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INFO PRIORITY PRETORIA

## SOUTH AFRICA: MEETING WITH GENERAL MALAN

1. WHEN I SAW THE SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENCE MINISTER YESTERDAY, GENERAL MALAN SAID THAT MEMBERS OF THE ANC'S MILITARY WING WERE CONTINUING TO INFILTRATE THROUGH BOTSWANA AND SWAZILAND. BUT THE BOTSWANA AND SWAZI AUTHORITIES WERE PLAYING NO PART IN THIS, THOUGH THEY WERE NOT ABLE TO CONTROL ALL MOVEMENT THROUGH THEIR OWN TERRITORIES. IN THE CASE OF ZIMBABWE AND MOZAMBIQUE, THE SOUTH AFRICANS KNEW, THROUGH THE QUESTIONING OF CAPTURED ANC, THAT THEY WERE GETTING HELP FROM ELEMENTS OF THE ZIMBABWEAN AND MOZAMBIKAN SECURITY ESTABLISHMENTS. THEY DID NOT KNOW WHETHER THIS WAS TAKING PLACE WITH THE DIRECT KNOWLEDGE OF MUGABE AND CHISSANO. MALAN ACKNOWLEDGED THAT MUGABE IN THE PAST HAD BEEN CAUTIOUS ABOUT THIS.
2. MALAN THEN REFERRED TO MY CONVERSATION WITH THE STATE PRESIDENT (MY TELNO 352) ABOUT CROSS BORDER RAIDS. THE STATE PRESIDENT HAD SPOKEN TO HIM ABOUT THIS. MALAN SAID THAT THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT WOULD TAKE ACCOUNT OF WHAT WE HAD SAID. THEY DID NOT WISH TO PUT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT IN AN IMPOSSIBLE POSITION AT VANCOUVER. BUT HE HAD A RESPONSIBILITY TO DEFEND SOUTH AFRICA. SOUTH AFRICA WAS ACCUSED OF DE-STABILISING NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES. BUT THE SADF WOULD NOT PERMIT ARMED TERRORISTS INFILTRATING FROM NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES TO DE-STABILISE SOUTH AFRICA. IF HE FOUND AN ARMED ANC GROUP POISED TO ENTER SOUTH AFRICA, HE WOULD HAVE TO DEAL WITH THEM.
3. I SAID THAT IF THE SOUTH AFRICANS ENCOUNTERED ARMED ANC CROSSING THEIR BORDERS, NO DOUBT THEY WOULD DEAL WITH THEM. BUT THE SORT OF RAIDS THEY HAD CARRIED OUT ON THE CAPITALS OF NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES IN MAY LAST YEAR HAD CAUSED REAL ANGER IN LONDON. WE COULD SEE NO MILITARY RATIONALE FOR THESE RAIDS, WHICH CERTAINLY HAD NOT SUCCEEDED IN HITTING ANC TARGETS. MALAN ARGUED THAT THESE RAIDS HAD BEEN NECESSARY AS A WARNING TO THE ANC AND TO THE GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED, WHO WERE ALLOWING THEM INCREASING SCOPE FOR ACTION. I SAID THAT WE DID NOT ACCEPT THIS. I REALISED THAT THE SAG WOULD PURSUE A SOUTH AFRICA FIRST POLICY. BUT THEY SHOULD REALISE THAT ACTIONS OF THAT KIND PUT A GREAT DEAL OF STRAIN ON THEIR RELATIONS WITH COUNTRIES WHO WERE TRYING TO BE HELPFUL AND NOT TO ADD TO THE DIFFICULTIES HERE. MALAN REPEATED THAT ACCOUNT WOULD BE TAKEN OF WHAT WE HAD SAID, PARTICULARLY IN THE RUN UP TO THE COMMONWEALTH CONFERENCE. I MADE CLEAR THAT OUR CONCERN ABOUT CROSS-BORDER ACTIONS OF THIS KIND WAS NOT GOING TO END WITH THAT CONFERENCE.

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4. I SAID THAT WE WERE GIVING A GREAT DEAL OF ASSISTANCE TO MOZAMBIQUE, NOT FOR PHILANTHROPIC REASONS, BUT BECAUSE WE DID NOT WANT TO SEE A CUBAN AND SOVIET PRESENCE IN MOZAMBIQUE OF THE KIND THAT EXISTED IN ANGOLA. WE WERE PROVIDING MILITARY TRAINING FOR THE MOZAMBIKAN FORCES AT INYANGA. BUT BRITISH MILITARY ADVISERS WERE NOT OPERATING WITH THE MOZAMBIKAN FORCES AND WOULD NOT DO SO.

5. MALAN SAID THAT FOLLOWING THE SIGNATURE OF THE NKOMATI ACCORD, HE HAD BEEN PERSONALLY INVOLVED IN AN ATTEMPT TO BROKER SOME AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE RENAMO LEADER DHLAKAMA AND MACHEL. THE ATTEMPT HAD BEEN MADE WITH MACHEL'S KNOWLEDGE AND HAD COME QUITE CLOSE TO SUCCEEDING. SINCE THEN THERE HAD BEEN NO CONTACT BETWEEN FRELIMO AND RENAMO. HE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT THERE WOULD BE PEACE IN MOZAMBIQUE UNTIL THERE WAS SOME AGREEMENT BETWEEN FRELIMO AND RENAMO. FRELIMO WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO DEFEAT RENAMO MILITARILY. THEY HAD WIDE SUPPORT AMONG THE POPULATION OUTSIDE THE CITIES. HE CLAIMED THAT RENAMO WERE NOT GETTING DIRECT SUPPORT FROM THE SADF EXCEPT FOR MEDICAL SUPPLIES. I SAID THAT, IN THAT EVENT, THEY APPEARED TO BE GETTING HELP FROM OTHER SOURCES IN SOUTH AFRICA.

6. I ADDED THAT WE WERE CONTRIBUTING TO THE ATTEMPT TO REHABILITATE THE TRANSPORT ROUTES THROUGH MOZAMBIQUE - THE BEIRA CORRIDOR, NACALA LINE AND THE LIMPOPO ROUTE. AS THE WESTERN INVESTMENT IN THE ATTEMPT TO UPGRADE THOSE ROUTES INCREASED, I HOPED THAT GENERAL MALAN WOULD REALISE THAT ATTACKS ON THOSE ROUTES WOULD CREATE MAJOR PROBLEMS. MALAN ACKNOWLEDGED THAT EVEN IF THE ROUTES WERE REHABILITATED, THE NET EFFECT WOULD BE TO REDUCE ZIMBABWE'S DEPENDENCE ON SOUTH AFRICA FOR ITS EXTERNAL TRADE FROM 80% TO ABOUT 60%. THERE WOULD BE NO SADF ATTACKS ON THOSE ROUTES. BUT HE COULD NOT ANSWER FOR RENAMO. THEY HAD ATTACKED THE ROUTES IN THE PAST AND NO DOUBT WOULD GO ON TRYING TO DO SO UNLESS CHISSANO ATTEMPTED TO WORK OUT SOME AGREEMENT WITH THEM.

7. I ASKED MALAN ABOUT NAMIBIA/ANGOLA. MALAN SAID THAT SWAPO WERE HAVING NO EFFECT MILITARILY IN NORTHERN NAMIBIA. BUT HE WAS CONCERNED ABOUT THE MAJOR ANGOLAN OFFENSIVE, INVOLVING THE CUBANS AND THE RUSSIANS, AGAINST SAVIMBI'S BASE AT JAMBA. THE AMERICANS HAD NOT GIVEN SAVIMBI NEARLY AS MUCH HELP AS HE HAD BEEN HOPING FOR. MALAN SAID THAT THE ANGOLAN COLUMN HAD A VAST AMOUNT OF EQUIPMENT AND AIR DEFENCE, POSING MILITARY PROBLEMS FOR THE SOUTH AFRICANS.

8. I SAID THAT THE ANGOLAN EXPERIENCE ILLUSTRATED THE SORT OF DANGERS IN TERMS OF SOVIET INVOLVEMENT WE WERE CONCERNED TO AVOID IN THE OTHER NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES. IT WAS IN SOUTH AFRICA'S INTEREST TO MAINTAIN ECONOMIC LINKS WITH ZIMBABWE AND TO HELP THE WHITE COMMUNITY TO REMAIN THERE. MALAN SAID THAT HE AGREED. THE ZIMBABWEAN AIR FORCE HAD SOME OLD CHINESE MIGS. HE UNDERSTOOD

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THAT THEY WERE ABOUT TO RECEIVE EIGHT MORE. HE WAS EXTREMELY CONCERNED ABOUT MUGABE'S PLANS TO BUY MIG29S. I SAID THAT WE HAD ADVISED THE ZIMBABWEANS STRONGLY AGAINST THIS. ( IF IN THE END WE SELL THE SORT OF PACKAGE DESCRIBED IN YOUR TELNO 214 TO HARARE TO THE ZIMBABWERNERS, IT OBVIOUSLY WILL BE IMPORTANT TO TELL MALAN IN ADVANCE WHY WE ARE DOING THIS).

9. PLEASE SEE MIFT.

RENWICK

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