

PRIME MINISTER

ANGLO/FRENCH/GERMAN CONSULTATIONS

I sent the Foreign Secretary a copy of the note about my talk with Attali and Teltschik. His comments are attached.

On a possible Quadripartite Meeting at Head of Government level during the President's visit to Europe, I have asked Sir A. Acland to sound out Carlucci privately, to establish the President's reaction to the idea and the feasibility.

On the idea of a Tripartite breakfast at the next European Council, the Foreign Secretary has misgivings and I suggest you discuss this with him at your next bilateral. *I think you should hold your ground. After all, you have an invitation.*

Finally, there is the question of a further meeting with Attali and Teltschik. The Foreign Secretary has no objection to a meeting in London on 5 May. It would need to be in No.10, I think. Can I please have authority to go ahead with this?

*Yes - it is necessary*

*C.D.P.*

Charles Powell

21 April 1987



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

15 April 1987

*Dear Charles,*

Many thanks for your letter of 11 April about your meeting with Attali and Teltschik. As you requested, I have shown it only to the Foreign Secretary.

The Foreign Secretary thinks that this was a useful meeting, though he endorses everything you say about the need for such meetings to be discreet, and to watch closely the Chirac/Mitterrand angle.

We are clearly moving into a difficult phase on INF: we shall be writing to you after the Shultz debrief tomorrow with a preliminary analysis, and I will not anticipate that. The Foreign Secretary thinks that we must try to get a coherent line on this subject within the Alliance very rapidly if we are not to appear totally disorganised to the Western press. For this a military input is necessary, and he is worried by the somewhat leisurely pace of military consideration at present envisaged in the NATO machinery. It may prove difficult to speed this up, though we shall try. But he hopes that we will not allow this to deter us from deciding what position our own national interest dictates that we should seek to establish in the Alliance. The implication of this is that our own military may well have to be pressed to give views in advance of NATO decisions, which they will be reluctant to do.

Of the matters covered in your letter, some are relatively easy:

- it is clear that we should resist strongly the incorporation of dual-use aircraft into any negotiations
- it is also clear that we should keep a strong link between any discussion of short range nuclear weapons (SNF) with conventional and chemical forces. Gorbachev's approach actually seems likely to facilitate this.

Treatment of SRINF will be much more difficult. Sticking to the present Alliance position as long as it is tenable clearly makes sense. But the Foreign



Secretary is inclined to think that it will not look sensible for long to resist an agreement purely in order to defend a theoretical option of deployment of SRINF weapons which in practice would be very difficult if not impossible to implement (the inclusion or non-inclusion of the German Pershing IAs will be a complicating factor). It is possible that Gorbachev's offer, if he has indeed made it, will be one which in the end we cannot refuse. Crucial to this will be an assessment of:

- whether there is or is not an adequate range of responses remaining to us without either LRINF and SRINF;
- whether holding on to a theoretical option to deploy SRINF would in practice improve that range of responses.

Meanwhile the Foreign Secretary agrees with the French suggestion that we should avoid talking about the denuclearisation of Europe. Like you, he is less certain whether a formal reaffirmation by the United States of its commitment to use strategic nuclear weapons in the event of a Warsaw Pact attack on Europe would be helpful.

#### EC Questions

The Foreign Secretary fully endorses the points you made.

#### WEU

I need hardly say that he also endorses your point on this subject.

#### South Africa

It is helpful to know that Teltschik and Attali are unenthusiastic about a statement on South Africa at the Economic Summit. We hope that following the Foreign Secretary's visit to Washington the Americans will not press this idea.

/Quadripartite

Quadripartite/Tripartite Meetings

This at the moment rests with my letter to you. I understand from Andy Bearpark that you did not wish it to be taken any further until your return. The Foreign Secretary thinks that it might conceivably be possible to arrange a Berlin Four meeting at Head of Government level in the context of the 750th Anniversary of the city. But in general he fears that any attempt to do this on a wider scale could well jeopardise the very successful quadripartite cooperation which takes place regularly at a less visible level. As regards tripartite meetings, he can see the attractions of breakfast meetings of the Berlin Three, but he believes that it would create such a hubbub among our other Community partners that it would probably make the whole enterprise more hindrance than help.

Further Meetings

The Foreign Secretary sees no objection to your holding a further meeting in London as proposed.

Yours ever,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'A C Galsworthy', with a long horizontal stroke extending to the left.

(A C Galsworthy)  
Private Secretary

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10 Downing Street