



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

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16 March 1990

R. H. T. Gozney

Dear Charles,

Polish-German Borders

When Mr Kenneth Baker visited Warsaw on 10 March, Mr Mazowiecki and General Jaruzelski raised the implications of German unification for Poland and sought a British reaction to the question of Polish involvement in the Two plus Four talks (Warsaw telno 207 enclosed).

I enclose draft instructions to the Ambassador in Warsaw to respond to the Polish request. They take account of the discussion between Political Directors of the Two plus Four in Bonn on 14 March (at which there was no agreement about a meeting of the Two plus Four in Warsaw). The Polish Ambassador in London was briefed in general terms on the Bonn meeting when he paid a farewell call on John Weston on 15 March.

Mr Mazowiecki also asked the Prime Minister to speak to President Bush about Polish concerns before his visit to Washington on 21 March. (He leaves for Washington on 19 March.) We would see no objection to this. But it is clear that the Americans are fully seized of the problem and share our view (Washington telno 622 enclosed). There seems therefore little to be gained from a further contact with President Bush, beyond pleasing the Poles with the gesture.

Yours ever,

R. H. T. Gozney

(R H T Gozney)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

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POLAND AND GERMAN UNIFICATION

SUMMARY

1. MAZOWIECKI AND JARUZELSKI TELL MR KENNETH BAKER ABOUT THEIR DISCUSSIONS WITH MITTERRAND. FRENCH SUPPORT FOR POLISH POSITION ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE BORDER QUESTION. ON MODALITIES, POLES SEEK BRITISH VIEWS ON POSSIBLE 2 PLUS 4 MEETING IN WARSAW TO SETTLE THE BORDER ISSUE. MAZOWIECKI ASKS PRIME MINISTER TO CONVEY POLISH CONCERNS TO BUSH. JARUZELSKI CONCERNED TO SETTLE SECURITY QUESTIONS AT AN EARLY STAGE OF UNIFICATION PROCESS.

DETAIL

2. I ACCOMPANIED MR KENNETH BAKER ON HIS CALLS ON MAZOWIECKI AND JARUZELSKI ON 10 MARCH. THE MAIN SUBJECT DISCUSSED WAS GERMAN UNIFICATION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR POLAND AND FOR EUROPEAN SECURITY. MAZOWIECKI AND JARUZELSKI, TOGETHER WITH SKUBISZEWSKI, HAD RETURNED TWELVE HOURS EARLIER FROM A DAY'S VISIT TO PARIS. MAZOWIECKI IN PARTICULAR WANTED TO ENSURE THAT THE PRIME MINISTER WAS BROUGHT UP TO DATE WITH POLISH THINKING FOLLOWING THE PARIS VISIT.

3. MAZOWIECKI SAID WE HAD ALL FOLLOWED THE STRANGE PIROUETTES OF CHANCELLOR KOHL. HE PERSONALLY HAD BEEN OFFENDED THAT KOHL HAD INTRODUCED THE ISSUE OF THE GERMAN MINORITY IN POLAND AFTER THIS HAD BEEN SETTLED DURING KOHL'S VISIT HERE LAST NOVEMBER. IN DOING SO KOHL HAD BROUGHT BACK MEMORIES OF PRE-WAR GERMAN INTERFERENCE IN THE NAME OF GERMAN MINORITIES. POLISH SOCIETY WAS UNEASY AS A RESULT AND THE PUBLIC NOW HAD TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.

4. HE REFERRED WARMLY TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S IMMEDIATE AND EARLY REAFFIRMATION OF THE NEED FOR THE BORDER QUESTION TO BE SETTLED BY A TREATY AND OF POLAND'S RIGHT TO TAKE PART WHEN ISSUES CONCERNING HER WERE DISCUSSED. FOLLOWING HIS VISIT TO PARIS, THIS WAS NOW ALSO THE FRENCH POSITION. HE REPEATED HOW IMPORTANT IT WAS

THAT THE TREATY SHOULD BE INITIALLED BEFORE UNIFICATION. THE FOUR POWERS SHOULD BE ASSOCIATED WITH IT.

5. MAZOWIECKI SAID THAT HE WOULD BE TELLING THE SOVIET UNION THAT DELAYING TACTICS WERE WRONG AND INAPPROPRIATE. IT WAS TOO LATE FOR A PHASED APPROACH: THE GERMANS MIGHT PRODUCE A FAIT ACCOMPLI. THE PRIME MINISTER HAD BEEN RIGHT TO DRAW ATTENTION TO THE DANGER THAT UNIFICATION MIGHT TAKE PLACE ON THE BASIS OF ARTICLE 23 OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. MAZOWIECKI HAD ASKED MODROW WHETHER ELECTIONS IN THE GDR WOULD RESULT IN A GOVERNMENT STRONG ENOUGH TO TAKE PART IN TALKS ON UNIFICATION. MODROW'S ANSWER WAS THAT HE COULD NOT GUARANTEE THIS : HE COULD SEE CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH ARTICLE 23 WOULD BE USED. AS MAZOWIECKI PUT IT, NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD TAKE PLACE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, AS OTHERWISE THERE WAS A RISK THAT THE STREETS AND ARTICLE 23 WOULD DETERMINE WHAT HAPPENED.

6. MAZOWIECKI SAID HE WAS AFRAID FOR GORBACHEV. ACCORDING TO POLISH INFORMATION, MATTERS WERE CURRENTLY VERY DIFFICULT FOR HIM.

7. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND, POLISH PARTICIPATION IN TALKS HAD BECOME EVEN MORE CRITICAL. IT WAS AN OPPORTUNITY FOR THE FOUR POWERS TO SHOW THAT THEY RESPECTED POLISH RIGHTS. HE RECALLED THAT HE HAD SAID ON BRITISH TV THAT HE DID NOT WANT POLAND'S WESTERN BORDER TO BE THE GIFT OF STALIN. AS HE SAW IT, THE ONLY WAY TO FORCE KOHL TO SETTLE THE BORDER ISSUE IN THE INITIAL STAGE OF THE PROCESS OF REUNIFICATION WOULD BE FOR THE FOUR POWERS TO GIVE THIS THEIR IMMEDIATE SUPPORT. HE HAD SUGGESTED TWO OPTIONS TO MITTERRAND. EITHER POLAND COULD FORMALLY REQUEST THE SIX POWERS THAT SHE SHOULD TAKE PART IN THE FIRST PHASE OF TALKS ON THE SECURITY OF GERMANY'S NEIGHBOURS. OR POLAND SHOULD INVITE THE 4 PLUS 2 TO WARSAW TO DISCUSS THIS PART OF THE PROBLEM. THE FIRST COURSE MIGHT BE SIMPLER BUT WOULD BE MORE DIFFICULT TO SET UP. THE SECOND MIGHT BE HARDER TO REJECT BUT MAZOWIECKI DID NOT WANT TO PROPOSE IT FORMALLY BEFORE BEING SURE THAT THE FOUR POWERS WOULD AGREE TO IT. MITTERRAND HAD LIKED THE SECOND METHOD AND HAD UNDERTAKEN TO GIVE THE POLES A DEFINITE ANSWER BY 16 MARCH.

8. MAZOWIECKI THEREFORE REQUESTED A BRITISH REACTION, ALSO BY 16 MARCH. HE THEN RECALLED THAT WHEN HE HAD BEEN IN LONDON THE PRIME MINISTER HAD ASKED HIM IF HE WANTED HER TO SPEAK TO PRESIDENT BUSH ABOUT POLISH CONCERNS. HE NOW WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF THE PRIME MINISTER COULD DELIVER ON HER OFFER BEFORE HE SAW THE PRESIDENT IN WASHINGTON ON 21 MARCH.

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9. MR BAKER STRESSED DURING THE MEETING THAT THE BORDER QUESTION WAS A QUESTION OF JUSTICE FOR POLAND AND THAT LEAVING IT UNCERTAIN COULD LEAD TO INSTABILITY IN EUROPE. HE POINTED TO THE PROBLEMS, FOR EUROPE AND THE COMMUNITY, OF THE ARTICLE 23 ROUTE. THESE MAJOR ISSUES, WHICH INCLUDED THE SECURITY QUESTIONS, COULD NOT BE BRUSHED ASIDE. HE WOULD REPORT THE DISCUSSION AND THE POLISH REQUEST (PARAGRAPH 8) TO THE PRIME MINISTER ON HIS RETURN.

10. AS WE WERE LEAVING, MAZOWIECKI'S PRIVATE SECRETARY ASKED THAT I SHOULD TRANSMIT OUR REPLY BOTH TO HIM AND TO THE MFA. AT OUR DINNER FOR MR BAKER LAST NIGHT SKUBISZEWSKI SAID THAT THE ANSWER TO THE MFA SHOULD BE GIVEN TO HIM PERSONALLY.

11. SEE MIFT FOR MR BAKER'S MEETING WITH JARUZELSKI.

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
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OF	7	OF 16 Z MARCH 90		
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	9	INFO IMMEDIATE UKDEL NATO, UKREP BRUSSELS		
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	11			
	12	YOUR TELNO 207: POLAND AND GERMAN UNIFICATION		
	13	1. Following Mazowiecki's and Jaruzelski's remarks to		
	14	Mr Kenneth Baker on 10 March, grateful if you would now convey		
	15	our views on the question of Polish involvement in discussions		
	16	in the two plus four framework on the question of Polish		
	17	borders, supplementing the Prime Minister's message already		
	18	delivered to Mazowiecki (FCO telno 134).		
	19	2. Background on procedural discussions about involvement of		
	20	the Poles is in the reporting telegrams of the meetings in		
	21	Paris and Bonn on 13 and 14 March respectively in the framework		
	22	of the two plus four. We took an active part in this		
	23	discussion, emphasising the need to involve the Poles in early		
	24	discussion of the Polish borders, preferably at the next		
	25	meeting at official level (planned to take place soon after the		
///	26	formation of a GDR government, in mid to late April). A		
//	27	Ministerial meeting in Warsaw was not agreed but there was		
/	28	complete agreement on the principle of Polish involvement in		
	29	that part of any discussion which concerned the Polish		
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Western border.

3. You should speak to the Poles on the following lines.

4. The Prime Minister was grateful to receive the views of Jaruzelski and Mazowiecki through Mr Baker. As indicated in a separate message, the Prime Minister shares the Polish view that the question of Poland's Western borders should be enshrined in a treaty. It is also our firm view that Poland should be invited to become involved in that part of the discussions of the two plus four which relates to the question of the borders between German and Poland. Our wish is that this should occur at an early stage and that Poland might, in the first instance, attend at official level in preparation for a possible subsequent meeting at Ministerial level.

5. If asked about the venue of a Ministerial meeting and the possibility that it might take place in Warsaw, you should be non-committal, saying, if necessary, that the question of the venue of meetings at Ministerial level has not yet been completely resolved. But it has been agreed in the two plus four that official-level meetings should take place on German soil. [For your own information you should be aware that we do not see much chance of a venue outside Germany.]

6. You should add that we have been in close touch with the Americans on this matter and believe that we share a very similar view (as indicated by Washington telno 622). ~~[The Prime Minister intends [does not intend] to speak to Mr Bush before 21 March.]~~

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10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

17 March 1990

Dear Richard,

POLISH-GERMAN BORDERS

Thank you for your letter of 16 March enclosing draft instructions to our Ambassador in Warsaw to respond to the Polish Government's request for a British reaction to the question of Polish involvement in the Four plus Two talks. The draft enclosed with your letter seems entirely consistent with the line we have taken and I am sure the Prime Minister would be content for it to issue. The Prime Minister has no plans to speak to President Bush before 21 March. I have therefore struck out the last sentence of the draft. But our Ambassador might say that the Prime Minister is confident that the Americans are fully aware of the Polish Government's concerns and share our views.

Yours sincerely,

(C. D. POWELL)

Richard Gozney, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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