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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

26 July 1988

CO 27/7-

Dear Charles,

Call on the Prime Minister by Chief Buthelezi:  
27 July, 9.15 a.m.

/ Chief Buthelezi, Chief Minister of KwaZulu, will call on  
the Prime Minister at 9.15 a.m. on 27 July. I enclose a  
personality note about him. Pretoria telnos 145 and 146, with  
/// Cape Town telno 150 (also enclosed), contain Mr Renwick's  
assessment of the South African political scene and an account  
of our aid programme in KwaZulu and Natal.

Chief Buthelezi will be calling on Mrs Chalker after his  
meeting with the Prime Minister and will see the Secretary of  
State at the end of the afternoon. He will meet the  
Prince of Wales on 28 July.

/ The Prime Minister previously met Chief Buthelezi in  
August 1985. I enclose a copy of the record. The present  
call arises out of your meeting with Sir Laurens van der Post  
in May, when Sir Laurens told you that Chief Buthelezi felt  
that he was being bypassed by Western powers and his position  
undermined.

/ Chief Buthelezi has prepared the enclosed long memorandum  
for the Prime Minister in advance of their meeting. A summary  
/ is at Annex A.

The memorandum sets out Chief Buthelezi's views in  
largely familiar terms. The most novel element is the  
elaborate proposal for increased positive engagement by  
companies. It is over-ambitious and some aspects (for example  
the new monitoring body) are impractical.

The Prime Minister may wish to agree (in general terms)  
with Chief Buthelezi's analysis of the present situation in  
South Africa and to support his contention that black economic  
advancement offers one of the best levers for change in South  
Africa. We share his frustration at the slow pace of change  
and at many of the prevailing attitudes in the international  
community. She may wish to explain that we are doing what we  
can to influence President Botha. We are particularly  
concerned at the failure to grasp the Mandela issue and to  
find ways of negotiating with representative, moderate  
leaders.

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The Prime Minister may wish to say that we shall study his ideas for greater involvement by British companies. No doubt he will want to discuss this at greater length with Mr Renwick. The Prime Minister might point out that several major British companies already operating in South Africa - eg. Unilever and Turner & Newall in his own area of Natal - are engaged in much the way advocated by Chief Buthelezi. (In 1986 British companies operating in South Africa spent more than Rand 140 million on health, welfare, pensions and education programmes of benefit to their black employees.) There are, however, limits to what outsiders, including companies which have to operate competitively, can do.

Finally, the Prime Minister may wish to assure Chief Buthelezi that we shall continue to bear KwaZulu and Natal in mind when making decisions on our bilateral aid. We have been able to help there through projects, relief after the floods and British Council programmes. If he raises the subject, she may wish to discourage him from thinking that the European Community would agree to major changes in the way it spends its aid money in South Africa. There is substantial support in many European countries for the programme in its present form.

*How ever, L Parker*

(L Parker)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street

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ANNEX

SUMMARY OF MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER BY  
CHIEF BUTHELEZI

- (i) Apartheid is doomed. But the manner of its eradication will determine the future shape of post-apartheid South Africa;
- (ii) There is a lack of constructive involvement by the international community. But the Prime Minister's pragmatism has averted a major debacle in South Africa through her opposition to sanctions and disinvestment;
- (iii) Opponents of sanctions should act to offset damage inflicted by sanctions;
- (iv) The majority of blacks are opposed to sanctions;
- (v) The Prime Minister is best placed to explore the implications of changed Russian attitudes to South Africa;
- (vi) "Black-on-black" violence is to be deplored (a clear reference to UDF/Inkatha violence in Natal). He criticises the ANC. [Chief Buthelezi objects to violence, or at least ANC violence; as Mr Renwick points out Inkatha is as responsible as others for black-on-black violence in Natal.] He writes favourably of building a united front between the ANC and Inkatha. He would be ready for outside mediation, eg. by President Kaunda.
- (vii) UK aid strategy is right. But Chief Buthelezi makes disobliging remarks about the Kagiso Trust (a channel for a substantial proportion of EC aid);
- (viii) Black economic enfranchisement would produce pressure for political change. Chief Buthelezi suggests a role and programme for business (including British companies) a - "conditional trade/investment strategy" - including a monitoring body. He acknowledges the analogy between the latter and the EC Code of Conduct, but wishes to go a great deal further;



- (ix) There are no short cuts to the final elimination of apartheid. But the South African Government are not making the first moves to establish real negotiations designed to scrap the present constitution and establish a "race-free, democratic dispensation". President Botha is still talking of South Africa as a nation of minorities and refusing to acknowledge blacks as the majority;
- (x) Chief Buthelezi wil not negotiate within the present South African Constitution.

BUTHELEZI, NKOSI (IE CHIEF) MANGOSUTHU GATSHA

Chief Minister of KwaZulu; President of Inkatha Yenkululekho Yesizwe; Chairman of the South African Black Alliance (SABA).

Born 1928. Chief of the Buthelezi clan and uncle of, and hereditary Chief Induna (ie Adviser or Minister) to, the King of the Zulus. A prince of the royal house through the maternal line.

Began university at Fort Hare, from which he was expelled, and completed his history degree at the University of Natal.

1970: Chief Executive Councillor, Zulu Territorial Authority (from 1972 the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly); 1975: revived Inkatha (the National Cultural Liberation Movement); 1976: Chief Minister, KwaZulu Government.

Deeply rooted in, and knowledgeable about, tribal tradition and custom, Buthelezi – like the KwaZulu Government – is a curious product of feudal autocracy and modern collective Cabinet responsibility. His power base remains Inkatha (SABA has virtually ceased to exist with the withdrawal of the Coloured Labour Party and the demise of the Indian Reform Party) and the rigid control he exercises over it has brought him into sharp conflict with other organisations, such as the United Democratic Front (UDF), whose objectives of political change by peaceful means he professes to share. Buthelezi has repeatedly attacked the homelands policy and has refused to consider KwaZulu's taking "independence". He is an avowed supporter of the free enterprise system and a vociferous opponent of sanctions and disinvestment.

He can show great charm and humour and is seldom discourteous in public but he can be ruthless with Zulus who step out of line and the elaborate civility he adopts in dealing with whites can hide deep private contempt.

Detests being addressed, or referred to, as "Gatsha".

His public speaking is often wooden and stylised and in conversation his English is not absolutely sure (though extempore in Zulu he can be marvellously amusing). He inspires fanatical loyalty among many Zulus.

The Buthelezi Commission, initiated by the Chief and composed of leading academics, politicians and businessmen, presented a report in 1982 calling for closer political co-operation between Natal and KwaZulu. Whilst the report was largely ignored at the time, it has provided much of the groundwork for the Natal/KwaZulu Indaba which began in April 1986 and presented proposals to the Minister in January 1987.

Has travelled extensively. He has visited UK and spoken at Wilton Park. He met the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State in London in 1985 and the Secretary of State again in Pretoria in 1986. In 1986 he also gave evidence to the House of Common Foreign Affairs Committee. A devout Anglican. Suffers from diabetes which he controls by dieting. His wife, Princess Irene, suffers from hypertension and seldom accompanies him.