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MIPT (ONLY TO FCO): TELTSCHIK ON GERMAN UNIFICATION AND NATO

SUMMARY

1. TELTSCHIK BELIEVES THAT SOVIET UNION WILL AGREE TO GERMAN MEMBERSHIP OF NATO, BUT NOT EASILY. URGES US TO KEEP STRESSING PUBLICLY THAT GERMANY SHOULD REMAIN IN NATO. FORESEES VERY DIFFICULT NEGOTIATIONS WITH SOVIET UNION IN 2 PLUS 4 ABOUT OTHER SECURITY MATTERS, ESPECIALLY NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN GERMANY. LATTER POINT COULD POSE GREAT DIFFICULTIES FOR FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. TELTSCHIK THINKS BUNDESWEHR SHOULD BE STATIONED IN EAST GERMANY AFTER SOVIET FORCES GO. WANTS TO HIVE OFF QUESTIONS OF LIMITS ON BUNDESWEHR AND FURTHER REDUCTIONS IN US FORCES IN GERMANY FOR A FURTHER CFE NEGOTIATION. URGES EARLY DISCUSSION OF A MANDATE FOR THIS IN NATO.

DETAIL

2. WHEN I SAW TELTSCHIK TODAY IN PREPARATION FOR NEXT WEEK'S BRITISH-GERMAN SUMMIT, I SAID THAT THE NATO ASPECTS WOULD BE THE MOST IMPORTANT AND DIFFICULT ELEMENT IN THE 2 PLUS 4 NEGOTIATIONS. IN OUR VIEW, THE NATO GUARANTEE SHOULD BE EXTENDED TO EAST GERMANY FROM THE TIME OF UNIFICATION. SUFFICIENT MILITARY CAPABILITY MUST BE IDENTIFIED IN ORDER TO MAKE THE GUARANTEE CREDIBLE. TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS WERE NEEDED IN THE SENSE THAT THE SOVIET WITHDRAWAL FROM EAST GERMANY WOULD REQUIRE SOME TIME. BUT IT WOULD BE DANGEROUS TO POSTPONE UNTIL AFTER THAT THE DECISIONS ON HOW TO MAINTAIN THE SECURITY OF EAST GERMANY, AS SOME PEOPLE IN BONN SEEMED TO BE SUGGESTING.

3. TELTSCHIK SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD EVENTUALLY ACCEPT GERMAN MEMBERSHIP OF NATO. GORBACHEV SEEMED STILL TO BE THINKING ABOUT IT. BUT ACCORDING TO THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR HERE, KVITSINSKY, THE SOVIET MILITARY WERE INCREASINGLY OPPOSED TO GERMANY BEING IN NATO. TELTSCHIK SAID THAT ALLIED UNITY WAS ESSENTIAL ON THE

MATTER, AND HE HOPED THAT WE WOULD CONTINUE TO STRESS PUBLICLY THAT GERMANY MUST REMAIN IN NATO. I TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO SAY THAT AGREEMENT ON THE 2 PLUS 4 SUBJECTS ESPECIALLY THE SECURITY ASPECTS, WOULD BE NEEDED AMONG THE FOUR WESTERN PARTICIPANTS BEFORE WE GOT INTO SUBSTANCE WITH THE RUSSIANS. TELTSCHIK EMPHATICALLY AGREED.

4. HE CONTINUED THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD PROBABLY TRY IN 2 PLUS 4 TO INSIST ON LIMITS ON THE BUNDESWEHR AND ON DEEP CUTS IN AMERICAN FORCES IN GERMANY BEYOND THOSE ALREADY FORESEEN, AS WELL AS CUTS IN OTHER STATIONED FORCES. THE RUSSIANS WOULD PRESS, ABOVE ALL, FOR THE REMOVAL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS FROM GERMANY. THINGS WOULD BECOME VERY TOUGH FOR THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IF THE RUSSIANS TRIED TO MAKE AGREEMENT TO THEIR POSITION ON ANY OF THESE MATTERS A CONDITION OF GERMAN UNITY. TELTSCHIK SAID THAT, IF THERE WAS AN ALL-OUT SOVIET PUSH FOR THE REMOVAL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS FROM GERMANY, THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT WOULD HAVE GREAT DIFFICULTY IN STANDING UP TO THE RUSSIANS, SINCE PUBLIC OPINION IN BOTH GERMAN STATES WOULD SEE ATTRACTION IN THE SOVIET POSITION. HE IMPLIED THAT THIS ISSUE COULD PREJUDICE THE OTHERWISE GOOD PROSPECTS OF THE CDU IN THE FEDERAL ELECTIONS IN DECEMBER. TELTSCHIK SAID THAT THE QUESTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN GERMANY MIGHT NEED TO BE TAKEN UP BY BUSH AT HIS SUMMIT WITH GORBACHEV IN JUNE.

5. I SAID THAT I HAD BEEN PUZZLED BY THE GENSCHER/STOLTENBERG STATEMENT THAT THE BUNDESWEHR, EVEN UNITS NOT ASSIGNED TO NATO, WOULD NOT BE STATIONED IN EAST GERMANY. WITHOUT THAT, HOW COULD A NATO GUARANTEE BE MADE CREDIBLE? TELTSCHIK AGREED THAT THE BUNDESWEHR MUST IN DUE COURSE BE STATIONED IN EAST GERMANY. BUT HE DOUBTED THAT THIS WOULD BE POSSIBLE WHILE SOVIET FORCES WERE STILL THERE. IT MUST BE CLEARLY AGREED IN 2 PLUS 4 THAT THE BUNDESWEHR WOULD LATER BE STATIONED IN EAST GERMANY, BUT IT COULD BE AGREED THAT CERTAIN TYPES OF WEAPONS WOULD BE PRESENT ONLY IN WEST GERMANY AND THAT THE BULK OF BUNDESWEHR WOULD BE IN WEST GERMANY. TELTSCHIK THOUGHT THAT THE QUESTION OF BUNDESWEHR IN EAST GERMANY WAS LESS IMPORTANT TO THE RUSSIANS THAN THE QUESTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN GERMANY.

6. TELTSCHIK SAID THAT 2 PLUS 4 MUST AGREE ON A TIMETABLE FOR SOVIET WITHDRAWAL FROM EAST GERMANY. BUT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT BE WILLING IN THAT FORUM TO AGREE TO LIMITS ON THE BUNDESWEHR OR FURTHER REDUCTIONS IN US FORCES IN GERMANY. THESE MATTERS SHOULD BE REMITTED TO A SECOND CFE CONFERENCE. IN ORDER TO GAIN 2 PLUS 4 AGREEMENT TO THIS APPROACH, A MANDATE FOR A FUTURE CFE NEGOTIATION WOULD BE NEEDED QUICKLY. FEDERAL OFFICIALS WERE WORKING ON IDEAS.

EARLY DISCUSSION IN NATO WAS DESIRABLE.

7. TELTSCHIK SAID THAT THERE WERE MANY INDICATIONS OF MAJOR SOVIET INTEREST IN ECONOMIC COOPERATION WITH UNITED GERMANY. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT WAS THINKING HOW TO DERIVE LEVERAGE FROM THIS IN 2 PLUS 4.

COMMENT

8. TELTSCHIK'S REMARKS ARE FURTHER EVIDENCE THAT GERMAN THINKING ON THE SECURITY ASPECTS OF 2 PLUS 4 IS NOT WELL ADVANCED. THERE HAVE BEEN SIGNS THAT SOME OF THE PLAYERS IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ARE TEMPTED BY A SOLUTION THAT WOULD LEAVE THE QUESTION OF MILITARY RESOURCES TO UPHOLD A NATO GUARANTEE OF EAST GERMANY FOR DECISION BETWEEN UNIFICATION AND THE COMPLETION OF SOVIET WITHDRAWAL FROM EAST GERMANY. THERE IS STILL NO REMOTELY CONVINCING ANSWER TO THE QUESTION HOW A NATO GUARANTEE OF EAST GERMANY COULD BE MADE CREDIBLE DURING THE PERIOD FROM UNIFICATION UNTIL COMPLETION OF SOVIET WITHDRAWAL.

9. TELTSCHIK DID NOT MENTION SNF NEGOTIATIONS. BUT I DO NOT (NOT) ATTACH IMPORTANCE TO THIS OMISSION. THERE ARE OTHER INDICATIONS HERE THAT THE GERMANS ARE PREPARING A PROPOSAL TO ACCELERATE THE OPENING OF SNF NEGOTIATIONS (MY TELNO 359).

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