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TELNO 377
OF 231822Z MARCH 90
INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, PARIS, WARSAW, MOSCOW

GERMAN-POLISH FRONTIER

SUMMARY

1. TELTSCHIK TALKS IN STRICT CONFIDENCE ABOUT KOHL'S FURTHER ROOM FOR MANOEUVRE ON THE ODER-NEISSE QUESTION.

DETAIL

2. TELTSCHIK SAID TO ME PRIVATELY TODAY THAT THE FEDERAL CHANCELLOR WAS NOT WILLING TO AGREE TO THE POLISH SUGGESTION THAT THE PROPOSED TREATY FIXING THE ODER-NEISSE FRONTIER SHOULD BE NEGOTIATED AND INITIALLED BY POLAND AND THE TWO GERMAN STATES BEFORE UNIFICATION. THERE WAS NO PRECEDENT FOR SUCH PROCEDURE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW. KOHL HAD MADE A NUMBER OF CONCESSIONS ON THIS SUBJECT AND COULD NOT RETREAT ANOTHER MAJOR STEP WITHOUT MAJOR TROUBLE IN HIS OWN PARTY. BUT HE WAS WILLING TO MOVE A BIT FURTHER THAN HE HAD SO FAR. THE IDENTICAL RESOLUTIONS TO BE PASSED BY THE BUNDESTAG AND THE NEW VOLKSKAMMER COULD SPECIFY THAT THE ODER-NEISSE LINE WAS THE FRONTIER OF POLAND AND WOULD NOT BE CHANGED, AS WELL AS SAYING THAT A TREATY WOULD FOLLOW UNIFICATION. BOTH GERMAN GOVERNMENTS COULD ENDORSE THIS. ONCE THERE WAS A GOVERNMENT OF UNITED GERMANY, IT COULD NEGOTIATE A TREATY WITH POLAND WHICH WOULD BE RATIFIED BY THE PARLIAMENT OF UNITED GERMANY.

3. THERE HAVE BEEN SIGNS THAT GENSCHER WOULD BE WILLING TO NEGOTIATE THE TREATY WITH POLAND BEFORE UNIFICATION.

4. IN SPEAKING TO ME IN THIS WAY, TELTSCHIK, I BELIEVE, WAS SEEKING TO CONVEY THE MESSAGE THAT IT WOULD BE UNCOMFORTABLE FOR KOHL IF THE PRIME MINISTER SUPPORTED THE PROPOSAL OF TREATY NEGOTIATION BEFORE UNIFICATION.

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