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FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

SECRETARY OF STATES CALL ON VICE PRESIDENT QUAYLE

1. WHEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE CALLED ON VICE PRESIDENT QUAYLE IN WASHINGTON THIS AFTERNOON, QUAYLE ASKED ABOUT GERMAN REUNIFICATION. THIS WAS AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF PUBLIC RUMOURS THAT GORBACHEV MIGHT BE THREATENING TO RESIGN AS GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY. QUAYLE SAID THAT HE WONDERED HOW GORBACHEV KEPT GOING WITH EVERYTHING CRUMBLING AROUND HIM. HE HAD ONCE THOUGHT THAT GORBACHEV HAD A GRAND STRATEGY AND PLAYED EVERYTHING LIKE A FIDDLE, BUT THE MORE HE SAW THE MORE IT LOOKED AS IF GORBACHEV OPERATED IN AN OUT OF THE POCKET, REFLEXIVE WAY. THE SECRETARY OF STATE AGREED THAT GORBACHEV'S MOMENTUM SEEMED TO COME FROM HIS OWN ADRENALIN. HE GAVE AN ACCOUNT OF HIS TALKS IN EAST GERMANY THE PREVIOUS WEEK. QUAYLE SAID THAT IT LOOKED AS IF GERMAN REUNIFICATION WOULD CERTAINLY COME. WHICH OF THE FRG POLITICAL PARTIES STOOD TO BENEFIT MOST? THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID HE THOUGHT THE SPD, WITH THEIR TRADITIONAL STRENGTH IN EAST GERMANY, WERE THE BEST ORGANISED AND WOULD DO BETTER THAN THE OTHER PARTIES. BUT THE PARLIAMENT THAT WAS ELECTED IN EAST GERMANY IN MARCH WOULD BE A KALEIDOSCOPE OUT OF WHICH IT MIGHT BE HARD TO FORM A GOVERNMENT. WE NEEDED TO THINK CAREFULLY ABOUT THE IMPLICATIONS OF UNIFICATION FOR NATO AND THE EC. THE EAST GERMANS HAD NOT BEGUN TO THINK ABOUT THESE THINGS AND THE WEST GERMANS, PREOCCUPIED WITH THEIR OWN ELECTIONS, FOUND THEM TOO HARD TO CONTEMPLATE.

2. QUAYLE SAID THAT IT WOULD BE BAD NEWS IF REUNIFICATION DAMAGED THE CDU. IT SEEMED TO HIM AS IF THE SPD HAD BEEN BETTER ABLE TO PUT THEMSELVES ON THE SIDE OF THE GERMAN PEOPLE THAN THE CDU WHO SEEMED TO BE MORE ON THE SIDE OF THE GOVERNMENT IN THE GDR. IT WAS VERY IMPORTANT THAT KOHL SHOULD WIN IN THE FRG.

3. AFTER A BRIEF DISCUSSION ABOUT THE IMPLICATIONS OF GERMAN

REUNIFICATION FOR THE SINGLE MARKET, QUAYLE SAID THAT IT WOULD BE A GREAT MISTAKE TO DISCARD THE SUCCESS OF THE ALLIANCE, WHICH HAD SO FAR BEEN EFFECTIVE, JUST WHEN COMMUNISM WAS DRYING UP AND BLOWING AWAY. CONGRESS TENDED TO WANT TO CUT EVERYTHING BUT HE THOUGHT THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD HAVE SOME LEVERAGE THROUGH THE BASE CLOSURE PROPOSALS IN THE NEW BUDGET. IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR CONGRESSMEN TO DEMAND DEFENCE CUTS IN GENERAL WHILE CLAIMING, AS THEY WOULD, THAT BASES IN THEIR PARTICULAR DISTRICT SHOULD BE SAVED. SO IT WOULD ALL BOIL DOWN TO PORK BARREL POLITICS. HE THOUGHT THE MOOD OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE WAS TO WANT CUTS, BUT NOT RADICAL OR DEEP CUTS. THEY VIEWED EASTERN EUROPE AS CHAOTIC. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES THE PRESIDENT'S CAUTIOUS APPROACH WAS THE RIGHT ONE.

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