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RECORD OF A MEETING BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE AND
THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
ON 30TH MARCH 1990

Present:

The Rt Hon Tom King MP
Secretary of State for Defence

HE Dr Gerhard Stoltenberg
Federal Minister of Defence

Mr Simon Webb
Private Secretary

Colonel Rainer Schuwirth
Adjutant

During this meeting Dr Stoltenberg expressed some personal views,
as well as the agreed positions of the FRG Government. This should
accordingly be treated with caution and not quoted back directly to
German officials.

After initial greetings, the Secretary of State said how grateful British forces in Germany were about the arrangements made to improve the protection for servicemen and their families living off-base in the Federal Republic. Dr Stoltenberg said he would pass on the British Government's thanks to his colleagues in the Interior Ministry.

EFA

2. In response to queries, the Defence Secretary said that Herr Ruppelt and Sir Peter Levene had agreed the terms of the side-letter. He had written to Italian and Spanish colleagues on 22nd March seeking their support. He would then have to confirm the arrangements to his Cabinet colleagues. The UK was keen to sign as soon as possible now.

3. Dr Stoltenberg said he was anxious that waiting for the other two countries should not lead to delay, which was costing 5 million DM a month. If they were ready to sign, that was fine. Otherwise did we really need them, given that the arrangement was between the British and the FRG Governments? He was under growing pressure in the Bundeswehr over the project. During the supplementary budget debate today, the SPD would try to kill it off. He could sustain a majority at present, but it was always difficult to keep the FPD on line and he was worried that continued delay might jeopardise the whole project.

4. The Defence Secretary explained that the UK Government assurance over the 200 million DM had to be sustained by an industrial guarantee back-to-back. GEC were prepared to provide

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this but wanted their partners in the other two countries to take their share. In further exchanges, during which Dr Stoltenberg reiterated that he was only concerned with his arrangements with the UK Government, the two Ministers agreed that the Government-to-Government arrangements must be finalised during April.

Exercises

5. Dr Stoltenberg thanked the Defence Secretary for his co-operative approach to Exercises. It was important to be sensitive to the political climate and environmental concerns. He was grateful for the reductions agreed on the UK side. There had been a silly leak in the press about low flying, alleging (and then inaccurately) that he wished to cut out all flying under 300m. In fact, Dr Stoltenberg had commissioned a study to report at the end of April which would then be discussed within appropriate NATO groups, before being exposed for political discussion with other Allied Ministers. No decisions had been taken. The Defence Secretary commented that British Forces in Germany had to be able to train; they could not remain effectively confined to barracks. He had commented to Herr Momper in Berlin earlier in the week that this was part of the price tag for the continuing British presence in Berlin which the Mayor and his predecessor had sought.

Implications of Unification

6. Turning to broader issues, Dr Stoltenberg said that when they had last met there had been good progress on CFE at Vienna. During the latest round he had seen a noticeable hardening of the Soviet position. It was difficult to judge what this meant but he was concerned that they might be trying to strengthen their negotiating stance in the "two-plus-four" talks.

7. Continuing Dr Stoltenberg set out the key elements of the FRG Government's position on the security aspects of unification:

- a. Obviously, a wholly unified Germany;
- b. No demilitarisation or neutrality;
- c. No transfer of NATO units to the Territories of the former GDR;
- d. They were prepared to discuss in "two-plus-four" a formula which allows the Soviet Union to keep Red Army units (within 195,000 ceiling) for some time after unification. His preference was to establish a clear final date.

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e. Articles V and VI of the NATO Treaty should apply to the Eastern Territory (though "one colleague" believed that this should not occur while the Red Army were present).

8. On the question of whether there would be German troops in the GDR while the Red Army was there, Dr Stoltenberg said his personal answer was yes, with limitations. The Federal Government would not take a final position until they had had discussions with the new GDR Government. It was immensely helpful that this would be led by the CDU. Herr de Maizièrè had said in an important article in WELT am SONNTAG last Sunday (which had gone unnoticed in the West) that he accepted there would be German troops in the GDR during the transition, but with limitations. Even the Polish Foreign Minister had said to the WEU in Brussels recently that it was conceivable to have German troops in the GDR during this phase (though, he had added, without weapons).

9. Dr Stoltenberg then added that, privately, he was very worried that a settlement without German troops in the GDR during transition would lead eventually to demilitarisation after the Red Army left. There was now agreement within the Government that the "two-plus-four" process should not be allowed to bring limitations on the Bundeswehr or on Allied forces in Germany. These were areas for CFE at Vienna. The Germans had discussed the military dimensions of this problem with the US Government (and he understood that it had been touched on in diplomatic discussions with the British Foreign Office). He felt it was important for NATO to reach a view within the next few months which could then be presented at Vienna, so as to avoid the focus shifting to "two-plus-four".

10. In response, Mr King said that it was increasingly his view that the Eastern Europeans would agree to a unified Germany joining NATO, and that the Soviet position was not as rigid as it sounded. The UK accepted that NATO troops as such could not be based in East Germany while the Red Army remained. It was however vital to ensure that a credible security structure was created to back-up the security guarantee that would be conferred on that Territory. In other words, NATO needed the infrastructure to support German troops in holding a new frontline if a unified Germany was attacked. Dr Stoltenberg referred again to Mr de Maizièrè's views and commented that it was important to continue with the tradition of conscription in East Germany. The whole Germany military tradition was, unlike that of Britain, founded on a conscript Army. One could not have a truly unified Germany in which conscription continued in the West but not in the East. In practice this meant that the National People's Army would need to be rebuilt (if only to provide a force in which East German conscripts could serve). There were, however, considerable problems since the officer structure of the NVA was predominantly composed of members of the

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Communist Party. In response to a question from Mr King about whether officers might be sent over from the FRG, Dr Stoltenberg said this was a very sensitive issue which needed to be discussed with the new GDR Government, but it might be possible to build up from a low level in that direction. It was important, he reiterated, that there were no limitations on German forces overall in "two-plus-four" (though he could see, as a final compromise, that some constraints might have to be accepted on the size of German forces in East Germany and their equipment).

11. Mr King said that the UK well understood the difficulties and sensitive issues involved here but it was important to ensure that practical military arrangements were put in place. He then went through with Dr Stoltenberg the advice he had received from the Chiefs of Staff about the measures they thought necessary. A copy is attached at Annex A. The Defence Secretary emphasised this was not yet the UK Government's position. Dr Stoltenberg said he would not respond formally, but indicated his agreement to most of the points, with the following exceptions:

- a. Peace-time contingency planning for German forces in the former GDR to become part of the integral military command structure in transition-to-war would pose difficulties.
- b. He paused over the idea of integrated air defence over the unified Germany, but did not demur.
- c. He saw substantial difficulties in the detail of item K.

12. Dr Stoltenberg said it was important to register this kind of thinking in the "two-plus-four" forum, commenting whimsically in another apparent reference to Herr Genscher that "we must all educate the diplomats on military matters".

Nuclear Forces

13. Dr Stoltenberg said he was sure we must now move towards smaller numbers of theatre nuclear weapons on both sides. It was becoming very difficult to justify any dual-capable artillery and Lance in Germany. The German Government would be placing increasing emphasis on dual-capable aircraft, but recognised that TASM was an essential component.

14. The Defence Secretary said that he recognised some of the reality of these pressures but it was very important that the Alliance should not change from the comprehensive concept until it had a clearer position on where we were going. Otherwise the Russians would have endless opportunities for mischief in

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"two-plus-four". He understood the sensitivities about basing on German soil and the role of other Allies in helping the German Government not to appear singularised.

15. The two Ministers agreed that their staffs should work together closely on these questions in the run-up to the NPG.

Ministry of Defence
30th March 1990

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SUMMARY OF MILITARY OBJECTIVES

47. From a military point of view, in discussion amongst Allies on the military implications of the unification of Germany, the UK aim should be to achieve agreement on the following framework:

- a. Articles 5 and 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty extend to the whole of the united Germany.
- b. The present GDR does not become "demilitarized" to the extent that the only forces allowed are paramilitary.
- c. Regular German forces are stationed in the former GDR both to man installations and to facilitate forward deployment by the Alliance in a crisis. These forces should be appropriate for the eventual military task, although there could be advantage if the force-level was not such as to justify the Soviet Union stationing large forces in Poland). Peacetime contingency plans should also be made for the incorporation of German forces stationed in the former GDR to become part of the IMCS in ITW within an agreed GDP.
- d. An integrated air defence is established over the united Germany.

(Footnote 4 continued from previous page)
air-delivered forces and tactical air transport.

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e. German forces stationed in the present FRG are within the IMCS.

f. Nuclear weapons, including those of the US, are retained on German soil.

g. Significant levels of US and European forces are stationed in the present FRG. While it is accepted that no US and European forces are to be stationed in the former GDR in peacetime, this limitation should be expressed in the form of unilateral declarations by the NATO countries concerned rather than by a contractual agreement with the Soviet Union.

h. An equitable solution is achieved concerning GDR military equipment, though NATO should be sympathetic to Soviet demands for non-TLEs to be destroyed.

i. Soviet forces do not remain in the GDR for any longer than is necessary.

j. Transitional arrangements allow the continued functioning of UK forces in Berlin until their subsequent orderly withdrawal.

k. NATO is not committed to defence in strength on the Oder-Neisse line, but that the ability to deploy forward of the existing IGB is improved by ideally negotiating the right to:

(1) Conduct exercises, albeit on a limited scale, in the GDR.

(2) Make provision for support forward.

(3) Make use of former military air bases in East

Germany

Interview mit dem Ost-CDU-Vorsitzenden und designierten DDR-Ministerpräsidenten Lothar de Maizière

„Den Staatsrat wird es bald nicht mehr geben“

Von HEINZ VIELAIN

Bonn
Am Freitagabend erklärte sich der Vorsitzende der CDU in der DDR, Lothar de Maizière, bereit, als Ministerpräsident zu kandidieren. Gegenüber WELT am SONNTAG gab er in einem Interview Auskunft über seine Pläne.

WELT am SONNTAG: Was wird aus den Institutionen Staatsrat und Staatsratsvorsitzender, der einmal Honecker hieß?

de Maizière: Wir sind der Auffassung, daß es den Staatsrat bald nicht mehr geben wird. Wir brauchen künftig einen Präsidenten. Es muß eine Persönlichkeit sein, die das Vertrauen der überwiegenden Mehrheit unserer Bevölkerung hat. Wir werden einen solchen Präsidenten finden. Zum Verzicht auf Staatsrat und Staatsratsvorsitzenden ist eine Verfassungsänderung notwendig. Ich gehe davon aus, daß dies mit der Mehrheit fast aller Parteien so entschieden wird.

WELT am SONNTAG: Die Allianz - CDU, DSU und DA - verfügt über 192 Volkskammerabgeordnete. Sie sagen, für einen Beitritt der DDR zur Bundesrepublik nach Artikel 23 Grundgesetz sei eine Zweidrittel-Mehrheit notwendig. Es gibt Experten, die dem widersprechen.

de Maizière: Die Vereinigung mit all ihren Konsequenzen wird am Ende der Arbeit der Volkskammer stehen. Ich bin der festen Überzeugung, daß der Weg gemäß Artikel 23 Grundgesetz der richtige zur Vereinigung Deutschlands ist. Ich glaube, daß es zu gegebener Zeit eine notwendige Mehrheit für diesen Weg gibt.

WELT am SONNTAG: Große Koalition um jeden Preis? Wo ist die Grenze des guten



VARIO-PRESS

Willens bei Ihnen? SPD statt DSU, geht das?

de Maizière: Die große Koalition ist nach wie vor wünschenswert. Von dem Angebot an die SPD machen wir keine Abstriche. Aber wir werden uns auch nicht verbiegen.

WELT am SONNTAG: Eine Fraktionsgemeinschaft von CDU, DSU und DA wird es nicht geben, sondern eine Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Abgeordneten der Allianz. Ist das kein Hemmnis für die praktische Parlamentsarbeit?

de Maizière: Ob eine Sache zum Hemmnis wird, kann man erst beurteilen, wenn man zumindest einen Teil des Wegs gegangen ist. Eine Fraktionsgemeinschaft, wie es sie zwischen CDU und CSU im Bundestag gibt, sieht die Geschäftsordnung der Volkskammer nicht vor. Die parlamentarische Arbeit bei uns muß schon auf die Verhältnisse der Volkskammer abgestellt werden. Im übrigen hatten wir die Arbeitsgemeinschaft nicht vereinbart, wenn wir sie nicht für

tragfähig hielten.

WELT am SONNTAG: Sie haben diese Woche mit dem Bundeskanzler über weitere Schritte auf dem Weg zur deutschen Einheit gesprochen. Geht es voran?

de Maizière: Die Verhandlungen für die Währungs-, Wirtschafts- und Sozialunion sind auf einem guten Weg, obwohl die Rahmenbedingungen außerordentlich schwierig sind. Das ist schon sehr viel. Die Parteien bei uns sind nun aufgerufen, Fraktionen in der Volkskammer zu bilden und eine Regierungsmannschaft zu stellen. Was dann gemeinsam zu geschehen hat, wird mit der Regierungserklärung dargelegt.

WELT am SONNTAG: Währungs-, Wirtschafts- und Sozialunion - die Bundesregierung möchte all dies bis Anfang Juli unter Dach und Fach haben. Was haben Sie in der DDR für einen Zeitplan?

de Maizière: Genaue Zeitpunkte werden weder ich noch andere nennen, weil wir bei der

Währungsumstellung keinen Raum für Spekulationen schaffen wollen. Dies kann nicht unser Interesse in der DDR sein. Die DDR-Bürger haben nach den Jahren des Lebens mit der Mauer die Möglichkeit zu reisen. Das ist für sie eine neue, wichtige Erfahrung. Sie möchten bald reisen mit dem richtigen Geld in der Tasche. Deswegen sage ich: Im Sommer soll es sein.

WELT am SONNTAG: Eines der aktuellen Probleme in der DDR ist die Volksarmee. Was soll aus der NVA werden?

de Maizière: Sie wissen, daß bei uns die Verkürzung der Wehrdienstzeit ansteht. Wir haben zudem eine Verordnung über einen sozialen Friedensdienst geschaffen. Das wird meines Erachtens die Welt der NVA schon wesentlich verändern. Ich glaube, daß diese Frage auch ganz stark verknüpft ist mit den Ergebnissen, die im Rahmen der Zwei-plus-vier-Gespräche zu finden sind. Diese Gespräche, die sicherlich nicht ohne Probleme sind, will

ich nicht mit Prognosen belasten. Wir gehen davon aus, daß es schon der Balance wegen in der DDR Streitkräfte mit noch zu beschreibenden Aufgaben geben wird. Deshalb gibt es keinen Grund für Soldaten, jetzt zu verzweifeln oder gar zu sagen, sie hätten sich in ihrem Leben völlig falsch entschieden.

WELT am SONNTAG: Diese Woche gab es aus der DDR Hinweise, wonach Ex-Stasi-Leute in die neue Volkskammer gewählt worden sein sollen. Liegen dazu konkrete Informationen vor oder werden Gerüchte verbreitet, um das erste frei gewählte Parlament in der DDR zu diskreditieren?

de Maizière: Erstens müssen wir mit dem Stasi-Problem fertigwerden, wir Menschen in der DDR. Zweitens ist die Funktion bundesrepublikanischer Medien dabei nicht immer hilfreich. Drittens sehe ich ein ziemliches Problem darin, daß das erste frei gewählte Parlament mit Diskussionen dieser Art belastet wird. Wir werden auf jeden Fall nach Mitteln suchen, alle Zweifel am Parlament auszuräumen, die Menschen bei uns in der DDR haben könnten.

WELT am SONNTAG: Betrifft die Offenlegung eines möglichen Stasi-Vergangenheit auch die Abgeordneten der PDS, also der früheren SED?

de Maizière: Wenn man sich zu der Maßnahme entschließt, die Legitimität eines frei gewählten Parlaments zu überprüfen, das sich noch nicht einmal konstituiert hat, also wenn man sich überhaupt zu einem solch umfassenden Schritt entschließt, müssen natürlich alle Fraktionen eingeschlossen werden, auch die PDS.