachev's latest proposals on arms control). They were quite useful, principally in underlining the desire of our three Governments to co-ordinate our views as closely as possible on arms control issues. The points for decision which arose are three:

- whether you, Mitterrand and Kohl should make a common presentation of your views on INF questions to the Americans after George Shultz's visit to Moscow. This is something we can determine only when we know the outcome of that visit and what the Russians propose;
- whether you should take a lead in suggesting to President Reagan that there should be a meeting of the Berlin Four at Head of Government level during his visit to Europe this summer;
- whether Attali, Teltschik and I should meet again in about three week's time.

C.D.P.
C. D. POWELL11 April 1987

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NOTE FOR THE RECORD

ANGLO/FRENCH/GERMAN CONSULTATIONS

I had some three hours of discussions in Paris yesterday with M. Attali and Herr Teltschik. The initiative for the meeting came from them.

Attali and Teltschik evidently meet regularly. The extension of their meetings to include us was, they said, stimulated by the Prime Minister's initiative in consulting President Mitterrand and Chancellor Kohl before her visit to Moscow. This had made a powerful impact. Both are keen to continue tripartite contacts in this group (see below). In Attali's case there is an element - of which we need to be cautious - of reinforcing President Mitterrand's role at the expense of Chirac.

Prime Minister's Visit to Moscow

I gave them a rather more detailed account of the Prime Minister's discussions in Moscow on arms control than we provided in the message to European Heads of Government.

Arms Control

Most of the time was spent on arms control. There was not much new in substance. The main point was the strong wish to co-ordinate French, German and British views as closely as possible, particularly on INF matters. Our discussions took place before news of Gorbachev's latest proposals.

The INF negotiations were very much in the forefront of their concerns, and particularly how the West should react to a Soviet offer of zero SRINF. Attali and Teltschik expected such an offer to be made, thought that the United States would be very tempted to accept it, and that public opinion in Europe would be impressed, constricting the room for manoeuvre of European governments. But both made clear that their governments would prefer to avoid zero-zero if possible and were alive to the dangers of being led inexorably down the

path towards elimination of United States nuclear weapons in Europe.

There were also some differences of nuance. Attali reflected President Mitterrand's familiar scepticism about the military value of shorter-range nuclear weapons. His three main points were:

- we should not talk about the 'denuclearisation' of Europe since this implied that the United Kingdom and French strategic deterrents might be subject to constraints or eliminated altogether. We should not admit this possibility, even by implication;
- strong French opposition to negotiations on shorter-range systems which would impinge on the new French missiles shortly to be deployed (with a range of 400 km). This led him to the conclusion that any follow-on negotiations after an INF agreement should be limited to systems in the range 500 km - 1000 km. There should be a 'Chinese wall' against negotiations below that range; and
- negotiations on INF and (if unavoidable) shorter-range systems should be balanced by a formal reaffirmation by the United States of its commitment to use strategic nuclear weapons in the event of Warsaw Pact attack on Europe.

Teltschik reflected the schizophrenia of the German government's position, pulled in different directions by Kohl and Genscher. Genscher's aim was to get an INF agreement signed and sealed as rapidly as possible and he was prepared to jettison virtually any awkward conditions about shorter-range systems to achieve this. Kohl's objective was to avoid a zero option for systems in the range 500 km - 1000 km. The question was: what were the best tactics to achieve this? The ideal solution would be Soviet agreement to equal ceilings greater than zero on such systems, embodied in

the text of an INF agreement. But if - as the Germans suspected - this proved unnegotiable, it would be better to leave these systems to the follow-on negotiations, with the western right to match unimpeded. The German view - unlike that of the French - was that these follow-on negotiations would then cover the whole range from 150 km - 1000 km. Teltschik did not conceal his differences with the French on this point, stemming from German anxiety to see the short-range systems (150 km - 500 km) which threaten Germany and no-one else reduced drastically, while longer-range systems are preserved. He also reflected German worries about being left as the only country in western Europe stationing weapons - the Pershing Is - in the SRINF category. The Germans would want to see some willingness on the part of Belgium, Netherlands, and Italy if not to station Pershing Is at least to store them, so that they could be moved forward into Germany in times of increased tension. This would spread the load.

I said that we should argue strongly for inclusion of equal ceilings above zero on SRINF in an INF agreement, as the Prime Minister had done in Moscow. The arguments why this was necessary in order to preserve western security were strong. We should not be defeatist about convincing public opinion in Europe of them, and we should not let ourselves be bounced into a new zero option. It was important to stick firmly to the agreed position on this, as set out in the American draft Treaty. But we also had to bear in mind that a western right to match might in practice be difficult to exercise. I did not fully share Attali's view on the need for a reaffirmation of the United States commitment to use its strategic nuclear weapons in defence of Europe: this might actually make it appear that we doubted the commitment. Part of the importance of common ceilings above zero on shorter-range systems was to avoid removing any further rungs from the ladder of flexible response, after an INF agreement. I warned of the likelihood that the Soviet Union would try to draw the American dual-capable aircraft in Europe into negotiations on short-range systems. This must be resisted. We should link

follow-on negotiations on short-range systems to progress in reducing imbalances in chemical and conventional weapons.

Attali raised the question how our three governments might best put their views to the United States Administration after Shultz' visit to Moscow (and the expected Soviet offer of a zero option on SRINF). He wondered whether there might be a joint letter from the Prime Minister, President Mitterrand and Chancellor Kohl. I said that the important thing was to coordinate our responses so that, so far as possible, we all said the same thing. How we did it was a tactical question which could only be decided when we saw what emerged from Shultz' meeting. A common letter might appear confrontational, but equally could be an impressive demonstration of solidarity. We should keep an open mind.

We talked less about other arms control topics. We were all three sceptical about the prospects of progress on conventional weapons. Attali argued for preserving a clear distinction between negotiations on shorter-range nuclear weapons and on conventional force reductions.

EC Questions

There was no time for full discussion of these but I made two points:

- the United Kingdom would definitely not accept an Inter-Governmental Agreement this year, as the Commission seemed likely to propose;
- the European Council in June would be only a beginning to serious discussion by Heads of Government of future financing of the Community.

WEU

Teltschik said that the German government were keen to make early progress in strengthening the WEU. This must include moving the institutions to Brussels, to be alongside NATO and the EC. Attali saw no problem with this latter point (but

subsequently telephoned me to say that he discovered that the French government were keen to keep the Secretariat in Paris). He appeared to see the future of WEU partly in domestic political terms: Chirac was taking a lead, so Mitterrand was cautious. I said that our views had been set out in the Foreign Secretary's recent speech.

South Africa

Teltschik and Attali said that the Americans had recently proposed to them that the Economic Summit should issue a statement on South Africa. They were not enthusiastic. I said that we would be very much opposed.

Quadripartite/Tripartite Meetings

There was some discussion of a possible Berlin Four meeting at Head of Government level this year, given that the 750th Anniversary of the City would provide good cover for such a meeting. It was agreed that it would not be appropriate to hold it in Venice, but it might be possible to do so at some other point in President Reagan's visit to Europe. Attali subsequently telephoned to say that he had discussed this with President Mitterrand who was enthusiastic and wondered whether the Prime Minister might like to suggest the idea to President Reagan. She could quote his support and readiness to host a meeting in Paris if convenient.

It was also suggested that the Berlin Three might meet at Head of Government level over breakfast at European Councils.

Further Meetings

Attali and Teltschik were keen to meet again in this group fairly soon (and suggested 5 May in London). I said that I would have to obtain confirmation of this.

C.D.P

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11 April 1987
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