



10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

Four Power Meeting in
Germany.

I think you will
want to read these
Telegrams, reporting the
Quadrilateral Meeting in
Germany last Wednesday, in
full. You need to be
aware of the detail.
You will note how the
Americans tend always to
support the Germans. CID 2/3

SECRET

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9(a-b)

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TO IMMEDIATE BONN

TELNO 147

OF 011959Z MARCH 90

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, PARIS, UKDEL NATO, MOSCOW, BMG BERLIN
INFO IMMEDIATE EAST BERLIN

MY SEVEN IPTS : GERMAN UNIFICATION : DIRECT ELECTIONS FOR BERLIN

SUMMARY

1. GERMANS ASK FOR GREEN LIGHT TO GO AHEAD WITH LEGISLATION ON DIRECT ELECTIONS FOR BERLIN. US PREPARED TO AGREE ONCE RUSSIANS HAVE BEEN INFORMED. DUMAS AND GENSCHER TO DISCUSS IN BERLIN ON 1 MARCH. UK STRESSES NEED NOT TO BOUNCE RUSSIANS. KASTRUP TO REPORT TO GENSCHER IN BERLIN.

DETAIL

2. KASTRUP SAID IT WAS UNCLEAR WHETHER THE ISSUE OF DIRECT ELECTIONS FOR BERLIN WOULD STILL BE A PROBLEM BY THE TIME OF THE FEDERAL ELECTIONS IN DECEMBER. HOWEVER THE LEGISLATIVE CALENDAR REQUIRED THE FRG TO TAKE THE NECESSARY STEPS IN MARCH. THIS WAS A POLITICALLY LIVE ISSUE IN BERLIN, WHOSE PEOPLE WANTED TO BE PART OF THE FRG. IN OTTAWA MINISTERS HAD AGREED ON THE PRINCIPLE BUT FOR TACTICAL REASONS HAD DELAYED GOING AHEAD. NOW WE HAD AGREEMENT OF THE FOUR PLUS TWO AND WERE ON THE VERGE OF STARTING THE PROCESS. THE ALLIES SHOULD GIVE THE FRG THE GREEN LIGHT TO GO AHEAD WITH LEGISLATION.

3. SEITZ SAID THAT IF THE FRG MADE A POLITICAL REQUEST FOR ALLIED APPROVAL HAVING ASSESSED THE RISKS, THEN THE US WAS PREPARED TO GO TO THE RUSSIANS. THE TIMING WAS UNFORTUNATE, RUNNING THE RISK OF POISONING THE BEGINNING OF THE FOUR PLUS TWO PROCESS. DUFOURCQ SAID HE DID NOT KNOW WHAT DUMAS'S POSITION WOULD BE. GENSCHER AND DUMAS WOULD DISCUSS THE ISSUE IN BERLIN ON 1 MARCH.

4. WESTON SAID THAT WE COULD HAVE AVOIDED THIS AWKWARD CONJUNCTION OF CIRCUMSTANCES IF THE FOUR PLUS TWO HAD MET EARLIER. WE WERE POSITIVE IN PRINCIPLE TO THE PROPOSAL BUT WE SHOULD NOT APPEAR TO IGNORE SOVIET VIEWS. IF WE DECIDED TO GO AHEAD WE WOULD HAVE TO RESPOND FIRST TO THE SOVIET DEMARCHE MAKING IT CLEAR THAT WE DID NOT ACCEPT THEIR ARGUMENTS. WE SHOULD IF POSSIBLE GIVE TIME FOR SILENCE PROCEDURE. THEN THE FRG COULD GO AHEAD WITH LEGISLATION, ASSUMING ACQUIESCENCE.

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THE UK WOULD NOT OBSTRUCT CONSENSUS BUT WE NEEDED TO
ADDRESS THE SOVIET ANGLE QUICKLY. KASTRUP SAID HE WOULD REPORT
THE DISCUSSION TO GENSCHER IN BERLIN.

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TO IMMEDIATE BONN

TELNO 146

OF 011955Z MARCH 90

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, PARIS, UKDEL NATO, MOSCOW, BMG BERLIN

INFO IMMEDIATE EAST BERLIN

8 (a-b)

MY SIX IPTS : GERMAN UNIFICATION : FOUR POWER STATUS

SUMMARY

1. DISCUSSION OF HOW TO WIND UP FOUR POWER RIGHTS. GERMANS PROPOSE DROPPING SYMBOLIC RIGHTS. AGREEMENT TO EXPERT MEETING IN BERLIN OF THREE ALLIES, FRG AND SENAT TO LIST ALLIED RIGHTS AND CONSIDER THE WAY FORWARD.

DETAIL

2. KASTRUP SAID WE COULD EITHER GIVE UP FOUR POWER RIGHTS GRADUALLY BEGINNING NOW OR IN ONE FELL SWOOP AT THE END OF THE UNIFICATION PROCESS. THE SENAT IN BERLIN HAD PROPOSED THAT AS A FIRST STEP WE SHOULD DO AWAY WITH OFFICES FOR ALLIED LIAISON OFFICERS IN THE RATHAUS AND THE IMMEDIATE RIGHT TO BRIEFING ON SENAT DISCUSSIONS. THESE RIGHTS WERE PURELY SYMBOLIC.

3. DUFOURCO SAID WE SHOULD BE CAUTIOUS ABOUT RUNNING DOWN FOUR POWER RIGHTS TOO QUICKLY. ZOELICK SAID THAT IF WE DROPPED ONE RIGHT THERE WOULD BE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE OTHERS. WE NEEDED TO KNOW WHAT RISKS THE FRG WAS WILLING TO RUN. KASTRUP SAID THE SENAT'S PROPOSAL CONCERNED A PURELY SYMBOLIC RIGHT. THIS WOULD NOT CHANGE THE LEGAL STATUS. HE PROPOSED ESTABLISHING A WORKING GROUP OF THE THREE ALLIES, THE FRG AND THE SENAT IN BERLIN. THIS SHOULD DRAW UP A LIST OF ALLIED REGULATIONS AND PRACTICES IN BERLIN AND CONSIDER WHAT COULD BE DONE AWAY WITH IMMEDIATELY AND WHAT SHOULD WAIT UNTIL THE END OF THE PROCESS. THIS WAS AGREED.

4. ZOELICK POINTED TO THE DANGER OF INCREASING SOVIET SENSITIVITIES. WESTON SUGGESTED LOW LEVEL CONTACTS BETWEEN THE THREE ALLIES AND THE SOVIET UNION IN BERLIN SEEKING RUSSIAN VIEWS ON THE QUESTION OF HOW FOUR POWER RIGHTS SHOULD BE WOUND UP, AND THUS IN EFFECT RESPONDING TO MAXIMYCHEV'S INITIATIVE, PROVIDED THE FRG WAS CONTENT. ZOELICK CONSIDERED THIS POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS. THE SOVIET UNION MIGHT USE SUCH CONTACTS AGAINST THE WEST.

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TO IMMEDIATE BONN

TELNO 145

OF 011949Z MARCH 90

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, PARIS, UKDEL NATO, MOSCOW, BMG BERLIN

INFO IMMEDIATE EAST BERLIN

MY FIVE IPTS: GERMAN UNIFICATION: LEGAL ASPECTS

SUMMARY

1. DISCUSSION OF DIFFICULT LEGAL PROBLEM OF SUCCESSION OF STATES. INITIAL GERMAN AND AMERICAN VIEW THAT IF UNIFICATION TAKES PLACE UNDER ARTICLE 23, THEN ALL PREVIOUS FRG OBLIGATIONS CONTINUE TO APPLY AUTOMATICALLY. AGREEMENT TO EXCHANGE PAPERS GIVING INITIAL LEGAL VIEWS.

DETAIL

2. KASTRUP SAID THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STATUS OF THE NEW STATE WOULD DEPEND ON THE ROUTE TO UNIFICATION CHOSEN BY THE NEW GOVERNMENT OF THE GDR. THE FRG'S PRELIMINARY LEGAL VIEW WAS THAT IF UNIFICATION TOOK PLACE UNDER ARTICLE 23 THE FRG WOULD CONTINUE WITH ALL ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW. FOR EXAMPLE, THE TREATY OF ROME AND THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON WOULD CONTINUE TO APPLY AND NO CONFIRMATION WOULD BE NECESSARY. THE STATE WOULD BE ENLARGED BUT WOULD CONTINUE TO HAVE THE SAME OBLIGATIONS. SEITZ SAID THIS WAS ALSO THE INITIAL US OPINION. DUFORCQ SAID THEY SAW IT AS A MERGING OF STATES. THERE WOULD THEREFORE BE A PROBLEM OF THE SUCCESSION OF STATES.

3. ZOELICK ASKED IF ALL THE OLD OBLIGATIONS OF THE GDR WOULD BE EXTINGUISHED. KASTRUP SAID THIS WAS A DIFFICULT LEGAL PROBLEM. THE POLITICAL TREATIES, SUCH AS THE WARSAW TREATY, WOULD AUTOMATICALLY CEASE TO EXIST BECAUSE OF INCOMPATIBILITY. BUT NOT ALL LEGAL OBLIGATIONS WOULD NECESSARILY CEASE. IT WOULD DIFFER FROM ONE TREATY TO ANOTHER.

4. KASTRUP SAID THAT IF UNIFICATION TOOK PLACE UNDER ARTICLE 23, THAT ARTICLE COULD THEN BE ABOLISHED TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT THERE WERE NO OTHER PARTS OF GERMANY ENTITLED TO ACCEDE. THIS WOULD BE AN IMPORTANT SYMBOL FOR POLAND.

5. WESTON PROPOSED AN EXCHANGE OF PAPERS AMONG THE FOUR GIVING PRELIMINARY LEGAL VIEWS. THIS WAS AGREED.

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TO IMMEDIATE BONN

TELNO 144

OF 011945Z MARCH 90

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, PARIS, UKDEL NATO, MOSCOW, BMG BERLIN

INFO IMMEDIATE EAST BERLIN

MY FOUR IPTS: GERMAN UNIFICATION: PEACE TREATY/SETTLEMENT

SUMMARY

1. GERMANS RESISTANT TO IDEA OF GENERAL PEACE TREATY AND RELUCTANT EVEN TO ACCEPT THE TERM PEACE SETTLEMENT. UK AND FRANCE STRESS IMPORTANCE OF PEACE SETTLEMENT BUT US INITIALLY SYMPATHETIC TO GERMAN CONCERNS. US OFFERS TO CIRCULATE PAPER ON LEGAL AND POLITICAL ASPECTS.

DETAIL

2. DUFOURCQ SAID THAT THE PARIS/BONN CONVENTIONS FORESAW A PEACE SETTLEMENT FOR GERMANY. THE FRENCH ENVISAGED A SET OF AGREEMENTS ON BORDERS AND OTHER ISSUES TO BE AGREED IN THE FOUR PLUS TWO. THEY HAD IN MIND A CONTRACTUAL AGREEMENT THAT COULD BE RATIFIED. ZOELICK AGREED THAT WE NEEDED TO RESOLVE FOUR POWER STATUS, BORDERS, THE STATUS OF BERLIN AND THE QUESTION OF UNIFICATION. AN EXCHANGE OF NOTES MIGHT BE SUFFICIENT.

3. KASTRUP SAID THE FRG WISHED TO AVOID CONCLUDING A FORMAL PEACE TREATY WITH OVER FIFTY FORMER ENEMIES FROM THE END OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR. THEY DID NOT OBJECT TO THE SUBSTANCE OF WHAT WAS PROPOSED BUT WERE NOT EVEN KEEN ON DESCRIBING IT AS A PEACE SETTLEMENT. THIS CAME TOO CLOSE TO THE EXPRESSION PEACE TREATY. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TWO WOULD NOT BE OBVIOUS TO THE GENERAL PUBLIC. ZOELICK SUGGESTED THAT IF THIS WAS A POLITICAL PROBLEM WE COULD CONSIDER CALLING THE SETTLEMENT SOMETHING ELSE. WESTON ARGUED THAT IF THE PARIS/BONN CONVENTIONS REFERRED TO A PEACE SETTLEMENT, THIS WAS WHAT WE SHOULD WORK TOWARDS. WE COULD NOT JUST LEAVE THE ISSUE HANGING. BUT THE EXPRESSION PERMITTED A WIDE RANGE OF POSSIBILITIES BOTH LEGALLY AND POLITICALLY.

4. ZOELICK THOUGHT THE SOVIET UNION MIGHT COME FORWARD WITH A PROPOSAL FOR A PEACE TREATY. THE WESTERN FOUR NEEDED TO CONDUCT PREPARATORY WORK ON THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL ISSUES SO THAT WE WERE IN A POSITION TO REACT IN THE FOUR PLUS TWO. HE VOLUNTEERED TO CIRCULATE A PAPER ON THIS QUESTION.

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5 (a-b)

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TO IMMEDIATE BONN

TELNO 143

OF 011935Z MARCH 90

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, PARIS, UKDEL NATO, MOSCOW, BMG BERLIN
INFO IMMEDIATE EAST BERLIN

MY THREE IPTS: GERMAN UNIFICATION: POLISH BORDER

SUMMARY

1. GERMANY MAY ACCEPT POLISH PROPOSAL FOR THE TWO GERMANIES TO INITIAL TREATIES TO BE SIGNED BY A UNIFIED GERMANY. WISH TO AVOID FORMAL PARTICIPATION OF POLAND IN FOUR PLUS TWO MEETINGS BUT NEED TO FIND SOME FORM OF ASSOCIATION. US PROPOSES COORDINATED BRIEFING BY FOUR WESTERN POWERS FOR CZECHOSLOVAKIA, HUNGARY AND POLAND. DISCUSSION OF FOUR POWER GUARANTEES ON POLISH BORDER.

DETAIL

2. KASTRUP SAID THERE WAS AGREEMENT THAT A LEGALLY BINDING DECLARATION OR INSTRUMENT ON THE POLISH BORDER WAS NECESSARY. THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT WAS OPEN TO SUGGESTIONS FOR HOW SUCH A GUARANTEE SHOULD BE GIVEN. THE POLES HAD PROPOSED THAT BOTH GERMAN STATES INITIAL A TREATY WITH POLAND PRIOR TO UNIFICATION AND THAT THE TREATY BE SIGNED BY A UNITED GERMANY. GENSCHER FOUND THIS A VERY ATTRACTIVE IDEA WHICH TOOK INTO ACCOUNT THE LEGAL SITUATION IN GERMANY AND GAVE POLAND THE NECESSARY ASSURANCES. KASTRUP BELIEVED THAT THE CONTROVERSY IN THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT COULD BE SETTLED ON THIS BASIS. IN ADDITION, FOLLOWING ELECTIONS IN THE GDR, THE TWO GERMAN PARLIAMENTS WOULD PASS A JOINT RESOLUTION (OR POSSIBLY IDENTICAL, SEPARATE RESOLUTIONS) ON THE POLISH BORDER. ZOELICK (AND OTHERS) WELCOMED THE GERMAN DECISION. HE HOPED IT COULD BE PUT FORWARD BEFORE A VISIT OF THE POLISH PRIME MINISTER TO WASHINGTON ON 21 MARCH.

3. KASTRUP SAID POLAND SHOULD NOT PARTICIPATE FORMALLY IN FOUR PLUS TWO MEETINGS. BUT WE NEEDED SOME SORT OF MECHANISM TO BRING THE POLES INTO THE GAME. DUFOURCQ ALSO RULED OUT FORMAL POLISH PARTICIPATION. BUT AT A CERTAIN POINT WE WOULD HAVE TO ASSOCIATE THE POLES WITH THE PROCESS. ZOELICK SAID THERE COULD BE NO DECISION WITHOUT POLISH INVOLVEMENT ALTHOUGH THEY COULD NOT PARTICIPATE DIRECTLY. WESTON SUGGESTED THAT ONE POSSIBLE SEQUENCE MIGHT BE AS FOLLOWS. POLAND WOULD PRESENT ITS DRAFT

TREATY TO THE TWO GERMAN STATES. THE FOUR PLUS TWO WOULD APPROVE THIS PROCEDURALLY AS THE RIGHT WAY FORWARD. THE TWO GERMANIES WOULD THEN REPORT TO THE FOUR FOLLOWING THEIR BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS WITH POLAND. THE FOUR PLUS TWO COULD DISCUSS THE RESULT AND AGREE THAT SUBJECT TO POLISH VIEWS THE PROBLEM OF THE POLISH BORDER HAD BEEN RESOLVED. THERE COULD THEN BE A BACK TO BACK MEETING BETWEEN THE SIX AND POLAND TO HEAR THAT THEY TOO WERE CONTENT WITH THE TREATY, WHICH WOULD THEN BE INITIALED. FINALLY THE TREATY SHOULD BE SIGNED BY POLAND AND A UNITED GERMANY. ZOELICK SAID WE SHOULD AVOID SETTING A PRECEDENT FOR THE CZECHS AND OTHERS BY TOO CLOSE INVOLVEMENT OF POLAND WITH THE FOUR PLUS TWO. THE WESTERN FOUR SHOULD ORGANISE MACHINERY FOR COLLECTIVELY DEBRIEFING POLAND, CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND HUNGARY ON MEETINGS OF THE FOUR PLUS TWO.

4. WESTON ASKED WHAT WAS MEANT BY TALK OF GUARANTEES IN THE CONTEXT OF GERMAN BORDERS. DUFOURCQ SAID FRANCE WOULD NOT EXCLUDE LEGAL GUARANTEES FOR THE POLISH BORDER. BUT THE BEST SOLUTION MIGHT BE FOR POLAND TO SIGN A FOUR POWER AGREEMENT ON THE BORDERS OF GERMANY IN GENERAL. KASTRUP SAW NO NEED FOR THE FOUR POWERS TO GUARANTEE THAT A GERMAN/POLISH TREATY WOULD NOT BE VIOLATED. SEITZ THOUGHT THE SOVIET UNION MIGHT RAISE THE ISSUE OF GUARANTEES. THE WESTERN FOUR SHOULD COORDINATE THEIR POSITION IN ADVANCE SO THAT THEY COULD RESPOND IN A WAY THAT DID NOT RAISE POLISH CONCERNS. WESTON SAID THAT A FORMAL GERMAN/POLISH TREATY ON THE BORDER WAS IN ONE SENSE ITSELF A GUARANTEE OF THAT BORDER, ESPECIALLY IF THE FOUR POWERS ASSOCIATED THEMSELVES WITH IT IN SOME WAY, IN FINAL DISCHARGE OF THEIR RESIDUAL RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES.

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TO IMMEDIATE BONN

TELNO 142

OF 011931Z MARCH 90

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, PARIS, UKDEL NATO, MOSCOW, BMG BERLIN
INFO IMMEDIATE EAST BERLIN

4 (a-d)

MY TWO IPTS: GERMAN UNIFICATION: MILITARY ASPECTS

SUMMARY

1. PENDING CABINET SUB-COMMITTEE ON 5 MARCH, GERMAN INDECISION ON THE MILITARY ASPECTS OF UNIFICATION. BUT NO GERMAN ARMED FORCES TO BE BASED IN THE GDR. AMERICANS SAY KOHL CLEAR IN WASHINGTON THAT ARTICLES 5 AND 6 OF THE WASHINGTON TREATY WOULD APPLY TO THE FORMER TERRITORY OF THE GDR. GERMANS ENVISAGE BILATERAL TREATY WITH THE RUSSIANS ON SOVIET FORCES REMAINING IN THE GDR. SIMILAR BILATERAL TREATIES COULD COVER ANY CONTINUING ALLIED GARRISONS IN BERLIN.

DETAIL

2. KASTRUP SAID ONLY TWO ELEMENTS OF GERMAN POLICY HAD BEEN AGREED SO FAR: A UNIFIED GERMANY WOULD BE A FULL MEMBER OF NATO BUT NATO BORDERS OR JURISDICTION WOULD NOT BE MOVED FURTHER EAST. THE GENSCHER/STOLTENBERG STATEMENT HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT NO UNITS OF THE ALLIANCE, INCLUDING BOTH ASSIGNED AND NON-ASSIGNED BUNDESWEHR, WOULD BE BASED IN THE FORMER GDR: BUT THAT THIS WAS FOR DISCUSSION WITH THE NEW GDR GOVERNMENT AND THE FOUR POWERS. THE GERMAN CABINET SUB-COMMITTEE ON SECURITY AND FOREIGN POLICY WOULD MEET ON 5 MARCH AND THE POSITION OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT WOULD EVOLVE. THE FRG WOULD WELCOME PARTNERS' VIEWS.

3. ZOELICK SAID THE US WAS UNCLEAR WHAT 'NATO JURISDICTION' MEANT. KOHL HAD SAID CLEARLY IN WASHINGTON THAT ARTICLES 5 AND 6 OF THE NATO TREATY WOULD BE EXTENDED TO THE FORMER TERRITORY OF THE GDR. IT WOULD BE DESTABILISING IF NATO SECURITY GUARANTEES DID NOT EXTEND TO THE WHOLE TERRITORY OF A UNIFIED GERMANY. IF IT WAS LEFT IN A HALF-WAY HOUSE A UNIFIED GERMANY IN FUTURE MIGHT TURN TO OTHER SOLUTIONS. HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE OF DEMILITARISED ZONES WAS NOT ENCOURAGING. THE US WOULD BE SENDING A SPECIAL MESSAGE TO THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT ON THIS POINT.

4. WESTON SAID DECISIONS AFFECTING SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE FORMER TERRITORY OF THE GDR WERE OF DIRECT CONCERN TO THE FRG'S ALLIES. THERE SHOULD BE CONSULTATION ON WHETHER OR NOT TROOPS WOULD BE BASED THERE. DID THE GENSCHER/STOLTENBERG STATEMENT

EXCLUDE THE BASING OF TERRITORIALHEER OR BUNDESGRENZENSCHUTZ TROOPS IN THE FORMER GDR? WOULD THE NVA CONTINUE IN EXISTENCE THERE? KASTRUP REPLIED THAT NO TERRITORIALHEER FORCES WOULD BE BASED IN THE FORMER GDR. THIS WAS WHAT WAS MEANT BY NON-ASSIGNED BUNDESWEHR. BUNDESGRENZENSCHUTZ WERE NOT MILITARY FORCES AND THUS COULD BE BASED THERE. AS FOR THE NVA IT WAS INCONCEIVABLE THAT THERE COULD BE TWO ARMIES IN ONE STATE. THE NVA WOULD DISAPPEAR.

5. DUFOURCQ SAID THE KEY ELEMENT WAS WHETHER ANY SPECIAL STATUS FOR THE GDR WAS TRANSITIONAL OR PERMANENT. FRANCE WOULD FAVOUR A SPECIAL STATUS FOR A TRANSITIONAL PERIOD. BUT A PERMANENT SPECIAL STATUS WOULD LEAVE A LASTING PROBLEM AT THE HEART OF EUROPE. HE ASSUMED THAT ARTICLES 5 AND 6 WOULD APPLY TO THE FORMER GDR.

6. WESTON AGREED THAT IT WAS HARD TO IMAGINE ARTICLES 5 AND 6 COULD NOT APPLY TO THE FORMER GDR. THERE WERE A WHOLE SERIES OF QUESTIONS THAT WE HOPED THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT WOULD CONSIDER: BUT WHICH NEEDED TO BE DISCUSSED WITH ALLIES: WHAT WOULD HAPPEN TO THE NVA? IF THE FORMER GDR WAS INCLUDED IN NATO HOW WOULD NATO PROVIDE IN PRACTICAL TERMS FOR ITS DEFENCE? COULD THERE BE PEACETIME EXERCISES THERE? WOULD MILITARY STOCKPILES BE PRE-POSITIONED? WOULD HARDENED AIRFIELDS THERE BE MAINTAINED FOR FORWARD DEPLOYMENT IN TRANSITION TO WAR? WHO WOULD POLICE THE AIR SPACE OF THE FORMER GDR DURING PEACE TIME? HOW WOULD ALL THIS FIT INTO NATO'S OPERATIONAL CONCEPT INCLUDING PLANS FOR FORWARD DEPLOYMENT OF GERMAN AND ALLIED STATIONED FORCES, AND INTEGRATED COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS? KASTRUP SAID THESE QUESTIONS HAD OCCURRED TO THE GERMANS TOO.

SOVIET FORCES

7. KASTRUP SAID THAT AFTER CFE I 180,000 SOVIET FORCES WOULD REMAIN IN THE GDR. THE FRG TENDED TOWARD A LIMITED TOLERATION OF SOVIET FORCES REMAINING AFTER UNIFICATION. THE FORCES WOULD BE LIMITED IN BOTH NUMBER AND IN THE TIME THEY COULD REMAIN. THE AIM OF THE FOUR PLUS TWO MECHANISM WAS TO TERMINATE THE OCCUPATION REGIME AND SOVIET FORCES COULD THEREFORE ONLY REMAIN ON THE BASIS OF A CONTRACTUAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND A UNIFIED GERMANY. THEY WERE CONSIDERING EITHER A TIME LIMIT OF 5 TO 7 YEARS IN THE BILATERAL TREATY OR LINKING THEIR REMOVAL TO THE RESULTS OF CONTINUING CFE NEGOTIATIONS. AT THE MOMENT THEY WERE TENDING TO THE LATTER SOLUTION.

8. ZOELICK SAID THE US PREFERRED A TIME LIMIT. ONE DID NOT EVEN KNOW IF A CFE II WOULD HAPPEN. THERE WAS A DANGER OF CREATING A LINK BETWEEN SOVIET AND AMERICAN FORCES. WESTON SAID WE FAVOURED A GENEROUS TRANSITION. THE SOVIET UNION WOULD HAVE

PRACTICAL PROBLEMS IN REMOVING ALL ITS FORCES AT ONCE: WE SHOULD ENDEAVOUR TO SAVE SOVIET FACE: AND PRESSING TOO HARD RISKED CREATING FALSE COMPARISONS WITH NATO STATIONED FORCES. ON CFE, THE RIGHT WAY ROUND WAS TO DECIDE BROADLY AMONG THE SIX WHAT WAS WANTED IN RELATION TO THE SECURITY CONTEXT OF A UNIFIED GERMANY AND PLAY THAT INTO CFE, NOT VICE VERSA. ZOELICK SAID IT WAS DIFFICULT FOR THE AMERICANS TO AGREE THAT SOVIET FORCES SHOULD REMAIN IN THE FORMER GDR, BUT IF THIS WAS ACCEPTABLE TO A UNIFIED GERMANY THEY COULD GO ALONG WITH IT.

BERLIN

9. KASTRUP RAISED THE POSSIBILITY OF MAINTAINING ALLIED FORCES IN BERLIN. IF WE DID SO IT WOULD HAVE TO BE ON THE BASIS OF NEW BILATERAL AGREEMENTS. ALLIED RIGHTS WOULD COME TO AN END. WESTON ASKED WHETHER THE FOURTH COMPONENT OF FORCES IN BERLIN WOULD BE GERMAN OR SOVIET. GERMANS OUGHT TO HELP DEFEND THE CAPITAL OF A UNIFIED GERMANY IN NATO. KASTRUP SUGGESTED THIS WAS COUNTER TO THE BASIC GERMAN POSITION ABOUT MOVING FORWARD THE FRONTIERS OF NATO. ZOELICK URGED KASTRUP TO CONSIDER CAREFULLY THE POSSIBILITY OF BASING SOME GERMAN FORCES IN BERLIN. THE GENSCHER/STOLTENBERG STATEMENT REFERRED ONLY TO THE GDR AND NOT TO BERLIN. THEY WOULD NOT THEREFORE BE MOVING THE BORDERS OF NATO EASTWARD. GERMANY SHOULD NOT BE PRECLUDED IN PERPETUITY FROM BASING ITS OWN TROOPS IN ITS OWN CAPITAL. SEITZ ASKED WHAT WOULD BE THE MILITARY MISSION OF WESTERN GARRISONS IN BERLIN MAROONED IN A SEA OF SOVIET FORCES IN THE GDR. KASTRUP SAID THIS HAD NOT YET BEEN CONSIDERED.

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TO IMMEDIATE BONN

TELNO 141

OF 011925Z MARCH 90

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INFO IMMEDIATE EAST BERLIN

3(ad)

MIPT: GERMAN UNIFICATION: FOUR PLUS TWO

SUMMARY

1. FRG TO BEGIN CONTACTS WITH GDR AND SOVIET UNION ON FOUR PLUS TWO MECHANISM. FRANCE AND UK PRESS FOR OFFICIAL FOUR PLUS TWO MEETING PRIOR TO GDR ELECTIONS. FRG AGREES TO CONSIDER ARGUMENTS AND MAKE DECISION ON 1 MARCH. US ALSO OPEN-MINDED AND TO DECIDE IN LIGHT OF GERMAN VIEWS. INSISTENT THAT WEST MUST AGREE ON STRATEGY BEFORE GOING INTO FOUR PLUS TWO MEETINGS.

2. AGREEMENT ON NEED TO ESTABLISH SUPPORT MACHINERY FOR WESTERN FOUR, POSSIBLY INCLUDING SUB GROUPS AND ENHANCED BONN GROUP. POSSIBILITY OF A MEETING OF THE FOUR FOREIGN MINISTERS IN NAMIBIA.

3. KOHL TO BRIEF NAC ON GERMAN UNIFICATION ON 8 MARCH. AGREEMENT THAT WESTERN FOUR SHOULD DE-BRIEF NATO AFTER FOUR PLUS TWO MEETINGS. RESULTS OF FOUR PLUS TWO SHOULD BE PRESENTED TO THE CSCE FOR DISCUSSION BUT NOT FOR APPROVAL.

DETAIL

4. KASTRUP (FRG) SAID GENSCHER AND SHEVARDNADZE HAD DISCUSSED THE FOUR PLUS TWO MECHANISM ON THE TELEPHONE ON 23 FEBRUARY. AS A RESULT KASTRUP WOULD MEET ADAMISHIN IN GENEVA OF 2 MARCH. HE WOULD HOLD HIS FIRST BILATERAL MEETING WITH THE GDR ON 7 MARCH TO EXPLORE THE APPROACH OF THE EXISTING GDR GOVERNMENT TO THE FOUR PLUS TWO MECHANISM. THEY WOULD NOT GO INTO THE SUBSTANCE OF UNIFICATION BUT THEY NEEDED TO BE SEEN TO REACT TO THE MODROW PROPOSAL. THEY WOULD KEEP THE THREE WESTERN ALLIES INFORMED. SEITZ (US) OBSERVED THAT SINCE THE TWO WERE ALREADY MEETING THE FOUR PLUS TWO MECHANISM WAS ALREADY IN OPERATION.

5. WESTON ASKED IF ALL COULD AGREE TO A FOUR PLUS TWO MEETING TAKING PLACE PRIOR TO THE GDR ELECTIONS. KASTRUP SAID THE FRG WOULD STICK TO THE OTTAWA AGREEMENT. BUT THEY WERE NOT PREPARED TO DISCUSS THE SUBSTANCE OF UNIFICATION WITH THE OUTGOING GDR GOVERNMENT. THE GERMAN POSITION ON AN EARLY OFFICIAL LEVEL MEETING OF THE FOUR PLUS TWO WAS OPEN BUT IT WAS NOT CLEAR TO THEM WHAT COULD BE DISCUSSED AT SUCH A MEETING. ZOELICK (US)

SAID THEY WERE ALSO OPEN TO A MEETING BUT WOULD NOT AGREE TO PROCEED WITH THE FOUR PLUS TWO UNTIL THEY WERE CERTAIN THAT THE FOUR WESTERN POWERS HAD A COMMON STRATEGIC APPROACH.

6. DUFOURCQ (FRANCE) SAID THEY FAVOURED A MEETING OF THE FOUR PLUS TWO AT POLITICAL DIRECTOR LEVEL PRIOR TO THE ELECTIONS. WE NEEDED TO SHOW THE PUBLIC THAT THE PROCESS WAS BEGINNING. IT WOULD HAVE A STABILISING EFFECT IN POLAND AND ELSEWHERE. THE FIRST MEETING WOULD BE EXPLORATORY AND WOULD DISCUSS PROCEDURE RATHER THAN SUBSTANCE. IF WE WAITED UNTIL AFTER THE ELECTIONS THERE WAS A DANGER THAT THE FORMATION OF A NEW GOVERNMENT IN THE GDR WOULD DELAY A MEETING UNTIL THE END OF APRIL. THE SOVIET UNION HAD MADE AN URGENT DEMARCHE IN PARIS CALLING FOR AN EARLY MEETING. WESTON SUPPORTED DUFOURCQ. WE TOO FAVOURED A MEETING BEFORE THE GDR ELECTIONS. WE HAD AGREED IN OTTAWA TO PRELIMINARY DISCUSSIONS SOON AND WE WOULD LOOK FOOLISH IF THE GROUP HAD STILL NOT MET AFTER TWO MONTHS. THE FIRST MEETING COULD BE PROCEDURAL AND DISCUSS LANGUAGE, AGENDA, LOCATION OF MEETINGS ETC, BUT WOULD CONVEY THE SIGNAL THAT WE WERE IN BUSINESS. WE HAD ALSO RECEIVED A SOVIET DEMARCHE.

7. KASTRUP SAID HE DID NOT HAVE AUTHORITY TO AGREE TO AN EARLY MEETING OF THE FOUR PLUS TWO. HE WOULD REPORT FRENCH AND BRITISH ARGUMENTS TO GENSCHER AND THEY WOULD MAKE A DECISION BY 1 MARCH. ZOELLICK SAID THE US WOULD ALSO MAKE A QUICK DECISION WHEN THEY KNEW GERMAN VIEWS. KASTRUP ASKED WHETHER OPPOSITION REPRESENTATIVES COULD BE INCLUDED IN THE GDR DELEGATION TO A MEETING OF THE FOUR PLUS TWO PRIOR TO ELECTIONS. THERE WAS NO OBJECTION.

8. ZOELLICK SAID THE US WOULD NOT AGREE TO GO INTO A FOUR PLUS TWO MEETING UNTIL THERE WAS A COMMON WESTERN STRATEGY. OUR OBJECTIVE SHOULD BE TO RETURN SOVEREIGNTY TO A UNIFIED GERMANY. THE UNIFIED STATE SHOULD BE FREE TO MAKE SOVEREIGN DECISIONS ON WHETHER TO BE A MEMBER OF NATO ETC. WE SHOULD NOT GIVE THE SOVIET UNION A VETO OVER THESE DEVELOPMENTS. WESTON AGREED THAT THE WEST MUST COORDINATE ITS POSITION CLOSELY. WE SHOULD NOT GIVE THE SOVIET UNION A CHANCE TO DIVIDE US. BUT AS LONG AS THERE WERE TWO GERMAN STATES THERE WERE QUESTIONS FOR JOINT DETERMINATION BY OTHERS TOO. EXTERNAL ASPECTS OF UNIFICATION WERE RELEVANT TO THE FOUR AND IT WAS OUR DUTY TO DISCHARGE OUR RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. KASTRUP EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THE AMERICAN ATTITUDE.

PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS

9. ZOELLICK SUGGESTED THERE SHOULD BE A MINISTERIAL FOUR PLUS TWO MEETING WITHIN ONE MONTH OF THE GDR ELECTIONS. KASTRUP AGREED. THE SEQUENCE SHOULD BE A MEETING OF THE TWO GERMANIES,

FOLLOWED BY A MEETING OF THE WESTERN FOUR, FOLLOWED BY AN OFFICIAL LEVEL FOUR PLUS TWO MEETING AND THEN A MINISTERIAL FOUR PLUS TWO. THE FIRST MEETING SHOULD TAKE PLACE IN THE FRG. DUFOURCQ SUGGESTED THAT LATER MEETINGS MIGHT ROTATE. IT WAS AGREED THAT EACH DELEGATION AT THE OFFICIAL LEVEL FOUR PLUS TWO SHOULD HAVE THREE MEMBERS.

WESTERN COORDINATION

10. ZOELICK PROPOSED A MEETING OF THE FOUR FOREIGN MINISTERS WHEN THEY WERE IN NAMIBIA FOR INDEPENDENCE CELEBRATIONS. IT WAS AGREED THAT THE FOUR POLITICAL DIRECTORS SHOULD MEET AGAIN IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO THE FIRST OFFICIAL FOUR PLUS TWO MEETING. WESTON SUGGESTED THAT AT FUTURE MEETINGS OF THE FOUR, POLITICAL DIRECTORS COULD BE ACCOMPANIED BY GERMAN EXPERTS AS WELL AS NOTE-TAKERS. WE MIGHT ALSO CONSIDER ESTABLISHING SUB GROUPS. ZOELICK PROPOSED THAT AN ENHANCED BONN GROUP SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED. IT SHOULD MEET AT A HIGHER LEVEL AND SHOULD BE SUPPLEMENTED BY EXPERTS FROM CAPITALS. THERE WERE A HOST OF LEGAL AND TECHNICAL ISSUES THAT NEEDED TO BE RESOLVED. KASTRUP SAID WE SHOULD ESTABLISH THE NECESSARY SUPPORT BODIES AS WE WENT ALONG. HE WOULD UNFORTUNATELY BE UNABLE TO AGREE TO MEET WITH THE THREE ALLIED AMBASSADORS IN BONN ON A REGULAR BASIS. HE HAD TOO MUCH TO DO ALREADY.

NATO

11. KASTRUP SAID KOHL WOULD BRIEF THE NAC ON 8 MARCH ON GERMAN UNIFICATION. ZOELICK ASKED WHETHER WE SHOULD PROPOSE CONSULTATIONS WITH NATO IN ADVANCE OF THE FIRST FOUR PLUS TWO MEETING. DUFOURCQ HAD RESERVATIONS ABOUT ESTABLISHING A PRECEDENT FOR COORDINATING A POSITION WITH ALLIES AUTOMATICALLY PRIOR TO EVERY MEETING. HE WOULD PREFER TO DE-BRIEF ALLIES AFTER MEETINGS. WESTON AGREED THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO CARRY THE ALLIES WITH US BUT WE SHOULD NOT ESTABLISH A MECHANISTIC LINK WITH THE NAC. WE SHOULD BE FLEXIBLE AND GENEROUS IN BRIEFING ALLIES ABOUT MEETINGS, INCLUDING BILATERALLY. KASTRUP PROPOSED THAT ONE OF THE FOUR POLITICAL DIRECTORS (IN ROTATION) SHOULD DE-BRIEF THE NAC AFTER FOUR PLUS TWO MEETINGS. THIS WAS ACCEPTED IN PRINCIPLE ALTHOUGH ON OCCASION IT WOULD BE NECESSARY FOR PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES TO DE-BRIEF RATHER THAN POLITICAL DIRECTORS. NOR WOULD DE-BRIEFING BE POSSIBLE AFTER EVERY FOUR PLUS TWO MEETING IF THESE BECAME TOO FREQUENT.

CSCE

12. KASTRUP SAID WE SHOULD PRESENT THE RESULT OF THE FOUR PLUS TWO MEETINGS TO THE CSCE SUMMIT BUT WE SHOULD NOT SEEK ITS APPROVAL AS SUCH. WESTON SAID THAT IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT THAT

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WHATEVER WAS REPORTED TO THE CSCE SUMMIT SHOULD BE GENERALLY AGREED BY THE FOUR PLUS TWO AS A WHOLE. WE DID NOT WANT PARTICIPANTS SPEAKING THERE DISCORDANTLY. DUFOURCQ SUGGESTED A DECLARATION OF THE 35 AT THE SUMMIT WELCOMING AND TAKING NOTE OF WHAT HAD BEEN AGREED BY THE FOUR PLUS TWO.

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INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, PARIS, UKDEL NATO, MOSCOW, BMG BERLIN
INFO IMMEDIATE EAST BERLIN

GERMAN UNIFICATION: MEETING OF POLITICAL DIRECTORS

1. POLITICAL DIRECTORS OF THE UK, US, FRANCE AND THE FRG MET IN LONDON ON 28 FEBRUARY TO DISCUSS GERMANY AND BERLIN IN THE CONTEXT OF THE DECISIONS MADE AT OTTAWA. THE US WAS REPRESENTED BY ZOELICK AND SEITZ.

2. MY 7 IFTS REPORT DISCUSSION OF:

- A) THE FOUR PLUS TWO
- B) MILITARY ASPECTS
- C) POLISH BORDER
- D) PEACE TREATY/SETTLEMENT
- E) LEGAL ASPECTS
- F) FOUR POWER STATUS
- G) BERLIN ELECTIONS

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