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FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

SECRETARY OF STATE'S MEETING WITH HERR GENSCHER

SUMMARY

1. REAFFIRMATION OF GERMAN SUPPORT FOR A STRONG STAND ON IRAN. GENSCHER VOICES FAMILIAR DOUBTS ABOUT SNF MODERNISATION, ALSO PLEADING ELECTORAL UNPOPULARITY AND RELATIONS WITH POLAND AS PRIMARY REASONS.

DETAIL

2. GENSCHER CAME TO BREAKFAST WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE THIS MORNING. FOLLOWING WERE THE MAIN POINTS DISCUSSED.

ANGLO-GERMAN SUMMIT

3. GENSCHER AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE AGREED THAT THE SUMMIT HAD BEEN A GOOD ONE AND THAT, ON THE WHOLE, PRESS COMMENT HAD BEEN POSITIVE.

IRAN

4. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN KEEN TO GET AS MUCH SUPPORT AS POSSIBLE FROM MONDAY'S MEETING IN BRUSSELS BUT HAD BEEN SURPRISED AT THE STRENGTH OF REACTION. GENSCHER SAID THAT KHOMEINI'S UTTERANCES WERE A FUNDAMENTAL THREAT TO FREEDOM AND CIVILISATION. GENSCHER ADDED THAT, IN HIS ABSENCE, THERE HAD BEEN A CABINET DISCUSSION IN BONN ABOUT POSSIBLE SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT WE WERE KEEN TO MOBILISE INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT BUT, WITH THREE MUSLIM COUNTRIES ON THE SECURITY COUNCIL (MALAYSIA, ALGERIA AND SENEGAL), WE WERE NOT SURE THAT WE WOULD GET SUPPORT THERE. OUR TWO MISSIONS IN NEW YORK SHOULD BE IN TOUCH. OUR ONLY RELUCTANCE ABOUT SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION WAS OUR FEAR THAT THE STRENGTH OF OUR MESSAGE WOULD GET DILUTED. GENSCHER DID NOT DISSENT. HE SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN CONVINCED THAT ONLY A REALLY STRONG MESSAGE FROM EUROPEAN FOREIGN MINISTERS WOULD GIVE ENCOURAGEMENT TO MODERATES WITHIN IRAN. THE HEAD OF THE IRANIAN DELEGATION TO HIROHITO'S FUNERAL HAD ASKED TO SEE HIM IN TOKYO. HE HAD REFUSED. THE SECRETARY OF

STATE AGREED THAT THE STRENGTH OF OUR CONCERN MUST BE PRESSED. HE WOULD ASK UNO TO MAKE JAPAN'S OPPOSITION TO KHOMEINI'S STATEMENTS CLEAR IN PUBLIC. THE JAPANESE ARGUED THAT THEY DID NOT WANT TO UNDERMINE THEIR POTENTIAL MEDIATORY ROLE OVER THE IRAN/IRAQ WAR. BUT WE WERE ALL IN THAT POSITION, AND MUST MAKE PLAIN THAT NONE OF US WOULD BE OPEN FOR BUSINESS UNLESS IRAN REACTED PROPERLY. GENSCHER INDICATED THAT HE HAD ALREADY SPOKEN IN SIMILAR TERMS TO UNO.

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5. THE SECRETARY OF STATE EXPLAINED THE CASE FOR DECISIONS THIS YEAR. GENSCHER SAID THAT THE ALLIANCE SHOULD (I) FOCUS ON THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS IE NOT ALLOWING PROLIFERATION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS. (II) HAVE A VERY CLEAR POSITION IN THE VIENNA TALKS SO AS TO BRING THE RUSSIANS TO THE TABLE AND DISCOVER HOW FAR THEY WERE PREPARED TO MOVE IN THE FIELD OF OFFENSIVE WEAPONS, TANKS AND ARTILLERY. THE ANNOUNCEMENTS THAT GORBACHEV HAD MADE IN NEW YORK WERE IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION BUT WERE NOT SUFFICIENT. REDUCTIONS IN TANKS AND ARTILLERY WERE MORE SIGNIFICANT THAN REDUCTIONS IN THE NUMBERS OF MEN. WE SHOULD BRING FORWARD OUR OWN PROPOSALS ON COMBAT READINESS, STRUCTURES ETC IN ORDER TO PUT TROOPS ON BOTH SIDES INTO A MORE DEFENSIVE MODE. THE QUESTION OF NUCLEAR ARTILLERY WAS ONE OF SELF-DETERRENCE RATHER THAN DETERRENCE OF THE ENEMY. A REDUCTION IN NUCLEAR ARTILLERY OR EVEN THEIR ELIMINATION WOULD NOT WEAKEN THE ALLIANCE. ON SNF, THERE WERE 88 SYSTEMS DEPLOYED ON GERMAN SOIL. THE RUSSIANS HAD 1350 SYSTEMS. NO-ONE KNEW HOW MANY MISSILES AND WARHEADS THEY HAD. THIS SUPERIORITY FRIGHTENED THE GERMANS. COMMON CEILINGS, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT WERE A NECESSARY PART OF THE COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT. WHO COULD SAY WHAT THE POSITION WOULD BE IN THE EARLY 1990'S. WE COULD NOT BASE OUR HOPES AND SECURITY ON FUTURE POSSIBILITIES BUT ONLY ON REALITY. WE MUST SEE WHAT WAS REALLY NECESSARY FOR THE DETERRENCE OF WAR RATHER THAN FOR FIGHTING A WAR AT THE HEART OF EUROPE. GERMANY HAD 288 AIRPLANES IN THE NUCLEAR ROLE BASED ON HER SOIL. THERE WERE LESSER NUMBERS IN OTHER COUNTRIES THOUGH THEIR PRESENCE WAS AN IMPORTANT FORM OF PSYCHOLOGICAL BURDEN-SHARING. IT STILL REMAINED THE CASE THAT GERMANY WAS THE ONLY COUNTRY WHICH WOULD HAVE MISSILES ON ITS SOIL IN WAR-TIME.

6. ASKING THAT NO RECORD SHOULD BE TAKEN, GENSCHER WENT ON TO SAY THAT HE WAS VERY CONCERNED ABOUT THE PRESENT ELECTORAL SITUATION IN GERMANY. HE COULD NOT BE SURE THAT THE COALITION WOULD MAINTAIN ITS MAJORITY. BERLIN WAS NOT A ONE-OFF SITUATION.

THE FORTHCOMING LOCAL ELECTIONS MIGHT SHOW A SIMILAR TREND. THE GERMAN PEOPLE WERE INCREASINGLY QUESTIONING WHY, GIVEN THEIR FIRM COMMITMENT TO THE ALLIANCE AND THEIR EXPOSURE TO THE SOVIET UNION, THE ALLIES SEEMED TO BE DETERMINED TO ISOLATE THEM.

7. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT WE TOO HAD FACED POLITICAL PRESSURES ON THE NUCLEAR ISSUE IN THE EARLY 1980'S. IF WE DID NOT MAINTAIN OUR COMMITMENT TO MODERNISATION, COMBINED WITH A WILLINGNESS TO MAKE PROPOSALS FOR REDUCTIONS SO AS TO ACHIEVE EQUAL CEILINGS AT LOWER LEVELS, THE RUSSIANS WOULD CONCLUDE THAT THEY HAD GOT US ON THE RUN. THE EXTENDED RANGE OF FOTL WOULD MOVE US FURTHER AWAY FROM HAVING BATTLE-FIGHTING NUCLEAR WEAPONS. IT WAS IMPORTANT TO OUR OVERALL CREDIBILITY TO MAINTAIN SOME LAND-BASED NUCLEAR SYSTEMS. WE HAD TO PAY HEED TO THE AMERICAN ASSESSMENT THAT IT WE WERE TO MODERNISE BY 1995 WE NEEDED A CONGRESSIONAL FUNDING PROGRAMME STARTING THIS YEAR. WE MUST THEREFORE HAVE SIGNIFICANT CONCLUSIONS FROM THE NATO SUMMIT ON DEPLOYMENT TO GET CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT FOR FUNDING. IT WAS UNFORTUNATE THAT THE WHOLE ISSUE HAD BEEN DRAMATISED. THE SECRETARY OF STATE HOPED WE COULD GET BACK TO A SITUATION IN WHICH THERE WAS A CLEAR PACKAGE INVOLVING A COMMITMENT TO KEEP OUR WEAPONS UP-TO-DATE WHILE AT THE SAME TIME BEING PREPARED TO MAKE REDUCTIONS IN NUCLEAR ARTILLERY. GENSCHER COMMENTED THAT SACEUR DID NOT SEE MODERNISATION IN THE TERMS DESCRIBED BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE. HE HAD INDICATED THAT, WHEN THE ALLIANCE HAD LONGER RANGE WEAPONS, WE WOULD HAVE MORE TARGETS AND WOULD THEREFORE NEED MORE MISSILES.

8. GENSCHER SAID THAT HE WANTED TO MAKE A RATHER EMOTIONAL POINT. HE HAD ALWAYS BEEN IMPRESSED BY THE BRITISH DECISION TO ISSUE AN ULTIMATUM TO HITLER IN SEPTEMBER 1939 THAT IF HE INVADED POLAND BRITAIN WOULD GO TO WAR. THE GERMAN OCCUPATION OF POLAND HAD BEEN QUITE DIFFERENT FROM ITS OCCUPATION OF OTHER COUNTRIES. IN POLAND THERE HAD BEEN A REAL ATTEMPT TO DESTROY THE INTELLIGENTSIA. TERRIBLE THINGS HAD BEEN DONE BY THE NAZI OCCUPATION. 1989 WAS THE 50TH ANNIVERSARY OF THIS OCCUPATION. KOHL WAS HOPING TO VISIT POLAND. THE POLES HAD OFFERED A BILATERAL AGREEMENT IN WHICH THEY WOULD FORGIVE AND FORGET THE PAST. HOW COULD GERMANY, IN THIS YEAR OF ALL YEARS, TAKE A DECISION INVOLVING THE STATIONING OF MISSILES WHICH WOULD BE TARGETTED ON TO POLISH TERRITORY? THIS WAS THE FIRST TIME HE HAD RAISED THIS ISSUE WITH A FOREIGNER, BUT HE DID SO IN A SPIRIT OF FRIENDSHIP WITH THE FOREIGN SECRETARY. IT WAS AN ISSUE OF CONSTANT DISCUSSION WITHIN THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT AND

A MAJOR PREOCCUPATION.

9. THE SECRETARY OF STATE HE APPRECIATED WHAT GENSCHER HAD SAID BUT THIS IN A WAY HAD MERELY UNDERLINED HIS OWN ANXIETY. WHAT REASON WAS THERE TO SUPPOSE THAT A DECISION NOT TAKEN IN 1989 WOULD BE ANY EASIER IN 1991. GENSCHER SAID THAT THERE WOULD BE A MAJOR DISCUSSION IN BONN ON MONDAY. HE HAD ASKED HIS PEOPLE TO PREPARE A PAPER SETTING OUT THE ISSUES FROM SCRATCH. THEREAFTER HE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE ANOTHER DISCUSSION WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE, PERHAPS IN BRITAIN. THE SECRETARY OF STATE AGREED TO SUCH A DISCUSSION THOUGH HE SUGGESTED IT MIGHT BE BEST HELD IN THE MARGINS OF ANOTHER MEETING SO AS TO MAINTAIN DISCRETION.

10. GENSCHER HAD TO LEAVE AT THIS POINT TO PREPARE FOR THE FUNERAL. IT WAS AGREED THAT THE MEETING WOULD NOT BE MENTIONED TO THE PRESS.

COMMENT

11. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID AFTERWARDS THAT, WITHOUT QUESTIONING GENSCHER'S SINCEREITY, HE WAS PRETTY SCEPTICAL ABOUT THE POLISH ARGUMENTS. THE ELECTORAL ARGUMENT WAS MORE REAL. THE SECRETARY OF STATE BELIEVES THAT THE PROSPECTS FOR AN AGREED OUTCOME AT THE NATO SUMMIT WILL DEPEND CRUCIALLY ON THE AMERICAN ASSESSMENT OF WHAT THEY NEED TO GET OUT OF THE SUMMIT IN ORDER TO SECURE CONGRESSIONAL FUNDING THIS YEAR.

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