

SECRET (DEDIP)

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BURNING BUSH

FM OTTAWA

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TELNO 127

OF 140001Z FEBRUARY 90

INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS, BONN, WASHINGTON, UKDEL NATO

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FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

MEETING OF FOUR FOREIGN MINISTERS: 13 FEBRUARY

SUMMARY

1. AGREEMENT ON PROCEDURE FOR SETTING UP A MEETING OF THE FOUR PLUS TWO. EMOTIONAL SPEECH BY GENSCHER THANKING HIS ALLIES FOR SUPPORT OVER GERMAN UNIFICATION. AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE ON GERMAN PROPOSAL ON BERLIN ELECTIONS BUT NOTHING TO BE SAID TO THE RUSSIANS FOR THE MOMENT.

DETAIL

2. THE FOUR FOREIGN MINISTERS MET FOR BREAKFAST THIS MORNING. THE MAIN TOPIC WAS FOLLOW-UP TO YESTERDAY'S DISCUSSIONS WITH SHEVARDNADZE ON ESTABLISHMENT OF A MEETING OF THE FOUR PLUS TWO (OR AS THE GERMANS WOULD PREFER IT, THE TWO PLUS FOUR). BAKER REPORTED THAT HE HAD TALKED TO SHEVARDNADZE WHO, WHILE STILL HANKERING AFTER SOMETHING ELSE, HAD AGREED THAT THIS APPROACH SEEMED INEVITABLE. HE HAD CONSULTED GORBACHEV OVERNIGHT AND WE AWAITED THE SOVIET RESPONSE.

3. MUCH OF THE ENSUING DISCUSSION WAS A MIXTURE OF SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE. THE MAIN POINTS WERE:

A) IT WAS AGREED THAT, IF THE RUSSIANS WERE ON BOARD, WE SHOULD AIM FOR A STATEMENT BY THE SIX LATER TODAY. THERE WOULD BE NO SUBSTANTIVE MEETING OF THE SIX IN OTTAWA BUT THEY SHOULD BE WILLING TO MEET FOR A PHOTOGRAPH WHEN THE STATEMENT WAS ISSUED. GENSCHER WAS ADAMANT THAT THERE COULD BE NO COLLECTIVE DISCUSSION WITH FISCHER: THE GDR GOVERNMENT NOW HAD NO LEGITIMACY AND KOHL HAD INSISTED THAT MODROW BE ACCOMPANIED ON HIS VISIT TO BONN BY REPRESENTATIVES OF THE ROUNDTABLE.

B) THE FIRST MEETING AT FOREIGN MINISTER LEVEL SHOULD TAKE PLACE AFTER THE 18 MARCH ELECTIONS. IT WAS AGREED THAT ALL THE MEETINGS WOULD BE IN GERMANY, SOME POSSIBLY IN THE WEST, SOME IN THE EAST. GENSCHER WAS KEEN THAT THE STATEMENT SHOULD SAY THAT THE GERMANS WOULD HOST THE MEETINGS BUT DUMAS, THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND BAKER RESISTED THIS. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT, IN PRACTICE, THE

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MEETINGS WOULD BE HOSTED BY THE GERMANS BUT IT WAS IMPORTANT FROM THE SOVIET POINT OF VIEW, AND TO SOME EXTENT FROM OURS, THAT THE MEETING OF THE SIX SHOULD NOT JUST APPEAR TO RUBBER STAMP SOMETHING ALREADY AGREED BETWEEN THE TWO GERMANIES. a

C) EXCHANGES BETWEEN POLITICAL DIRECTORS IN PREPARATION FOR A MEETING AFTER 18 MARCH COULD START STRAIGHTAWAY. THE FOUR POLITICAL DIRECTORS WOULD ANYWAY DISCUSS HOW TO HANDLE THESE CONTACTS. GENSCHER WAS ONCE AGAIN ADAMANT THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO COLLECTIVE MEETING OF THE SIX INVOLVING THE POLITICAL DIRECTOR OR EQUIVALENT FROM THE PRESENT GDR GOVERNMENT.

4. ELECTION OF MEMBERS OF THE BUNDESTAG FROM BERLIN. GENSCHER ASKED FOR THE VIEWS OF HIS ALLIES. BAKER SAID THE AMERICANS HAD NO PROBLEM ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE PROPOSAL BUT HE WONDERED IF IT WAS RIGHT TO RAISE IT WITH THE RUSSIANS UNTIL THE PROCESS OF THE FOUR PLUS TWO HAD GOT UNDERWAY. THIS WOULD BE JUST ONE MORE JAB IN THE RUSSIAN EYE, WHICH WOULD NOT BE WISE. THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND DUMAS AGREED. GENSCHER SAID HE WAS HAPPY WITH THAT. IF EVERYBODY WAS AGREED IN PRINCIPLE, THEN THERE WAS NO NEED TO RAISE THE MATTER WITH THE RUSSIANS NOW. HE CLEARLY THOUGHT THAT, WITH THE DEMISE OF AN INDEPENDENT GDR, THE ISSUE WOULD QUITE QUICKLY BECOME ACADEMIC.

5. GENSCHER THEN MADE A RATHER EMOTIONAL STATEMENT. HIS COLLEAGUES COULD UNDERSTAND HOW EVERYTHING THAT WAS HAPPENING IN GERMANY WAS DEEPLY MOVING FOR THE GERMANS AND FOR HIMSELF. HE WANTED TO EXPRESS HIS GRATITUDE TO HIS FRIENDS AND ALLIES FOR THEIR CONTINUOUS SUPPORT. THIS WAS APPRECIATED NOT ONLY BY THE GOVERNMENT BUT BY ORDINARY GERMANS AS A WHOLE. GENSCHER HIMSELF WAS VERY FAMILIAR WITH THE VIEWS AND FEELINGS CHERISHED BY THE GERMAN PEOPLE. THEY HAD ALWAYS BEEN PART OF A COMMUNITY OF DEMOCRATIC COUNTRIES. THAT WAS IRREVERSIBLE. HE WANTED TO ADDRESS HIMSELF PARTICULARLY TO HIS TWO COLLEAGUES WHO WERE MEMBERS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY. WHAT WAS NOW HAPPENING IN GERMANY SHOULD SERVE TO INCREASE THEIR MUTUAL EFFORTS TO CONTINUE THE INTEGRATION OF THE COMMUNITY IN ALL AREAS AND TO SPEED UP THE PROCESS. HE ALSO HOPED THAT THE COMMUNITY WOULD FIND WAYS AND MEANS TO DEVELOP ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE UNITED STATES, IN KEEPING WITH THE NEW SITUATION. HE ALSO BELIEVED, AS HE HAD TOLD SHEVARDNADZE, THAT THERE WAS SCOPE FOR A CLOSER RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE EC AND THE SOVIET UNION. GENSCHER SAID THAT HE HAD NOT WILLINGLY LEFT THE GDR AS A YOUNG MAN BUT HAD BEEN FORCED TO DO SO. HIS COLLEAGUES COULD IMAGINE WHAT IT MEANT TO HIM TO VISIT HIS HOME TOWN OF HALLE LATER IN THE WEEK TO TELL THE PEOPLE THERE OF THE EXCITING DEVELOPMENTS. ONCE AGAIN HE WANTED TO EXPRESS HIS HEARTFELT GRATITUDE TO HIS ALLIES. THEY WOULD FIND IN THE GERMANS FRIENDS, PARTNERS AND ALLIES ON WHOM THEY COULD RELY.

6. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID WE COULD ALL MAKE THE EFFORT OF IMAGINATION TO UNDERSTAND GENSCHER'S FEELINGS. WE WOULD ALL DO OUR BEST TO BE FRIENDLY AND CONSTRUCTIVE AS HIS VISION BECAME A REALITY. DUMAS (WHOSE FATHER WAS SHOT BY THE GERMANS) SAID RATHER RUEFULLY THAT GENSCHER WOULD APPRECIATE WHAT WAS IN EVERYONE'S MINDS WITH ALL THE HISTORY THAT LAY BEHIND THEM. ALL THIS WAS A MATTER OF PAST RELATIONSHIPS AS WELL AS OF THE FUTURE. WE WERE TURNING A NEW CORNER AND NEEDED STRONG LINKS IN THE FUTURE.

7. BAKER SAID HE APPRECIATED GENSCHER'S REMARKS ABOUT THE STRENGTHENED TIES BETWEEN THE EC AND THE US. THESE TIES WOULD PLAY A LARGER ROLE IN A CHANGED EUROPE. HE HAD BEEN MOVED WHEN GENSCHER HAD CALLED HIM LAST NOVEMBER AND WHEN THE GERMAN SWITCHBOARD OPERATOR PUTTING THROUGH THE CALL HAD SAID "GOD BLESS AMERICA AND ALL YOU HAVE DONE FOR GERMANY". THESE WERE HISTORIC TIMES. IF THE SOVIET UNION AGREED TO THE TWO PLUS FOUR MECHANISM THEY HAD DISCUSSED THAT MORNING, THAT TOO WOULD BE A SMALL PART OF HISTORY.

8. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID HE WAS SORRY TO DRAG MATTERS BACK TO THE PEDESTRIAN BUT IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT WE SHOULD ALL BEAR IN MIND THAT, WITH THE NATO COUNCIL IN JUNE, PRECEDED BY A MEETING OF THE FOUR FOREIGN MINISTERS AT CHEVENING, FOLLOWED BY THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL AND THE ECONOMIC SUMMIT, WE NEEDED TO THINK THROUGH THE OPPORTUNITIES THAT WOULD BE OPEN TO US TO MANAGE THE PROCESS OF CHANGE. ALL THE OTHERS AGREED, DUMAS EMPHASISING THE NEED FOR FLEXIBILITY.

9. BAKER STRESSED THAT, IN PREPARING FOR THE CSCE SUMMIT, IT WAS VERY IMPORTANT THAT THE NATO COUNCIL SHOULD BE ABLE TO BRING SOME INFLUENCE TO BEAR. THESE MATTERS MUST BE SHAPED WITHIN THE NATO COUNCIL AND NOT COMPLETELY APART FROM IT. NATO WOULD BECOME LESS OF A MILITARY AND MUCH MORE OF A POLITICAL ALLIANCE. IT WAS THE ALLIANCE WHICH TIED THE UNITED STATES TO EUROPE AND IT WAS VITAL NOT TO LOSE THAT POLITICAL COMBINATION. SO THE SPECIAL GROUP PREPARING FOR THE CSCE MUST REPORT TO THE NATO COUNCIL OR NATO WOULD BE DIMINISHED. THE SECRETARY OF STATE AGREED. DUMAS SAID THAT WE NEEDED A BROAD DISCUSSION ON THE FUTURE OF NATO. BAKER, WITH CONSIDERABLE EMPHASIS, SAID THAT AS LONG AS EUROPE WANTED THE US TO BE COUPLED WITH THE CONTINENT AND TO HAVE THE BENEFITS OF THE NUCLEAR UMBRELLA, THERE MUST BE CLEAR POLITICAL LINKAGE. HE HAD SUGGESTED MORE POLITICAL CONTACTS WITH THE COMMUNITY. NATO WAS ANOTHER FORUM. ONE WAY OR ANOTHER THE LINKS MUST BE MAINTAINED.

10. THE SECRETARY OF STATE ASKED FOR HIS COLLEAGUES' VIEWS ON SHEVARDNADZE'S IDEA OF A MEETING OF THE 35 AT FOREIGN MINISTER LEVEL BEFORE THE SUMMIT. GENSCHER SAID IT WOULD BE USEFUL. THE RUSSIANS NEEDED IT AS THE WARSAW PACT ERODED. WE MIGHT ALL NEED SOMETHING TO KEEP EUROPE TOGETHER. IN THE FACE OF THE DANGER OF BALKANISATION, WE NEEDED SOMETHING MORE THAN NATO AND THE EC. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID HE COULD NOT VERY EASILY SEE A MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS TAKING PLACE ON THE SORT OF TIMESCALE SHEVARDNADZE SEEMED TO ENVISAGE. BAKER ASKED WHAT SUCH A MEETING WOULD DO. GENSCHER SAID THAT IT WAS NOT A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE WHETHER SUCH A MEETING TOOK PLACE, IE MEANING THAT WE SHOULD NOT OPPOSE IT.

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