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INFO ROUTINE BONN, EAST BERLIN, WASHINGTON, UKDEL NATO

INFO ADDRESSEES PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR

GERMANY: SIR P CRADOCK'S CALL ON ADAMISHIN.

1. SIR P CRADOCK CALLED ON ADAMISHIN, DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER, SUPERVISING EUROPE, ON 20 FEBRUARY. ADAMISHIN GAVE A ROBUST AND SOMEWHAT HISTORIC PRESENTATION OF SOVIET VIEWS ON GERMANY. HE SUGGESTED IN PARTICULAR THAT A MEETING OF THE SIX SHOULD BE HELD BEFORE THE EAST GERMAN ELECTIONS. OTHERWISE WE WOULD FIND OURSELVES SIMPLY RUBBER-STAMPING WHATEVER DECISIONS THE TWO GERMANIES REACHED AMONGST THEMSELVES. HE INDICATED THAT IT WOULD BE CONVENIENT FOR THE SOVIET UNION IF THE BRITISH WERE TO TAKE THE LEAD IN PROPOSING SUCH A MEETING. BRITISH AND SOVIET VIEWS WERE VERY CLOSE, AS THE NEWS DEPARTMENT OF HIS MINISTRY HAD JUST ANNOUNCED (MY TELNO 293).

2. ADAMISHIN REPEATED THE NOW STANDARD SOVIET LINE THAT GERMAN REUNIFICATION WAS INEVITABLE, BUT THAT IT MUST TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE INTERESTS OF OTHER PARTIES. THE PARTNERS OF THE TWO GERMANIES HAD EVERY INTEREST IN SLOWING THE PROCESS DOWN AND ENSURING THAT IT WENT IN STAGES. BUT THE SOVIET UNION, AND GERMANY'S OTHER PARTNERS, HAD VERY FEW EFFECTIVE LEVERS. THEY THEREFORE NEEDED TO THINK IMAGINATIVELY ABOUT THE OPPORTUNITIES AVAILABLE.

3. THE OTTAWA AGREEMENT ON THE TWO-PLUS-FOUR MECHANISM WOULD BE A VALUABLE INSTRUMENT FOR THIS PURPOSE. THE SOVIETS BELIEVED THERE SHOULD NOT BE A SEPARATE MEETING OF THE FOUR POWERS ON THEIR OWN, BECAUSE IT WAS IMPORTANT NOT TO ACT BEHIND THE BACKS OF THE GERMANS. BUT THE GERMANS WERE ALREADY TALKING TO ONE ANOTHER. HE THEREFORE SUGGESTED THAT MEETINGS OF THE SIX SHOULD BE HELD IN PARALLEL WITH THE MEETINGS BETWEEN THE TWO GERMANIES, AND ABOVE ALL THAT THEY SHOULD BEGIN BEFORE THE EAST GERMAN ELECTIONS ON 18 MARCH. IF WE LEFT ANY MEETINGS OF THE SIX UNTIL BEYOND THAT DATE, THE PROCESS WOULD ALREADY BE FORGING AHEAD WITHOUT US.

4. ADAMISHIN FIRMLY REJECTED THE PROPOSITION THAT A UNITED GERMANY SHOULD BE A MEMBER OF NATO. THIS WAS COMPLETELY UNACCEPTABLE TO THE SOVIET SIDE. IT WAS A GRAVE MISTAKE ON THE PART OF THE WEST TO THINK

THAT A UNITED GERMANY IN NATO WOULD CORRESPOND TO SOVIET INTERESTS. IT WOULD BE A MAJOR OBJECTIVE OF SOVIET POLICY TO PREVENT SUCH AN OUTCOME. LEAVING ASIDE THE FACT THAT SUCH AN OUTCOME WOULD ENTAIL THE DISMANTLING OF THE SOVIET UNION'S PRESENT SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS, IT WOULD LOOK TO THE SOVIET PEOPLE LIKE A NEW ANSCHLUSS, AND TO THE LOSS BY THE SOVIET UNION OF THE FRUITS OF VICTORY AND OF A STRATEGIC ALLY. THIS COULD LEAD TO A WAVE OF NATIONALISM IN THE SOVIET UNION WITH UNPREDICTABLE CONSEQUENCES.

5. THE RIGHT WAY FORWARD WAS TO FOLLOW THE MODROW PLAN. THERE SHOULD BE AN AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE ON UNIFICATION, WHICH COULD COME QUITE SOON, FOLLOWED BY A SLOW GROWING TOGETHER OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF THE TWO GERMANIES. THIS WOULD GIVE TIME TO DEVISE NEW FORMS OF EUROPEAN SECURITY STRUCTURE, BASED ON MORE MODERN CONCEPTS OF 'NEUTRALITY' AND 'SECURITY'. IN ADDITION, THERE WOULD NEED TO BE A FORMAL JUDICIAL ACT GOVERNING THE EXISTING FRONTIERS OF GERMANY AND RATIFIED BY PARLIAMENTS. WE SHOULD NOT REPEAT THE MISTAKES OF 1939, WHEN THE GERMANS HAD SIMPLY PLAYED OFF THE RUSSIANS, FRENCH AND THE BRITISH AGAINST ONE ANOTHER. NOR SHOULD WE UNDERESTIMATE THE RISK THAT A UNITED GERMANY WOULD REVIVE ITS AMBITIONS TO REGAIN THE TERRITORIES WHICH IT HAD HELD ON THE EVE OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR.

6. SIR P CRADOCK SAID THAT IN OUR VIEW GERMANY UNIFICATION WAS INEVITABLE, AND COULD COME ABOUT VERY RAPIDLY: BUT THE EXTERNAL IMPLICATIONS WERE EXTREMELY IMPORTANT AND REQUIRED CAREFUL THOUGHT. IT WAS OUR FIRM VIEW THAT A NEUTRAL GERMANY, WITH NO FIRM ATTACHMENTS TO EAST OR WEST, COULD BE A FORCE FOR INSTABILITY. THAT IS WHY WE CONSIDERED THAT IT WAS IN THE INTERESTS OF EVERYONE IN EUROPE FOR GERMANY TO REMAIN FIRMLY ANCHORED IN NATO. EVEN IF THE RUSSIANS COULD NOT ACCEPT THIS CENTRAL PROPOSITION, THERE WERE A LARGE NUMBER OF ISSUES THAT WE SHOULD DISCUSS BILATERALLY IN THIS VERY RAPIDLY EVOLVING SITUATION: FOR EXAMPLE, THE FORM OF ANY NECESSARY GUARANTEES OF THE GERMAN FRONTIERS, PROCDURAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR CARRYING FORWARD DISCUSSION AMONGST THE SIX AND LATER MORE WIDELY WITH GERMANY'S NEIGHBOURS, ESPECIALLY THE POLES, AND SO ON. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT THOUGHT IT IMPORTANT TO REMAIN IN THE CLOSEST BILATERAL CONTACT WITH THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT ON THESE ISSUES. ADAMISHIN WARMLY AGREED.

COMMENT

7. AS MR WALDEGRAVE DISCOVERED DURING HIS RECENT VISIT, ADAMISHIN HAS A TENDENCY TO OVERSTATE HIS CASE. THE POLICY HE SET OUT DOES NOT DIFFER FROM THE LINE TAKEN IN THE LAST FEW DAYS BY SHEVARDNADZE AND

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GORBACHEV (MY TELEGRAMS 282 AND 294). BUT HIS UNCOMPROMISING REJECTION OF GERMAN MEMBERSHIP OF NATO WAS MORE ABSOLUTE THAN THEIRS, AND IS NOT NECESSARILY AN ACCURATE GUIDE TO WHERE THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WILL EVENTUALLY EMERGE. HE IS HOWEVER PROBABLY RIGHT TO EMPHASISE, YET AGAIN, THAT THIS IS DOMESTICALLY A POLITICAL HOT POTATO FOR THE RUSSIANS AND TO INDICATE THAT AN EARLY MEETING OF THE FOUR-PLUS-TWO WOULD THEREFORE BE HELPFUL. BUT HE SEEMED WELL ENOUGH AWARE THAT, AT THE END OF THE DAY, THE SOVIET UNION HAS LITTLE SCOPE FOR INFLUENCING THE PROCESS OF GERMAN REUNIFICATION DECISIVELY.

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