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GERMAN UNIFICATION: GENSCHER'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON

SUMMARY

1. GENSCHER VISIT DEMONSTRATES GENERAL HARMONY OF US AND FRG APPROACHES, THOUGH SECURITY ISSUES NOT DISCUSSED IN DETAIL. PUBLIC PUSH FOR 2 PLUS 4 PROCESS TO BEGIN QUICKLY WITH A MINISTERIAL MEETING BY END OF THE MONTH. PROPOSAL BY GENSCHER FOR ATLANTIC DECLARATION DEFINING THE US/EC RELATIONSHIP. SPEECH IN WASHINGTON ON 6 APRIL.

DETAIL

2. GENSCHER SAW BAKER AND BUSH IN WASHINGTON ON 4 APRIL. HE ALSO GAVE A BRIEF PRESS CONFERENCE. THE ORIGINAL PURPOSE OF THE VISIT WAS TO ADDRESS THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF NEWSPAPER EDITORS ON 6 APRIL - WHICH IS STILL SCHEDULED TO GO AHEAD AS PLANNED. BUT THE KEY PART OF THE PROGRAMME WAS BROUGHT FORWARD IN ORDER TO TAKE PLACE BEFORE THE TALKS WITH SHEVARDNADZE. (GENSCHER IS SPENDING 5 APRIL IN CANADA). THE FOLLOWING ACCOUNT IS BASED ON A BRIEFING OF EC AMBASSADORS BY THE GERMAN CHARGE AND INITIAL REPORTS FROM DOBBINS (STATE) AND ZELIKOW (NSC).

3. ACCORDING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS, THE LINE TAKE BY GENSCHER WAS BROADLY AS EXPECTED AND NOT QUOTE ALARMING UNQUOTE. ON THE PROCESS IN GENERAL HE SAID THAT THE GDR ELECTIONS HAD EASED PRESSURES FROM THE EAST GERMANS. THE CURRENT FOCUS WAS ON ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION, WHICH, IN MANY WAYS, WAS THE ISSUE OF MOST IMMEDIATE CONCERN TO PEOPLE IN THE GDR. ALTHOUGH THE DISCUSSIONS ON GEMU HAD DE-RAILED BY THE PUBLIC CONTROVERSY OVER DM CONVERSION RATES, GENSCHER EXPECTED THIS TO BE BACK ON TRACK BEFORE LONG. NEVERTHELESS THE GEMU PROCESS WAS NO REASON FOR ANY DELAY IN GETTING TO GRIPS WITH CONSTITUTIONAL

UNIFICATIONS PER SE. ONCE THE NEW GDR GOVERNMENT WAS FORMED (POSSIBLY NEXT WEEK) WORK WOULD BEGIN ON THE UNIFICATION TREATY. IT WAS THEREFORE NECESSARY TO MOVE QUICKLY TO SETTLE EXTERNAL ASPECTS OF UNIFICATION ON 2 PLUS 4. GENSCHER SUGGESTED THAT THE NEXT ROUND OF TALKS BETWEEN OFFICIALS COULD TAKE PLACE BY MID-APRIL, FOLLOWED BY A MEETING AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL AT THE END OF THE MONTH.

4. GENSCHER HAD SPELT OUT THE RATIONALE FOR THIS TIMETABLE TO BAKER. THE GERMANS WANTED THE WORK OF THE 2 PLUS 4 TO BE COMPLETED IN TIME FOR THE CSCE SUMMIT IN NOVEMBER SO THAT THE INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF UNIFICATION COULD BE SUBSUMED WITHIN A MEETING WHOSE PURPOSE WAS NOT CONFINED SOLELY TO GERMANY BUT HAD A BROADER AGENDA. TO DELAY THE ISSUES UNTIL 1991 WOULD RISK DEMANDS FOR A SPECIAL MEETING, SINGULARISING GERMANY, WHICH COULD ALL TOO EASILY ASSUME THE DREADED FORM OF A PEACE TREATY NEGOTIATION. THE NEXT MANAGEABLE OCCASION WOULD BE HELSINKI II IN 1992 BUT THE INTERNAL GERMAN PRESSURES FOR UNIFICATION COULD NOT BE DELAYED BEYOND 1991. GENSCHER HAD THEREFORE MADE A QUOTE STRONG PITCH UNQUOTE FOR THE EXTERNAL ISSUES TO BE PUT ON A FAST TRACK.

5. GENSCHER REPEATED HIS CALL FOR A MINISTERIAL MEETING BY THE END OF APRIL DURING A BRIEF PRESS CONFERENCE OUTSIDE THE WHITE HOUSE AFTER HIS MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT. (DOBBINS TOLD US THAT KASTRUP COMMENTED TO HIM AFTERWARDS THAT IT MIGHT BE UNREALISTIC, IN PRACTICAL TERMS, FOR THE MINISTERIAL MEETING TO TAKE PLACE UNTIL MID-MAY - A VIEW WHICH US OFFICIALS TENDED TO SHARE.)

6. AS REGARDS THE SECURITY ISSUES, THE AMERICANS DO NOT SEEM TO HAVE PRESSED GENSCHER OVER SEVERAL OF THE SPECIFICS (ALTHOUGH THESE WERE DISCUSSED FURTHER WITH GERMAN OFFICIALS INCLUDING HOLIK AND KASTRUP). DOBBINS SAID THAT BAKER WAS NOT BRIEFED TO RAISE ARRANGEMENTS FOR STATIONING TROOPS IN THE FRG OR BERLIN, OR THE BASING OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. GENSCHER CONFINED HIS REMARKS TO STRESSING THAT A UNITED GERMANY WOULD BE IN NATO - A POINT REITERATED CLEARLY IN THE PRESS CONFERENCE. ASKED THERE ABOUT SNF ON GERMAN SOIL HE SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THE QUESTIONING WAS TO BE ABOUT QUOTE CURRENT ISSUES UNQUOTE. IN THE MEETING WITH BAKER, GENSCHER ALSO REITERATED THE GERMAN CONCERN TO ENSURE THAT SOVIET ATTEMPTS TO HANDLE IN 2 PLUS 4 ISSUES SUCH AS THE TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR SOVIET TROOPS IN THE GDR AND THE SIZE OF THE BUNDESWEHR SHOULD BE RESISTED AND DEALT WITH

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SEPARATELY - IN THE FORMER CASE, BILATERALLY, IN THE LATTER, IN CFE.

7. THERE WERE FAMILIAR PITCHES FROM GENSCHER ON THE NEED TO SECURE CFE AGREEMENTS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND ON INSTITUTIONALISING THE CSCE PROCESS (REGULAR MEETINGS OF FOREIGN MINISTERS NEW BODIES TO DEAL WITH HUMAN RIGHTS AND CONFIDENCE BUILDING-MEASURES). HERE THE AMERICANS HAD RESPONDED CAUTIOUSLY, REFERRING TO THE EXISTING ROLES OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE AND EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE AND SUGGESTING THAT THEY MIGHT BE EXPANDED AS AN ALTERNATIVE.

8. THE ONE SURPRISE WAS A PROPOSAL BY GENSCHER - ALSO PRESENTED TO THE PRESS - TO MATCH THE CONTINUING DEVELOPMENT OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY BY STRENGTHENING WHAT HE CALLED THE QUALITY OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE EC AND THE UNITED STATES. HE REFERRED (VAGUELY) TO THE NEED FOR A DECLARATION DEFINING THE RELATIONSHIP IN TERMS OF COMMON OBJECTIVES, TASKS AND CHALLENGES. THE AMERICANS ARE PLEASED IF UNSURE AS TO WHAT THIS WOULD AMOUNT TO. BUT IN PUBLIC TERMS AT LEAST IT HAS ALREADY HELPED TO STAMP THE VISIT WITH A WARM AURA OF GERMAN GRATITUDE FOR US SUPPORT AND A STRENGTHENING US/GERMAN RELATIONSHIP.

9. GENSCHER RETURNS ON 6 APRIL FOR HIS SPEECH AND FOR MEETINGS WITH CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS AND, PERHAPS, CHENEY. HE MAY SECURE A DE-BRIEFING FROM BAKER ON THE TALKS WITH SHEVARDNADZE SHOULD THESE END EARLY ENOUGH.

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