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TALK WITH GENSCHER ABOUT THE GERMAN QUESTION

SUMMARY

1. GENSCHER WORRIED ABOUT ATTEMPTS OF THE GDR GOVERNMENT AND SED TO EXPLOIT THEIR ADVANTAGES UNFAIRLY IN THE ELECTIONS. FEDERAL GOVERNMENT WILL TALK TO GDR GOVERNMENT ABOUT CONCRETE MEASURES LIKE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND BETTER ROADS BUT SHOULD ALSO SEEK CONTACTS WITH OPPOSITION GROUPS TO BUILD UP THEIR IMPORTANCE. RISK OF PUBLIC CALLS IN THE GDR FOR EARLY REUNIFICATION OR ANOTHER BIG WAVE OF EMIGRATION. EMPHASIS ON STABILITY IN PROGRESS TOWARDS UNITY. DISMISSAL OF IDEA OF CONFEDERATION IN GERMANY. GENSCHER THINKS TERRITORY OF FRG COULD REMAIN IN NATO AFTER UNITY, AND SOME US FORCES COULD STAY.

DETAIL

2. I HAD 20 MINUTES' PRIVATE TALK WITH GENSCHER DURING A RECEPTION TODAY. HE EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT THE GDR GOVERNMENT AND THE SED WERE EXPLOITING THEIR STILL EFFECTIVE ORGANISATION AND THEIR MONOPOLY OF THE MEDIA AND OTHER UNFAIR ADVANTAGES FOR ALL THEY WERE WORTH IN THE RUN-UP TO THE GDR ELECTIONS ON 6 MAY. THERE WAS A SERIOUS RISK THAT THE ELECTIONS WOULD NOT BE FAIR. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT COULD NOT AVOID TALKING ABOUT PRACTICAL MEASURES WITH THE PRESENT GDR GOVERNMENT BUT WOULD TRY TO AVOID GIVING IT ADDED LEGITIMACY IN THE PROCESS. CONCRETE MEASURES LIKE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION PROJECTS AND MODERNISATION OF ROADS IN THE GDR WOULD BE DISCUSSED. SEITERS WOULD THEREFORE VISIT EAST BERLIN THIS MONTH AND MODROW'S PLANNED VISIT TO BONN AT THE BEGINNING OF FEBRUARY WOULD NOT BE CANCELLED. BUT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT WAS MINDED TO POSTPONE UNTIL AFTER THE GDR ELECTION THE CONCLUSION OF A FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT ON A TREATY ASSOCIATION BETWEEN THE GDR AND THE FRG. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND THE MAJOR PARTIES WOULD ALSO TAKE PAINS TO DEVELOP ACTIVE CONTACTS WITH THE MAJOR GDR OPPOSITION GROUPS, TO BUILD UP THEIR CREDIBILITY AND IMPORTANCE.

3. GENSCHER SAID THAT THE BEHAVIOUR OF THE GDR GOVERNMENT INCREASED

THE RISK OF INSTABILITY IN THE GDR. DEMONSTRATIONS CALLING FOR EARLY UNITY OR A NEW BIG WAVE OF EMIGRATION MIGHT BE STIMULATED. HAVING BEEN BORN IN THE GDR HIMSELF, SAID GENSCHER HE WOULD EMOTIONALLY LIKE UNITY TO BE ACHIEVED SOON BUT HE KNEW THAT STABILITY WAS ESSENTIAL AND HE WOULD WORK HARD FOR A STABLE PROCESS. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT WOULD TRY TO INFLUENCE THE GDR GOVERNMENT, ON THE BASIS OF THE LATTER'S OWN INTEREST IN STABILITY, THAT IT MUST TREAT THE OPPOSITION GROUPS MORE FAIRLY IN THE RUN-UP TO THE ELECTIONS. BUT GENSCHER WAS NOT CONFIDENT THAT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT WOULD PREVAIL IN THIS.

4. I ARGUED THE NEED FOR SELF-DETERMINATION IN GERMANY BEFORE UNITY WAS ASSUMED TO BE THE ANSWER TO THE GERMAN QUESTION. I MADE THE CASE FOR STABILITY AND ABOVE ALL FOR MAINTAINING FULLY RELIABLE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS IN EUROPE. I ASKED GENSCHER WHAT SOLUTION HE SAW TO THE CONUNDRUM OF HOW TO RECONCILE GERMAN UNITY, IF THAT SHOULD BE THE GERMANS' CHOICE IN FREE SELF-DETERMINATION, WITH THE ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENT THAT NATO REMAINED IN BEING AND EFFECTIVE. GENSCHER SAID THAT IT WAS TOO MUCH TO ASK GORBACHEV TO CONTEMPLATE THE GDR'S ABSORPTION INTO NATO. THAT WOULD MEAN NOT ONLY THE END OF THE WARSAW PACT BUT ALSO THE STRENGTHENING OF NATO. I ASKED WHETHER THE SPD'S FAVOURED OPTION OF A GERMAN CONFEDERATION WOULD ENABLE WEST GERMANY TO STAY IN NATO IF UNITY WERE ACHIEVED. GENSCHER DISMISSED THIS IDEA AS ARTIFICIAL AND SAID IT HAD NO FUTURE. HE COULD ENVISAGE A GERMAN FEDERATION IN WHICH THE LAENDER NOW COMPRISING THE FRG WOULD REMAIN IN NATO BUT THE FORMER TERRITORY OF THE GDR WOULD NOT JOIN IT AND MIGHT STAY IN THE WARSAW PACT IF THAT SURVIVED. LIKE WEST BERLIN TODAY, THE FORMER GDR MIGHT BE EXCLUDED FROM THE AMBIT OF THE BUNDESWEHR. I QUERIED WHETHER SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT COULD LAST. GENSCHER ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THIS COULD BE A PROBLEM, AND SAID THAT A GREAT DEAL WOULD DEPEND ON WHAT PROGRESS WAS MADE IN ARMS CONTROL. THE LOWER THE REMAINING LEVEL OF FORCES, THE EASIER SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT MIGHT BE TO MANAGE DURABLY. HIS PURPOSE WOULD BE TO KEEP WEST GERMANY IN NATO.

Snely important

5. I SURMISED THAT THE SOVIET UNION MIGHT WANT SOME AMERICAN FORCES TO STAY IN A UNITED GERMANY. GENSCHER AGREED. HE SAID THE REASONS HAD TO DO WITH GERMANY'S PAST AND WERE UNDERSTANDABLE. FOR THE SAME UNDERSTANDABLE REASONS BRITAIN AND FRANCE AND BELGIUM AND OTHERS WOULD WANT SOME FOREIGN FORCES TO STAY IN GERMANY. THE SOVIET UNION MIGHT ALSO WISH TO KEEP SOME FORCES IN WHAT IS NOW THE GDR. GENSCHER SAID THAT HIS IDEA OF WEST GERMANY STAYING IN NATO AFTER GERMAN UNITY SHOULD MAKE CONTINUED STATIONING OF AMERICAN FORCES POSSIBLE.

COMMENT

6. IN A SEPERATE TELEGRAM I HAVE REPORTED SIMILAR REMARKS BY TELTSCHIK ON THE UNFAIR ADVANTAGES OF THE SED IN THE GDR ELECTION. I AM GLAD, IN THIS CONNECTION, THAT THE PROGRAMME FOR YOUR VISIT TO THE GDR INCLUDES TALKS WITH OPPOSITION GROUPS. GENSCHER INVITED ME FOR A FURTHER TALK BEFORE LONG, AND I SUGGESTED THAT I MIGHT TELL HIM ABOUT THE PLANS FOR YOUR VISIT TO THE GDR. I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR AUTHORITY TO TALK TO HIM ON THE LINES SUGGESTED IN MY TELNO 013. GENSCHER'S REMARKS ABOUT WEST GERMANY REMAINING IN NATO ARE INTERESTING BUT STRUCK ME AS SPONTANEOUS RATHER THAN AS REPRESENTING A SETTLED VIEW ON HIS PART. I COULD PROBE ON THIS IN MY FURTHER MEETING WITH HIM.

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