

CONFIDENTIAL

055547
MDADAN 3094

ADVANCE COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

FM BMG BERLIN

TO DESKBY 261500Z FCO

TELNO 015

OF 261400Z JANUARY 90

INFO IMMEDIATE BONN

INFO PRIORITY MOSCOW, PARIS, WASHINGTON, UKDEL NATO, UKREP BRUSSELS

INFO PRIORITY EAST BERLIN

FOLLOWING FROM AMBASSADOR

BONN TELNO 31 : CALL ON WEIZSAECKER : THE GERMAN QUESTION

SUMMARY

1. WEIZSAECKER MORE CAUTIOUS AND SOBER THAN KOHL. DOES NOT EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF COLLAPSE OF GDR REGIME BEFORE ELECTIONS. BUT THINKS GDR MORE LIKELY TO GET BY UNTIL ELECTIONS. REGRETS THAT WEST GERMAN POLITICAL PARTIES ARE INTENSIFYING PRESSURE FOR GERMAN UNITY AND INTERFERING WITH PARTIES IN THE GDR. AGREES ON CRITICAL IMPORTANCE OF STABILITY AND OF THE EUROPEAN FRAMEWORK ESPECIALLY REGARDING NATO AND EC. FORESEES NO (NO) DIFFICULTY ABOUT US AND WESTERN FORCES BEING STATIONED IN A UNITED GERMANY BUT CANNOT SOLVE CONUNDRUM OF RECONCILING UNITY AND NATO. REGRETS ONE SIDE-EFFECT OF DECEMBER MEETING OF FOUR POWER AMBASSADORS IN BERLIN.

DETAIL

2. I CALLED ON THE FEDERAL PRESIDENT FOR ONE HOUR IN BERLIN TODAY. I GAVE HIM AN ACCOUNT OF YOUR VISIT TO THE GDR AND ASKED HOW HE SAW THE CHANCES OF THE EAST GERMAN GOVERNMENT SURVIVING UNTIL THE MAY ELECTIONS. WEIZSAECKER THOUGHT THERE MIGHT BE A COLLAPSE OF AUTHORITY IN THE GDR, BECAUSE PEOPLE WERE UNDERSTANDABLY IMPATIENT AFTER 40 YEARS OF AUTOCRACY AND, RATHER THAN WAITING FOR IMPROVEMENTS IN THE GDR, MIGHT EMIGRATE IN EVEN LARGER NUMBERS. BUT ON BALANCE HE THOUGHT THAT A RESTRUCTURING OF THE GDR GOVERNMENT SHOULD ENABLE IT TO MUDDLE THROUGH UNTIL THE ELECTIONS. IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT ALL SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL FORCES IN THE GDR SHOULD BE BROUGHT INTO A CARETAKER GOVERNMENT NOW, SO THAT NONE WOULD HAVE THE ELECTORAL ADVANTAGE OF REMAINING IN OPPOSITION.

3. I SAID THAT BRITAIN, IN LINE WITH THE STRASBOURG FORMULA, SAW

SELF-DETERMINATION AS THE CENTRAL PRINCIPLE. THERE WAS A DANGER THAT AN ACT OF SELF-DETERMINATION WOULD BE ASSUMED TO HAVE OCCURRED WITHOUT ANYTHING SPECIFIC REALLY HAPPENING. WEIZSAECKER AGREED THAT SOME ACT OF SELF-DETERMINATION WAS NEEDED. IT WAS TOO SOON TO SAY WHAT FORM IT SHOULD TAKE. HE WAS NOT SURE WHETHER THE DEMONSTRATIONS IN FAVOUR OF UNITY IN THE GDR REALLY REPRESENTED THE FEELINGS OF THE PEOPLE. NOR WERE EMIGRANTS VOTING WITH THEIR FEET FOR UNITY SO MUCH AS FOR GUARANTEED FREEDOM AND PROSPERITY. BUT THE FACT WAS THAT IT WAS BECOMING CLEAR THAT THE OVERALL WISH OF THE GERMANS WAS FOR UNITY. THE NEW GOVERNMENT IN THE GDR AFTER THE ELECTIONS WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY DECLARE FOR UNITY.

4. WEIZSAECKER SAID THAT IN THE FRG THE CAUSE OF UNITY WAS LIKE A CHARIOT PULLED BY FOUR HORSES : THE TABLOID BILD NEWSPAPER, DER SPIEGEL, KOHL AND BRANDT. THE PRESSURE OF KOHL AND BRANDT FOR UNITY WAS UNDERSTANDABLE IN DEMOCRATIC TERMS, BUT IT WAS MAKING IT HARDER TO LOOK AT THE SUBJECT IN DISPASSIONATE TERMS. WITH THE FEDERAL ELECTION COMING IN DECEMBER, THE POLITICAL PARTIES, NATURALLY BUT MOST REGRETTABLY, WERE LOOKING AT EVERY QUESTION AND EVERY EVENT FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF PARTY POLITICAL ADVANTAGE.

5. WEIZSAECKER SAID THAT THE TWO GERMANIES WERE RAPIDLY GROWING TOGETHER. THE INFLUENCE OF WEST GERMAN POLITICAL PARTIES OVER EAST GERMAN ONES WAS EXCESSIVE BUT WAS BY NO MEANS THE ONLY EXAMPLE OF INNER-GERMAN OSMOSIS. MORE AND MORE WEST GERMAN FIRMS WOULD CONSIDER JOINT VENTURES IN THE GDR. CONTACTS AT MUNICIPAL LEVEL WERE PROLIFERATING. SO WAS COOPERATION BETWEEN UNIVERSITIES AND SCHOOLS.

6. I SAID THAT, WHATEVER HAPPENED THROUGH FREE SELF-DETERMINATION, IT WOULD BE NECESSARY FOR STABILITY TO BE MAINTAINED. BRITAIN HAD A STRONG INTEREST IN FURTHERING STABILITY IN EUROPE. FOR MANY REASONS, FOR INSTANCE THE SHEER SIZE OF THE SOVIET UNION, AN EFFECTIVE WESTERN SECURITY SYSTEM WOULD REMAIN ESSENTIAL. HOW COULD GERMAN UNITY AND

NATO BE RECONCILED? WEIZSAECKER AGREED ABOUT STABILITY AND THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BRITISH INTEREST AND THE NEED FOR DEFENCE AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION IN THE FUTURE. HE SAID THAT THERE WOULD BE MANY MATTERS TO SETTLE BETWEEN THE TWO GERMANIES IF A DECISION WAS TAKEN FOR UNITY. THAT WOULD REQUIRE A STABLE PROCESS OF TRANSITION, IF ONE COULD BE ACHIEVED. BUT IT WAS EASIER TO SEE HOW TO SETTLE THE INNER-GERMAN PROBLEMS THAN THE QUESTIONS OF EUROPEAN ARCHITECTURE. HE WAS VERY GLAD THAT I HAD RAISED THE SPECIFIC QUESTION OF NATO AND GERMAN UNITY. THAT WAS THE HARDEST ISSUE OF ALL. HE WAS SURE THAT IT WAS WRONG TO EXPECT THE SOVIET UNION TO ALLOW THE GDR TO COME WITHIN

NATO. BEYOND THAT, HE COULD NOT YET SEE AN ANSWER TO MY QUESTION. I SAID THAT AMERICAN FORCES WOULD BE NEEDED IN WESTERN EUROPE AS AN ESSENTIAL PILLAR OF ANY VIABLE WESTERN SECURITY SYSTEM. WEIZSAECKER AGREED AND SAID THAT HE FORESAW NO PROBLEM ABOUT THE GERMANS AGREEING TO AMERICAN AND OTHER FOREIGN FORCES STAYING IN WEST GERMANY IN REDUCED NUMBERS. HE HOPED THAT EAST EUROPEAN LEADERS LIKE HAVEL WOULD NOT LAUNCH GREAT INITIATIVES ABOUT WITHDRAWAL OF AMERICAN AS WELL AS SOVIET STATIONED FORCES.

7. WEIZSAECKER SAID THAT THE QUESTION OF THE GDR'S RELATIONSHIP TO THE EC WAS MUCH MORE DIFFICULT THAN DELORS WAS MAKING OUT. I AGREED AND SAID THAT THE WAY FOR THE COMMUNITY TO HELP THE GDR IN THE COMING PERIOD WAS THROUGH THE AGREEMENT NOW UNDER NEGOTIATION. TALK OF ASSOCIATION, LET ALONE MEMBERSHIP OF THE EC, FOR THE GDR WAS WILDLY PREMATURE. WEIZSAECKER NODDED BUT SAID THAT IT WAS UNDERSTANDABLE THAT GERMANS SHOULD WANT TO MOVE FASTER ON THIS SUBJECT.

8. WEIZSAECKER REMARKED THAT HMG WAS NOT SAYING MUCH ABOUT THE GERMAN QUESTION. I REFERRED AGAIN TO THE STRASBOURG FORMULA AND TOOK HIM THROUGH THE MAJOR POINTS OF MY PUBLIC STATEMENTS IN THE GDR.

9. WEIZSAECKER SAID THAT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE GERMAN CAPITAL IN BERLIN SHOULD BE THE LAST STONE TO BE PUT IN PLACE IN A BUILDING CALLED GERMAN UNITY. BUT THERE WOULD BE DIFFICULT PROBLEMS TO MANAGE, AS THE TWO HALVES OF THE CITY GREW TOGETHER, EVEN FASTER THAN THE TWO GERMAN STATES. I SAID THAT OUR POLICY WAS TO MAINTAIN OUR PRESENCE IN RELATION TO BERLIN AS LONG AS THE BERLINERS WANTED IT. MY CONVICTION WAS THAT OUR PRESENCE AND POSITION IN THE CITY WERE A VALUABLE FACTOR FOR STABILITY IN THESE TIMES OF CHANGE IN CENTRAL EUROPE. WEIZSAECKER AGREED. I SAID THAT WE WOULD BE FLEXIBLE ON SPECIFIC ISSUES CONCERNING BERLIN AND WOULD DEVELOP OUR POSITIONS ON BERLIN MATTERS IN STEP WITH THE TIMES. WEIZSAECKER SAID THAT, SPEAKING AS A FORMER GOVERNING MAYOR, THIS POLICY WOULD BE EXACTLY RIGHT.

10. HE SAID, HOWEVER, THAT ONE ASPECT OF THE MEETING OF THE AMBASSADORS OF THE FOUR POWERS IN THE ALLIED CONTROL AUTHORITY BUILDING IN BERLIN ON 11 DECEMBER HAD BEEN MOST REGRETTABLE. I

INTERJECTED TO EXPLAIN HOW WE HAD TALKED ONLY ABOUT MATTERS OF INTEREST TO BERLINERS AND EVADED THE SOVIET ATTEMPT TO GET US TO TALK ABOUT GERMANY AS A WHOLE. WEIZSAECKER ACCEPTED THAT, BUT SAID THAT

THE SIMPLE FACT OF THE MEETING AND THE PHOTOGRAPHS IN ALL THE MEDIA AT THE TIME ENABLED THE REPUBLIKANER PARTY TO MAKE OUT THAT THE ALLIES WERE TRYING TO REASSERT CONTROL OVER GERMANY. I SAID THAT WE WERE CONSCIOUS THAT PUBLIC REACTIONS TO SUCH MEETINGS COULD BE MIXED AND THEREFORE HAD BEEN AND WOULD CONTINUE TO BE, CAREFUL. BUT THERE WERE BERLIN MATTERS WHICH WE NEEDED TO DISCUSS WITH THE RUSSIANS AND WE ALSO WISHED TO AVOID GIVING THEM ANY EXTRA REASON FOR ANXIETY, AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF ALL THE CHANGE IN CENTRAL EUROPE. FOUR POWER DISCUSSION ABOUT BERLIN MATTERS WOULD PROCEED FOR THE TIME BEING BELOW THE LEVEL OF AMBASSADORS.

COMMENT

11. WEIZSAECKER IS MUCH MORE READY THAN KOHL TO RECOGNISE THE RISKS IN THE PRESENT SITUATION AND THE POTENTIAL DIFFICULTY OF CONTROLLING EVENTS. HE IS ALSO MORE READY TO RECOGNISE THE COMPLEXITY OF THE MANY RAMIFICATIONS OF A PROSPECT OF GERMAN UNITY. IN PART THIS REFLECTS HIS MORE REFLECTIVE TEMPERAMENT AND IN PART HIS POSITION AS CONSTITUTIONAL HEAD OF STATE. HIS PUBLIC STATEMENTS HAVE EXPRESSED HIS SOBRIETY AND CAUTION. FOR US, IT IS WELCOME THAT HE ACCEPTS THAT THE ALLIES HAVE AN OBVIOUS AND LEGITIMATE RIGHT TO BE INVOLVED IN DECIDING WHAT HAPPENS ABOUT THE REPERCUSSIONS OF THE GERMAN QUESTION.

CORBETT

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION

14

ADVANCE

12

.BERLIN/INNER-GERMAN RELATIONS
.(WIDE)
PS
PS/PUS
MR P J WESTON
MR RATFORD
HD/WED

HD/SOVIET
HD/NEWS
~~RESIDENT CLERK~~
MR S MCCARTHY SEC(NATO/UKP)MOD
WG CDR ANDREWS DCTS NATO MOD
PRESS SECRETARY NO 10
MRS GLOVER LEGAL ADV

PAGE 4

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

He is
just
clever.
This ain't
anthe
same
no