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022312
MDHOAN 4288

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FM FCO

TO DESKBY 030700Z MOSCOW

TELNO 328

OF 021940Z MARCH 90

AND TO DESKBY 030900Z BONN

AND TO DESKBY 030900Z BMG BERLIN

AND TO DESKBY 030900Z EAST BERLIN

AND TO DESKBY 030900Z PARIS

AND TO DESKBY 022100Z WASHINGTON

not A rather curious
message. It seems to
indicate concern on the
part of the Russians that
West troops in East
Germany may be involved in
incidents immediately after

GERMANY: MESSAGE FROM SHEVARDNADZE TO SECRETARY OF STATE.

1. THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR CALLED ON WESTON LATE ON 2 MARCH TO DELIVER
THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE (UNOFFICIAL SOVIET EMBASSY TRANSLATION)

QUOTE

DEAR SECRETARY OF STATE,

FURTHER TO OUR AGREEMENT TO CREATE QUOTE TWO PLUS FOUR UNQUOTE

MECHANISM I WOULD LIKE TO POSE THE FOLLOWING SUGGESTIONS.

ONE CANNOT EXCLUDE THAT UNFORESEEN CIRCUMSTANCES, WHICH WILL
CALL FOR A REACTION, MIGHT ARISE IN CONNECTION WITH THE
FORTHCOMING ELECTIONS IN THE GDR.

IN MY VIEW, IT IS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT THAT NONE OF THE
PARTICIPANTS OF OUR QUOTE SIX UNQUOTE WOULD ACT IN THESE CONDITIONS
IN A UNILATERAL MANNER, WITHOUT NOTIFYING OTHER MEMBERS OF HIS
INTENTIONS AND WITHOUT CONSULTING OTHERS.

I WOULD SUGGEST THE FOLLOWING PROCEDURE: THE SIDE, WHICH IS
AFFECTED BY THESE POSSIBLE UNFORESEEN CIRCUMSTANCES, WILL
REQUEST AN URGENT MEETING OF THE QUOTE SIX'S UNQUOTE AMBASSADORS
IN ITS CAPITAL. UNLESS IT RECEIVES A CONSENT FOR SUCH A MEETING
WITHIN MAXIMUM 12 HOURS AFTER REQUESTING IT, THIS SIDE GETS
FREEDOM OF ACTIONS IN REPLY TO THAT SITUATION, WHILE INFORMING
SIMULTANEOUSLY ABOUT ITS ACTIONS OTHER MEMBERS OF THE QUOTE SIX
UNQUOTE.

OBVIOUSLY, THE SPEEDIEST MEANS OF COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN US
WOULD BE USED IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES.

I BELIEVE THAT MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING ON THAT ACCOUNT WOULD
INTRODUCE A CERTAIN STABILISING ELEMENT INTO OUR FUTURE
CO-OPERATION AND INTERACTION. OTHERWISE WE MIGHT FIND OURSELVES
IN A COMPLICATED SITUATION, AS UNDESIRABLE MISUNDERSTANDINGS
COULD BECOME POSSIBLE.

I AM MAKING THE SAME SUGGESTION TO OUR COLLEAGUES IN WASHINGTON,

*the elections. He (Ambassador)
is coming to see me
later
this
week.
Cdr.*

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PARIS, BONN AND BERLIN.
I COUNT ON YOUR AND THEIR SUPPORT ON THAT METTER.
YOURS RESPECTFULLY,
E. SHEVARDNADZE
UNQUOTE

2. WESTON MADE NO SUBSTANTIVE COMMENT ON THE MESSAGE BUT ASKED
WHAT LAY BEHIND IT. ZAMYATIN, STRESSING THAT HE WAS SPEAKING
PERSONALLY, HINTED THAT THE MESSAGE REFLECTED CONCERN ABOUT
SOVIET TROOPS IN THE GDR BUT HE REFUSED TO BE DRAWN FURTHER

HURD

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ADDITIONAL

13

PAGE 2

BERLIN/INNER-GERMAN (WIDE) CONFIDENTIAL

PS/NO 10.

NNNN

Dear Charles,
We'll be much obliged
if you can provide
us with a copy of the
message, sent to Moscow.
N.H.

Unofficial translation

COA 573.

"Dear Secretary of State,

Further to our agreement to create "two plus four" mechanism I would like to pose the following suggestions.

One cannot exclude that unforeseen circumstances, which will call for a reaction, might arise in connection with the forthcoming elections in the GDR.

In my view, it is extremely important that none of the participants of our "six" would act in these conditions in a unilateral manner, without notifying other members of his intentions and without consulting others.

I would suggest the following procedure: the side, which is affected by these possible unforeseen circumstances, will request an urgent meeting of the "six's" Ambassadors in its capital. Unless it receives a consent for such a meeting within maximum 12 hours after requesting it, this side gets freedom of actions in reply to that situation, while informing simultaneously about its actions other members of the "six".

Obviously, the speediest means of communications between us would be used in such circumstances.

I believe that mutual understanding on that account would introduce a certain stabilising element into our future co-operation and interaction. Otherwise we might find ourselves in a complicated situation, as undesirable misunderstandings could become possible.

I am making the same suggestion to our colleagues in Washington, Paris, Bonn and Berlin.

I count on your and their support on that matter.

Yours respectfully,

E. Shevardnadze"