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SIR P CRADOCK'S CALL ON INTERNATIONAL DEPARTMENT, CPSU: GERMANY

1. IN FALIN'S ABSENCE, ATTENDING THE SUPREME SOVIET, SIR P CRADOCK WAS RECEIVED BY ONE OF HIS DEPUTIES, BRUTENTS. BRUTENTS CONFINED HIS DISCUSSION TO GERMANY.
2. IN HIS INTRODUCTORY REMARKS BRUTENTS SAID THAT EVENTS WERE PROCEEDING WITH THE SPEED OF A CAVALRY CHARGE, OBLIGING US ALL TO MAKE POLICY ON THE HOOF. IT WOULD BE STUPID AND FRUITLESS TO IMPEDE UNIFICATION. IT WAS INEVITABLE. BUT IT SHOULD NOT HAPPEN UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF THE CROWD. IT SHOULD HAVE AN ORDERLY CHARACTER AND SERVE TO STRENGTHEN, RATHER THAN WEAKEN EUROPEAN STABILITY.
3. BRUTENTS THOUGHT THAT ECONOMIC UNITY COULD DEVELOP QUICKLY: HOWEVER THE CENTRAL AND MORE DIFFICULT ISSUE WAS THAT OF SECURITY. IT WAS A HIGHLY SENSITIVE SUBJECT IN THE SOVIET UNION. IF EVEN THE SPECTRE OF GERMAN NATIONALISM AROSE, IT WOULD CREATE A STRONGLY NEGATIVE MOOD AMONG THE PUBLIC, WHICH WOULD BE USED BY OPPONENTS OF PERESTROIKA.
4. EUROPEAN STABILITY WAS PREDICATED ON THE MILITARY-STRATEGIC BALANCE. THE NEW EUROPEAN SECURITY STRUCTURE HAD STILL NOT REACHED THE STAGE OF BLUEPRINTS. WE HAD TO SYNCHRONISE THE MILITARY ASPECT OF THE GERMAN QUESTION WITH THESE ELEMENTS OF PAN-EUROPEAN SECURITY, WHICH WERE ONLY JUST FORMING. THIS MEANT THAT THE EXTERNAL ASPECTS OF THE GERMAN QUESTION SHOULD BE ADDRESSED OVER A PROLONGED PERIOD. THIS WAS WHERE THE RUSSIANS FOUND THEMSELVES IN CLOSE AGREEMENT WITH THE PRIME MINISTER. THE PROCESS SHOULD PROCEED STEP BY STEP TAKING CONTINUAL ACCOUNT OF THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF OTHER COUNTRIES.
5. BRUTENTS SAID THAT THE PROPOSAL FOR A UNIFIED GERMANY IN NATO DID NOT MATCH THE SOVIET UNION'S INTERESTS. AS GORBACHEV HAD SAID DURING ONE OF HIS DISCUSSIONS, THE SOVIET UNION FORESAW GERMANY OUTSIDE THE MILITARY GROUPINGS, AND THAT ITS TERRITORY SHOULD NOT BE USED BY EXTERNAL MILITARY FORCES. THE RUSSIANS FAVOURED NEUTRALITY FOR

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GERMANY, BUT BRUTENTS STRESSED THEY MEANT PURELY MILITARY NEUTRALITY.

6. A RANGE OF IDEAS HAD BEEN PUT FORWARD FOR LINKING GERMANY TO THE WEST. IT NEED NOT BE A BLACK AND WHITE ISSUE OF GERMANY IN NATO OR NEUTRAL. THERE WAS SCOPE FOR DIPLOMATIC WORK TO FIND AN ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION. 'ASSOCIATION' MIGHT BE THE ANSWER.

7. SIR P CRADOCK SAID WE UNDERSTOOD THE EMOTIONS THAT THE SPECTRE OF GERMAN NATIONALISM COULD AROUSE, AND RECOGNISED THE RIGHT OF SOVIET PEOPLE TO FEEL THIS WAY. HOWEVER, IT WAS NOT IN SOVIET OR BRITISH INTERESTS TO IMPEDE GERMAN UNITY, OR TO BE SEEN TO DO SO. HE HAD HEARD WHAT MR BRUTENTS HAD SAID ABOUT NATO MEMBERSHIP, BUT WHICH WAS THE BEST SOLUTION, OR LEAST BAD, FOR OUR MUTUAL SECURITY INTERESTS: A GERMANY TIED INTO STABLE INSTITUTIONS OR A NEUTRAL, LOOSE CANNON? UNIFICATION COULD NOT BE HELD UP. BUT TO HAVE GERMANY ANCHORED DID NOT MEAN THAT NATO TROOPS SHOULD BE ON THE TERRITORY OF THE FORMER GDR. HE REFERRED TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S SUGGESTION OF ARRANGEMENTS FOR STATIONING SOVIET TROOPS IN EAST GERMANY. HE MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE OPTION OF 'ASSOCIATION' WITH NATO WAS NOT ON OFFER.

8. BRUTENTS SAID WE SHOULD NOT ALLOW EVENTS TO OVERTAKE US. BUT HE THOUGHT THE DEVELOPMENT OF ECONOMIC LINKS BETWEEN THE TWO GERMANIES COULD PROCEED AT A DIFFERENT RATE TO THE RESOLUTION OF EXTERNAL ISSUES, INCLUDING THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ASPECTS. HE WAS NOT CONVINCED ABOUT THE RETENTION OF SOVIET TROOPS IN A UNITED GERMANY, SINCE THE LEGAL BASIS FOR THEIR PRESENCE WOULD BE COMPLETELY DIFFERENT FROM THAT OF NATO TROOPS. THIS WOULD BE A SERIOUS IMBALANCE.

BRAITHWAITE

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