



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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From The Minister of State

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Y^l 1990 may like
to glance at
this. It's helpful

Joe Carter.

// I attach two documents which were handed to me by Mr Zamyatin, on a confidential basis, this morning at the airport. The first paper is a summary of the Baker/Gorbachev talks; the second is a record of the Gorbachev/Kohl talks. Zamyatin asked for copies to be sent to you.

Exactly what the
press conference said

that they give
than to us.

The Rt Hon William Waldegrave

CAD
13/2.

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The Moscow negotiations became a major event in Soviet-American relations.

1. The discussions were centred on questions of security and disarmament.

While discussing nuclear and space issues, both sides confirmed the Maltese understanding that a treaty on 50% reductions of strategic offensive forces should be signed in 1990. All its major problems should be solved by the June summit. The ministers devoted special attention to three problematic areas: air-launched cruise missiles, sea-launched cruise missiles and undeployed ICBM's.

On ALCM's the sides agreed in packet on all issues (counting rule, nuclear and conventional missiles, verification) except the issue of range of missiles.

An agreement of principle was reached that the issue of SLCM's would be solved on the basis of parallel politically-binding statements.

The Soviet side confirmed its position on interrelationship between the START Treaty and fulfilling the ABM Treaty. We said once again: the USSR will be ready to sign and implement START Treaty, even if we fail to reach agreement on anti-missile defence, but both sides will continue to respect the ABM treaty in the form, in which it was signed in 1972. However, we believe that it will be useful if by that time we can agree on common understanding of concrete parameters of ABM-related activities, which are allowed or disallowed by this treaty.

The situation in Vienna negotiations was thoroughly discussed from the point of view of reaching an agreement in 1990 as early as possible. Taking into account recent proposal by President Bush we put forward a radical initiative - to limit the American and Soviet forces in Europe (outside the Soviet territory) by the level of 195 thousand men. Since the Americans were not yet ready for it, M.S.Gorbachev suggested an alternative limitation - 225 thousand men for all European zone. The American side is to give an answer to this proposal.

As a step forward to the NATO position we stated about our readiness to remove from the agenda the issue of imposing common ceilings on numbers of NATO and WP forces in Europe. However, we suggest that in Central Europe they should be limited by 700-750 thousand men.

The limitation of aviation still remains a difficult area of the Vienna negotiations. We made a point of including of medium-range bombers into the level of front aviation, which had been proposed by us. The American Secretary of State agreed in principle with our proposal to establish separate level for air-defence interceptors. However, concrete levels, which are proposed by the two sides in both categories, still substantially differ.

A noticable step forward was made in Moscow as far as the nuclear tests are concerned. We accomplished our work on the Protocols to the 1974 and 1976 Treaties. In response to our request Mr. Baker made a statement that the American side reaffirmed the agreement that had been achieved in September 1987 on further negotiations on nuclear tests which had the total ban as their final goal.

The Soviet side once again expressed its readiness to stop immediately on mutual basis all nuclear tests.

As a result of the discussions on banning chemical weapons there appeared an opportunity to draft a bilateral Soviet-American agreement in this field by June this year.

The ministers approved a separate, more detailed joint statement on the problem of chemical weapons. (The statement was published.) It was agreed that a bilateral discussions will start on the problems of cooperation in the sphere of destruction of chemical weapons.

Positive assessment was made of previous Soviet-American contacts in the sphere of missile and missile technology non-proliferation. We stated about our readiness to join the regime "of unilateral restraint".

The Soviet side once again raised the subject of Navies. We believe that at first it could be discussed at the expert level.

There was an exchange of views on the forthcoming "Open skies" conference in Ottawa. Mr. Shevardnadze and Mr. Baker spoke for an early agreement which could make a real contribution to openness and transparency in the security sphere.

2. The European theme was discussed in detail. Mr. Baker informed that the US agreed to our proposal to convene summit within the framework of Helsinki process in 1990, meaning that it would be a preparatory step towards "Helsinki-II" in 1992, and that during this meeting an agreement on conventional forces and weapons in Europe will be signed.

Great attention was paid to the German issue, particularly, on the context of different initiatives on German unification as well as on creation of foreign policy mechanisms which could exclude a possibility of destabilization of the situation in Europe during the process of rapprochement of the two German states. We confirmed our principled interest in resolving the German issue within the all-European context. Mr. Baker in general gave support to such an approach.

3. A substantial and deep exchange of views took place on regional problems. The Soviet side made practical attempts to use the realistic elements in the American position in order to advance the cause of political settlement and national reconciliation in different regions.

On the Afghan settlement. Despite existing serious differences on the content of the political process we attempted to find new common points in our positions. Previous discussions, including the one in Malta, were taken into account.

The Americans expressed readiness to work on the idea of a transitional period, in particular on the suggestion of "negative symmetry", i.e. an ending of arms supplies from all sources to all Afghan sides. A common view was expressed regarding the usefulness of work aimed at achieving an international consensus between a number of states, most involved in Afghan affairs.

At the same time the American side was advancing its version of the political settlement which envisages, at a certain stage of the transitional period, the exclusion of Najibullah from future structures of state power. The Americans only made some minor adjustments to this part of the plan.

We, on our part, told the Secretary of State that the general settlement plan which he brought with him is unacceptable. Our known position was presented in detail, which includes the latest proposals made by the Afghan leadership (readiness to accept any results of elections, etc.).

On Central America. We demanded an immediate withdrawal of US troops from Panama and free elections there. We called upon the USA to publicly state their readiness to accept the election results in Nicaragua on the basis of the findings of the international observers.

Mr. Baker stated the USA's readiness to accept Sandinistas' victory at fair elections but tied the normalisation of relations with Nicaragua to Sandinistas' ending their support of rebels in Salvador.

On the Korean question. A mutual interest emerged regarding the reduction of military and political tensions on the peninsula, and the development of a dialogue between the North and the South.

On the Cambodian question. A closeness of Soviet and American positions exists regarding the fact that the key to the settlement lies in a free expression of the Cambodian people's will through general elections under the UN supervision, and the unacceptability of the return of the Pol Pot regime.

The idea of a moratorium on arms supplies to all Cambodian sides was confirmed.

On the Middle East. We emphasized an urgent need for both bilateral and multilateral measures, including those through the UN, aimed at overcoming the existing deadlock.

We resolutely condemned Israel's actions regarding the settlement of immigrants on the occupied Arab territories. The Americans

said that they shared our assessment of Shamir's statement on this matter.

On the Lebanese situation. Both sides spoke in support of a cease-fire, the legitimately elected Lebanese authorities and the Taif agreements.

On African affairs. Both sides concentrated on a search of ways in which to cooperate on the settlement of conflicts in Southern Africa and the Horn of Africa. As a results, a common assessment of the developments in South Africa and ways of dismantling apartheid were worked out. A certain mutual understanding regarding the Angolan and Ethiopian settlements by political rather than military means was reached.

4. There was a useful discussion on transnational problems.

Main attention was focused on issues of ecology, international terrorism and drugs, the activity of the UN and the International Court, legal status of the world ocean, space exploration and Antarctica.

The Soviet side put forward its ideas in relation to the UN Conference on environment and development (1992), in particular, about advisability to hold it on the highest level and to adopt there a code of ecological ethics. On the whole the American side reacted positively to these ideas. An issue of an establishment of Soviet-American ecological association was considered. A discussion was continued about a creation of the UN centre of ecological aid in emergency situations.

It was recognized that in the interests of both sides would be a further development of cooperation in the field of peaceful exploration of space. Among the promising directions of such cooperation they mentioned: remote exploration of Earth for environmental purposes, monitoring of "space debris", etc.

The Soviet side spoke in favour of adopting a joint statement on a highest level in support of an international project on nuclear fusion.

5. During discussions on the issues of bilateral Soviet-American relations emphasis was made on a preparation for the next summit meeting in the USA with a view of its practical productiveness.

Among issues under discussion there were: peaceful use of nuclear energy, exploration of world ocean, delimitation of sea territories in the Bering Sea, exchange of consular missions in New York and Kiev and cultural and information centers in Washington and Moscow, as well as energy, forestry and educational exchanges.

6. Both sides gave an object consideration to the prospects of development of mutually beneficial trade and economic relations. They confirmed their intention to conclude trade agreement by the forthcoming summit meeting. They also agreed to start in the nearest time negotiations on agreement about protection of capital investments and on taxation convention.

7. In the field of human rights a progress was noted in humanitarian issues and human rights. Some steps for the future were agreed upon.

An "old" agenda - consideration of specific humanitarian cases - has been substantially reduced. Thus significance of the "Refusniks issue" is coming to an end. We confirmed our intention to adopt in the near future a law on exit and entry from/to the USSR. On a reciprocal basis an exchange of information is going on legal matters which are of concern for the other side.

8. In order to consolidate weighty results of the Moscow meet-
i and to achieve further agreements, first of all, in the field
of disarmament by the time of a summit, the sides agreed to hold
two more rounds of negotiations on ministerial level in the coming
months, the first of them - in the United States.

The idea of a visit was initiated by Chancellor Kohl. It was a short working visit. The German affairs were central to the discussions.

The talks with M.S. Gorbachev were of major importance. They were held "eye-to-eye" (ministers held their talks in parallel). Our position on the German issue was stated in definite and clear-cut terms. Its essence is in inseparable interrelationship of two aspects: it is true, that Germans themselves should resolve the question of unity and define their choice. But the German question can only be solved in context of the all-European development, with due account of security interests of FRG's neighbours, other countries of Europe, interests of maintaining peace and security on the continent.

M.S. Gorbachev resolutely put forth the question of the necessity to respect the interests of security of the Soviet Union. He emphasized, that the nucleus of the German problem is a military component, which plays decisive role in defining european and world-wide balance of forces. That is why it is of prime importance that a threat of new war should never come from german soil, that post-war frontiers were untouchable, that the territory of Germany should not be used by the outside forces. The idea that the unified Germany would be member of NATO was categorically rejected.

Mr. Kohl and Mr. Gensher spoke against the neutrality for the unified Germany, because that would allegedly discriminate the Germans and would not correspond to today's realities. However, they said that the NATO area would not spread over to the GDR territory (on our part we said that we did not understand such a construction). The unified Germany would not have nuclear, chemical or bacteriological weapons. Mr. Gensher did not exclude a possibility of deep cuts in Bundeswehr man power.

As far as borders are concerned Mr. Kohl said that he couldn't unconditionally recognize them due to the consideration

of domestic politics. However he gave assurances that there would be no problems in this matter. The Chancellor expressed a view that it is not obligatory to conclude a new treaty on borders. It is quite possible to reconfirm the Moscow and the Warsaw treaties, if the Soviet Union and Poland agree with it. That should be done by the Government of the unified Germany.

I agree
The Soviet side, however, believes that an issue of borders cannot be solved only by unilateral action of the Germans.

Mr. Kohl and Mr. Gensher put forward the following scenario of further development in German affairs: at first two German states discuss with each other conditions of unification, simultaneously they would establish regular contacts with four powers, so that they would not be acting "behind their back" as Mr. Gensher put it. Later these agreements would be submitted to four powers, but they would be considered jointly with two German states (two plus four). Decisions adopted by the six could be submitted to CSCE summit. Mr. Gensher put forward an idea that due to a speedy developments, CSCE summit could take place earlier than autumn. The West German side in general recognized the necessity that the process of unification should be implanted into all-european process.

It seems that an idea of the FRG Government on the conference of the six requires some consideration in the context of securing interests of four powers stemming from their responsibility in German affairs, including security issues. Though we, of course, are not indifferent to the procedure of discussion.

Taking into account that soon after elections in the GDR both German states could immediately start preparing conditions for their unification, it would seem sensible to start parallel consideration of relevant issues within a framework of four powers or on a bilateral basis, i.e. between USSR and Britain, USSR and France, USSR and USA.

During the talks our side sharply criticized interference of the FRG into the election campaign in the GDR, its line

wipping up the events, heating up emotions as regards unification. Once again we supported an idea of a "contractual community", emphasized a necessity to stabilize situation in the GDR and to that end to provide economic aid to it.

