

PRIME MINISTER

SOUTH AFRICA

We agreed that you should send a message to President Botha following your meeting with Chief Buthelezi. I attach a draft letter for you to sign. Although it is quite long, there is a lot to be said and it is some time since you let him have your views. I hope you will feel able to sign it.

You also owe Chancellor Kohl a reply on the question of a joint message or emissary. He will actually be away on holiday for most of August so nothing much is likely to happen before September. It is probably best to keep both options open until then and suggest that I have a word with Mr. Teltschik on return from Australia. I attach a further letter from you to Chancellor Kohl.

Agree to sign?

Yes. *Harley on very much*
not

C D P

C. D. POWELL

28 July 1988

KKLABD

GCP



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

28 July 1988

Dear Charles,

at 11.15
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Thank you for your letter of 22 July recording Sir Geoffrey Howe's discussion of South Africa with the Prime Minister that day. I enclose, as requested, a draft message for the Prime Minister to send to President Botha.

As you know, Mr Renwick spoke to Mr Pik Botha on 19 July to convey the Prime Minister's previous oral message (your letter of 9 June). What he had to say should reach senior members of the South African Government. The written message will convey the Prime Minister's views direct to the State President.

The Foreign Secretary sees advantage in joining the Germans in sending either an emissary or a joint message. The best time for this might be early to mid-September. Earlier action might overload the circuit (the Prime Minister will recall that Mr Renwick has only recently been instructed to give President Botha an oral message about South African allegations concerning ANC activities in London). It will in any event take time to agree with the Germans what an emissary or message should say.

The Foreign Secretary considers that it is too early to reach a final conclusion on whether an emissary or a joint message would be preferable. We need to have a better idea of what the Germans want to say; nor is our investigation of possible candidates yet complete (though the evidence of Herr Leutweiler's dealings with South Africa over debt re-scheduling suggests he may not be the obvious choice). We need in any case to engage the Germans in early discussion of the next steps. He suggests that the Prime Minister may wish to send a brief message to Chancellor Kohl. You might then telephone Herr Teltschik following the Prime Minister's return from Australia with a view to setting up discussion between officials. Before doing so, we will need to consider carefully whether we wish to confine the exercise to the Chancellery. From the UK point of view, a major objective of the exercise will be to stiffen the Germans; it may be desirable to bring in Genscher and the Foreign Ministry at some stage. Ideally, though, this should not be done until we are sure that the Chancellery will take a satisfactory line. I attach a draft message to Chancellor Kohl.

Yours ever, *L. Parker*(L Parker)
Private SecretaryC D Powell Esq
PS/No 10 Downing Street

DSR 11 (Revised Sept 85)

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1 +

FROM: PRIME MINISTER

Reference JASANN

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

Your Reference

BUILDING:

ROOM NO:

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CAVEAT

TO:

Chancellor Helmut Kohl

Copies to:

Federal Republic of Germany

SUBJECT:

KKIABCE

(redraft)

When we discussed South Africa

~~I was glad that our discussion on 9 July gave us the opportunity to exchange views on South Africa. I am sure that it is right that we should act together to reinforce our common view that the South African Government must accelerate the pace of change and, in particular, find a way of releasing Mr Mandela.~~

I believe that we are approaching a watershed.

~~To a great extent, our ability to exert effective influence on an incoming American Administration will depend on developments in South Africa, and between South Africa and her neighbours. Without visible and concrete progress on reform and towards peace, the difficulty of doing so will be enormously increased.~~

~~on these matters~~

I recently asked our Ambassador in Pretoria to ensure that Mr P W Botha was aware of these

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thoughts. You told me of your own recent approach to the South Africans.

We need to see how these ^{representations} approaches are received before deciding how best to manage a joint approach. But, as we discussed on 9 July, I believe that we should give serious consideration to sending either a joint message to President Botha, or an emissary to speak personally for both of us. The best time to do this would perhaps be in early to mid-September.

As I am about to leave for a visit to Australia, I suggest that the next step might be for ^{Chasen Daniel} ~~my~~ office to contact ^{Mr. Teltschik} ~~yours~~ early next month to discuss how ^{best take} ~~to carry~~ forward ^a ~~our~~ joint approach.

DSR 11 (Revised Sept 85)	DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despach/note		TYPE: Draft/Final 1 +
	FROM: The Prime Minister DEPARTMENT:		Reference HR1AAY
	TEL. NO:		Your Reference
	BUILDING:	ROOM NO:	
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	TO: President P W Botha		Copies to:
Top Secret	SUBJECT:		
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Restricted			Chief Minister Buthelezi called to see me in London this week I was able to ask him about the reform process and the prospects for further political progress of a kind that would carry conviction within South Africa and in the Western world. I know of the new initiatives you have taken by opening up the possibility of appointing a black representative to the Cabinet and creating a National Council in which black leaders will be invited to discuss future constitutional arrangements. These are potentially important steps and I am most concerned that the opportunity should not be missed to produce convincing results. But it was clear from what Chief Buthelezi told me that he will himself feel unable to participate in these structures while Mr. Nelson Mandela remains in prison. <i>Mr. Renwick spoke of my deep concern about this matter when he saw your Foreign Minister on 19 July to give</i>
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John 22-6

negotiations about

You know

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him an oral message from me. Mr Mandela has now spent 26 years in prison. The longer he stays there, the more of a legend he becomes. ~~I am sure you do not intend that Mr Mandela's sentence of life imprisonment should mean incarceration until he dies.~~ ^{His} In my view ~~the~~ death of Mr Mandela in prison would have very damaging consequences, not only for South Africa's relations with the outside world, which I am anxious to see preserved, but also for the prospects of peaceful change within South Africa. I am therefore asking you once again to take the steps necessary to enable Mr Mandela to be released. I believe that this would make a crucial difference to the chances of political progress along the lines you wish. *It would be a tragic mistake to lose the opportunity of*

You know the strength of my commitment to the pursuit of policies which will help to make things better in South Africa and not worse, and of the many battles I have fought in that cause. But we are approaching a watershed. At the turn of the year, we shall have a new US Administration. ~~Whoever is elected will want to re-define US policy towards South Africa.~~ *Who will continue in turn undermine the prospects for* I will exert my influence with ~~whoever is elected~~ ^{the new} President to try to ensure that ~~they~~ ^{he} pursues policies which will not further complicate the task of those committed to reform and peaceful change in South Africa. But my ability to exert effective influence on an incoming US Administration on this issue will depend on

negotiations with the representatives of moderate black South Africa opinion such as Chief Buthe. Let if they are not drawn in, they will inevitably go ground to the extremists.

I am now anxious to avoid further economic damage being inflicted on South Africa of a kind that would make all the problems harder to solve

President's negotiators

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developments in South Africa and between South Africa and her neighbours in the meanwhile. ~~I have to tell you that~~ without visible, concrete progress on reform and towards peace in the region, the difficulty of my task in Washington will be enormously increased. It would be particularly damaging if the Promotion of Orderly Internal Politics Bill, or a variation of it, were to be adopted early next year, coinciding as this would with the advent of a new US Administration. You ~~will~~ know our views on the Bill. Its adoption would put the West under heavy pressure to take action, with serious consequences both for your interests and ours.

great attention
I am following with ~~close interest~~ the negotiations now under way on Angola and Namibia. A solution to these problems does not of course lie in South Africa's hands alone and I know that the South African delegation has played a constructive role in the negotiations ~~so far~~. I regard progress towards the settlement of these issues as being of the greatest importance, ~~not least for South Africa's relations with the outside world~~. It is difficult to see how the continuance and intensification of the current military conflict could possibly turn out to the benefit of either side. It is our objective to see a withdrawal of foreign forces from Angola, and an ~~internationally~~ ^{internationally} recognised settlement in Namibia.

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My position on this is known to
~~I have made my position on this clear to~~
~~Mr Gorbachev, as well as to President Dos Santos. It~~
~~is also well known to the Cubans.~~ *Angola.* ~~And we take every~~
~~opportunity to encourage African leaders to give~~
~~progress with internal reconciliation in Angola a~~
~~high priority, in order to facilitate a~~
~~comprehensive, lasting regional settlement.~~

also
I have *been* informed of the important steps you have
taken to try to achieve a return to the spirit of the
Nkomati Accord in your relations with Mozambique. I
welcome these and will welcome any other positive
initiatives you are able to take. It is a time when
leadership is more than ever required. There will be
much at stake over the next few months.