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FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

SECRETARY OF STATE'S VISIT TO BONN: CALL ON FOREIGN MINISTER
GENSCHER

SUMMARY

1. GENSCHER IN FORTHCOMING MOOD. ENVISAGES INTERIM PERIOD WHILE SOVIET TROOPS STILL IN FORMER GDR IN WHICH ARTICLES 5 AND 6 OF NATO TREATY WOULD NOT APPLY. BELIEVES ONLY GERMAN FORCES WOULD BE BUNDESGRENZSCHUTZ (BORDER POLICE). GENSCHER CLEAR THAT ALL MEETINGS OF THE TWO PLUS FOUR SHOULD BE IN GERMANY WITH THE FIRST MEETING AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL IN APRIL. ACCEPTS NEED FOR GOOD PREPARATION AMONG THE FOUR WESTERN ALLIES WITH A POLITICAL DIRECTORS MEETING BEFORE EACH TWO PLUS FOUR MEETING. HAPPY TO ACCEPT A MEETING OF THE TWO PLUS FOUR WITH THE POLES BUT NOT IN WARSAW.

2. LIBYA. DESCRIBED LIBYAN SUGGESTION THAT RABTA COULD BE DISMANTLED IF GERMANS PAY. SEE SEPARATE TEL NOT TO ALL.

3. BAZOFT. AGREES TO APPEAL FOR CLEMENCY TO IRAQI PRESIDENT AND FOREIGN MINISTER (SEPARATE TEL NOT TO ALL).

DETAIL

4. GENSCHER SAID OPINION IN THE GDR ELECTION CAMPAIGN WAS SHIFTING. THE FDP HAD MADE A BAD MISTAKE BY NOT HAVING THE SAME NAME IN THE GDR AS IN THE FRG. THE SPD WAS STILL IN FRONT BUT IT WOULD NOT GET MORE THAN 50 PER CENT OF THE VOTE. THE BEST OUTCOME WOULD BE A BROAD COALITION OF ALL THREE MAIN PARTIES. LATER, OVER LUNCH, GESCHER DESCRIBED THE EXTRAORDINARY AND MOVING ENTHUSIASM OF THE CROWDS HE WAS ADDRESSING IN THE GDR. BUT THEIR ENTHUSIASM WAS FOR WEST GERMAN POLITICIANS. THEY WERE COMPLETELY APATHETIC ABOUT THEIR OWN PEOPLE.

5. GENSCHER SAID HE WAS VERY GRATEFUL FOR THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE ON THE POLISH BORDER. AT THE FOUR POWER MEETING IN OTTAWA HE HAD SAID HOW IMPORTANT IT WAS FOR THE MEETINGS OF THE TWO PLUS FOUR TO TAKE PLACE IN GERMANY. WE SHOULD STICK TO THAT. THE POLISH GOVERNMENT WOULD WANT TO PARTICIPATE AT SOME POINT. (MUCH OF THE SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION CENTRED ON HOW TO HANDLE THIS ISSUE AND THE POLISH INVITATION TO A MEETING IN

WARSAW.) GENSCHER SAID THAT THE POLISH PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN MINISTER HAD REACTED POSITIVELY TO THE BUNDESTAG RESOLUTION. ONLY JARUZELSKI HAD COMPLAINED THAT THERE WAS NO SPECIFIC MENTION OF THE ODER/NEISSE. THE POLES HAD SUBSEQUENTLY MADE CLEAR THAT THEY WANTED NEGOTIATIONS ON AN AGREEMENT IN ADVANCE OF UNIFICATION. THE AGREEMENT WOULD BE INITIALLED AT THIS STAGE BUT WOULD ONLY BE SIGNED AND RATIFIED BY AN ALL-GERMAN GOVERNMENT AND PARLIAMENT. DUMAS HAD TELEPHONED HIM ON SATURDAY ABOUT THE POLISH INVITATION TO A TWO PLUS FOUR MEETING IN WARSAW. HE (GENSCHER) COULD NOT AGREE TO THAT. WE SHOULD STICK TO MEETINGS IN GERMANY. OTHERWISE WE WOULD LAY OURSELVES OPEN TO DEMANDS TO MEET IN MOSCOW. AS REGARDS THE FORM AN EVENTUAL AGREEMENT WITH POLAND MIGHT TAKE, NORMALLY ONE WOULD EXPECT SUCH AN AGREEMENT TO BE BILATERAL. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE SUGGESTING SIGNATURE BY THE FOUR OR THE 35. THE 35 CAME TOO CLOSE TO A PEACE TREATY. THE FOUR WOULD BE BETTER. BUT HIS UNDERSTANDING HAD ALWAYS BEEN THAT THE FOUR WOULD GIVE A MORE GENERAL BLESSING TO A TREATY AND THEN INDICATE THAT THEIR OWN POWERS HAD LAPSED. HE DID NOT KNOW IF THE FOUR WOULD GUARANTEE THE BORDER.

5. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THE IMPORTANT THING WAS TO ESTABLISH A CLEAR WESTERN POSITION ON THE FUTURE OF SOVIET TROOPS IN THE FORMER GDR AND ON THE DEFENCE OF THE FORMER GDR. WOULD ARTICLES 5 AND 6 APPLY? WE THOUGHT THEY WOULD HAVE TO BUT THAT THERE WOULD NOT BE NATO FORCES STATIONED THERE. IF, FOLLOWING THE GENSCHER/STOLTENBERG DISCUSSIONS, THE BUNDESWEHR WERE NOT TO BE STATIONED IN THE FORMER GDR, WHAT TROOPS AND IN WHAT UNIFORM WOULD BE THERE? IT WOULD OF COURSE BE A MISTAKE TO LINK THESE QUESTIONS WITH THOSE OF THE US OR BRITISH PRESENCE IN THE WEST. BRANDT HAD SUGGESTED SYMMETRY BETWEEN THE SOVIET PRESENCE AND THE AMERICAN PRESENCE. WE DID NOT ACCEPT THAT.

6. GENSCHER AGREED. EITHER THE SOVIETS COULD REMAIN FOR A NUMBER OF YEARS OR THEIR PRESENCE COULD BE TOLERATED UNTIL A CERTAIN STAGE OF DEVELOPMENT WAS REACHED. GENSCHER THOUGHT THE RUSSIANS WOULD MOVE SOONER THAN ANY OF US EXPECTED ON THIS ISSUE. THEY WOULD NOT IMMEDIATELY ACCEPT A TOTAL WITHDRAWAL OF THEIR TROOPS: THEY NEEDED A FACE-SAVER. AND THEY WOULD TALK ABOUT ALL THE PROBLEMS THEY WOULD FACE OVER EG HAVING NO BARRACKS IN THE USSR. AS THE GDR ECONOMY IMPROVED (WHICH IT WOULD DO - QUICKLY), THEY WOULD ALSO NOTICE THE DISPARITY OVER STANDARDS OF LIVING. THEY WOULD WANT TO BE PAID IN SOME FORM. GENSCHER WAS CONVINCED IN THE END THE RUSSIANS WOULD ACCEPT GERMANY'S PRESENCE IN NATO. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT

THE RUSSIANS WERE CLAIMING THAT THIS ISSUE WAS VITAL TO GORBACHEV'S SURVIVAL. HE THOUGHT THEY WERE BUILDING THEMSELVES A TOUGH NEGOTIATING HAND.

7. REVERTING TO THE QUESTION OF THE GERMAN MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE FORMER GDR, THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT ONE COULD ENVISAGE VARIOUS SCENARIOS IN WHICH TROOPS COULD BE NEEDED, EG TROUBLE PERHAPS ARISING FROM THE PRESENCE OF THE SOVIET GARRISON. GENSCHER SAID THAT THE GERMAN CONSTITUTION ABSOLUTELY RULED OUT THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE FOR DOMESTIC DISPUTES. IT WAS CONCEIVABLE TO USE THE BORDER POLICE (BUNDESGRENZSCHUTZ) BUT THEY WOULD HAVE TO BE REAL POLICE, NOT MILITARY IN DISGUISE. THE ISSUE WOULD HAVE TO BE DISCUSSED WITH THE GDR GOVERNMENT WHO WOULD THEMSELVES PROBABLY PROPOSE SOMETHING ON THESE LINES. BUT THESE FORCES WOULD NOT BE FORMER MEMBERS OF THE GDR ARMY IN POLICE UNIFORM. THEY WOULD HAVE TO BE GENUINE POLICE, THOUGH INCLUDING POLICE IN BARRACKS.

8. THE SECRETARY OF STATE ASKED WHETHER ARTICLES 5 AND 6 WOULD APPLY. GENSCHER SAID THAT THEY WOULD IN THE LAST ANALYSIS. THE REAL QUESTION WAS WHAT TO DO IN THE PERIOD WHEN THE RUSSIANS WERE STILL PRESENT. WHATEVER THE SITUATION, WE HAD TO BEAR IN MIND THAT THE CARDS WERE ALL STACKED IN FAVOUR OF THE WEST: THE RUSSIAN PRESENCE IN THE GDR WOULD BE RESTRICTED, THE GDR WOULD NOT BE PART OF THE WARSAW PACT, THE RUSSIANS WOULD BE OUT OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT IF, BY ANY MISCHANCE GORBACHEV WERE OVERTHROWN BY THE GENERALS, GERMANY WOULD NONETHELESS FACE 250,000 SOVIET TROOPS ON HER TERRITORY. GENSCHER SAID THAT, THANKS TO CFE ETC, THE NUMBERS WOULD BE A MAXIMUM OF 175,000. HE ACCEPTED THAT THERE WOULD NEED TO BE A SEPARATE STATIONING TREATY WITH REGULATIONS COVERING WHAT SHOULD HAPPEN IN THE EVENT OF VIOLATIONS. IT WAS POSSIBLE (AND GENSCHER EMPHASISED THAT HE WAS THINKING ALOUD) TO MAKE PROVISION FOR ARTICLES 5 AND 6 TO APPLY ONCE SOVIET TROOPS WERE WITHDRAWN OR IN THE EVENT OF THE REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE SOVIET TROOPS BEING VIOLATED, IE THERE COULD BE A TRIGGER. BUT THIS SHOULD BE A MATTER OF NEGOTIATION BY THE ALLIANCE, NOT A SOVIET/GERMAN ISSUE. HE DID NOT WANT TO GIVE THE RUSSIANS LEVERAGE BY PUTTING TOO MANY IDEAS ON THE TABLE. HE EXPECTED THE RUSSIANS TO SAY THAT THE BUNDESWEHR WAS ANYWAY TOO NUMEROUS. ONCE THE SOVIETS REDUCED THEIR TROOP LEVELS UNDER CFE, THERE WOULD BE A DISPARITY AND GERMANY WOULD NO DOUBT HAVE TO MAKE REDUCTIONS. THIS TOO WAS A MATTER FOR THE VIENNA NEGOTIATING TABLE. IT WAS IN THE INTERESTS OF THE ALLIANCE THAT GERMANY SHOULD NOT BE SEEN AS A SPECIAL CASE. IN PARALLEL WITH THE TWO PLUS FOUR TALKS, WE SHOULD DEVELOP OUR APPROACH TO THE VIENNA

NEGOTIATIONS. THE SECRETARY OF STATE AGREED WITH THIS APPROACH. THE WEST WAS IN A STRONG POSITION.

9. THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND GENSCHER AGREED THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE VERY WORRIED ABOUT THE USE OF ARTICLE 23 BUT GENSCHER SAID THAT THEY SHOULD BE REASSURED. EVEN ARTICLE 23 COULD ONLY COME IN AT THE END OF A PROCEDURE WHICH WOULD SETTLE THE EXTERNAL ASPECTS OF GERMAN UNITY. HE HAD MADE THIS PUBLIC IN THE

BUNDESTAG DEBATE LAST WEEK AND HAD ALSO MADE CLEAR THAT ONCE UNITY WAS ACHIEVED, THE RELEVANT PARTS OF THE PREAMBLE AS WELL AS ARTICLES 23 AND 146 WOULD BE DELETED FROM THE BASIC LAW.

11. GENSCHER SAID THAT IN DISCUSSIONS WITH THE GDR GOVERNMENT HE HAD MADE CLEAR THAT ISSUES OF SUBSTANCE COULD ONLY BE DISCUSSED ONCE THE FREELY-ELECTED GOVERNMENT WAS IN POWER. IT HAD BEEN AGREED THAT ALL THE MEETINGS SHOULD BE ON GERMAN TERRITORY. HE AGREED WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE THAT WE MUST PROPERLY PREPARE FOR THE MINISTERIAL TWO PLUS FOUR TALKS. THIS SHOULD BE DONE BY POLITICAL DIRECTORS. HE THOUGHT THE FIRST MEETING AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL WOULD TAKE PLACE SOME TIME IN APRIL.

12. IN FURTHER DISCUSSION OF THE POSSIBILITY OF A MEETING OF THE TWO PLUS FOUR IN WARSAW, GENSCHER SAID THIS WOULD BE VERY BAD FOR GERMAN PUBLIC OPINION. IF THE POLES WANTED A GUARANTEE OF THEIR BORDERS BY THE FOUR HE COULD LIVE WITH THAT. HE LATER TOLD THE SECRETARY OF STATE AGAIN THAT WARSAW WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT. THE SECRETARY OF STATE URGED HIM TO SAY AS POSITIVELY AS HE COULD THAT THE POLES WOULD BE WELCOME AT THE TWO PLUS FOUR TALKS AT THE RELEVANT MOMENT, LEAVING UNTIL LATER THE QUESTION OF VENUE.

13. THE SECRETARY OF STATE ASKED GENSCHER HOW HE THOUGHT WE COULD DEAL WITH THE RUSSIANS' LEGAL HOLD OVER THE ARTICLE 23 PROCESS IN RESPECT OF BERLIN. GENSCHER SAID IT WAS THE FRG'S CLEAR INTENTION TO SETTLE ALL THE EXTERNAL ASPECTS BEFORE UNIFICATION WAS FINALISED. HE AGREED WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE THAT IT WOULD BE SENSIBLE TO OFFER TO DISCUSS HOW TO WIND UP THE OCCUPATION REGIME BUT WE SHOULD NOT ALLOW THE RUSSIANS TO FILIBUSTER. THE AIM SHOULD BE TO PRESENT THE CSCE SUMMIT WITH THE RESULTS OF THE TWO PLUS FOUR DISCUSSIONS.

14. OVER LUNCH THERE WAS SOME DISCUSSION OF THE EC ASPECTS OF UNIFICATION. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT WE ENVISAGED SHORT TRANSITION PERIODS. IT WOULD REQUIRE A MAJOR EFFORT TO BRING THE GDR UP TO COMMUNITY STANDARDS AND WE WERE ASKING A LOT OF THE FRG. WHAT WAS GENSCHER'S VIEW ON THE IMPACT OF GEMU?

15. GENSCHER SAID THAT EC QUESTIONS WERE NOT THE MOST DIFFICULT. THE MOST DIFFICULT WERE PROBLEMS LIKE PROPERTY AND PENSION RIGHTS. WITH THE PRESENT RATE OF EXODUS FROM THE GDR,

THERE WAS NO ALTERNATIVE TO GEMU. THE CREATION OF A SINGLE CURRENCY WAS THE BEST WAY OF EXERTING PRESSURE FOR MARKET CONDITIONS. THE PRIVATE BANKS IN THE FRG, WHO WERE AS CAUTIOUS AS THEY CAME, SUPPORTED THIS PROCESS. GENSCHER AGREED WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE THAT IT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT TO KEEP ALL THESE ISSUES ON A STABLE FOTTING DURING THE LONG FRG ELECTORAL CAMPAIGN. HE PERSONALLY HOPED THAT DOMESTIC ISSUES WOULD DISPLACE EXTERNAL ISSUES AT THE TOP OF THE AGENDA. HE DID NOT REGARD THE BORDER QUESTION AS BEING THE REAL PROBLEM THOUGH KOHL MIGHT SEE THINGS DIFFERENTLY. IT WAS VERY IMPORTANT THAT THE GERMAN PUBLIC SHOULD NOT SEE THE TWO PLUS FOUR PROCESS AS GERMANY BEING TRAMPLED ON. HENCE THE IMPORTANCE OF THE TALKS BEING HELD IN GERMANY.

16. GENSCHER SAID HE ATTACHED A LOT OF IMPORTANCE TO INVESTMENT IN THE GDR BY OTHER EC MEMBER STATES. IT WAS POLITICALLY NECESSARY FO THE WHOLE COMMUNITY TO BE SEEN TO BE INVOLVED, AND THAT THE FRG SHOULD NOT HAVE AN UNFAIR ADVANTAGE.

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