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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 201

OF 161724Z FEBRUARY 90

INFO IMMEDIATE BONN

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INFO ROUTINE OTHER EC POSTS, WASHINGTON

MY TELNO 194 (NOT TO UKDEL NATO AND WASHINGTON): MITTERRAND/KOHL
MEETING, 15 FEBRUARY

SUMMARY

1. MITTERRAND BROADLY SATISFIED WITH KOHL'S APPROACH ON THIS
OCCASION ON EC AND SECURITY QUESTIONS. KOHL OUT TO REASSURE, BUT
VERY FIRM THAT THE GERMAN-POLISH FRONTIER ISSUE CAN ONLY BE RESOLVED
AFTER REUNIFICATION.

DETAIL

2. VEDRINE, MITTERRAND'S SPOKESMAN AND ADVISER ON EAST/WEST
RELATIONS, TOLD ME TODAY THAT MITTERRAND HAD FOUND HIS TWO HOUR
MEETING WITH KOHL ON 15 FEBRUARY A FAIRLY REASSURING OCCASION. THE
TONE HAD BEEN FRIENDLY, BETTER THAN IN SOME RECENT EXCHANGES. THE
CHANCELLOR HAD BEEN READY TO ENGAGE IN REAL DISCUSSION AND TO TAKE
ACCOUNT OF THE PREOCCUPATIONS OF GERMANY'S NEIGHBOURS. HE HAD GIVEN
MITTERRAND A FULL ACCOUNT OF WHERE THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC STOOD
VIS-A-VIS THE GDR AND MOSCOW.

3. ON THE CONFIRMATION OF THE GERMAN-POLISH FRONTIER, KOHL HAD BEEN
VERY FIRM THAT THIS WAS SOMETHING WHICH COULD ONLY BE RESOLVED BY
THE PARLIAMENT AND GOVERNMENT OF A UNITED GERMANY. (THIS PROVOKED
MITTERRAND AT THE JOINT PRESS CONFERENCE INTO A TART REJOINDER THAT
THE ODER NEISSE LINE MUST BE SOLEMNLY CONFIRMED.)

4. KOHL HAD ALSO SHOWN HIMSELF DETERMINED TO AVOID A FORMAL PEACE
CONFERENCE AND TREATY: UNITY MUST SOMEHOW BE BROUGHT ABOUT AND
ASSOCIATED PROBLEMS SOLVED THROUGH THE FOUR PLUS TWO PROCESS.

5. KOHL HAD ENDORSED THE IDEA OF A SPECIAL INFORMAL EC SUMMIT BUT
SAID THAT IT SHOULD NOT BE HELD TOO SOON AFTER THE GDR ELECTIONS:
THIS POINTED TO APRIL RATHER THAN LATE MARCH. VEDRINE COMMENTED THAT
THE QUESTION OF WHAT THIS SUMMIT WOULD ADDRESS WAS NOT ENTIRELY

SIMPLE, GIVEN THAT THE TWELVE SHOULD NOT GET INVOLVED IN THE EXTERNAL ASPECTS OF GERMAN REUNIFICATION ITSELF, WHICH WERE FOR THE FOUR PLUS TWO. THE SUMMIT WOULD PRESUMABLY ADDRESS THE EC IMPLICATIONS OF REUNIFICATION INCLUDING SUCH QUESTIONS AS VOTING RIGHTS, CONTRIBUTION TO STRUCTURAL FUNDS ETC. HE AGREED THAT BRITAIN AND FRANCE HAD MANY COMMON INTERESTS IN THE MANAGEMENT OF THE INTEGRATION OF THE FORMER GDR INTO THE COMMUNITY.

6. WHEN KOHL HAD ARGUED, AS AT STRASBOURG, AGAINST HOLDING THE IGC BEFORE THE FEDERAL GERMAN ELECTIONS, MITTERRAND'S RESPONSE HAD BEEN THAT AN IGC STARTING IN DECEMBER WOULD BE GOOD BUT AN IGC STARTING EARLIER IN THE YEAR WOULD BE EVEN BETTER.

7. SECURITY ISSUES: THERE HAD BEEN NO DIFFERENCE IN THE APPROACH OF KOHL AND MITTERRAND TO CONTINUED GERMAN MEMBERSHIP OF NATO, WITH AN ARRANGEMENT WHEREBY THE TERRITORY OF THE FORMER GDR WOULD BE FREE OF NON-GERMAN FORCES, BUT WITH AN ARRANGEMENT ALSO FOR SOVIET TROOPS TO REMAIN FOR AT ANY RATE A TRANSITIONAL PERIOD. BUT VEDRINE ADDED, AS HIS OWN VIEW, THAT IN TWO OR THREE YEARS TIME, WHATEVER THE GOVERNMENT OF GERMANY, IT WOULD BE CALLING FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF US AND OTHER STATIONED FORCES, AND THAT WE SHOULD BE LOOKING AT WAYS TO COMPENSATE FOR THIS PERHAPS ON THE LINES OF MIXED EUROPEAN FORCES SUCH AS THE FRANCO/GERMAN BRIGADE, WHICH MIGHT BE TOLERABLE TO THE GERMANS.

8. ON GERMANY AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS (A NAGGING WORRY TO THE FRENCH AS THEY HAVE SHOWN ON A NUMBER OF OCCASIONS) KOHL HAD SIMPLY SAID THAT THERE WAS NO PROBLEM. A UNITED GERMANY WOULD BE IN THE SAME POSITION AND PURSUE THE SAME POLICIES AS THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC, (WHICH HAD RENOUNCED NUCLEAR WEAPONS).

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