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MODUK FOR PS/DEFENCE SECRETARY AND DUS(P)

FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

SECRETARY OF STATE'S MEETING WITH NATO SECRETARY GENERAL, 5 MARCH

SUMMARY

1. WOERNER WORRIED ABOUT POSSIBILITY OF SPD VICTORY IN GERMANY IN DECEMBER AND ANXIOUS TO SETTLE QUESTION ABOUT A UNIFIED GERMANY IN NATO SOON. SUGGESTS THAT AFTER UNIFICATION SECURITY OF FORMER GDR TERRITORY SHOULD BE IN HANDS OF AN EAST GERMAN TERRITORIAL ARMY WHICH, IN DUE COURSE, COULD MERGE WITH THE TERRITORIAL ARMY OF THE BUNDESWEHR (WHICH IS NOT (NOT) ASSIGNED TO NATO). CONCERNED THAT A PURELY MILITARY NATO WOULD DISINTEGRATE, GIVEN REDUCTION IN MILITARY THREAT AND, THEREFORE, THAT NATO SHOULD BE PUT TO GOOD USE AS FORUM FOR HIGH LEVEL POLITICAL DISCUSSION. HENCE HIS IDEA FOR EXTRA MEETING OF NATO FOREIGN MINISTERS, IN APRIL.

DETAIL

POSITION OF SPD

2. WOERNER SAID THAT LAFONTAINE WAS SEEKING AGREEMENT TO THE IDEA OF A UNITED GERMANY LEAVING NATO AS A PRE-CONDITION TO HIS CANDIDACY FOR CHANCELLOR IN THE DECEMBER ELECTIONS. THE SPD WAS SPLIT. SOME FAVOURED A UNITED GERMANY BEING IN NATO, SOME FAVOURED A LIMITED GERMANY IN NATO FOR A SHORT PERIOD, OR EVEN GERMANY IN BOTH NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT (WHICH WAS COMPLETE NONSENSE). LAFONTAINE CLAIMED TO FAVOUR A EUROPEAN DEFENCE COMMUNITY AND CLAIMED TO OPPOSE GERMAN NEUTRALITY. BUT IF HE TOOK GERMANY OUT OF THE ALLIANCE WHEN NO EUROPEAN DEFENCE COMMUNITY YET EXISTED, AND WAS NOT LIKELY FOR A DECADE OR MORE, THEN HIS PROFESSED OPPOSITION TO GERMAN NEUTRALITY

RANG HOLLOW.

3. WOERNER ASSESSED THAT LAFONTAINE WOULD PROBABLY WIN THE ARGUMENT WITHIN HIS PARTY. THE SECRETARY OF STATE THEN ASKED ABOUT BRANDT'S POSITION. WOERNER THOUGHT BRANDT WOULD NOT STICK UP FOR GERMAN MEMBERSHIP OF NATO BUT WOULD ARGUE INSTEAD FOR AN OVERALL EUROPEAN SECURITY STRUCTURE. HE AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE AGREED THAT THE POSSIBILITY OF A LAFONTAINE VICTORY IN DECEMBER UNDERLINED THE NEED FOR THE ALLIANCE TO SETTLE THE QUESTION OF GERMANY IN NATO AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

DEFENCE OF GDR TERRITORY

4. WOERNER HAD SPENT TWO HOURS WITH KOHL, AND SOME TIME WITH STOLTENBERG, ON 2 MARCH, KOHL WAS IN FAVOUR OF A UNITED GERMANY STAYING IN NATO AND VERY CLEAR THAT ARTICLES 5 AND 6 OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY SHOULD EXTEND TO WHAT WAS NOW GDR TERRITORY. ACCORDING TO KOHL, GENSCHER BELIEVED THIS TOO. WOERNER HAD WARNED AGAINST REFERRING TO THE QUOTE JURISDICTION UNQUOTE OR QUOTE TERRITORY UNQUOTE OF NATO NOT EXTENDING TO THE GDR. IT WAS SAFER TO SAY THAT NATO WOULD NOT EXPAND ITS MILITARY INTEGRATION INTO WHAT WAS NOW THE GDR.

5. WOERNER SAID THAT WHAT WAS NOW GDR TERRITORY COULD, IN A UNIFIED GERMANY, BE DEFENDED BY A VERSION OF THE NATIONALE VOLKSARMEE (NVA). THIS WOULD BE A TERRITORIAL FORCE, AND SOME DAY, - THOUGH THIS WAS ONLY HIS OWN THOUGHT - MERGE WITH THE TERRITORIAL FORCE IN THE BUNDESWEHR, WHICH WAS NOT (NOT) ASSIGNED TO NATO. GORBACHEV HAD PROBABLY NOT YET MADE UP HIS MIND ABOUT WHETHER SOME SUCH SOLUTION WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE, AND POSITIONS ESPOUSED BY OTHERS IN MOSCOW WERE PROBABLY LESS FIRM THAN THEY SOUNDED. WOERNER AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE AGREED THAT THE KEY QUESTION FOR MOSCOW WAS THE FUTURE OF THE SOVIET FORCES IN THE GDR, AND THAT THE NATO COUNTRIES' INTERESTS WOULD BE BEST SERVED BY ADOPTING A GENEROUS ATTITUDE. WOERNER'S PERSONAL VIEW WAS THAT MOSCOW SHOULD BE GIVEN UNTIL THE YEAR 2000 TO REMOVE ALL SOVIET TROOPS FROM THE GDR, ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT WITHDRAWALS IN THE EARLY YEARS OF THE RUN DOWN WOULD BE LARGE.

6. WOERNER SAID THAT IF WHAT WAS NOW THE GDR WAS ATTACKED THEN OF COURSE NATO FORCES WOULD COME INTO PLAY FOR ITS DEFENCE. BUT HE WOULD NOT (NOT) ADVOCATE NATO EXERCISES IN THE TERRITORY FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. THE PROSPECT OF SUCH EXERCISES WOULD BE TOO MUCH TO ASK OF GORBACHEV. HOWEVER, NATO MIGHT INCLUDE THE IDEA OF EXERCISES, OR SOME OTHER NEGOTIATING FAT, IN ITS OPENING BID.

EASTERN EUROPE

7. WOERNER SAID THAT THERE WAS NO REAL DOUBT ABOUT KOHL'S POSITION OVER THE GERMAN/POLISH BORDER. AS THE CHANCELLOR HAD EXPLAINED, HE WISHED TO SECURE A COMMON DECLARATION BY THE TWO PARLIAMENTS (OF THE GDR AND THE FRG) AND WOULD THEN BE HAPPY TO SEE A TREATY BETWEEN GERMANY AND POLAND. BUT THE CHANCELLOR WAS STRONGLY OPPOSED TO A GENERAL PEACE TREATY.

8. WOERNER ASKED ABOUT THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S REACTION TO LORD CARRINGTON'S RECENT SPEECH IN WHICH HE HAD RE-SURFACED KISSINGER'S IDEA OF OFFERING THE SOVIET UNION A BUFFER IN THE FORM OF NEUTRAL EASTERN EUROPEAN STATES. WOERNER HIMSELF HAD DOUBTS ABOUT THE IDEA.

9. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT THE WEST COULD NOT DICTATE TO THE EASTERN EUROPEANS THEIR FUTURE POLITICAL ORIENTATION. IN PRACTICE, HOWEVER, THE COUNTRIES WOULD PROBABLY CHOOSE NEUTRALITY EVEN THOUGH THE HUNGARIAN FOREIGN MINISTER HAD THROWN UP THE IDEA OF HUNGARY JOINING NATO AS A DEBATING POINT. THE REAL QUESTION WAS WHO WOULD GUARANTEE EASTERN EUROPEAN CONTRIES' NEUTRALITY. WOERNER SAID THAT WHILE THERE WAS MUCH TALK OF THE CSCE CONTRIBUTING TO A FUTURE EUROPEAN SECURITY STRUCTURE, IN HIS VIEW THE CSCE COULD SERVE ONLY AS AN UMBRELLA, RATHER THAN AS AN ARCH SPANNING THE GAP BETWEEN EAST AND WEST AND CAPABLE OF TAKING REAL WEIGHT. EVEN DIENSTBIER, THE CZECHOSLOVAK FOREIGN MINISTER, HAD AGREED WITH WOERNER THAT THE CSCE COULD NOT PROVIDE SECURITY GUARANTEES. THE SECRETARY OF STATE AGREED THAT THE CSCE COULD NOT SUBSTITUTE FOR NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT. BUT IT COULD BE BUILT UP TO PROVIDE, FOR EXAMPLE, A CONCILIATION SERVICE AND AGREEMENTS PROVIDING GUARANTEES FOR DEMOCRACY.

10. WOERNER SAID HE WANTED NATO'S MEETING IN 1990, INCLUDING THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL MINISTERIAL IN JUNE IN TURNBERRY, TO EXPLAIN THE NEED FOR NATO, WHY NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT WERE NOT EQUIVALENT, AND NATO'S IDEAS FOR USE OF THE CSCE PROCESS.

ESTRA NAC MINISTERIAL

11. THE SECRETARY OF STATE ASKED ABOUT WOERNER'S PLANS FOR AN EXTRA MINISTERIAL MEETING. WOERNER SAID HE HAD TWO REASONS FOR SUGGESTING IT:

(A) TO GET TO THE END GAME AT THE VIENNA CFE NEGOTIATIONS, FOREIGN MINISTERS WOULD, IN HIS VIEW, NEED TO GET TOGETHER TO CRACK OUTSTANDING DIFFICULTIES (ESPECIALLY THE GRECO/TURKISH DISPUTE OVER MERSIN).

(B) THE GERMAN QUESTION: WHILE HE WAS A FERVANT EUROPEAN, IN FAVOUR OF EC POLITICAL UNION AND, ONE DAY, OF A EUROPEAN DEFENCE IDENTITY, FOR THE TIME BEING NATO WAS THE ONLY WESTERN SECURITY ORGANISATION AND THE ONLY MECHANISM FOR KEEPING THE UNITED STATES ENGAGED IN EUROPE. A STRONG POLITICAL ROLE FOR THE ALLIANCE WAS ESSENTIAL BECAUSE NATO AS A PURELY MILITARY ALLIANCE WOULD DISINTEGRATE GIVEN THE REDUCTION IN THE SOVIET THREAT. THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY HAD DECIDED TO HOLD AN EXTRA SUMMIT TO LOOK AT THE GERMAN QUESTION. THIS WOULD GO BEYOND THE TECHNICAL QUESTIONS OF CURRENCY UNION AND SO FORTH. WOERNER FOUND THE NORWEGIANS AND TURKS INCREASINGLY UNEASY, AND HAD ALSO TO ANSWER UNITED STATES' AND CANADIAN CONCERNS ABOUT THE HANDLING OF THE GERMAN QUESTION BEING LEFT TO THE EC. HIGH LEVEL CONSIDERATION IN NATO WAS THEREFORE NEEDED. FOR THE SAME REASON HE HAD ASKED KOHL TO BRIEF NATO PERSONALLY (WHICH WOULD BE DONE ON 8 MARCH).

12. FOR THE SAME REASON, WOERNER HAD BEEN ANXIOUS TO OUTMANOEUVRE GENSCHER ABOUT THE SITE OF PREPARATIONS FOR THE CSCE SUMMIT. HE HAD SUCCEEDED: CSCE PREPARATIONS WOULD TAKE PLACE AT NATO AS WELL AS AT THE EC.

13. THE SECRETARY OF STATE RE-ASSURED WOERNER ABOUT THE DUBLIN MEETING ON 28 APRIL. THE TWELVE WOULD HAVE PLENTY TO DISCUSS ON A PURELY COMMUNITY AGENDA: THE ABSORPTION OF THE GDR POSED FORMIDABLE PROBLEMS. BUT HE AGREED THAT GERMAN UNITY SHOULD BE DISCUSSED BY THE 16 ALLIES AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL, AND THAT TO LEAVE DISCUSSION UNTIL JUNE AT TURNBERRY WOULD BE TOO LATE. IF THE SECRETARY GENERAL CHOSE 9 APRIL THE SECRETARY OF STATE WOULD BE ON HIS WAY TO MOSCOW AND WOULD NEED TO SEND SOMEBODY ELSE. WOERNER SAID THE SECRETARY OF STATE SHOULD BE THERE AND IMPLIED THAT HE WOULD AVOID THIS DATE.

14. WOERNER SAID HE HAD BEEN THINKING ABOUT THE OTHER NATO MINISTERIAL MEETINGS (NPG AND DPC). HE WISHED NATO DEFENCE MINISTERS TO GIVE TWO MESSAGES TO THEIR PUBLICS: ABOUT WHY NATO WAS STILL NEEDED AND ABOUT HOW NATO WAS ADJUSTING TO CHANGE AND LOOKING FORWARD IN MILITARY TERMS SO THAT THE ALLIES DID NOT MERELY REACT TO CHANGE BUT HELPED TO SHAPE IT. AT THE MINISTERIAL MEETING HE WOULD TRY TO CONVINCE THE 16 GOVERNMENTS THAT THEIR DEFENCE CUTS, WHICH WERE IN MANY CASES INEVITABLE, SHOULD BE COORDINATED AND INTEGRATED WITH NATO'S APPROACH TO ARMS CONTROL.

15. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT LOOKING BEYOND THE CFE NEGOTIATIONS AT VIENNA, HE THOUGHT THAT THE NEXT PHASE SHOULD NOT MERELY REPLICATE CFE I. THE WEST WOULD PROBABLY NEED A NEW FORMULA

FOR SUBSEQUENT ARMS CONTROL DISCUSSIONS, WHICH MIGHT INCLUDE DISCUSSION OF ARRANGEMENTS IN WHAT WAS NOW THE GDR. WOERNER FELT THAT SOME COUNTRIES WHICH WERE IN THE WARSAW PACT IN NAME, BUT NO LONGER IN SPIRIT (SUCH AS CZECHOSLOVAKIA), SAW THE PACT AS USEFUL ONLY IN TERMS ON CONTINUING ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS AT 23. HIS RECENT MEETING WITH GRINEVSKY INDICATED THAT THE SOVIET UNION ALSO SEEMED TO FAVOUR THE FRAMEWORK OF THE 23. IN SUGGESTING THAT A NEW MANDATE WOULD ONLY BE POSSIBLE IF THE WEST AGREED TO INTRODUCE NAVAL FORCES, GRINEVSKY SEEMED TO BE DELIBERATELY ENCOURAGING THE WEST TO STICK WITH NEGOTIATIONS AT 23. WOERNER THOUGHT THAT THE MAIN GOAL OF NEGOTIATIONS AFTER CFE I WOULD STILL BE TO LIMIT THE SOVIET UNION'S FORCES. THE WEST WOULD NEED TO DECIDE WHETHER TO ACCEPT THAT PURSUIT OF THIS AIM COULD LEAD TO LIMITS ON THEIR OWN NATIONAL FORCES. THE WEST HAD FOR SO LONG FOUGHT AGAINST ALLOWING A SOVIET DROIT DE REGARD OVER THEIR NATIONAL FORCES. WOERNER HAD THAT MORNING INITIATED IN HOUSE DISCUSSION ON THIS POINT, WHICH HE HOPED TO PURSUE WITHOUT PUBLICITY.

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ADDITIONAL

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