

CONFIDENTIAL

053764
MDHOAN 4858

CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO

TO IMMEDIATE BONN

TELNO 180

OF 122205Z MARCH 90

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, PARIS, MOSCOW, OTHER NATO POSTS

INFO IMMEDIATE EAST EUROPEAN POSTS

FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

SECRETARY OF STATE'S VISIT TO BONN: CALL ON CHANCELLOR KOHL
SUMMARY

1. KOHL GIVES HIS VERSION OF EVENTS ON POLISH BORDER BUT REGARDS THE ISSUE AS LESS SIGNIFICANT THAN GERMANY'S PLACE IN NATO WHICH HE SEES AS CENTRAL TO FRG ELECTION CAMPAIGN. UNLIKE GENSCHER, DOES NOT GIVE A CLEAR VIEW ON APPLICATION OF ARTICLES 5 AND 6 OF NATO TREATY. GRATEFUL FOR PRIME MINISTER'S SUPPORT ON BUNDESTAG RESOLUTION ON POLISH BORDER. PREPARED TO SEE POLISH GOVERNMENT INVOLVED IN FOUR PLUS TWO TALKS AT RELEVANT MOMENT BUT THINKS A MEETING IN WARSAW WOULD BE TOO SENSITIVE POLITICALLY FOR THE GERMANS. THINKS THE CDU HAVE CAUGHT UP IN THE EASTERN GERMAN ELECTION CAMPAIGN. SEES BEST OUTCOME AS ONE IN WHICH NO PARTY HAS ABSOLUTE MAJORITY.

DETAIL

2. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SPENT NEARLY AN HOUR WITH KOHL IN BONN THIS AFTERNOON. KOHL SAID HE HAD NO SPECIAL FEEL FOR THE OUTCOME OF THE GDR ELECTION CAMPAIGN. HE THOUGHT THAT THE CDU HAD CAUGHT UP WITH THE OTHERS. THE SED HAD MADE GROUND EARLIER ON BUT HE IMPLIED THAT THEIR EARLIER LINKS WITH THE SED AND THE WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT UP TO 30 PER CENT OF FORMER SED MEMBERS WAS NOW TELLING AGAINST THEM. KOHL DESCRIBED THE ENORMOUS AUDIENCES HE WAS GETTING FOR HIS SPEECHES IN THE GDR. THE SUBSTANTIVE PROBLEMS THERE REMAINED. THE COMMUNIST LEADERSHIP HAD DELIBERATELY TAKEN A LONG TIME TO ESTABLISH AN ELECTORAL LAW. ECONOMIC REFORMS HAD NOT STARTED. THE SECURITY POLICE WERE STILL THREATENING PEOPLE (QUOTE WE'LL STILL BE HERE EVEN AFTER THE ELECTIONS UNQUOTE), AND THE EXODUS FROM THE GDR WAS CONTINUING UNABATED: 132,000 SINCE 1 JANUARY, IE HALF A MILLION BY THE SUMMER AT CURRENT RATES. HENCE THE IMPORTANCE ON CURRENCY/ECONOMIC UNION. KOHL'S ORIGINAL INTENTION HAD BEEN TO PROCEED AT A MUCH SLOWER PACE. IN THE BRITISH PRESS HE WAS ACCUSED OF HOTTING THINGS UP BUT THE OPPOSITE WAS TRUE. HE ENVISAGED THREE SETS OF ELECTIONS IN THE GDR THIS YEAR: THE ELECTIONS ON 18 MARCH, REGIONAL ELECTIONS IN MAY (WHICH COULD

LEAD TO THE RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF THE OLD LAENDER) AND ELECTIONS IN THE LAENDER THEMSELVES. ELECTIONS IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC WOULD GO AHEAD IN DECEMBER. THERE MIGHT BE ALL-GERMAN ELECTIONS NEXT YEAR BUT HE WOULD WANT INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS TO BE IN PLACE BEFORE THEN. HE HOPED THE TWO PLUS FOUR PROCESS WOULD BE CONCLUDED BY THE END OF THE YEAR, IE PRIOR TO THE PROPOSED CSCE MEETING AND TO THE FRG ELECTIONS.

3. KOHL SAID THAT MEMBERSHIP OF NATO WAS CRUCIAL AND NOT TO BE BARGAINED, IE HE WOULD NOT BE TEMPTED DOWN THE PATH OF LEAVING NATO AS THE PRICE OF GERMAN UNITY, THOUGH THERE WERE FORCES AT WORK IN THE OPPOSITE DIRECTION. IT WAS IN THIS CONTEXT THAT HE WAS AGAINST UNIFICATION TAKING PLACE UNDER ARTICLE 146. ARTICLE 146 WAS BAD (1) BECAUSE IT WOULD INVOLVE A DEBATE WHICH COULD LAST UP TO 18 MONTHS WHILE A NEW CONSTITUTION WAS DISCUSSED. ONE OF THE LESSONS OF 1948 HAD BEEN NOT TO REPEAT THE MISTAKES OF THE WEIMAR CONSTITUTION: (2) UNDER ARTICLE 146 THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY COULD CHANGE A NUMBER OF THINGS BY SIMPLE MAJORITY, EG DESTROYING THE SOCIAL MARKET ECONOMY: (3) THE NATO AND OTHER TREATIES COULD BE RE-NEGOTIATED. LAFONTAINE WANTED TO LEAVE NATO. ARTICLE 146 FOR HIM WOULD BE AN ELEGANT WAY OF ACHIEVING THAT. THERE WERE SOME PEOPLE WHO CLAIMED THAT ARTICLE 23 WAS AN ANSCHLUSS. IT WAS NOT. THE GDR WOULD HAVE TO SUBMIT A REQUEST UNDER ARTICLE 23 AND THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE AGREEMENT ON A TRANSITION. A NUMBER OF ISSUES WOULD HAVE TO BE RESOLVED WHICH WOULD TAKE MANY YEARS. PROPERTY RIGHTS WERE COMPLETELY DIFFERENT FOR EXAMPLE.

4. KOHL SAID HE WAS GRATEFUL TO THE PRIME MINISTER FOR HER MESSAGE ON THE POLISH BORDER ISSUE. HE LOOKED FOR CLOSE COOPERATION WITH US IN THE TWO PLUS FOUR FRAMEWORK. OF COURSE WE WOULD HAVE TO TALK TO THE SOVIET UNION ABOUT NATO BUT HE REPEATED THAT THERE WAS NOT A PRICE TO BE PAID FOR GERMAN MEMBERSHIP. THE AIM WAS THAT GERMANY SHOULD BE A COMPLETELY NORMAL COUNTRY WITHIN NATO WITH THE SOLE AND LONG-ESTABLISHED EXCEPTION OF BEING A NON-NUCLEAR STATE. OF COURSE SOVIET TROOPS WOULD NOT LEAVE THE GDR OVERNIGHT (HE MENTIONED A 5 YEAR TRANSITION) AND FOR A TRANSITIONAL PERIOD THE BUNDESWEHR WOULD HAVE NO PRESENCE IN THE GDR. THESE WERE ISSUES TO BE DISCUSSED. THE RUSSIANS WERE PLAYING THE CARDS THEY HAD IN THEIR HAND BUT HE BELIEVED THAT IN THE END THE RUSSIANS WOULD WANT GERMANY TO BE A MEMBER OF NATO - ALBEIT FOR NOT VERY FRIENDLY REASONS.

5. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID WE UNDERSTOOD WHAT KOHL WAS TRYING TO ACHIEVE. WHAT HE HAD SAID ABOUT NATO WAS CRUCIAL. WE IMAGINED IT WOULD BE A BIG ISSUE IN THE FEDERAL CAMPAIGN. IN A BRITISH NEWSPAPER ARTICLE THAT DAY BRANDT HAD SAID THAT THERE

SHOULD BE A SYMMETRICAL WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TROOPS FROM EAST GERMANY AND AMERICAN TROOPS FROM WEST GERMANY. THAT WAS A FALSE SYMMETRY.

6. KOHL AGREED. WHEN HE HAD BECOME CHANCELLOR IN 1981 PEOPLE THOUGHT HE WOULD BE A BIRD OF PASSAGE. BUT HE HAD BEATEN OFF THE OPPOSITION. HE HAD TAKEN THEM ON OVER INF STATIONING AND WON. THE SPD ALLIANCE WITH THE SED IN THE GDR WAS PULLING THE SPD DOWN THE PATH TOWARDS NEUTRALITY. BRANDT'S COMMENTS TENDED IN THE SAME DIRECTION. HE RECOGNISED THAT NATO WOULD CHANGE BUT THAT WAS QUITE DIFFERENT FROM WHAT BRANDT WAS SAYING. KOHL WAS CONFIDENT HE WOULD WIN THE BATTLE. HE WOULD ONLY BE DEFEATED IF THE SPD, FDP AND THE GREENS CAME TOGETHER. HE WAS WORKING TO KEEP THE PRESENT COALITION TOGETHER. HE THOUGHT A MAJORITY IN THE COALITION SUPPORTED THE ARTICLE 23 ROUTE. HE DID NOT THINK THE FDP WOULD BE LOOKING FOR A NEW PARTNER, BUT THEY DID WANT SOME MORE LEEWAY.

7. KOHL SAID THAT GETTING THE RESOLUTION HE HAD SECURED ON THE POLISH BORDER IN THE BUNDESTAG HAD BEEN SOMETHING OF A TRIUMPH. ONE HAD TO REMEMBER THAT THERE WERE STRONG FEELINGS ON BOTH SIDES OF THE BORDER. TERRIBLE THINGS HAD BEEN DONE BY GERMANS IN POLAND. BUT THE DISPLACEMENT TO POLAND OF PEOPLE OF GERMAN ORIGIN WAS ALSO A WOUND THAT CONTINUED TO IRRITATE. BOTH SIDES NEEDED A GESTURE. GERMANY HAD ALREADY PAID LARGE REPARATIONS TO POLAND AND HE DID NOT WANT THAT WHOLE ISSUE RE-OPENED IN A PEACE TREATY. THE POLES WERE STILL TALKING IN LARGE FIGURES. IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO REACH AN AGREEMENT PROVIDED THE WHOLE ISSUE WAS NOT MAGNIFIED. HE HIMSELF WOULD BE GO IN A FEW DAYS TIME. HE WOULD RATHER STAND DOWN THAN BE MISUNDERSTOOD BY HIS FRIENDS.

8. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID WE WERE SATISFIED WITH THE WAY THE DECISION HAD COME OUT. THE POLES HAD GOT REASONABLE SATISFACTION ON SUBSTANCE BUT WANTED SOMETHING ON PROCEDURE TO SHOW THEY WERE NOT TO BE PRESENTED WITH A FAIT ACCOMPLI. ON THE WIDER ISSUES, OF COURSE SOVIET TROOPS WOULD REMAIN IN THE GDR FOR A TIME. BUT IF THERE WERE NOT TROOPS FROM THE BUNDESWEHR THERE WHO WOULD DEFEND THE FORMER TERRITORY OF THE GDR IF THINGS WENT WRONG? KOHL AGREED THAT THE ISSUE HAD TO BE DISCUSSED. WE NEEDED AN INTERIM SOLUTION. GORBACHEV WOULD HAVE ABOUT 200,000 TROOPS THERE (WHICH WOULD, HOWEVER, BE A REDUCTION FROM PRESENT LEVELS). WE SHOULD NOT MOVE TOO SPEEDILY. MUCH OF THE BASIS OF CONFLICT WOULD HAVE BEEN REDUCED. NATO ITSELF WAS MUCH MORE THAN A MILITARY ALLIANCE. HIS OWN LIFE-LONG SUPPORT FOR IT HAD BEEN BASED ON A CONCEPT OF BRINGING TOGETHER PEOPLE IN STATES WITH THE SAME BASIC IDEAS AND ORDER: THE WESTERN

COMMUNITY OF VALUES. IT WAS THAT THAT NEEDED PROTECTION AGAINST ATTACK. HE HAD SET OUT HIS POSITION CLEARLY IN NATO THE PREVIOUS WEEK.

9. REVERTING TO THE QUESTION OF THE TWO PLUS FOUR DISCUSSIONS, KOHL SAID HE HAD HAD A TELEPHONE CALL FROM JARUZELSKI LAST WEEK URGING THE NEED TO AVOID A NEW YALTA. KOHL ACCEPTED THAT BUT IF THE TWO PLUS FOUR TALKS WERE HELD IN WARSAW THAT WOULD CREATE A PSYCHOLOGICAL SITUATION WHICH WOULD HAVE DEVASTATING EFFECTS. THE GERMAN PUBLIC ACCEPTED THE REALITY OF A SETTLEMENT WITH THE POLES BUT THEY COULD NOT BE EXPECTED TO BE JUBILANT ABOUT IT. HE HAD ACCEPTED THAT THE POLES SHOULD BE AT THE TABLE FOR THE FOUR PLUS TWO MEETING FOR THE RELEVANT DISCUSSIONS BUT TO HAVE THAT DISCUSSION IN WARSAW WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT FOR HIM POLITICALLY. HE WAS NOT SUGGESTING THAT THE POLES MUST COME TO BONN OR BERLIN BUT WHY COULD THEY NOT MEET IN DRESDEN OR FRANKFURT OR LEIPZIG? THOSE PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS APART, ONCE A MEETING WAS HELD IN WARSAW THEN THE RUSSIANS COULD DEMAND A MEETING IN MOSCOW. HE WANTED TO KEEP THESE ISSUES UNDER CONTROL SO THAT HE COULD FIGHT THE MAIN BATTLE WHICH WAS NOT ABOUT THE ODER/NEISSE LINE BUT ABOUT GERMANY'S PLACE IN NATO.

10. KOHL SAID THAT THE NEWLY UNITED GERMANY WOULD HAVE A VERY DIFFERENT POWER AXIS FROM THE GERMANY OF 1933. THE CAPITAL OF A UNITED GERMANY HAD NOT BEEN DECIDED BUT THE REAL CENTRE WOULD, AS WITH THE FRG NOW, BE IN THE SOUTH OR SOUTH-WEST. MODERN POWER LAY NOT IN COAL BUT IN THE COMPUTER. PRUSSIA WOULD NOT BE THE CENTRE OF POWER THAT IT HAD BEEN. THE SITUATION WOULD BE NO DIFFERENT FROM NOW WHEN GERMAN PROSPERITY LAY IN THE PROVINCES LIKE HESSE BADEN-WUERTEMBERG, BAVARIA AND RHEINLAND-PALATINATE. FEARS ABOUT THE DEVELOPMENTS OF A UNITED GERMANY RAN UNFOUNDED. WHOEVER BELIEVED POINCARE WAS A GOOD ADVISER WAS WRONG. POINCARE WAS DEAD.

HURD

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION

174

MAIN

161

.BERLIN/INNER-GERMAN RELATIONS
.(WIDE)
LIMITED

CRD
ECONOMIC ADVISERS
LEGAL ADVISERS