

SECRET



10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

1 May 1989

FILE 80
cc hie 6
2nd
rc
MOD (Hawthorn)
AS fl (Woolley)

SNF

I enclose:

- the text of a message from the Prime Minister to Mr. Lubbers about her meeting yesterday with Chancellor Kohl. I should be grateful if this could be telegraphed to The Hague for delivery as soon as possible;
- the text of a message which the Prime Minister has sent to President Bush on the same subject. This has gone direct to the White House and the copy is for information only.

(C. D. POWELL)

The Resident Clerk,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. 90c/89.

SECRET

SUBJECT

4(A-B)

cc OPS

025323

MAJOR MDHOAN 0190

SECRET

FM FCO

TO DESKBY 011500Z THE HAGUE

TELNO 95

OF 011440Z MAY 89

File: GERMANY: PM's
Meetings with Hen Kohl
in Germany Part 8

FROM RESIDENT CLERK

1. NO 10 HAVE ASKED FOR THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO MR LUBBERS TO BE DELIVERED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

MESSAGE BEGINS:-

DEAR RUUD,

I WAS MOST GRATEFUL TO YOU AND YOUR COLLEAGUES FOR COMING OVER TO CHEQUERS ON SATURDAY AND FOUND OUR TALK VERY USEFUL. I THOUGHT YOU MIGHT FIND IT HELPFUL TO HAVE A BRIEF ACCOUNT OF MY MEETING WITH HELMUT KHOL BEFORE YOU SEE HIM YOURSELF ON WEDNESDAY.

WE DID NOT REACH ANY AGREEMENT. BUT I THINK PROGRESS CAN BE MADE. MY FEELING IS THAT HELMUT IS UNCOMFORTABLE WITH PARTS AT LEAST OF THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT'S POSITION AND ACUTELY AWARE OF THE DIFFICULTIES WHICH IT HAS CAUSED IN NATO AND WITH THE UNITED STATES. I REMINDED HIM THAT HE HAD BEEN THE ONE TO PRESS FOR AN EARLY NATO SUMMIT TO TAKE THE MODERNISATION DECISION AHEAD OF THE EUROPEAN ELECTIONS. THIS GAVE HIM A PARTICULAR RESPONSIBILITY TO RESOLVE THE PROBLEMS WHICH THE CHANGE IN THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT'S POSITION HAD CAUSED.

ON MODERNISATION, I PUT TO HIM THE POINTS WE AGREED AT CHEQUERS, NAMELY THAT WE NEEDED AGREEMENT ON THE CONTINUING REQUIREMENT FOR SNF, THE NEED TO KEEP IT UP TO DATE WHERE NECESSARY, AND SUPPORT FOR THE US DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME. ALL THREE POINTS REPRESENTED COMMITMENTS ALREADY ACCEPTED BY ALL NATO GOVERNMENTS AT THE NATO SUMMIT OR IN THE NPG. I HOPED THAT GERMANY WOULD NOT RESILE FROM THEM.

HELMUT IS CONCERNED THAT SUPPORT FOR THE US DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME FOR FOTL WILL BE SEEN IN GERMANY AS PRE-EMPTING THE EVENTUAL DEPLOYMENT DECISION. I POINTED OUT THAT IT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE TO TAKE DEPLOYMENT DECISIONS IN 1992, AS ENVISAGED IN THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT'S OWN STATEMENT, UNLESS THE DEVELOPMENT WORK WAS DONE BETWEEN NOW AND THEN. AND IT WAS REASONABLE FOR THE UNITED STATES TO EXPECT AND RECEIVE OPEN SUPPORT FROM NATO FOR THAT WORK TO BE DONE. HELMUT FINALLY SAID THAT HE WOULD BE READY TO CONSIDER LANGUAGE ON THIS. IT WOULD BE VERY HELPFUL IF YOU COULD CONTINUE TO PRESS HIM ON THESE POINTS: I THINK THAT WE CAN PROBABLY REACH A SATISFACTORY CONCLUSION.

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MDHOAN 0190

THE POSITION ON SNF NEGOTIATIONS REMAINS VERY DIFFICULT. HELMUT SAYS THAT HE IS FIRMLY OPPOSED TO A THIRD ZERO, BUT NEEDS TO HAVE A CLEAR INDICATION THAT THERE WILL BE NEGOTIATIONS ON SNF. HE ARGUES THAT GERMANY IS THE COUNTRY MOST DIRECTLY AFFECTED AND ITS INTERESTS MUST BE GIVEN DUE WEIGHT. I TOOK HIM THROUGH THE POINTS WE DISCUSSED AT CHEQUERS, EMPHASISING THAT THE RIGHT WAY FORWARD WAS TO CHALLENGE THE RUSSIANS TO MAKE UNILATERAL REDUCTIONS TO NATO'S LEVELS. THIS WOULD BE A MUCH BOLDER INITIATIVE AND WOULD PUT THE ONUS ON GORBACHEV TO PROVE HIS BONA FIDES AND SHOW THAT HE IS REALLY COMMITTED TO DISARMAMENT. I LEFT HELMUT IN NO DOUBT THAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES WERE NOT PREPARED TO AGREE TO SNF NEGOTIATIONS, EVEN IF THIS GAVE RISE TO DIFFICULTIES AT THE SUMMIT ITSELF.

HELMUT EMPHASISED MORE THAN ONCE THAT THE GERMAN PAPER WAS INTENDED AS A BASIS FOR DISCUSSION WITH GERMANY'S ALLIES AND NOT AS AN ULTIMATUM. HE WANTED THE SUMMIT TO BE A SUCCESS AND WAS PREPARED TO EXAMINE OUR VIEWS WITH AN OPEN MIND. I HOPE YOU WILL ALSO TAKE HIM THROUGH ALL THE ARGUMENTS AND GIVE HIM NO GROUNDS TO HOPE THAT AGREEMENT TO SNF NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE FORTHCOMING, URGING HIM TO ACCEPT INSTEAD THE CONCEPT ON WHICH WE AGREED OF CHALLENGING THE RUSSIANS TO MAKE UNILATERAL REDUCTIONS TO NATO'S LEVELS. I THINK IT WOULD BE BETTER NOT TO TABLE ANY COMPROMISE TEXTS AT THIS STAGE, SINCE THEY WILL ONLY BECOME THE BASE-LINE FOR FURTHER NEGOTIATION. WE HAVE ALREADY MADE A MAJOR CONCESSION BY AGREEING NOT TO PRESS FOR A DECISION ON DEPLOYMENT AT THE SUMMIT, AND CANNOT MOVE ANY FURTHER.

I AM GIVING GEORGE BUSH A SIMILAR REPORT. I LOOK FORWARD TO HEARING HOW YOU GET ON.

WARM REGARDS,
MARGARET.
MESSAGE ENDS.

HOWE

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION

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MAIN

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LIMITED
SEC POL DEPT
WED

MR GOULDEN
MR BOYD
RESIDENT CLERK

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SECRET

171

L. D. Muller

No amendment
—
me

MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO MR. LUBBERS

Dear Ruud,

I was most grateful to you and your colleagues for coming over to Chequers on Saturday and found our talk very useful. I thought you might find it helpful to have a brief account of my meeting with Helmut Kohl before you see him yourself on Wednesday.

We did not reach any agreement. But I think progress can be made. My feeling is that Helmut is uncomfortable with parts at least of the German government's position and acutely aware of the difficulties which it has caused in NATO and with the United States. I reminded him that he had been the one to press for an early NATO summit to take the modernisation decision ahead of the European elections. This gave him a particular responsibility to resolve the problems which the change in the German government's position had caused.

On modernisation, I put to him the points we agreed at Chequers, namely that we needed agreement on the continuing requirement for SNF, the need to keep it up to date where necessary, and support for the US development programme. All three points represented commitments already accepted by all NATO governments at the NATO summit or in the NPG. I hoped that Germany would not resile from them.

Helmut is concerned that support for the US development programme for FOTL will be seen in Germany as pre-empting the eventual deployment decision. I pointed out that it would not be possible to take deployment decisions in 1992, as envisaged in the German government's own statement, unless the development work was done between now and then. And it was reasonable for the United States to expect and receive open support from NATO for that work to be done. Helmut finally said that he would be ready to consider language on this. It would be very helpful if you could continue to press him on these points: I think that we can probably reach a

satisfactory conclusion.

The position on SNF negotiations remains very difficult. Helmut says that he is firmly opposed to a third zero, but needs to have a clear indication that there will be negotiations on SNF. He argues that Germany is the country most directly affected and its interests must be given due weight. I took him through the points we discussed at Chequers, emphasising that the right way forward was to challenge the Russians to make unilateral reductions to NATO's levels. This would be a much bolder initiative and would put the onus on Gorbachev to prove his bona fides and show that he is really committed to disarmament. I left Helmut in no doubt that Britain and the United States were not prepared to agree to SNF negotiations, even if this gave rise to difficulties at the summit itself.

Helmut emphasised more than once that the German paper was intended as a basis for discussion with Germany's allies and not as an ultimatum. He wanted the summit to be a success and was prepared to examine our views with an open mind. I hope you will also take him through all the arguments and give him no grounds to hope that agreement to SNF negotiations will be forthcoming, urging him to accept instead the concept on which we agreed of challenging the Russians to make unilateral reductions to NATO's levels. I think it would be better not to table any compromise texts at this stage, since they will only become the base-line for further negotiation. We have already made a major concession by agreeing not to press for a decision on deployment at the summit, and cannot move any further.

I am giving George Bush a similar report. I look forward to hearing how you get on.

Warm regards,

Margaret

Message ends."

SECRET

FILE 31(A-B)
CPC
1 May 1989
CBSD

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