

CONFIDENTIAL



10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

3 April 1990

*File KRo
a:1 Gorbachev
adv R.*

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH CHANCELLOR KOHL:
MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT GORBACHEV

Thank you for your letter of 2 April, covering a draft message for the Prime Minister to send to Mr. Gorbachev about her recent talks with Chancellor Kohl. The Prime Minister found it a bit sparse in content and peremptory in tone. She has approved the enclosed alternative version. Provided the Foreign Secretary is content, I should be grateful if it could be despatched as soon as possible.

CHARLES POWELL

J. S. Wall, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT CHAIRMAN
OF

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T64/90

MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT GORBACHEV

Dear Mr. President,

When we spoke on the telephone, I promised to let you have a note of my talk with Chancellor Kohl on 30 March. Charles Powell did give an immediate briefing to a member of your Embassy staff, and I hope you will have had an account of this.

Chancellor Kohl and I spent the greater part of our meeting in discussion of German unification. My impression is that he hopes and expects to bring about economic and monetary union this summer, but that his timetable for full unification is rather more extended. He clearly envisages that unification will take place under the Article 23 procedure. He is quite categorical that the external consequences have to be settled in advance: he hopes this can be done by the end of this year.

We both agreed that a united Germany should be a member of NATO. This is the clear wish of the German people: and membership of NATO offers a framework within which to meet their defence needs. We also agreed that there should be arrangements by which Soviet troops would remain in the GDR for a transitional period, perhaps in the form of a treaty, if that was what was wanted. We noted particularly the importance for the Soviet Union of maintaining existing trading arrangements with the GDR.

On the question of Germany's Eastern border with Poland, Chancellor Kohl confirmed the Federal German Government's intention that the definitive nature of the Oder-Neisse border should be embodied in a legally-binding treaty immediately after unification. I believe this assurance should be very satisfactory to Poland.

Chancellor Kohl described the enormous task which lay ahead in rehabilitating the East German economy, and how the Federal Republic proposes to finance this. We also discussed the arrangements which would be necessary to incorporate the GDR into the European Community.

I gave Chancellor Kohl a brief account of our telephone conversation on 26 March on Lithuania. We agreed that the situation was complex and sensitive and could only be resolved by dialogue and discussion: and that nothing should be done to add to the difficulties.

We also touched on a number of other regional problems including the situation in Southern Africa.

I was glad that we were able to talk the other day, and hope we can remain in close touch.

With every good wish,

Yours sincerely,

Margaret Thatcher

3 April 1990



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH
CONFIDENTIAL AND PERSONAL

Prime Minister

4 April 1990

You agreed to send Gorbachev a message about your meeting with Kohl. Dear Charles, The Foreign Office draft was hopeless and I have done another which is attached.

Prime Minister's meeting with Chancellor Kohl

/ As requested in your letter of 30 March, I enclose a message to President Gorbachev about the Anglo-German Summit, covered by a draft telegram of instructions to Moscow.

The draft message reflects the Prime Minister's explicit agreement, which she repeated at the press conference, to Chancellor Kohl's view that "all border questions" other than the Oder-Neisse line should be discussed in the CSCE framework rather than in the Two plus Four group. We shall have to be careful not to allow this to be read (as the Germans themselves might wish) as altering the position set out in Article VII of the Relations Convention of 1954 between the three Western Allies and the FRG that "the final determination of the boundaries of Germany must await a [peace] settlement". It has long been the UK view that the Four Powers (i.e. US, UK, France and USSR) have rights and responsibilities relating to such a settlement and thus to borders. When the Helsinki Final Act was adopted the Western Allies stated that Quadripartite rights and responsibilities were unaffected by it. And we have continued to argue, as also do the French in particular, that some act by the Four Powers accepting as definitive the changes to the borders of Germany since 1945 and determining the borders of Germany as those described in its Constitution (amended if necessary to show that no further accession after the merger of the GDR is contemplated) will be a necessary component of whatever package finally emerges as part of the peace settlement.

Perhaps the best thing is to say that the Prime Minister's agreement with Kohl meant that any future suggestion of changes to borders in Europe would be a matter falling under the Helsinki principle that borders may be changed only by peaceful means and by agreement; but that this was not to be read as affecting Four Power rights and responsibilities in relation to the borders of Germany as a whole which would remain to be discharged as part of the eventual peace settlement, the modalities for which would fall appropriately for discussion within the Two plus Four. In practice (although there is so far no definite agreement on this), we envisage that the Two plus Four would present the CSCE Summit with the intention that the Oder-Neisse line border should be fixed by treaty between Germany and Poland and the view that there is no question of changing any of the

CONFIDENTIAL AND PERSONAL



CONFIDENTIAL AND PERSONAL

other existing borders relating to pre-War Germany (apart from the Inner German border) which will continue to be subject to the Helsinki Accord. At some subsequent point, perhaps when the Polish-German treaty is ratified, the Four Wartime Allies will finally give up all their rights and responsibilities in regard to this border and the other borders of pre-War Germany.

If you agree, it might be as well to omit the relevant sentence from the message to Mr Gorbachev.

Yours,
Stephen Wall

(J S Wall)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

94

CONFIDENTIAL AND PERSONAL