



File 1 (A-B)
cc/FOREIGN/GERMANY2. MEM
cc PC

10 DOWNING STREET

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From the Private Secretary

1 March 1990

SUBJECT CC MASTER

GERMANY

The Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary took stock this evening of developments over Germany. Their assessment was that our views and policies are gaining ground: but a great deal of work remains to be done.

They agreed that Chancellor Kohl's visit to Camp David had gone quite well, in the sense that he had re-affirmed Germany's commitment to NATO and had been put under some pressure on the issue of the Polish border. But there appeared to have been little discussion of future security arrangements for East Germany: and generally the Americans were a bit too easily pleased with rather vague commitments by the Germans.

Looking ahead, the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary identified the following tasks:

- we needed to work out in greater detail our own ideas on security arrangements for East Germany. It made no sense for the FRG to take over the GDR and make no plans for its defence (which seemed to be Genscher's position). Once we had a clear view, we should put it forward in the Four plus Two group;
- we needed to give thought to the EC Heads of Government meeting on 28 April, in particular how we could avoid a bounce on an IGC or institutional questions. One way would be to insist that COREPER and the Council should draw up and agree an annotated agenda in advance. This should be pursued by the Foreign Secretary next week. The key decision which we should seek at the 28 April meeting would be to establish a clear framework for negotiations on the GDR's absorption into the EC;
- we also needed to give careful thought to the Anglo-German Summit at the end of March and particularly to the handling of the press conference. It might be worthwhile trying to agree in advance on the line which the Prime Minister and Chancellor Kohl would use on unification and its

consequences at the press conference (on the model of the agreed line on SNF at the Frankfurt Summit). It would also be helpful to have Herr Teltschik over to No. 10 to prepare the Summit (although he would probably find it difficult to leave Bonn around the time of the GDR elections);

- the Foreign Secretary would let the Prime Minister have as soon as possible some further thoughts on how the CSCE framework might be developed.

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