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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

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INFO PRIORITY EC POSTS, MOSCOW, WASHINGTON, UKDEL NATO, EAST BERLIN
INFO BMG BERLIN, ACTOR

CALL ON DUMAS: DEVELOPMENTS IN EUROPE

SUMMARY

1. DUMAS BELIEVES THAT THE FRG GOVERNMENT HAVE MADE REUNIFICATION THEIR ABSOLUTE PRIORITY. HE IS STRONGLY IN FAVOUR OF CLOSER ANGLO-FRENCH COOPERATION. HE REPEATS HIS CONVICTION THAT EUROPEAN INTEGRATION MUST BE ACCELERATED, BUT POINTS TO THE NEED TO RESPOND TO POSITIVE DEVELOPMENTS IN EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES. HE FINDS US POLICY UNCLEAR. IMPORTANT FOR THE BRITISH AND FRENCH TO DECIDE ON A FLOOR FOR ARMS REDUCTIONS.

They are now playing back to some of our views about Germany. The problems will be overcome by the E.C. Germany's

DETAIL

2. I CALLED ON DUMAS THIS AFTERNOON TO ASK FOR HIS VIEWS ON RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN EUROPE. HE WAS ALONE. HE SAID THAT EVENTS IN EAST GERMANY AND THE REACTION OF THE FRG GOVERNMENT TO THEM HAD CONVINCED HIM THAT, MORE THAN EVER, IT WAS VITAL TO ADVANCE QUICKLY TOWARDS A REINFORCEMENT OF THE STRUCTURE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY. THE FRG GOVERNMENT WERE NOW MAKING REUNIFICATION WITH EAST GERMANY THEIR OVERRIDING PRIORITY. HE FEARED THAT, IF NEUTRALITY WAS THE PRICE TO BE EXACTED FOR REUNIFICATION, THE FRG GOVERNMENT WOULD BE READY TO PAY IT. SIMILARLY, IF THE FRG GOVERNMENT HAD TO CHOOSE BETWEEN REUNIFICATION AND THE CONTINUED DEVELOPMENT OF THE EC, THEY WOULD CHOOSE THE FORMER. FOR THESE REASONS IT WAS VITAL FOR BRITAIN AND FRANCE TO PERSUADE THE FRG GOVERNMENT TO LOOK SERIOUSLY AT THE POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF THEIR ACTIONS. I SAID THAT DUMAS MUST BE AWARE THAT GOING FULL TILT TOWARDS THE STRENGTHENING OF THE COMMUNITY RAISED DIFFICULT POLITICAL ISSUES FOR THE UK. WE NEEDED TO EXAMINE THE QUESTION WHETHER REINFORCING THE STRUCTURE OF THE EC WAS IN FACT THE BEST WAY OF ENSURING STABILITY IN CENTRAL EUROPE. INDEED IT WAS BECAUSE THE ANSWERS TO SUCH QUESTIONS WERE SO IMPORTANT THAT FRANCE AND THE U.K. NEEDED TO DISCUSS THEM WITH AS MUCH FRANKNESS AS POSSIBLE.

ambition would be to become the dominant and active factor

3. DUMAS AGREED THAT MORE THAN EVER IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR THE BRITISH

AND THE FRENCH TO MAINTAIN A DETAILED EXCHANGE OF VIEWS AND TO SEEK TO INCREASE THEIR BILATERAL COOPERATION. PRESIDENT MITTERRAND HAD BEEN VERY PLEASED WITH HIS CONVERSATION WITH THE PRIME MINISTER ON 20 JANUARY: SUCH EXCHANGES SHOULD TAKE PLACE ON A REGULAR BASIS SO THAT WE COULD DISCUSS THE COMMON PROBLEMS FACING BOTH COUNTRIES. I TOLD HIM OF THE FORTHCOMING MEETING ON 4 FEBRUARY AT WEHRKUNDE BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE AND M CHEVENEMENT: DUMAS WELCOMED IT WARMLY. I UNDERLINED THE EXTENT OF THE PROGRESS IN ANGLO-FRENCH RELATIONS IN COOPERATION ON DEFENCE MATTERS IN RECENT YEARS: THE FREQUENCY AND DEPTH OF REGULAR CONTACT THAT NOW EXISTED WAS VERY IMPORTANT. DUMAS AGREED. HE PARTICULARLY WELCOMED THE FORTHCOMING OPPORTUNITIES HE WOULD HAVE TO SEE YOU AND ADDED THAT, GIVEN THE CONSTANT DIARY DIFFICULTIES WHICH MINISTERS FACE, HE WAS CONCERNED TO USE EVERY OPPORTUNITY IN THE MARGINS OF MULTILATERAL MEETINGS TO STAY IN TOUCH WITH YOU.

4. AT AN EC AMBASSADORS' LUNCH ON 1 FEBRUARY, DUMAS ENLARGED ON SOME OF THE ABOVE POINTS. HE SAID THAT WE COULD EITHER LET THE POST-WAR EUROPE DECOMPOSE INTO PRE-FIRST WORLD WAR NATIONALISM OR WE COULD BUILD ON THE EXISTING LEVEL OF EUROPEAN CONSTRUCTION WHICH, THOUGH STRONG, WAS FRAGILE (HE REFERRED HERE TO THE ALTERCATION WITH THE FRG OVER SCHENGEN). WE NEEDED FIRST TO FINISH THE WORK REQUIRED TO COMPLETE EXISTING DECISIONS TAKEN BY THE COMMUNITY. HE WOULD THEN BE READY, PROVIDED THAT EVERYONE WAS READY, TO CONSIDER MORE FAR-REACHING QUESTIONS SUCH AS POLITICAL UNION. THERE WERE, HOWEVER, MORE IMMEDIATE PROBLEMS. HE CITED THE CASE OF HUNGARY, WHICH HAD ALREADY MOVED SIGNIFICANTLY TOWARDS DEMOCRATIC PLURALISM AND NOW WANTED TO COME CLOSER TO THE EC. WE COULD NOT OFFER THEM INTEGRATION, BUT MUST LOOK FOR SOME NEW TYPE OF ASSOCIATION ON AN A LA CARTE BASIS. WE COULD NOT LEAVE HUNGARY, AND OTHER COUNTRIES LIKE IT, WITHOUT A RESPONSE. ANOTHER OPTION WAS TO SEE WHAT COULD BE DONE WITHIN THE CSCE FRAMEWORK. HE WAS FIRMLY AGAINST PROPOSALS WHICH WOULD EXTEND THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION'S COMPETENCE.

5. ASKED ABOUT THE GDR, DUMAS SAID THAT THE GDR GOVERNMENT HAD NOT YET ASKED FOR EC MEMBERSHIP: WE DID NOT YET KNOW WHAT THEY MIGHT DEMAND AFTER THE MARCH ELECTIONS. THERE WERE BOTH LEGAL AND POLITICAL PROBLEMS. THE LEGAL ISSUE WAS NOT A PROBLEM FOR THE FRG, BUT THE REST OF US NEEDED TO BE VERY CLEAR OF THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF ANYTHING WE DECIDED. WE SHOULD ACCEPT THAT REUNIFICATION WOULD HAPPEN, BUT IT MUST TAKE PLACE IN A WAY WHICH WOULD GIVE REASSURANCE TO ALL THOSE WHOM IT WOULD AFFECT. DUMAS ACCEPTED, WHEN I RAISED THE POINT, THAT WE SHOULD NOT MOVE SO PRECIPITOUSLY THAT GORBACHEV'S POSITION WOULD BE AFFECTED, BUT ADDED

THAT GORBACHEV'S ATTITUDE HAD CHANGED SIGNIFICANTLY SINCE MITTERRAND'S MEETING WITH HIM IN KIEV, AS HIS REMARKS DURING MODROW'S VISIT TO MOSCOW SHOWED. ALL THE SAME, DUMAS DID NOT THINK THAT UNDERLYING RUSSIAN ATTITUDES HAD CHANGED.

6. ON THE ALLIANCE, DUMAS SAID THAT THE CRUMBLING OF THE WARSAW PACT NEED NOT NECESSARILY LEAD TO THE DISAPPEARANCE OF NATO, BUT THERE WERE CONSEQUENCES WHICH NEEDED TO BE CONSIDERED. WE NEEDED TO THINK CAREFULLY ABOUT THE FUTURE LINK BETWEEN EUROPE AND THE US. AN AMERICAN PRESENCE IN EUROPE REMAINED DESIRABLE AND THE AMERICANS THEMSELVES WISHED TO STAY. IT SEEMED THAT THE RUSSIANS WISHED THEM TO STAY TOO. SO LONG AS THE SOVIET UNION REMAINED THE DOMINANT MILITARY POWER ON THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT, THE US MUST REMAIN AS A BALANCING FACTOR. ON THE OTHER HAND, HE FOUND US POLICY UNCLEAR. THE AMERICANS PERSISTENTLY PLAYED THEIR TUNE IN BOTH THE EUROPEAN AND THE SOVIET REGISTER: IT WAS HARD TO KNOW WHICH THEY FAVOURED. AT TIMES THEY PREFERRED TO DEAL DIRECT WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND WERE RELUCTANT TO ALLOW THE EUROPEANS TO PUT CONSTRAINTS ON THE BILATERAL SUPER-POWER RELATIONSHIP. THE SAME SEEMED TO APPLY TO THEIR RESISTANCE TO SOVIET PARTICIPATION IN THE EBRD. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES THE EUROPEANS NEEDED TO HARMONIZE THEIR OWN POSITION BETTER. THIS AFTERNOON DUMAS TOLD ME THAT HE BROADLY AGREED WITH YOU ON THE IMPORTANCE OF STRENGTHENING EC/US LINKS. I MENTIONED YOUR DISCUSSION WITH BAKER IN WASHINGTON. DUMAS ALSO THOUGHT THAT IT WAS WISE TO AVOID A FORMAL TREATY.

7. ASKED AT THE EC LUNCH ABOUT ARMS CONTROL, DUMAS SAID THAT WE NEEDED TO BE CLEAR ABOUT WHAT THRESHOLD OF SECURITY WE OUGHT TO MAINTAIN. PROGRESS OVER ARMS CONTROL FOCUSSED ATTENTION ON BOTH THE BRITISH AND FRENCH DETERRENT FORCES. HOW SHOULD THEY BE INCLUDED IN ARMS CONTROL AND WHAT WAS THE RIGHT LEVEL FOR DETERRENT FORCES? THERE SHOULD BE A FLOOR, BUT US AND SOVIET REDUCTIONS HAD A LONG WAY TO GO BEFORE THAT POINT WAS REACHED.

8. RESIDENT CLERK PLEASE PASS TO GOZNEY, PRIVATE OFFICE.

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