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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

2 March 1990

Dear Charles,

German Unification: NATO and Security Aspects

The Foreign Secretary undertook to send the Prime Minister papers which have been written here as part of the follow-up to the Chequers seminar in January on the security implications of German unification.

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I enclose two papers. The first, on "German unification: Security Implications", anticipates questions which the Russians may raise in the Two plus Four talks and suggests what line the Western representatives in the talks should take in response. The second, "The Defence of a Unified Germany", sets out the issues that arise if NATO is to take on the obligation to defend the former GDR as part of a united Germany, and suggests what our objectives should be in discussions with the Germans and other Allies.

The papers will need further work. The MOD are working on their own papers on the military aspects.

I am copying this letter to Simon Webb (MOD) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Yours,
Stephen Wall

(J S Wall)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

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GERMAN UNIFICATION: SECURITY IMPLICATIONS

1. Soon after the GDR elections on 18 March discussions will begin among representatives of the two German states and the four powers with special responsibility for Germany on the security and external aspects of German unification.
2. There is as yet no specific agenda for the talks; nor any indication of what particular topics the Russian and/or the GDR representatives may wish to raise. The two key issues for the West are likely to be that a unified Germany must remain in NATO, albeit subject to some special status in relation to part of its territory, and that Soviet forces should leave the GDR after a [finite] or undefined transitional period. Some of the problems, both internal and external, which might arise in relation to membership of a unified Germany in NATO are addressed in a separate paper.
3. But in addition to querying the desirability/acceptability of NATO membership as such the Soviet Union may raise a number of other security-related issues. Among them are:-
 - (i) The position of Soviet forces in the GDR: would they remain there, if so, for how long, in what numbers and under what conditions?
 - (ii) Would the Soviet Union retain any residual military rights in Germany?
 - (iii) What would be the future level and composition of the armed forces of the new, unified German state?
 - (iv) What non-German forces would be stationed on the territory of a new, unified German state? Where, in what numbers and with what equipment?
 - (v) Would a new, unified German state be entitled to possess nuclear (or biological or chemical) weapons?

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(vi) Would non-German nuclear weapons be present on the territory of the new, unified German state?

(vii) In what framework and/or through what legal instrument would all these issues be addressed or regulated?

4. The purpose of this paper is to suggest a line which representatives of the three Western powers and of the FRG might take in response to these questions. The aim is to offer a means of providing the Soviet Union with adequate re-assurances in respect of its legitimate security concerns (concerns which may in some measure be shared by some of Germany's other Eastern neighbours); while at the same time not prejudicing essential Western security requirements. In most cases the response proposed can only be provisional. Some of the questions likely to be raised by the Soviet Union go to the heart of the Alliance's current strategy; and there is as yet no clear view within the Alliance - nor even do we have one nationally - on how that strategy should evolve in the light of changed circumstances; and what the consequences of such evolution might be for force structure and deployments, forward defence, flexible response and arms control.

5. It will be important to establish at the outset an agreed line among the four, so that all including the Germans take a robust position during the initial phase of the 2 + 4 negotiations - which will be tactical and interrogative rather than substantive. The US envisage playing things the same way. Our aim should be to concentrate in the 2 + 4 on the issues of four power rights, the status of the GDR and Berlin, and ~~not~~ to negotiate on the wider security issues covered in this paper (although it may be necessary to agree with the Russians in the 2 + 4 guidelines for future negotiations).

But we
must
an agreed
position on
this

Delete
not.

FUTURE OF SOVIET FORCES IN THE FORMER GDR

6. In 1988 the Soviet Union had some 380,000 forces stationed in the GDR, along with 80,000 in Czechoslovakia, 65,000 in Hungary and 40,000 in Poland. These figures are already in decline as a result of unilateral reductions undertaken by the Soviet Union and pressure

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from Czechoslovakia and Hungary. Under the terms of the prospective CFE Treaty the Soviet Union will be limited to 195,000 stationed forces in Central Europe (and that all other Soviet forces withdrawn from Eastern Europe will have to be demobilised). It seems almost certain that within the next couple of years Soviet forces will withdraw completely from Czechoslovakia and Hungary. As regards Poland the situation is less clear. Some Poles still see a Soviet military presence on their territory as a desirable insurance against possible political and military developments in Germany - or as a lever to secure a treaty on the Polish/German border.

7. It is fundamental to the Western approach to security that foreign forces should only be present on the territory of another state on the basis of an agreement freely entered into by a democratically elected government of the state concerned. It is most improbable that any German government would voluntarily want a Soviet military presence on its territory other than for a transitional period. And indeed it is hard to see how in the long run such a presence could be justified or organised. There are precedents for a Soviet military presence in Europe on the territory of countries not belonging to the Warsaw Pact, namely the base which the Russians maintained at Porkkala in Finland until 1956 and their maintenance of military forces in Austria until 1955. But in each case the circumstances of the Soviet military presence related to the terms of the settlement of the Second World War and the Russians voluntarily relinquished their rights in due course. In regard to a united Germany, which would not have any Treaty of Alliance with the Soviet Union and whose armed forces would be integrated within an alliance of which the Soviet Union itself was not a member, no viable argument for a permanent Soviet military presence (except perhaps as a liaison mission: see paras 13/14 below) could be adduced.

8. The retention of such a presence for a limited, transitional period is however another matter. There is a strong case, on three main grounds, for accepting such an arrangement. Firstly, for practical reasons: it would not be physically possible for the Soviet Union instantly to absorb such a large number of troops back on its own territory, over and above the massive reductions in its

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armed forces which will anyway accrue from a CFE Treaty. Secondly in order not to humiliate the Soviet Union: it will be important, in negotiating the security aspects of German unification, not to repeat in relation to the Soviet Union the mistakes made in relation to Germany under the Treaty of Versailles: namely to exploit political weakness in order to impose terms which give rise subsequently to resentment and grievance. It would not be in our interest for the Soviet Union's leadership, and in particular its military leadership, to regard the outcome of the 2 + 4 negotiations as a political defeat at the hands of the West.

9. The length of such a transition period will be a function of what the Soviet Union may demand and what the unified German domestic market will bear. Anything under 3 years would probably be impossible on practical grounds; anything over 10 unacceptable politically. 5 years might be a median period (possibly with a further change of status after the bulk of Soviet forces had been withdrawn in the first 2-3 years). But if the East German population started to make life difficult for Soviet forces, they might well decide to go more quickly.

10. It would also be necessary to establish a legal framework for the continued presence of Soviet forces after the relinquishment of quadripartite rights; and agreement on what sort of activities they would be allowed to undertake. This legal framework will probably have to be a bilateral one with the new German government. As regards the activities of Soviet forces, they would have to remain under Soviet national command. Most of the ground forces involved are stationed in discrete and self-contained barracks and training areas whose temporary retention exclusively for Soviet use might be feasible. For aircraft the position, as regards air traffic control, might be more complex.

11. Other issues which would arise in relation to such a transitional period could include:-

- would it be phased, ie with agreed and verified interim ceilings for Soviet force levels?

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- what constraints would apply to Soviet activities out of barracks and to Soviet military aircraft?
-
- who would be responsible for the protection of Soviet forces in the event of violent incidents as the result of hostility from the local population?
The police aided by whom? Will Germany have armed police when possible
- Would the armed forces of the new German state be present (and if so in what numbers) on former GDR territory, along with Soviet forces, during the transitional period? (This issue is addressed in the separate paper on Germany and NATO).
- Would Soviet forces be permitted to retain nuclear weapons?
- The implications for the CFE Treaty.

12. Suggested response:-

- Permanent Soviet military presence not compatible with political reality or with German membership of NATO. Legitimate Soviet security concerns can be satisfied by other means.
- But willing to contemplate transitional period (up to 5 years) during which an agreed level of Soviet forces will remain.
- Details and conditions to be negotiated.
- No nuclear weapons with Soviet forces in the GDR during the transitional period.

SOVIET RESIDUAL MILITARY RIGHTS

This would really mean a Peace Treaty

13. It is axiomatic that the unification of Germany must involve the relinquishment by the 4 former occupying powers of those quadripartite rights, in respect both of Berlin and of Germany as a whole, which derive from the Second World war. It is possible however that the Soviet Union may ask for some continuing form of

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special liaison mission in Germany, either in relation to Germany as a whole or in relation to the former territory of the GDR. It is hard to see what practical value there would be to the Russians in such a mission, given that the CFE Treaty, and the Open Skies and CSBM agreements, will provide ample opportunities for the inspection of force levels and the observation of military activities. But the Russians may see it as having some symbolic value as an indication that they will have some vestigial special interest in German affairs.

14. The Germans are unlikely to be enamoured of anything that smacks of Soviet occupation rights. But if the function of such a mission was related to the implementation of a CFE treaty (which will involve a high level of inspection activity on German territory), and provided that the granting of the right to operate the mission was the responsibility solely of the German Government, they might not in the end object. Among the issues which would arise in relation to it would be:-

- What exactly would it do?
- How would it relate to the CFE treaty inspection regime (and to the CSBM observation and evaluation provisions)?
- Would it operate throughout Germany or only in the former GDR? Would there be an equivalent organisation in Poland?
- What liaison rights, if any, would it have vis à vis non-German forces on German territory?

15. Suggested response:-

- Is this of real political importance for the Soviet Union?
- Why privilege the Soviet Union and singularise Germany in this way? *for obvious reasons*
- What exactly do you have in mind?
- Willing to contemplate the idea of a military liaison mission

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accredited to the new German government, at least while Soviet forces are in the GDR. Modalities to be negotiated bilaterally.

SIZE OF GERMANY'S ARMED FORCES

16. The Soviet Union will be likely to insist that if it is to withdraw completely from the GDR it must receive assurances about the future size of the armed forces of a new unified German state. Others of Germany's neighbours are likely to have similar concerns. Even within NATO there will be misgivings about the creation of a political imbalance if the new Bundeswehr occupies too prominent a role in the integrated military organisation. Limits on German armament (freely entered into by the then government of the FRG) were a feature of the legal instrument (the Modified Brussels Treaty of 1954) through which Germany entered as a full member into Western defence arrangements. It would not be unreasonable for limits (albeit of a different kind) to be part of the deal whereby German unification is finally achieved.

17. There are both military and political aspects to the issue. In military terms it will be necessary to set the limits at levels which:-

- on the one hand correspond to NATO's collective requirement to have forces available to meet our objective assessment of the threat posed by the Soviet Union's residual, reduced but still potent military capability;
- on the other hand do not constitute a national capability which could be perceived as threatening by any of Germany's Eastern neighbours or politically de-stabilising within NATO itself.

18. At the political level there is unlikely to be any fundamental German unwillingness to accept some form of limitation on the new Bundeswehr. The German perception of the threat to their national security is unlikely to be such as to make them reluctant to

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contemplate further cuts on the size of their armed forces beyond those which will come from the prospective CFE Treaty. On the contrary: the Germans are the most enthusiastic proponents of the need for further arms control, and further reductions of conventional forces in Europe; and there is a public expectation in Germany that unification will necessarily be accompanied by further such reductions.

19. The Germans will however be sensitive to anything which smacks of singularisation, ie measures which appear to impose upon Germany alone, or upon the Central Region alone, an arms control regime which would not apply elsewhere. This was a major source of German discontent during the years of the MBFR talks and has been a feature of their approach to CFE. They are therefore likely to argue that any limitations on the size of the new Bundeswehr should be part of a package which would include national limitations on the forces of other European countries as well.

20. It may well be that we would be prepared to accept, in parallel with limits on the Bundeswehr, specific limitations on Western forces stationed on German territory. But what we should avoid is the acceptance, as a price for German unification, of limitations on British forces on British territory. If we are ever to accept limitations of this kind we should do so for wider security reasons, not simply for German-related ones. The French are likely to have a similar concern.

21. The United States have already accepted, within the context of the CFE, a ^{floor} limit of 195,000 on their manpower in the Central Region. A lowering of this level as part of an agreement whereby Soviet forces withdraw eventually back to the territory of the Soviet Union itself would almost certainly be acceptable, indeed even welcome, to the United States. As regards the Russians, they would no doubt argue that their forces in Europe are subject to the application of the 30% sufficiency rule in CFE. Whether in the context of German unification they would be prepared to accept a further, lower, figure for their armed forces it is difficult to predict. They might argue that their complete withdrawal back to their national territory is by itself a sufficient gesture. We

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should not accept this.

22. As regards the level at which the limitation on German armed forces might be set, the armed forces of the FRG currently total 450,000 men, 5,200 tanks, 2,500 artillery pieces, 3,000 armoured combat vehicles and 775 combat aircraft. As a result of the re-structuring of the Bundeswehr, and of the impact on Germany of the prospective CFE Treaty, these figures are anyway likely over the next two to three years to go down to 400,000 men, 4,200 tanks, 2,200 artillery pieces, 2,500 armoured combat vehicles and 650 combat aircraft. The Russians however will be likely to demand a figure lower still than this in return for their assent to unification. From a Soviet perspective, a Germany armed with, say, 200,000 men, 2,000 tanks, 1,000 artillery pieces, 1,500 armoured combat vehicles and 350 aircraft (ie reduced by about half from its present size) might be an attractive security goal. Whether levels of around this order of magnitude would be compatible with NATO's own collective security requirements in the new situation would require further study.

23. Suggested response:-

- willing to contemplate specific limitations on the armed forces of a united Germany as part of overall agreement on future levels of all forces in the central zone including the Western military districts.

STATIONED FORCES IN A UNITED GERMANY

24. The Soviet Union will almost certainly demand that the complete withdrawal of Soviet forces from the former territory of the GDR should be accompanied by the complete withdrawal of all Western stationed forces from the territory of the former FRG. A number of Soviet representatives have already spoken in this sense. Even if they eventually soften this position, they are likely to argue for the withdrawal of all non-US stationed forces (on the grounds that the distance from which such forces might hypothetically have to come in order to re-inforce Germany is no greater than the distance which Soviet forces would have been

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withdrawn).

25. The West German reaction to such demands is difficult to predict. Hitherto some German government spokesmen have argued in favour of the need for a continued presence of US forces on German territory. They have conspicuously failed however to argue in public the case for the retention of British and French forces; and there will be many Germans who will view the presence of non-US forces on their territory as, at most, a desirable adjunct, rather than a security prerequisite. The perception of the United Kingdom as the ally least in sympathy with German unification and may mean that the Germans will be less inclined, if push came to shove, to argue the case for the retention of BAOR. The creation of a more multinational NATO force in Europe might however make stationed forces more attractive to German opinion.

26. The retention of US stationed forces on German territory at levels which are more than just cosmetic is a vital security requirement for the United Kingdom. As regards other stationed forces, it would be politically useful, as a demonstration of the common interest and cohesion of NATO, for the Dutch, Belgians and Canadians to remain. This will also be useful if we are to pursue multinational NATO forces. But in military terms the Canadian presence is tiny; the Dutch deploy few of their forces forward in peacetime (they rely on rapid re-inforcement in crisis or war); and if the Belgians decided to move most or all of their 26,000 forces back across the Belgian frontier, the impact in military terms would not be catastrophic.

27. The question of British and French forces in Germany raises a variety of political, economic and military issues, a full discussion of which would go beyond the scope of this paper. Among them are:-

- Would it be, in the long run, politically sustainable in the United States for the US alone to station forces on German territory?
- What would be the practical consequences and penalties (in

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terms eg of accommodation and training) of removing significant numbers of British forces from the FRG. What would this mean for the overall structure of our army?

- What would be the consequence for British political influence in Europe of the complete withdrawal, or reduction beyond a certain level, of BAOR and RAF Germany? Should the continued presence of British forces in Germany be linked to that of France?

28. The Soviet Union will be likely to press, at a minimum, for significant reductions in British and French (as well as American) forces on German territory as a price for the eventual complete withdrawal of Soviet forces in the GDR; and German public opinion would consider such reductions both justifiable and desirable. It is difficult to speculate on what levels of forces the Soviet Union might be prepared to accept. A figure of 100,000 for US forces seems to be gaining some currency in Washington. A proportionate level for British and French forces might in that case be 25 - 30,000. The establishment of genuinely multinational NATO forces would make these levels more acceptable to German opinion.

29. Suggested response:-

- Willing to accept limits on Western stationed forces in Germany in context of complete Soviet withdrawal from GDR.
- But such levels must reflect a continued requirement on political and military grounds for a significant American and European presence.

GERMAN POSSESSION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

30. For the Soviet Union the permanent German renunciation of nuclear weapons, as well as biological and chemical weapons, is an over-riding security interest. Soviet spokesmen in the past have implied that German acquisition of such weapons would be a casus belli in Europe. Both the FRG and the GDR have forsworn the possession of these weapons in a number of international instruments

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of which the most significant are the Modified Brussels Treaty of 1954 in the case of the FRG; and the Non-Proliferation Treaty in the case of both the FRG and the GDR.

31. It is envisaged that a unified Germany would remain a party to both these Treaties. Nonetheless, the Modified Brussels Treaty, to which the Soviet Union is in any case not a party, has a specific expiry date; and the Non-Proliferation Treaty has a withdrawal clause. The Soviet Union will be likely to argue that in the context of re-unification a new legal framework, with no provision for withdrawal or termination, is required and that the Soviet Union must be a party to it.

32. This would be a reasonable demand, comprehensible to German public opinion, which any German government would be likely to be disposed to accept. The issue would essentially be a choice of legal framework. If the Soviet Union could not be persuaded to accept that the affirmation by the unified Germany of its WEU and NPT obligations was sufficient, other options would be:-

- (i) the new constitution of a unified Germany;
- (ii) the legal treaty (assuming that one is required) through which the four occupying powers gave up their quadripartite rights;
- (iii) a Soviet/German treaty under which the Soviet Union would undertake to withdraw its forces from the GDR according to an agreed timescale (and, perhaps, acquire the right to a Military Liaison Mission);
- (iv) a multilateral arms control treaty (see paragraphs 37-40 below) imposing a range of military obligations in respect of force levels in and around Central Europe;
- (v) a multilateral treaty among the 35 within the CSCE framework.

33. Suggested response

- It is for a united German government to decide how the commitment of the FRG and the GDR not to acquire nuclear weapons

(I doubt whether the USSR would take kindly to such a push in view of past experience)

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should be reaffirmed.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON GERMAN TERRITORY

34. The Russians are also likely to demand that no nuclear weapons be present on German soil. Such a commitment could be part of a general call for the de-nuclearisation of Europe; or - more likely on the basis of current Soviet attitudes - the contention that, though some continuing framework of nuclear deterrence in Europe is acceptable, the presence of nuclear weapons on German territory in circumstances where there are no Soviet forces on any of the countries immediately adjacent to Germany is anomalous and unjustifiable.

35. If the Russians made clear that the de-nuclearisation of Germany is really the bottom line of their demands in respect of German unification, then the bulk of German public opinion is likely to be sympathetic. Although it is difficult to predict what will be the composition of a democratically elected leadership in the GDR, rejection of nuclear weapons is likely to feature prominently among its policies. The churches in the GDR, influential in the process of reform, have taken a strong public stand on this issue. Even those Germans who have hitherto supported the doctrine of, and accepted the practical consequences of, nuclear deterrence, will find it hard to resist the pressure of public opinion: not least since objectively there will have been such a dramatic change in the East-West conventional force balance and in the capabilities of the Soviet Union for surprise attack or offensive action. In any analysis of the Alliance's deterrence requirements in the new situation, the need for nuclear systems of shorter range geared to battlefield targetting will be much reduced.

36. Separate consideration is in hand within the FCO and MOD of how NATO might sustain deterrence in Europe even without the presence of nuclear weapons on German territory. Judgements however will inevitably reflect in the end what is politically attainable rather than what can be shown to be objectively necessary. It would clearly be desirable, if only on grounds of risk- and burden-sharing, for there to be some nuclear weapons on the

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territory of a united Germany. On the other hand, it cannot be proved that the credibility of extended deterrence would be fatally eroded without this, provided that nuclear weapons were present elsewhere in Europe, and that US forces stayed in Europe on that basis. In circumstances where German territory was no longer the front line, the problem posed by its de-nuclearisation would be not so much the loss of targetting coverage and/or survivability, but rather the example of burden-shedding by the Germans and the risk of contamination elsewhere within the Alliance. It seems unlikely that the Dutch or the Italians would be prepared to retain nuclear weapons on their territory even after they had disappeared from Germany.

37. On the assumption that the Russians press their demand for the removal of all nuclear weapons from a unified Germany, we shall need to decide whether to try to persuade our Western Allies to insist that this is an issue to be dealt with in the SNF negotiations (and run the risk of not being able in the long run to carry the Germans with us); or whether to offer some concession in the hope of establishing early on in the negotiation a position around which a consensus might emerge. In the latter case, the only realistic option would be to offer, at the time of the completion of Soviet withdrawal from the GDR, to remove LANCE missiles and nuclear artillery. This would leave air delivered systems in place; but we would no doubt face in due course difficulties, both internally and vis à vis the Soviet Union, if we try to upgrade these air delivered capabilities by introducing a tactical air-to-surface missile. Since such a missile will be all the more important for NATO in the absence of land-based systems, the option of trying to cut a deal with the Russians on nuclear matters in the Four Plus Two context seems dangerous and inadvisable.

38. Suggested response:-

- Willing to discuss limits on types of land-based nuclear systems which would be deployed in Germany as part of SNF negotiations after a CFE treaty has begun to be implemented.

We need
minimum
deterrence.

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FRAMEWORK FOR FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS

39. It is unlikely that all of the issues in (i) - (vii) of paragraph 3 above could be resolved in the course of the 2 + 4 negotiations themselves. Indeed, in some instances it will be an objective of Western policy to ensure that resolution of them is postponed until a subsequent stage. The Russians, by contrast, will no doubt press for as specific commitments as they can extract. In some areas, eg in relation to the future size of the Bundeswehr and/or the future levels of stationed forces in Germany, they are likely at a minimum to insist on a clear understanding and timetable for a negotiation at which such general undertakings as the Allies might be prepared to offer in the 2 + 4 talks would be translated into specific treaty commitments. They might decline to agree to any specific limit to the transitional period for the retention of Soviet forces in the former GDR other than in the context of this negotiation.

40. There are a number of options for participation in such a negotiation. They will need to be analysed separately. But, as seen from today's perspective, the following considerations should affect the choice:-

- A framework of 23, based on parity between the two alliances is inappropriate. Bloc to bloc equality is no longer a desirable or viable arms control instrument.
- In any case experience in the CFE talks has shown that it is difficult to encompass within a East-West security negotiation states such as Greece or Turkey whose security concerns are different from those of allies in the Central region.
- A forum of 35 (or 34), though it might have a role to play as an overall framework/umbrella, would be too large and unwieldy for the purpose of negotiating limits on force levels geared specifically to the security aspects of German unification.
- Successful arms control, post-CFE, is likely to be based on negotiating structures limited to those countries who have

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direct interest in the subject matter. In the case of the security aspects of German unification those countries are; on the Western side Germany, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg and perhaps, Denmark and Canada; and on the Eastern side the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia and perhaps Hungary. It is the forces of these countries in Central Europe which might potentially be subject to further limitation.

41. This suggests that a desirable outcome of the 2 + 4 talks would be agreement to establish a new negotiating forum, limited to the countries of Central Europe, and geared to the negotiation of limitations upon the forces in that area and in that area alone (the precise delineation of Soviet territory for this purpose would be for consideration: at a minimum, the three Western Military Districts would need to be included). Any negotiation on nuclear weapons in Germany would need to be conducted in a separate forum.

42. Of course, other countries, notably within the Alliance, could justifiably claim a security interest in force levels in Central Europe. It would be particularly necessary to take account of the views and susceptibilities of Allies not directly involved in the central area. It may well also be desirable to relate such a negotiation to a wider arms control context, in practise the CSCE/35 framework.

43. Suggested response:-

- Prepared to address some of the issues involved in 2 + 4 talks themselves. But not realistic to hope to resolve all of them in detail.
- One possibility for dealing with issues not settled in the 2 + 4 would be to establish a new negotiating forum limited to countries with forces in and around Germany to address question of future force levels. But we would wish to consult our allies about the acceptability of this.
- Such a forum would need to be related to wider CSCE framework:

perhaps as a sub-group (on analogy of current 23:35
relationship) to Vienna II negotiation on CSBMs.

SECURITY POLICY DEPARTMENT
FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

1 MARCH 1990

THE DEFENCE OF A UNIFIED GERMANY

1. There is general agreement in NATO that a unified Germany should remain a member of NATO, and that some special security arrangements will apply in the territory of the former GDR, to reassure the Soviet Union.
2. Our preferred model has been that NATO (or Germany) would voluntarily forswear the deployment of non-German forces in peacetime on the territory of the former GDR, but that some units of the German armed forces not assigned to NATO would be based there, to provide a measure of deterrence/defence, and a framework which could be filled out by NATO forces deploying forward in time of tension or Transition-to- War. Other Allies, including the US, France and at least some members of the Federal Government, shared this approach. But the Genscher/ Stoltenberg statement of 19 February that no Bundeswehr units, whether assigned to NATO or not, would be based in the former GDR, appears to foreclose that option (although it may leave open the option of basing German forces not part of the Bundeswehr).
3. As a result, there is considerable uncertainty about how in practice the former GDR would be defended. This paper considers the questions that arise in two stages. First, there are a number of crucial issues of NATO planning that need to be resolved between the Allies (the Russians will need subsequently to be informed, but not consulted, about them). Secondly, there are issues that will need to be negotiated with the Soviet Union in the Two Plus Four Structure.
4. We have not yet reached firm judgements on the military aspects - the MOD are working urgently on a paper on the military implications of a number of models for defending the GDR. But given the pace of events we need to use the next round of Allied contacts to probe German thinking and to bring home to them (if possible with US and French support) that the choices made about security arrangements in the former GDR carry implications for the defence NATO can provide, and therefore need to be made in conjunction with Allies. The following paragraphs provide material for this.

ISSUES FOR AGREEMENT WITHIN NATO

- (i) Will Articles V and VI of the North Atlantic Treaty apply to the former GDR, including Berlin?

These articles define the territorial scope of the mutual defence commitment.

- If they will apply to the former GDR, then NATO collectively has responsibility for defending this territory from aggression. In that case the constraints on military activities in the territory in peacetime should not be so severe as to rule out implementing an effective defence in war.
- If they will not apply, what does membership of NATO by a unified Germany mean in practice? The most vulnerable part of its territory, including quite possibly its capital, would be excluded from the NATO Treaty area. But in reality NATO would still have some moral obligation to come to the aid of a NATO member if attacked, without the opportunity to prepare for this in peacetime. A highly ambiguous, and therefore unstable, outcome.

Preferred outcome: Clear statement by the FRG that Articles V and VI of the Treaty will apply to the former GDR (and recognition that this has consequences for other aspects of security arrangements - see below).

- (ii) What German forces will be based there in peacetime?

Following the Genscher/Stoltenberg statement, the basing of Bundeswehr units, whether assigned to NATO or not, appears to be ruled out. Yet the statement also rejected demilitarisation of the former GDR. Apart from Soviet Forces, which are likely to remain there for a generous transitional period, what forces will be based there? Possibilities:

*Transition
Period during
which they do
NOT apply
under terms
violated - crown
minimum
defence in
West Germany
to prevent effects on
GDR*

Territorialheer: Bundeswehr forces not assigned to NATO. Territorially-based, but, unlike the British TA, not part of the main Army Structure. The FMOD had been envisaging using these units as the core of defence arrangements in peacetime. But they are part of the Bundeswehr so are they ruled out?

- Bundesgrenzeschutz: (border security units). More heavily armed, subordinate to the Interior Ministry. Could they be developed into an effective security force?
- A revamped East German Volksarmee, separate from the Bundeswehr. But with what equipment? How would it be integrated with Allied forces in wartime?

Preferred outcome: German recognition that demilitarisation would be inconsistent with application of Articles V and VI of the Treaty, and that they need to spell out militarily credible arrangements they propose for a German military (or para-military) presence in the former GDR in peacetime.

(iii) Exercises

Would NATO forces (German and stationed) based in the Western part of Germany, and earmarked to deploy into the former GDR on transition to war, be permitted to exercise in the former GDR in peacetime? *Ne*

Defence of the former GDR would be more effective if forces earmarked for deployment could gain experience of the terrain, and exercise the command and central arrangements that would apply if the combined NATO forces and whatever German forces were permanently stationed there.

Preferred outcome: Realistically, NATO cannot expect to secure Soviet (? and German) acquiescence in large-scale field training exercises. But we should not give up the option of some on training areas and by prior notification

at least until military judgements about the need for exercises are clearer.

(iv) Pre-positioning of stockpiles

Stockpiling of ammunition, fuel and other supplies in the former GDR would permit a more effective defence of the whole territory of the former GDR.

Preferred outcome: Military advice is necessary on the extent of the military penalty that would be incurred if NATO forces had to deploy forward carrying with them all their logistic requirements. It might well make it impossible in certain scenarios to mount an effective defence of the whole of the former GDR. This too is therefore an option that should be kept open for the present.

(v) Aircraft

The Genscher/Stoltenberg statement does not address the deployment of Luftwaffe aircraft in the former GDR. If there is not to be a large gap at the centre of NATO's air defence system, it will be necessary for German aircraft to police the airspace of the former GDR in peacetime, with other Allied aircraft able to deploy there in Transition-to-War. It will therefore be important to have hardened airfields on a care and maintenance basis to receive them. As part of the air defence arrangements we should also seek to permit overflight by NATO AWACS aircraft in peacetime.

Preferred outcome: German Air Force to police airspace of former GDR in peacetime. Germans to maintain hardened airfields to receive German and other Allied combat aircraft in Transition-to-War. Right for AWACS to overfly former GDR.

(vi)

NATO's Operational Concept for Defending the Former GDR

How NATO sets about developing plans for defending the GDR will depend to a significant extent on the answers to the above questions. A distinctive feature of collective defence as practised so far by NATO has been that, whatever the position about the stationing of foreign forces in peacetime, by the time war breaks out there should be multinational NATO forces on the front line. It is then clear to an attacker that he is taking on the Alliance as a whole. This is the case, for example, in Northern Norway, where there are no stationed forces in peacetime, but plans to deploy NATO forces into the territory in Transition-to-War. If it helped the Germans, there may be scope for Allied Forces in the FRG to be integrated into multinational forces down to lower levels of command than the current Army Groups (work is in hand on this in the MOD).

This analysis underlines that Kohl and Genscher need to recognise that they face an important choice (Stoltenberg clearly does see this choice). If Articles V and VI of the North Atlantic Treaty are not to apply to the territory of the former GDR, NATO cannot be expected to maintain forces in the Western part of Germany earmarked for defence of the former GDR. The Germans would be consigning the citizens of this part of their country (including the capital) to second-class status in security terms. This is probably not sustainable politically and could spill over to affect security arrangements in the Western part of Germany as well.

If Articles V and VI are to apply, NATO will have to be in a position to carry out its responsibility to defend this part of Germany (including Berlin). That will require operational plans to deploy forces assigned to the Integrated Military Command into the territory. A CFE agreement, once implemented, will give NATO significantly greater warning time of Soviet preparations for an attack on the Central Front. But even allowing for that, an effective defence of the whole of German territory would require:

- plans for the deployment forward of German and Allied stationed forces assigned to the Integrated Military Structure. Precise operational concepts will need further study. But static defence at the Oder-Neisse line would not be feasible. There will be more emphasis on mobile forces, and trading space for time. Given that US and other force levels in Germany may fall further, reinforcement will be a key factor. Exercising reinforcement in the Western part of Germany will therefore remain necessary. One of the main choices the Germans face is that the more constraints they apply (particularly in the former GDR, but also in the West) on exercises, pre-positioning and other aspects of peacetime planning, the more space NATO would have to trade in war.
- Command arrangements to allow the effective integration of these forces with whatever screening force was deployed in the former GDR in peacetime. In practice, the whole of German territory would have to come under Allied Command Europe in Transition-to-War, and would form part of CINCENT's area.

Preferred outcome: German acceptance that if the former GDR is to be covered by Articles V and VI of the Treaty, NATO will need to develop operational plans to carry out that defence, and that this will not be feasible unless certain conditions are met.

(vii) Berlin

The future of the Allied garrisons is an issue to be resolved among the Allies in the first place (though it will then feed into wider consideration of Berlin aspects in the Two Plus Four Structure). There is an intelligence-related reason for keeping part of the garrison in Berlin for as long as Soviet forces remain in the former GDR. But the Allied garrisons at their present level (British garrison is about 3,000) would not alone be able to defend Berlin. If the Germans choose not to station Bundeswehr units in peacetime in the former

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GDR, the Allies have no interest of their own in retaining garrisons in Berlin in the longer term.

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ISSUES FOR NEGOTIATION WITH THE SOVIET UNION

- (i) The transitional arrangements for Soviet forces in the territory of the former GDR (covered in the separate paper).
- (ii) The future of the GDR armed forces. This is an issue that is bound to arise at an early stage in the Unification talks between the two Germanies after 18 March. The strength of the Volksarmee is nominally about 173,000 active duty personnel (92,000 of whom conscripts) although over a third are already working in the civilian economy. Some of their Soviet-supplied equipment is modern (Mig 29 aircraft, T72 tanks). The question of what to do with the manpower is primarily for Germans to resolve (the FMOD are reluctant to absorb officers, though willing to take some experienced NCOs; conscripts would simply be released). However, if the Germans chose to reconstitute the Volksarmee as a screening force in the former GDR, NATO would have a direct interest, since these forces would then be the core of the defence of the territory in war. The question will arise of how to dispose of the Soviet-supplied equipment owned by the Volksarmee. Some will in any case be destroyed as part of CFE reductions. Would the more modern items (eg Mig 29s) be sold back to the Soviet Union? There will be need to be some discussion with the Russians about the re-allocation of the former GDR's entitlements under CFE for Treaty Limited Equipment. This will be the subject of a separate paper.
- (iii) Forces in Berlin. Arrangements for the reduction/withdrawal of garrisons in Berlin will need to be discussed with the Soviet Union following Allied consultations.
- (iv) Nature of NATO's Undertaking about the special arrangements applying in the former GDR. Covered in more detail in the separate paper: the Soviet aim will be to make the undertaking as solemn, binding and internationally ratified as possible. NATO will want to maintain it as far as possible as a unilateral commitment applying in peacetime only, preserving NATO's flexibility to respond to in the face of aggression.


CONCLUSIONS

The priority for the next round of Allied Consultations should be to bring home to the Germans (if possible with support from the US and France) that there should be the fullest possible discussion with Allies before choices are made on security issues, since these choices entail consequences for NATO's commitment to defend the former GDR. Specifically, we should urge the Federal Government:

- (i) to recognise that, on the assumption that Articles V and VI of the North Atlantic Treaty apply to the territory of the former GDR, NATO will need to be in a position to make adequate arrangements to carry out its defence responsibilities. If the Germans choose to make unilateral concessions about military dispositions in the former GDR, they should recognise the consequences for the application of articles V and VI;
- (ii) to accept that, consistent with the undertaking that the territory will not be demilitarised, significant forces (however described) will be deployed there in peacetime. They should exploit the scope to interpret the Genscher/Stoltenberg statement narrowly so as to keep open the option of deploying either Territorialheer or Bundesgrenzschutz units, to serve as an initial screening force;
- (iii) to keep open the option of low-level exercises and pre-positioning of logistic supplies and ammunition in the former GDR;
- (iv) to agree that German aircraft would police the airspace of the former GDR in peacetime, with assistance of NATO AWACS aircraft, and that they should maintain hardened airfields for NATO use in war.

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- (v) to begin to think through with other Allies the implications for NATO force posture and command arrangements on the Western side.



Security Policy Department
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