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MIPT: MODROW'S VISIT

STATEMENT BY GORBACHEV ON GERMAN REUNIFICATION

SUMMARY

1. IN A DEFINITIVE STATEMENT ON GERMANY, GORBACHEV 'ABSOLUTELY EXCLUDES' PARTICIPATION OF A UNITED GERMANY IN NATO. GRUDGING WELCOME FOR 'CORRECTIVES' IN KOHL'S POSITION ON FRONTIERS. CRITICISM OF WEST GERMAN INTERFERENCE IN GDR ELECTIONS.

DETAIL

2. AT THE CLOSE OF HIS TALKS WITH MDOROW, GORBACHEV USED A SHORT TELEVISION INTERVIEW TO UPDATE HIS POSITION ON GERMAN REUNIFICATION.

A) NATO MEMBERSHIP AND PROCESS OF REUNIFICATION

3. GORBACHEV WAS ASKED ABOUT THE SOVIET ATTITUDE 'TO ANY FORM OF PARTICIPATION OF A UNITED GERMANY IN NATO'. HE REPLIED: 'WE CANNOT GIVE OUR AGREEMENT TO THIS. THIS IS ABSOLUTELY EXCLUDED'.

4. GORBACHEV WENT ON TO SAY THAT HISTORY WAS NOW MOVING AT SPEED. IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE INTERESTS NOT ONLY OF THE GERMANS BUT OF ALL WHO WERE INVOLVED IN THIS PROCESS, INCLUDING THE NATURAL INTERESTS OF THE NEIGHBOURS OF THE TWO GERMAN STATES AND OF ALL EUROPEANS. THE PROBLEM COULD NOT BE OVER-SIMPLIFIED. IN SUCH A WEIGHTY QUESTION, IT WAS INADMISSABLE TO ACT IN A HIGH-HANDED MANNER. A STEP-BY-STEP APPROIACH WAS NECESSARY. THIS WAS IN THE INTERESTS OF THE PEOPLE OF THE GDR, WHO WISHED TO KNOW WHERE THEIR FUTURE DESTINY LAY. IT WAS ALSO IN THE INTERESTS OF THE GERMANS IN THE FRG, WHO NEEDED TO KNOW WHAT UNIFICATION REQUIRED FROM THEM. SYNCHRONISATION OF THE PROCESSES OF EUROPEAN CONVERGENCE AND GERMAN REUNIFICATION WOULD HELP TO ALLAY VARIOUS ANXIETIES.

5. GORBACHEV FURTHER ENVISAGED THE TRANSFORMATION OF NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT FROM MILITARY/POLITICAL INTO POLITICAL ORGANISATIONS AS A CONSEQUENCE OF THE EUROPEAN AND VIENNA PROCESSES AND OF HELSINKI II.

THIS WOULD RESOLVE THE QUESTION OF THE PLACE OF A UNITED GERMANY. HE HAD RECENTLY BEEN ASKED BY A WESTERN REPRESENTATIVE WHY HE WAS CONCERNED ABOUT THIS MATTER. HE HAD ACKNOWLEDGED THAT BOTH EASTERN AND WESTERN GERMANS WANTED PEACE. BUT HE HAD ASKED WHY, IF THE MATTER HAD NO FURTHER SIGNIFICANCE, THEY SHOULD NOT JOIN THE WARSAW PACT.

6. GORBACHEV REITERATED THE NEED FOR A HIGHLY RESPONSIBLE APPROACH TO REUNIFICATION, DRAWING ON THE LESSONS OF THE PAST - NOT ONLY THE POSITIVE BUT ALSO THE NEAGATIVE. THE SOVIET UNION WOULD PARTICIPATE ACTIVELY AND CONSTRUCTIVELY IN THE PROCESSES UNDER WAY, BUT COULD NOT ALLOW THE GROWING POSITIVE TENDENCIES IN EUROPE TO BE DISRUPTED.

B) FRONTIERS/CHANCELLOR KOHL

7. GORBACHEV SAID THAT THE CHANCELLOR HAD APPLIED CERTAIN CORRECTIVES TO HIS POSITION ON THE FRONTIER QUESTION IN RECENT DAYS. HE WELCOMED THIS, AS ''MANOEUVRES'' OR A LACK OF CLARITY IN SUCH FUNDAMENTAL MATTERS DID NOT CONSTITUTE SERIOUS POLICY.

C) GDR ELECTIONS

8. ASKED ABOUT THE GDR ELECTIONS, GORBACHEV UNDERScoreD THE IMPORTANCE OF NON-INTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF OTHERS, AND SAID THAT HE WAS AT PAINS TO OBSERVE THIS PRINCIPLE. BUT SINCE HE HAD BEEN ASKED THE QUESTION, HE NOTED THAT ATTEMPTS WERE BEING MADE TO INFLUENCE THE GERMANS OF THE GDR. HE HAD SEEN HOW MANY VISITORS HAD GONE FROM THE FRG TO THE GDR ''AND HOW THEY ARE INTERFERING IN ITS AFFAIRS, AS IF THE GDR HAD ALREADY LOST ITS SOVEREIGNTY, AS IF THE GDR WAS ALREADY NOT AN INDEPENDENT STATE, RECOGNISED BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY''. THE EAST GERMAN PEOPLE COULD AND SHOULD MAKE UP THEIR OWN MINDS. IT WAS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT AT THIS STAGE THAT IN THE PARLIAMENT AND GOVERNMENT THERE SHOULD BE PEOPLE CAPABLE OF ACTING RESPONSIBLY AND OF COOPERATING WITH ALL THE INTERESTED GOVERNMENTS AND PEOPLES.

D) FUTURE SOVIET/GERMAN RELATIONS

9. THE PROSPECTS FOR FUTURE RELATIONS WOULD DEPEND ON PRESENT COOPERATION. UNDER ONE APPROACH, COOPERATION COULD BE BROADENED AND STRENGTHENED. BUT UNDER A DIFFERENT APPROACH, SUSPICIONS AND NEGATIVE ELEMENTS COULD INTRUDE. THE SOVIET UNION HAD VERY WIDE CONTACTS WITH THE FRG AS WELL AS WITH THE GDR, AND DID NOT WANT THESE INTERESTS TO SUFFER WHEN THE PROCESS OF UNIFICATION TOOK PLACE. LESSONS HAD TO BE DRAWN FROM THE LONG HISTORY OF RELATIONS BETWEEN GERMANY AND RUSSIA: ''WE CANNOT FORGET WHAT HAPPENED WHEN FASCISM CAME TO POWER IN GERMANY, AND WHAT CONSEQUENCES THIS HAD FOR OUR

PEOPLES.' ' THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE PEACE HAD TO BE CONSOLIDATED.

COMMENT

10. IN ADVANCE OF THE DISCUSSIONS BY THE TWO PLUS FOUR AND OF THE GDR ELECTIONS, GORBACHEV HAS NOW PLACED HIS PERSONAL IMPRINT ON THE HARDENING SOVIET POSITION TOWARDS GERMAN PARTICIPATION IN NATO. THIS IS HIS MOST CATEGORICAL STATEMENT TO DATE. AT THE VERY LEAST IT REPRESENTS A TOUGH OPENING STANCE FOR FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS.

11. HIS TALKS WITH MODROW CONCLUDE GORBACHEV'S ROUND OF PRE-ELECTION CONSULTATIONS WITH LEADING GDR POLITICIANS. THE FRG EMBASSY BELIEVE THAT THE TALKS CENTRED AROUND DETAILED DISCUSSIONS OF MODROW'S THOUGHTS ON UNIFICATION, IN THE EXPECTATIONS THAT MODROW WILL HAVE AN IMPORTANT MINORITY ROLE TO PLAY IN THE FUTURE. IN THEIR TALKS WITH THE EAST GERMANS, AS IN THEIR RECENT CONTACTS WITH OTHER GOVERNMENTS OF THE FOUR, THE RUSSIANS WILL HAVE BEEN AT PAINS TO AVERT THE RISK OF FACING A FAIT ACCOMPLI AFTER 18 MARCH.

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