

CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO

TO IMMEDIATE BONN

TELNO 95

OF 091900Z FEBRUARY 90

AND TO IMMEDIATE OTTAWA

INFO IMMEDIATE BMG BERLIN, EAST BERLIN, MOSCOW, PARIS

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKDEL NATO, UKREP BRUSSELS

OTTAWA FOR SECRETARY OF STATE'S PARTY ON ARRIVAL

MEETING BETWEEN THE PUS AND THE STATE SECRETARY OF THE FRG MFA:
THE GERMAN QUESTION

SUMMARY

1. SUDHOFF REPORTS THAT THE GDR IS IN CHAOS: ELECTIONS COULD BE BROUGHT FORWARD AGAIN. ON NATO, GERMANY WANTED ALLIED TROOPS TO REMAIN: DETAILED ARRANGEMENTS WERE DIFFICULT TO PURSUE BEFORE THE GDR ELECTIONS. WE STRESSED THE DESIRABILITY OF DEVELOPING A UNITED ALLIED POSITION TO ASSIST CONTACTS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. TALKS BETWEEN THE FOUR POWERS AND THE GERMANIES COULD BE USEFUL AT SOME POINT. SUDHOFF ACCEPTS THE NEED TO REASSURE THE SOVIET UNION BUT FOUR POWER TALKS ON THEIR OWN WOULD BE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE. THE POSITION OF THE SPD IN THE FRG HAD STRENGTHENED. THE POSSIBILITY OF UNIFICATION UNDER ARTICLE 23 WAS IMPORTANT BUT UNPREDICTABLE: COULD NOT RULE OUT POSSIBILITY OF PAN-GERMAN ELECTIONS IN DECEMBER. NO DISCUSSION OF EC/GDR. DETAIL

2. THE PUS HAD 5 HOURS' TALK WITH SUDHOFF, ACCOMPANIED BY VON RICHTHOFEN, ON 9 FEBRUARY. DISCUSSION CONCENTRATED ON THE GERMAN QUESTION.

GDR

3. SUDHOFF GAVE A FULL ACCOUNT OF THE SITUATION IN THE GDR. THE CHAOS THERE WAS SUCH THAT MODROW MIGHT NOT LAST UNTIL THE ELECTIONS ON 18 MARCH. THE FACT THAT THE SYSTEM WAS STILL ALIVE WAS A RESULT OF THE RESPONSIBLE ATTITUDE OF THE ROUND TABLE. THE ECONOMY HAD DECLINED BY 2-4 PER CENT. THE CURRENT RATE OF EMIGRATION OF 2,500 TO 3,000 A DAY WAS UNBEARABLE FOR BOTH SIDES. THE LACK OF PRACTICAL KNOW-HOW IN THE GDR MEANT THAT HELP FROM FRG POLITICAL PARTIES WAS UNAVOIDABLE AND DESIRABLE. IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO SAY HOW THE QUESTION OF GERMAN UNITY WOULD COME TO BE RESOLVED.

IT MIGHT TAKE OVERNIGHT OR A YEAR OR 2 OR 3. THE MAIN NEED AT PRESENT WAS ECONOMIC HELP. THIS WAS WHY CHANCELLOR KOHL HAD PROPOSED ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION, THOUGH SUDHOFF HAD NO IDEA WHAT THE EFFECTS OF THAT WOULD BE. ISSUES INVOLVED WERE TOO BURNING TO BE PREDICTED. HENCE IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT WESTERN PARTNERS SHOULD UNDERSTAND WHAT WAS GOING ON. THE GDR HAD NOWHERE TO TURN TO BUT THE FRG. QUOTE IF WE ARE ASKED, HOW CAN WE SAY NO QUOTE UNQUOTE.

4. IN SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION, SUDHOFF EXPRESSED THE PERSONAL VIEW (PLEASE PROTECT) THAT LAFONTAINE'S POSITION HAD BEEN STRENGTHENED BY THE SAARLAND RESULT AND THE BRINGING FORWARD OF THE GDR ELECTIONS (WHICH SHORTENED THE TIME AVAILABLE FOR RIGHT WING PARTIES TO ORGANISE THEMSELVES). THE QUESTION OF POSSIBLE UNIFICATION UNDER ARTICLE 23 OF THE BASIC LAW WAS IMPORTANT BUT NOT CAPABLE OF PREDICTION. IN ANSWER TO A QUESTION, SUDHOFF SAID THAT HE COULD NOT RULE OUT UNITED ELECTIONS AT THE END OF THE YEAR, ALTHOUGH ELECTORAL LAWS MIGHT HAVE TO BE CHANGED. THE QUESTION HAD COME AS A SURPRISE IN THE FRG, AS IT HAD ELSEWHERE, AND WAS STILL BEING STUDIED.

NATO/FOUR POWERS

5. THE PUS ENQUIRED HOW MUCH THOUGHT HAD BEEN GIVEN IN THE FRG TO THE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE EC AND NATO. IT WAS DESIRABLE TO CLARIFY BROAD OBJECTIVES SOON. WESTON ADDED THAT THE PACE OF EVENTS SHOULD NOT BE TAKEN AS AN EXCUSE FOR NOT LOOKING AHEAD. IN THE VARIOUS BILATERAL CONTACTS WITH THE SOVIET UNION, IT WAS DESIRABLE TO SEND AGREED SIGNALS, WHICH THEREFORE REQUIRED PRIOR DISCUSSION.

6. SUDHOFF AGREED WITH THIS LINE OF THINKING. MUCH WORK WAS IN HAND BUT THE END RESULT COULD NOT YET BE PREDICTED. GERMANY MUST REMAIN PART OF THE WEST, MUCH AS THE FRG WAS AT PRESENT. NO-ONE IN THE FRG WANTED NEUTRALITY (THE GREENS WERE BEING MARGINALISED). HE HAD BEEN POSITIVELY IMPRESSED BY THE REACTIONS OF SPD LEADERS DURING A VISIT TO NATO HEADQUARTERS. HE STRESSED, HOWEVER, THAT WHILE THERE WERE NO PROBLEMS WITH THE PRESENT COALITION, IT WAS NOT ENTIRELY POSSIBLE TO PREDICT WHAT WOULD HAPPEN WITH A DIFFERENT GOVERNMENT. SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED IN WHICH THE SOVIET UNION COULD FEEL ACCOMMODATED.

7. GOULDEN POINTED OUT THAT MILITARY DISCUSSIONS WITH GERMAN AND FRENCH REPRESENTATIVES REVEALED A CONSIDERABLE DEGREE OF COMMON GROUND, ALTHOUGH FUTURE ARRANGEMENTS WERE LESS CLEAR. BOTH SIDES AGREED THAT WORKING-LEVEL COOPERATION OVER NATO AND THE CFE WERE EXCELLENT.

8. WESTON ENQUIRED ABOUT GERMAN ATTITUDES TOWARDS A POSSIBLE STATEMENT AT THE JUNE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL ON GERMAN UNITY AND NATO. COULD GENSCHER'S IDEAS BE DEVELOPED SO AS TO FIX THE ISSUE AND REMOVE IT FROM THE FRG'S ELECTORAL CONTEXT QUERY. SUDHOFF SAID THAT IT WOULD BE HELPFUL AND ESSENTIAL TO HAVE A CLEAR STATEMENT ABOUT THE GERMAN QUESTION AT THE NAC. CLEAR SUPPORT FOR THE GERMAN ISSUE WOULD BE WELCOME AND EXPECTED, WOULD SHOW THAT GERMANY WAS NOT ALONE AND THAT THE GERMAN QUESTION WAS NOT AN OBSTACLE TO STABILITY. HE WOULD NOT BE DRAWN ABOUT DEVELOPING GENSCHER'S IDEAS BUT SUGGESTED THAT THERE WAS LITTLE SCOPE FOR THIS BEFORE THE GDR ELECTIONS.

9. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION FROM THE PUS ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF WORKING ON THE SOVIET UNION TO ACCEPT IDEAS SUCH AS THOSE OF GENSCHER, SUDHOFF RAISED THE QUESTION OF THE MODALITIES OF CONTACTS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. THE ROLE OF THE FOUR POWERS SHOULD BE CAREFULLY FITTED INTO THE CONCEPT OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CSCE MEMBER COUNTRIES AS AN OVERRIDING EUROPEAN FRAMEWORK. THE QUADRIPARTITE MEETING OF AMBASSADORS IN BERLIN IN DECEMBER HAD CAUSED SOME SURPRISE IN THE MEDIA WITHOUT AROUSING CRITICISM OR REJECTION. MANY HAD FORGOTTEN THIS HISTORIC MECHANISM. THE FRG WERE AWARE OF SOVIET INTEREST. BUT IT WAS DOUBTFUL THAT CONTINUATION OF SUCH MEETINGS WOULD BE CONSIDERED IN THE SAME OBJECTIVE WAY. IT WAS NOT IN THE WESTERN INTEREST TO GIVE THE IMPRESSION TO THE GERMAN PUBLIC OF THE REVIVAL OF OLD HISTORICAL STRUCTURES AND OF A DIRECTORATE DEALING WITH GERMAN ISSUES ABOVE THEIR HEADS. RUSSIAN INTEREST COULD BE DEALT WITH AT A LOWER LEVEL THAN THAT OF AMBASSADORS AND COULD COVER, FOR EXAMPLE, THE BERLIN INITIATIVE. IT WOULD BE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE FOR WESTERN INTERESTS TO AROUSE PUBLIC CONCERN ABOUT THIS IN THE FRG.

10. THE PUS EMPHASISED THAT WE WERE WELL AWARE OF GERMAN SENSITIVITIES. NONETHELESS THERE WOULD BE CONTINUING BERLIN-RELATED MATTERS WHICH IT WOULD BE APPROPRIATE AND NECESSARY TO DISCUSS WITH THE SOVIET UNION, ALTHOUGH THIS COULD BE DONE AT A LOWER LEVEL. SECOND, THE NEED TO REASSURE THE SOVIET UNION REMAINED. HENCE FURTHER THOUGHT MIGHT NEED TO BE GIVEN TO THIS ISSUE, PERHAPS BY MEANS OF DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE FOUR POWERS TOGETHER WITH THE GERMANIES. THE FOUR POWERS MIGHT BE SUMMONED BY THE GERMANIES, RATHER THAN THE OTHER WAY ROUND. BROOMFIELD ADDED THAT THE FRG MIGHT NEED TO ENCOURAGE THE GDR ON THIS ISSUE SINCE THEY WOULD NOT BE ON THE RUSSIAN SIDE AFTER ELECTIONS. THE PUS ADDED THAT THE ONLY WAY IN WHICH TO SECURE FORMAL RUSSIAN ACCEPTANCE OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NATO AND THE FORMER GDR MIGHT BE TO INVOLVE THE SOVIET UNION IN SUCH A

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PROCESS. THE FOREIGN SECRETARY MIGHT WISH TO EXPLORE THIS FURTHER WITH GENSCHER IN OTTAWA.

11. THE PUS ASKED TO WHAT EXTENT THE QUESTION OF NATO AND FOREIGN MILITARY PRESENCE MIGHT BECOME AN ELECTORAL ISSUE. SUDHOFF SAID THAT SO FAR THE QUESTION HAD NOT ARISEN. SO LONG AS FOREIGN MILITARY PRESENCE WAS NOT AN OBSTACLE TO GERMAN UNITY, THERE WAS NO NEED FOR DISCUSSION. HE STRESSED, SEVERAL TIMES, THAT GERMANY WANTED A NATO MILITARY PRESENCE AND ALSO SAW THE DESIRABILITY OF ALLOWING SOVIET MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE FORMER GDR IF NECESSARY.

FRG/SOVIET UNION

12. BROOMFIELD ASKED WHAT MESSAGES KOHL WOULD TAKE TO GORBACHEV ON 10 FEBRUARY. SUDHOFF REPLIED THAT KOHL WOULD SAY THAT THE FRG WANTED STABILITY. HE WOULD NOT PURSUE IN ANY DETAIL THE QUESTION OF A UNITED GERMAN RELATIONSHIP WITH NATO. THE CONCEPT OF A EUROPEAN PEACE ORDER WAS OF MORE VALUE TO THE SOVIET UNION THAN THE OLD SYSTEM. SECOND, THE FRG RECOGNISED SOVIET SECURITY CONCERNS. THE FRG SIDE WOULD NOT (NOT) RAISE THE QUESTION OF THE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF SOVIET TROOPS IN THE GDR, ALTHOUGH IT COULD NOT BE EXCLUDED THAT THE RUSSIANS RAISED IT. GOULDEN POINTED OUT THAT THE NATO POSITION ON STATIONED FORCES WAS ESTABLISHED AND SOUND. THE RUSSIANS WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO BE DIVISIVE.

CFE

13. SUDHOFF SAID THAT THE WEST SHOULD BE AGGRESSIVE IN TACKLING THE NEXT STEPS AFTER CFE 1. THIS WOULD ENTAIL REDUCTIONS OF FORCES, INCLUDING THOSE OF THE FRG. IT WAS A GREAT STRENGTH THAT NATO HAD ALWAYS BEEN MORE THAN SIMPLY A MILITARY ALLIANCE. WESTON SAID THAT THE CONCEPT OF COOPERATIVE SECURITY SHOULD BE DEVELOPED OUTWARDS FROM THE BASIS THAT NATO WAS A STARTING POINT. SUDHOFF EMPHASISED (SEVERAL TIMES) GERMANY'S WESTERN COMMITMENT.

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