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INFO IMMEDIATE BONN, PARIS, WASHINGTON, EAST EUROPEAN POSTS,

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MIPT: POLAND AND GERMAN REUNIFICATION: MR BAKER'S MEETING WITH JARUZELSKI.

1. JARUZELSKI DESCRIBED AS SHOCKING THE PACE OF PROGRESS TOWARDS GERMAN UNIFICATION. ACHIEVING IT BY COMBINING THE TWO STATES WAS PREFERABLE TO ANNEXATION - A PRESUMED REFERENCE TO ARTICLE 23 - WHICH HAD UNFAVOURABLE ASSOCIATIONS.

2. HE HAD TOLD MITTERRAND IN PARIS THAT A UNITED GERMANY WOULD SOON BE EVEN MORE POWERFUL THAN IT WAS TODAY. HE FEARED NOT GERMAN MILITARISM BUT ECONOMIC DOMINATION. HE FORESAW A POWERFUL ECONOMIC BLOC CONSISTING OF GERMANY, AUSTRIA AND PERHAPS CZECHOSLOVAKIA.

3. GORBACHEV FACED A DIFFICULT ECONOMIC SITUATION AND PROBLEMS OVER THE NATIONALITIES. BUT FOR THE SOVIET UNION THE SECURITY ASPECTS OF GERMAN UNIFICATION WERE PARTICULARLY SENSITIVE. SINCE THE WAR SOVIET SECURITY HAD BEEN ORGANICALLY TIED TO THE LINE OF THE ELBE. NOW THE GDR ARMY HAD ALMOST CEASED TO EXIST AND THE WHOLE MILITARY INFRASTRUCTURE IN THE GDR MIGHT BE LOST TO THE SOVIET UNION. IF HMG WAS INTERESTED IN HELPING GORBACHEV, WE SHOULD HELP TO PREVENT A SITUATION WHERE PEOPLE IN THE SOVIET UNION MIGHT THINK THAT THEIR SECURITY WAS BEING THREATENED. HE HAD SAID IN PARIS THAT GERMANY COULD NOT BE NEUTRAL AND THAT IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO WORK OUT NOW NEW SECURITY STRUCTURES. THESE COULD INCLUDE UPDATING THE CAF NEGOTIATIONS IN VIENNA, SETTING CEILINGS ON NATIONAL ARMED FORCES (EG THE BUNDESWEHR), MILITARY DOCTRINE, CONFIRMATION THAT A UNITED GERMANY RENOUNCED ABC WEAPONS.

4. HE HAD TOLD MITTERRAND IN PARIS THAT THIS WAS THE LAST MOMENT BEFORE UNIFICATION AT WHICH THE FOUR POWERS COULD FIX TERMS. MITTERRAND HAD REACTED WITH INTEREST BUT JARUZELSKI THOUGHT HE HAD SEEN SERIOUS PROBLEMS OVER GIVING EFFECT TO WHAT THE POLES WERE SUGGESTING. JARUZELSKI CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT AFTER THE EXPLOSIVE AND RAPID CHANGES OF 1989, IT WAS NECESSARY TO ENSURE IN 1990 THAT THE NEW FLUIDITY SHOULD BE GUIDED INTO NEW STRUCTURES THAT WOULD MEET EUROPEAN SECURITY NEEDS FOR AT LEAST THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS.

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POLAND AND GERMAN UNIFICATION

SUMMARY

1. MAZOWIECKI AND JARUZELSKI TELL MR KENNETH BAKER ABOUT THEIR DISCUSSIONS WITH MITTERRAND. FRENCH SUPPORT FOR POLISH POSITION ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE BORDER QUESTION. ON MODALITIES, POLES SEEK BRITISH VIEWS ON POSSIBLE 2 PLUS 4 MEETING IN WARSAW TO SETTLE THE BORDER ISSUE. MAZOWIECKI ASKS PRIME MINISTER TO CONVEY POLISH CONCERNS TO BUSH. JARUZELSKI CONCERNED TO SETTLE SECURITY QUESTIONS AT AN EARLY STAGE OF UNIFICATION PROCESS.

DETAIL

2. I ACCOMPANIED MR KENNETH BAKER ON HIS CALLS ON MAZOWIECKI AND JARUZELSKI ON 10 MARCH. THE MAIN SUBJECT DISCUSSED WAS GERMAN UNIFICATION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR POLAND AND FOR EUROPEAN SECURITY. MAZOWIECKI AND JARUZELSKI, TOGETHER WITH SKUBISZEWSKI, HAD RETURNED TWELVE HOURS EARLIER FROM A DAY'S VISIT TO PARIS. MAZOWIECKI IN PARTICULAR WANTED TO ENSURE THAT THE PRIME MINISTER WAS BROUGHT UP TO DATE WITH POLISH THINKING FOLLOWING THE PARIS VISIT.

3. MAZOWIECKI SAID WE HAD ALL FOLLOWED THE STRANGE PIRQUETTES OF CHANCELLOR KOHL. HE PERSONALLY HAD BEEN OFFENDED THAT KOHL HAD INTRODUCED THE ISSUE OF THE GERMAN MINORITY IN POLAND AFTER THIS HAD BEEN SETTLED DURING KOHL'S VISIT HERE LAST NOVEMBER. IN DOING SO KOHL HAD BROUGHT BACK MEMORIES OF PRE-WAR GERMAN INTERFERENCE IN THE NAME OF GERMAN MINORITIES. POLISH SOCIETY WAS UNEASY AS A RESULT AND THE PUBLIC NOW HAD TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.

4. HE REFERRED WARMLY TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S IMMEDIATE AND EARLY REAFFIRMATION OF THE NEED FOR THE BORDER QUESTION TO BE SETTLED BY A TREATY AND OF POLAND'S RIGHT TO TAKE PART WHEN ISSUES CONCERNING HER WERE DISCUSSED. FOLLOWING HIS VISIT TO PARIS, THIS WAS NOW ALSO THE FRENCH POSITION. HE REPEATED HOW IMPORTANT IT WAS THAT THE TREATY SHOULD BE INITIALLED BEFORE UNIFICATION. THE FOUR POWERS SHOULD BE ASSOCIATED WITH IT.

5. MAZOWIECKI SAID THAT HE WOULD BE TELLING THE SOVIET UNION THAT DELAYING TACTICS WERE WRONG AND INAPPROPRIATE. IT WAS TOO LATE FOR A PHASED APPROACH: THE GERMANS MIGHT PRODUCE A FAIT ACCOMPLI. THE PRIME MINISTER HAD BEEN RIGHT TO DRAW ATTENTION TO THE DANGER

THAT UNIFICATION MIGHT TAKE PLACE ON THE BASIS OF ARTICLE 23 OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. MAZOWIECKI HAD ASKED MODROW WHETHER ELECTIONS IN THE GDR WOULD RESULT IN A GOVERNMENT STRONG ENOUGH TO TAKE PART IN TALKS ON UNIFICATION. MODROW'S ANSWER WAS THAT HE COULD NOT GUARANTEE THIS : HE COULD SEE CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH ARTICLE 23 WOULD BE USED. AS MAZOWIECKI PUT IT, NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD TAKE PLACE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, AS OTHERWISE THERE WAS A RISK THAT THE STREETS AND ARTICLE 23 WOULD DETERMINE WHAT HAPPENED.

6. MAZOWIECKI SAID HE WAS AFRAID FOR GORBACHEV. ACCORDING TO POLISH INFORMATION, MATTERS WERE CURRENTLY VERY DIFFICULT FOR HIM. →

7. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND, POLISH PARTICIPATION IN TALKS HAD BECOME EVEN MORE CRITICAL. IT WAS AN OPPORTUNITY FOR THE FOUR POWERS TO SHOW THAT THEY RESPECTED POLISH RIGHTS. HE RECALLED THAT HE HAD SAID ON BRITISH TV THAT HE DID NOT WANT POLAND'S WESTERN BORDER TO BE THE GIFT OF STALIN. AS HE SAW IT, THE ONLY WAY TO FORCE KOHL TO SETTLE THE BORDER ISSUE IN THE INITIAL STAGE OF THE PROCESS OF REUNIFICATION WOULD BE FOR THE FOUR POWERS TO GIVE THIS THEIR IMMEDIATE SUPPORT. HE HAD SUGGESTED TWO OPTIONS TO MITTERRAND. EITHER POLAND COULD FORMALLY REQUEST THE SIX POWERS THAT SHE SHOULD TAKE PART IN THE FIRST PHASE OF TALKS ON THE SECURITY OF GERMANY'S NEIGHBOURS. OR POLAND SHOULD INVITE THE 4 PLUS 2 TO WARSAW TO DISCUSS THIS PART OF THE PROBLEM. THE FIRST COURSE MIGHT BE SIMPLER BUT WOULD BE MORE DIFFICULT TO SET UP. THE SECOND MIGHT BE HARDER TO REJECT BUT MAZOWIECKI DID NOT WANT TO PROPOSE IT FORMALLY BEFORE BEING SURE THAT THE FOUR POWERS WOULD AGREE TO IT. MITTERRAND HAD LIKED THE SECOND METHOD AND HAD UNDERTAKEN TO GIVE THE POLES A DEFINITE ANSWER BY 16 MARCH.

8. MAZOWIECKI THEREFORE REQUESTED A BRITISH REACTION, ALSO BY 16 MARCH. HE THEN RECALLED THAT WHEN HE HAD BEEN IN LONDON THE PRIME MINISTER HAD ASKED HIM IF HE WANTED HER TO SPEAK TO PRESIDENT BUSH ABOUT POLISH CONCERNS. HE NOW WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF THE PRIME MINISTER COULD DELIVER ON HER OFFER BEFORE HE SAW THE PRESIDENT IN WASHINGTON ON 21 MARCH.

9. MR BAKER STRESSED DURING THE MEETING THAT THE BORDER QUESTION WAS A QUESTION OF JUSTICE FOR POLAND AND THAT LEAVING IT UNCERTAIN COULD LEAD TO INSTABILITY IN EUROPE. HE POINTED TO THE PROBLEMS, FOR EUROPE AND THE COMMUNITY, OF THE ARTICLE 23 ROUTE. THESE MAJOR ISSUES, WHICH INCLUDED THE SECURITY QUESTIONS, COULD NOT BE BRUSHED ASIDE. HE WOULD REPORT THE DISCUSSION AND THE POLISH REQUEST (PARAGRAPH 8) TO THE PRIME MINISTER ON HIS RETURN.

10. AS WE WERE LEAVING, MAZOWIECKI'S PRIVATE SECRETARY ASKED THAT I SHOULD TRANSMIT OUR REPLY BOTH TO HIM AND TO THE MFA. AT OUR DINNER FOR MR BAKER LAST NIGHT SKUBISZEWSKI SAID THAT THE ANSWER TO THE MFA SHOULD BE GIVEN TO HIM PERSONALLY.

11. SEE MIFT FOR MR BAKER'S MEETING WITH JARUZELSKI.

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