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OF 151843Z FEBRUARY 90

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BUNDESTAG DEBATE ON GERMAN UNIFICATION ON 15 FEBRUARY

SUMMARY

1. SITREP FROM KOHL, IN THE WAKE OF HIS VISIT TO MOSCOW AND MODROW'S VISIT TO BONN. CRITICISM FROM THE SPD. GENSCHER ON OTTAWA.

DETAIL

2. IN HIS SPEECH OPENING THE DEBATE KOHL EMPHASISED EARLY ON THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S GRATITUDE TO THE WESTERN ALLIES FOR THEIR CONSISTENT SUPPORT THROUGHOUT ALL THE VICISSITUDES OF THE PAST DECADES, FOR THEIR MAINTENANCE OF THE COMMITMENT TO GERMAN UNIFICATION EXPRESSED IN THE RELATIONS CONVENTION, AND FOR THE SPECIAL TREATMENT WHICH FOR SO LONG HAD BEEN ACCORDED TO THE GDR VIA THE PROTOCOL ON INNER-GERMAN TRADE ATTACHED TO THE TREATY OF ROME. OTHER POINTS AS FOLLOWS:

(A) NATO. KOHL SAID HE HAD TOLD GORBACHEV THAT "'WITH ALL DUE RESPECT FOR SOVIET SECURITY INTERESTS'" A UNITED GERMANY COULD NOT BE NEUTRAL OR DEMILITARISED BUT MUST REMAIN A MEMBER OF NATO. THE HISTORY OF THE 20TH CENTURY SHOWED THAT NOTHING WAS WORSE FOR EUROPEAN STABILITY THAN A GERMANY THAT SWAYED BETWEEN EAST AND WEST. A GERMANY FIRMLY ALLIED TO FREE DEMOCRACIES AND INCREASINGLY POLITICALLY AND ECONOMICALLY INTEGRATED IN THE EC WAS THE ESSENTIAL FACTOR FOR STABILITY NEEDED IN THE CENTRE OF EUROPE. HE HAD MADE CLEAR TO GORBACHEV HIS VIEW, WHICH HE KNEW WAS SHARED BY PRESIDENT BUSH, THAT NATO SHOULD CONCENTRATE MORE STRONGLY ON ITS POLITICAL ROLE AND THAT NO NATO UNITS AND INSTITUTIONS WOULD BE STATIONED IN THE TERRITORY OF TODAY'S GDR.

(B) THE FOUR POWERS HAD SPECIAL RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR GERMANY AND BERLIN. AFTER THE GDR ELECTION ON 18 MARCH THE TWO GERMAN STATES WOULD DISCUSS THE WAY TO GERMAN UNITY. THEY WOULD THEN TALK TO THE FOUR POWERS ABOUT THE EXTERNAL ASPECTS AND THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF NEIGHBOURING STATES.

(C) HIS TALKS WITH MODROW HAD TAKEN PLACE AGAINST A BACKGROUND OF RAPID DESTABILISATION IN THE GDR. THE CONTINUING STREAM OF RESETTLERS (85,000 THIS YEAR ALREADY) WAS CAUSING INCREASING PROBLEMS FOR THE FRG. FOR THIS REASON HE HAD OFFERED IMMEDIATE TALKS ON MONETARY UNION, AND BOTH SIDES HAD AGREED TO FORM A JOINT COMMISSION TO PREPARE THE GROUND FOR DECISIONS AFTER THE GDR ELECTIONS. MONETARY UNION MUST BE ACCOMPANIED BY SIMULTANEOUS ESTABLISHMENT OF THE LEGAL PRECONDITIONS FOR A SOCIAL MARKET ECONOMY IN THE GDR. HE TOOK SERIOUSLY THOSE CRITICS WHO HAD EXPRESSED DOUBTS ABOUT THIS SCHEME, BUT THE CRISIS IN THE GDR CALLED FOR A COURAGEOUS ANSWER. IT WAS AN HISTORIC OFFER WHICH WOULD ALLOW THE GDR TO PROFIT FROM ONE OF THE WORLD'S STRONGEST CURRENCIES. BUT IT WOULD ONLY MAKE SENSE IF ACCOMPANIED BY REFORMS, WHICH INCLUDED TAKING OVER THE POLICIES OF THE BUNDESBANK, LIBERALISATION OF THE GDR ECONOMY, TAX REFORM, INTRODUCTION OF CO-DETERMINATION AND PROPER SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES.

(D) THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC WAS WELL ABLE TO ASSIST THE GDR, BECAUSE OF ITS EXTREMELY FAVOURABLE ECONOMIC OUTLOOK. ITS ANNUAL CAPITAL INVESTMENT OVERSEAS AMOUNTED TO DM 100 BILLION: IF ONLY A PART OF THIS WERE DIVERTED TO THE GDR IT WOULD BRING RAPID ECONOMIC IMPROVEMENT. THE GDR WAS NO LARGER THAN A SINGLE LAND OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC LIKE HESSEN. THIS WAS NOT TO TRIVIALISE THE DIFFICULTIES BUT TO PUT THEM IN PERSPECTIVE.

(E) KOHL SAID THAT HE TOOK SERIOUSLY THE FEARS OF GDR CITIZENS ABOUT UNEMPLOYMENT. HE PROMISED THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S HELP WITH THE IMMEDIATE CREATION OF A MODERN LABOUR AND SOCIAL BENEFITS SYSTEM AND SAID THAT THIS WOULD MEAN NO REDUCTION IN SOCIAL BENEFITS IN THE FRG ITSELF.

3. REPLYING FOR THE OPPOSITION VOGEL, CHAIRMAN OF THE SPD:

(A) SAID THAT THE AIM OF THE TWO GERMAN STATES MUST BE GRADUALLY TO EMBED GERMANY IN A EUROPEAN PEACE ORDER IN WHICH THE ALLIANCES WERE 'ABSORBED', MILITARY POTENTIALS WERE REDUCED TO A MINIMUM AND RESERVED RIGHTS OF THE ALLIES BELONGED TO THE PAST. AN INTERMEDIATE STAGE MUST BE RAPID AND COMPREHENSIVE DISARMAMENT AND A FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE OF THE ALLIANCES INTO POLITICAL INSTRUMENTS. HE REJECTED GERMAN NEUTRALITY AND THE EXPANSION OF ONE ALLIANCE AT THE EXPENSE OF THE OTHER.

(B) ARGUED THAT KOHL'S FAILURE TO MAKE A CLEAR STATEMENT ON THE

QUESTION OF POLAND'S WESTERN BORDER COULD ENDANGER THE PROCESS OF UNIFICATION.

(C) SUPPORTED THE REORGANISATION OF THE GDR INTO ITS TRADITIONAL LAENDER BUT CAUTIONED AGAINST HASTE TOWARDS UNIFICATION VIA ARTICLE 23.

(D) SAID THAT EAST GERMAN IMMIGRANTS SHOULD NO LONGER RECEIVE SPECIAL ADVANTAGES BUT BE TREATED LIKE WEST GERMANS WHO CHOSE TO MOVE AROUND THE FRG. THE SOCIAL PROBLEMS OF UNITY FOR THE FRG SHOULD NOT BE UNDERESTIMATED.

(E) CRITICISED KOHL FOR FAILING TO PROVIDE IMMEDIATE FINANCIAL HELP FOR THE GDR.

4. GENSCHER REPORTED ON THE 'OPEN SKIES' CONFERENCE IN OTTAWA: HE CLAIMED AGREEMENT THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS ON CONVENTIONAL STABILITY SHOULD CONTINUE IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE END OF NEGOTIATIONS ON SNF, INCLUDING NUCLEAR ARTILLERY, MUST BEGIN 'AT THE BEGINNING OF THE SECOND ROUND OF CONVENTIONAL DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS.'

5. IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT THE CSCE SUMMIT CONFERENCE PLANNED FOR 1990 SHOULD BE A SUCCESS FOR THE EUROPE OF TOMORROW. THIS WOULD ONLY BE THE CASE IF THE GERMANS HAD ALREADY DETERMINED THEIR OWN FUTURE. IT WAS THEREFORE ESSENTIAL THAT THE 'NEGOTIATIONS' BETWEEN THE TWO GERMAN STATES AND 'TALKS' WITH THE FOUR POWERS SHOULD PRODUCE A CONCEPT TO PRESENT TO THE CONFERENCE. GENSCHER REPEATED WHAT HE AND KOHL HAD TOLD GORBACHEV IN MOSCOW: DURING THEIR NEGOTIATIONS THE TWO GERMANY'S WOULD DO NOTHING BEHIND THE BACKS OF THE FOUR POWERS.

6. GENSCHER WELCOMES THE FACT THAT THE IDEA OF NEUTRALISING GERMANY HAD BEEN REJECTED. WHAT WAS REQUIRED WAS DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE THAT WOULD, STEP BY STEP, 'BUT WITH BIG STEPS' REMOVE THE MILITARY OBSTACLES TO RAPPROCHEMENT. THE REJECTION OF GERMAN NEUTRALITY WAS GAINING SUPPORT NOT ONLY IN NATO BUT ALSO AMONG THE WARSAW PACT STATES. THE AIM SHOULD BE COOPERATIVE SECURITY STRUCTURES WHICH INCREASINGLY VAULTED OVER THE ALLIANCES AS IN WHICH THE ALLIANCES COULD THEN BE 'OBSORBED' IN THE CSCE FRAMEWORK.

7. ANTJE VOLLER, JOINT SPOKESMAN OF THE GREENS PARLIAMENTARY PARTY, INTERRUPTED GENSCHER TO ASK WHETHER THE FOUR PLUS TWO MEETING WOULD PRODUCE A PEACE TREATY THAT WOULD ENABLE BORDERS TO BE FINALISED AND REPARATION CLAIMS TO BE PURSUED. GENSCHER DUCKED THIS QUESTION BY REPEATING THAT THE GERMANS WANTED TO UNITE ONLY THE TWO GERMAN

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
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