

CONFIDENTIAL

cc BUp

PRIME MINISTER

MEETING WITH THE NEW GERMAN AMBASSADOR

You are to see the new German Ambassador on Monday. He is Baron von Richthofen, grandson of the World War One flying ace. He is also a great improvement on his predecessor. Even so, you will want to bear in mind that he works primarily for Genscher not for Kohl. He arrived in December. A biographical note is in the folder.

After welcoming him, you will want to refer to the forthcoming Anglo-German Summit in Frankfurt. You will be staying overnight and attending a concert and a large reception which Chancellor Kohl is arranging in your honour. You are also going to meet some German bankers (including, we hope, Karl-Otto Poehl).

The most topical issue is Libya. We are convinced that the Libyan plant at Rabta is intended for the manufacture of chemical weapons, even though this purpose can rapidly be disguised.

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When you saw Chancellor Kohl in Rhodes you promised to send him material about how we ban or limit exports of particular chemicals. This has been done and the Germans are now introducing legislation.

You may like to look forward in the European Community where the main topic over the next few months will probably be monetary cooperation. Our hope is that the Federal Republic will address the issues in a practical and concrete way - so admirably set out by Herr Poehl - rather than go for political froth. As the two major European economies run on genuine free market principles, Britain and the FRG have a strong, underlying common interest in this area.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

You should also raise what seems bound to be the major issue between us in the first half of the year, that is the Comprehensive Concept, modernisation of NATO's theatre nuclear weapons and the question of SNF arms control. I have put back in the folder the note which you saw over the Christmas/New Year period. You will recall that Chancellor Kohl told you that there would be an internal German meeting in January to settle German policy. You might enquire how preparations for this are going. The essential point is that it is virtually impossible to devise an SNF arms control negotiating position which meets NATO's security requirements. There may be scope for further reducing NATO's holding of nuclear artillery shells unilaterally while modernising LANCE and our nuclear bombs. But we do not want to give the Russians a card of entry in this field. You will want to be sure that the Ambassador reports back that you continue to hold firm views on this issue; it is one where the substance is too important to be bridged by a form of words.

You might refer to Chancellor Kohl's suggestion that you and he should talk regularly on the telephone. You intend to follow-up this proposal, but have seen no reason to disturb Kohl over the Christmas/New Year period.

ed?

(C. D. POWELL)

6 January 1989

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HERMANN, FREIHERR VON RICHTHOFEN

Born 20 November 1933 in Breslau.

1953-55 underwent training in industry. 1955-58 studied Law at the Universities in Heidelberg, Munich and Bonn. 1963 received PhD in Law. 1963 entered Federal Foreign Service. 1965-66 Desk Officer in the Foreign Affairs Ministry Legal Department. Postings to Saigon and Jakarta. 1970 Legal Adviser in Foreign Affairs Ministry, later Deputy Head of Department for International Law. 1975-78 Head of Section the Political Department in the Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Germany in Berlin (East). 1978-80 Head of Department in the Political Directorate General. 1980-86 Head of Working Unit Covering Inner German Relations and Berlin, in the Federal Chancellory. 1986 Deputy Under Secretary, Director-General for Legal Affairs and Special Adviser on International Law in the Foreign Ministry. Since October 1986 promoted to the rank of Deputy Under Secretary (Political Director) in the Foreign Ministry

Von Richthofen is charming in a rather formal and conscious way. He is clever and highly conscientious. His intellectual style, perhaps influenced by his legal background, is thorough and cautious rather than visibly brilliant. An active Christian, he is married to Christa Countess Schwerin, who was born in East Prussia. She is a psychoanalyst. They have three children: Peter, 21, doing military service before reading Economics at University; Anna-Fita, 17, and Esther 8, both at school in England.

Baron von Richthofen has good contacts to the SPD, having been in the Federal Chancellery for the last part of Schmidt's period as Chancellor.

His hobbies are skiing, swimming, country walking, and reading, particularly politics and history. Speaks good English.

PRIME MINISTER

COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT

You asked to see some background papers on the Comprehensive Concept of arms control. The attached folder contains:

- a short explanatory note by the Cabinet Office;
- the first draft of a Comprehensive Concept put forward by the United Kingdom;
- the current NATO draft (which is a dog's breakfast and scarcely worth your reading);
- a paper on options for Short-range Nuclear Forces (SNF) arms control, which we recently put to the Germans to show how difficult it is to devise any acceptable option; and
- a letter on the same subject from Michael Alexander.

It all boils down to a simple question: can the Germans be brought to take firm and specific decisions on the modernisation of NATO's SNF without a commitment by the Alliance to negotiate with the Russians on further reductions in SNF? You have of course discussed the subject with Chancellor Kohl.

It is clear from the attached papers that Sir Michael Alexander and others are deep into examining possible options for SNF negotiations, either because they believe this is the best way to head off the Germans by demonstrating the damage which would be done to NATO's capabilities; or because (in Michael's case) they think that we are going to have to give in to the Germans on this and may as well start now. The problem is that it gives the wrong signal to the Germans. Once we concede it is a subject which can be discussed, there is no going back.

In the end it's a matter of judgment whether we can get the Germans to the right conclusion on modernisation without

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

selling the pass on SNF negotiations. We did it - or just about - on the INF Agreement although it was a painful process. It will be even more difficult this time. My own view is that, rather than make concessions to them on SNF negotiations, we should look for some unilateral action by NATO, for instance linking modernisation of SNF with a unilateral decision to reduce SNF munitions and particularly nuclear shells (for which we have no real use).

This may be an issue which you will want to discuss with the Defence and Foreign Secretaries at one of the two meetings on defence matters we already have planned for January, namely Chemical Weapons and SDI. Agree?

*But who do I discuss it
with first? John Hartley used
to be tough but he is no longer there.*

C.D.P.

not

CHARLES POWELL

22 December 1988

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EAMAKT

cc/pe?

Ref. A088/3676

CDB
21/12

NOTE FOR RECORD

cc Mr Lavelle
Mr Weston
Mr Powell
Mr Adams (Foreign Office)

Call by West German Ambassador

Baron von Richthofen, the new West German Ambassador, called on Sir Robin Butler at 11.00 am on 19 December.

2. Baron von Richthofen said that part of his role would be to give more public emphasis to the close friendship and commonality of interests and values which existed between the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the United Kingdom. These were long-standing, but had not received adequate recognition. Sir Robin Butler said that Sir Christopher Mallaby, the United Kingdom's Ambassador to the FRG, was similarly concerned to raise the profile of the Anglo-German relationship. Chancellor Kohl's invitation to the Prime Minister and Mr Thatcher to stay at his home in the country had been greatly appreciated.

3. Baron von Richthofen said that Chancellor Kohl attached particular importance to the establishment of a secure telephone link between his office and No 10. This was not designed to bypass the very good links which already existed with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, but rather to provide rapid contact at high level to forestall major problems which might damage the Anglo-German relationship. Sir Robin Butler said that the Prime Minister took a particularly close interest in certain issues, and it would sometimes be valuable to be able to

give the Chancellor early notice where this was the case. Baron von Richthofen said that this was just the kind of use that Chancellor Kohl envisaged for the link.

4. Baron von Richthofen continued by asking how the Cabinet Secretariat was structured. Sir Robin Butler outlined the Cabinet's Committee structure and that of the secretariats which supported it. The two secretariats of most interest to Baron von Richthofen were the European Secretariat, headed by Mr Roger Lavelle, and the Overseas and Defence Secretariat, headed by Mr John Weston. The European Secretariat was rather more closely involved, on a day-to-day basis, in the co-ordination of the United Kingdom's approach to European matters than was the Overseas and Defence Secretariat in the co-ordination of the matters with which it was concerned. In the latter case, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Ministry of Defence often advised the Prime Minister directly on issues, without Cabinet office mediation. Within No 10, Mr Charles Powell (who had close contacts with Herr Teltschik) would also be an important contact.

Paul H Turner

P H TURNER

21 December 1988

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The Alliance's Comprehensive Concept of
Arms Control and Disarmament

"We have directed the North Atlantic Council in Permanent Session, working in conjunction with the appropriate military authorities, to consider the further development of a comprehensive concept of arms control and disarmament. The arms control problems faced by the Alliance raise complex and interrelated issues which must be evaluated together, bearing in mind overall progress in the arms control negotiations enumerated above as well as the requirements of Alliance security and of its strategy of deterrence." (Reykjavik Communique)

This project, which is the responsibility of the NATO Ambassadors meeting as the North Atlantic Council in permanent session, was launched by Foreign Ministers at Reykjavik in June 1987. The NATO Foreign Ministers in Brussels this December directed that the work on the concept should be completed by June 1989, when NATO Foreign Ministers next hold a scheduled meeting in London. A NATO Summit earlier in 1989 would shorten the deadline further.

2. The so-called comprehensive concept is largely a procedural fig leaf to cover NATO's confusion about how to deal with short range nuclear forces (SNF) both in defence programme and in arms control terms. After the INF agreement the Germans took fright at the prospect that NATO's arms control agenda (START, conventional forces, chemical weapons) made no clear provision for further arms control on SNF. This phobia is encapsulated in their slogan: "The shorter the range, the deader the Germans". The dilemma over SNF was papered over with a formula to the effect that SNF reductions should be sought "in conjunction with the establishment of a conventional balance and the global elimination of chemical weapons". But there is no

agreement about whether this means a simultaneous or a sequential process. Moreover, the Germans argued that decisions on the necessary modernisation of SNF could not be taken piecemeal and needed to be related to the overall picture of how NATO's security needs are met and the place of arms control in this. The current difficulties in advancing the drafting of the comprehensive concept derive principally from this underlying problem, which has been accentuated by Gorbachev's adroit diplomacy.

3. For nine months after the Reykjavik directive to draw up a comprehensive concept virtually no progress was made. The Americans and the Germans both dragged their feet on the exercise, hoping thereby to stymie SNF arms control and modernisation respectively. In March 1988 the United Kingdom therefore circulated a full national draft of the comprehensive concept (Annex A) in an attempt to move things forward. We also tried to engage the Americans and the Germans behind the scenes in a trilateral effort to crack the problem. This offer was not taken up and we have therefore had to work on each of them separately. Meanwhile the NATO drafting exercise has stagnated, as the impoverished NATO draft of December 1988 (Annex B) shows. The nub of the drafting revolves around three points: - How is arms control.

a. Is arms control the handmaiden of defence policy, or are they full and equal partners?

Defence policy is of course predominant

b. How much if at all does Gorbachev's new thinking alter the equation?

Not at all

c. How to reconcile SNF arms control and modernisation.

The way we have agreed all along - no further nuclear reductions in the Convention. Symmetry is allowed, and chemical weapons also in effect.

4. If there is to be agreement on the comprehensive concept in the first half of 1989, it is increasingly the view of our Ambassadors in Bonn and NATO that a bargain must be struck which says something for German ears about the prospect of negotiations at some stage in relation to SNF, in return for some fairly precise guidelines on SNF modernisation (sufficient for United States Congressional purposes), accompanied by a decision on downward adjustment of NATO's existing stockpile of SNF warheads (~~especially of~~ nuclear artillery shells *only*). It is hard to devise an SNF arms control negotiating position as such which would meet NATO's security requirements.

But it is perhaps not wholly impossible to define a position which would give the Germans enough to meet their political needs while maintaining strong pressure on the Soviet Union to reduce its SNF preponderance and simultaneously presenting TASM and the Lance replacement as logical ways of restructuring the NATO stockpile in the direction of fewer SNF holdings overall. For this aim to be attainable during 1989, it will be essential to galvanise the Bush Administration quickly to address the whole subject with greater imagination than the Americans have so far shown. Without some break-through on this key issue between ourselves, Washington and Bonn, the comprehensive concept will continue to be little more than second order skirmishing.

Cabinet Office
19 December 1988

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file to

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

8 December, 1988.

Thank you very much for your letter, and welcome to London.

The Prime Minister would be very happy to see you. Unfortunately the time which we originally offered on 19 December is no longer available, but she suggests that you should come on Monday, 9 January, at 1730.

I would be delighted to see you at your convenience. Perhaps your secretary would telephone the Duty Clerk at No.10 to fix a time.

(C.D. Powell)

His Excellency Baron Hermann von Richthofen

K12

AD

DER BOTSCHAFTER
DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND

Baron Hermann von Richthofen

1730-1800
Monday 9 January
Tg
8/12

London, 8 December 1988

Dear Mr. Powell,

as you know I have arrived in London on Monday, December 5th and taken up my functions in the German Embassy.

I already had the privilege to be received by Sir Geoffrey Howe for my first courtesy call as well as by Minister of State Mrs. Lynda Chalker and the Permanent Secretary of State Sir Patrick Wright. I have been informed that the date for the presentation of my Letters of Credence to Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II. has been set for December 16th.

In view of the forthcoming Anglo-German summit early next year it would attach great importance to call on the Prime Minister. I understand that her timetable for December is already crammed. I therefore should like to ask you to kindly arrange a meeting at the earliest convenience in January if an appointment in December is not possible after all. As you know I would be of the disposition of the Prime Minister at any given time and would in this regard make any appropriate arrangements in my calendar. In the meantime I would be happy to come to see you in your office and would be grateful if you let me know which date would be convenient.

Yours sincerely,

Hermann Richthofen

Mr. Charles D. Powell
Private Secretary to the Prime Minister
10, Downing Street
London SW1A 2AA

Baron Hermann von Richthofen

Ambassador
of the Federal Republic of
Germany



10 DOWNING STREET

~~Tessa~~

Any chance of

$\frac{1}{2}$ an hour.

~~Charles~~

C

Thursday 12th Jan.

Would 5.30 pm after the
Governor's Reception of Berlin (5.00)

be ok? ~~What about~~

Tg.

7/12

~~Tessa~~ ~~Yes.~~

Tg

8/12

Can we say 5.35. can