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TO IMMEDIATE MOSCOW
TELNO 650
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(a-d)

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, BONN, PARIS, UKDEL NATO, BM BERLIN
INFO IMMEDIATE EAST BERLIN, UKREP BRUSSELS, THE HAGUE, OTTAWA
INFO IMMEDIATE BRUSSELS, LUXEMBOURG, ROME, LISBON, MADRID
INFO IMMEDIATE COPENHAGEN, WARSAW, PRAGUE, BUDAPEST
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, DUBLIN, UKDEL VIENNA

FOLLOWING FOR PS/SECRETARY OF STATE
MY 3 IPTS: MEETING OF THE FOUR WESTERN POLITICAL DIRECTORS:
POL MIL ISSUES
SUMMARY

1. UK PUSHES FOR DECISIONS ON GERMANY AND NATO. FRG STILL UNABLE TO REPLY. DISCUSSION CONTINUES BETWEEN KOHL AND GENSCHER. US PROPOSES LINE TO TAKE ON LIKELY SOVIET CONCERNS, INVOLVING DIVERSION OF MOST ISSUES OUT OF TWO PLUS FOUR. UK WARNS OF DANGER OF DRAINING TWO PLUS FOUR OF SUBSTANCE. US BELIEVES POL MIL ISSUES BETTER DEALT WITH LATER IN THE PROCESS. US AND FRG ARGUE FOR CONTINUATION OF CFE AFTER SIGNATURE OF CFE I TO DEAL WITH SOVIET WISH FOR LIMITS ON BUNDESWEHR.

DETAIL

2. WESTON SAID THE POL MIL ASPECTS OF UNIFICATION WERE OF GREAT IMPORTANCE. WE NEEDED TO AGREE A WESTERN POSITION ON SUBSTANCE BEFORE WE WENT INTO THE TWO PLUS FOUR. IF WE DID NOT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD ATTEMPT TO DIVIDE US. HE APPRECIATED THAT IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO AGREE ON ALL THE DETAILS BUT WE SHOULD TRY TO ESTABLISH A CLEAR PRIVATE UNDERSTANDING ON THE MAIN ISSUES. WE NEEDED ALSO TO DECIDE TACTICALLY HOW TO HANDLE THE POINTS THE SOVIET UNION WAS LIKELY TO RAISE IN THE TWO PLUS FOUR.

3. ZOELICK (US), TAKING UP THE SECOND POINT, SAID IT WAS IMPORTANT NOT TO SINGULARISE GERMANY. MANY OF THE SOVIET CONCERNS SHOULD BE ADDRESSED OUTSIDE THE TWO PLUS FOUR. HE PROPOSED THE FOLLOWING LINE:

A) LIMITS ON THE BUNDESWEHR SHOULD BE NEGOTIATED IN CFE. THERE SHOULD BE NO DISCUSSION OF SUBSTANCE IN THE TWO PLUS FOUR.

B) RENUNCIATION OF NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS WAS A SOVEREIGN GERMAN DECISION. THE FRG MIGHT WISH TO EXPLAIN THIS IN THE TWO PLUS FOUR, BUT IT SHOULD NOT BE DECIDED THERE.

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- C) THE STATIONING OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN GERMANY WAS A MATTER FOR NATO AND SNF NEGOTIATIONS. THERE SHOULD BE NO DISCUSSION OF SUBSTANCE IN THE TWO PLUS FOUR.
- D) THE STATIONING OF SOVIET TROOPS IN THE GDR FOR A TRANSITIONAL PERIOD WAS A GERMAN DECISION TO BE NEGOTIATED WITH THE SOVIET UNION AFTER DISCUSSION IN NATO. IT COULD BE DISCUSSED IN THE TWO PLUS FOUR BUT NOT SETTLED THERE. (IF WE SETTLED THIS ISSUE IN THE TWO PLUS FOUR THERE WAS A DANGER OF THE SOVIET UNION TRYING TO LINK IT TO THE WITHDRAWAL OF US FORCES FROM THE FRG.)
- E) THE MILITARY STATUS OF THE GDR WAS FOR DECISION BY GERMANY AND NATO. WE SHOULD DISCUSS TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS IN THE TWO PLUS FOUR, BUT NOT MAKE DECISIONS THERE.
- F) MEMBERSHIP OF NATO WAS A MATTER FOR GERMANY AND NATO. WE SHOULD HOWEVER EXPLAIN THE LOGIC OF WHY WE THOUGHT THIS WOULD PROVIDE FOR STABILITY IN THE TWO PLUS FOUR.
- G) ECONOMIC ASPECTS SHOULD BE DEALT WITH BY THE FRG, GDR AND THE SOVIET UNION TRILATERALLY AND IN THE CONTEXT OF EC COMPETENCE, WITH EXPLANATIONS IN THE TWO PLUS FOUR.
4. DUFORCQ SAID IT WAS IMPORTANT NOT TO SINGULARISE GERMANY. ANY SPECIAL STATUS FOR THE GDR MUST BE TRANSITIONAL.
5. WESTON SAID IT WAS DIFFICULT TO DECIDE ON TACTICS UNTIL WE HAD DECIDED ON SUBSTANCE. IN OUR VIEW THE BASIC WESTERN POSITION WE SHOULD ALL SUSTAIN WAS:
- A UNIFIED GERMANY WOULD BE A FULL MEMBER OF NATO.
 - THE NATO TREATY WOULD APPLY.
 - ALLIED STATIONED FORCES SHOULD REMAIN IN THE FRG IN AN INTEGRATED COMMAND STRUCTURE, ALBEIT AT LOWER LEVELS.
 - THERE SHOULD BE A SENSIBLE MIX OF NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL FORCES.
 - TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS SHOULD BE AGREED FOR EAST GERMANY. WE PROBABLY COULD NOT BE MORE SPECIFIC AT THIS POINT WITHOUT STRAINING CONSENSUS. BUT THIS LINE WOULD GIVE US A SOUND BASIS FROM WHICH TO APPROACH DISCUSSIONS IN THE TWO PLUS FOUR.
6. KASTRUP SAID HE WAS NOT IN A POSITION TO AGREE IN TERMS TO THIS LINE. THIS WAS A VERY SENSITIVE ISSUE IN THE FRG. IT WAS THE SUBJECT OF DISCUSSION BETWEEN KOHL AND GENSCHER, WHO WERE LOOKING FOR ANSWERS IN THE FRAMEWORK OF AN OVERALL CONCEPT. THERE WERE, AS YET, NO DECISIONS. HE COMMENTED THAT THERE HAD BEEN LITTLE EFFORT BY WESTERN FOREIGN MINISTERS IN RECENT DISCUSSIONS TO SECURE ANSWERS TO THESE POINTS FROM GENSCHER. WESTON RECALLED THAT THERE HAD BEEN AN EXCHANGE ON THESE LINES DURING MY TALKS WITH GENSCHER ON 30 MARCH.

7. ZOELICK SAID WESTON'S LIST WAS A GOOD ONE. HE HAD THE IMPRESSION THERE WAS ALREADY MUCH COMMON GROUND. HE ATTEMPTED TO DRAW KASTRUP OUT ON A NUMBER OF POINTS BUT KASTRUP DECLINED. ZOELICK SAID THAT IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY DECISIONS IT WAS IMPORTANT NOT TO PREJUDICE ONE ANOTHER'S POSITIONS DURING DISCUSSIONS IN THE TWO PLUS FOUR.

8. WESTON EMPHASISED THAT WE MUST NOT DRAIN THE TWO PLUS FOUR OF ALL SUBSTANCE. WE HAD INCLUDED POL MIL ISSUES AS AN ITEM ON THE AGENDA. WE SHOULD LET THE RUSSIANS TALK THEMSELVES OUT. THE TWO PLUS FOUR MIGHT WELL ACT AS A STEERING GROUP IN DIRECTING WORK TO OTHER QUARTERS WHERE APPROPRIATE. BUT WE SHOULD ALSO USE THE MEETINGS TO LET THE SOVIET UNION EXPLAIN THEIR POSITION.

9. WESTON ASKED WHAT ASSURANCES WE COULD OFFER THE SOVIET UNION THAT THEIR CONCERNS WOULD BE COVERED IN ANY FOLLOW ON TO VIENNA. WE NEEDED TO DISCUSS AMONG OURSELVES POSSIBLE MANDATES FOR ANY SUCH FOLLOW ON NEGOTIATIONS. ZOELICK SAID POL MIL ISSUES MIGHT BE BETTER DEALT WITH LATER IN THE TWO PLUS FOUR PROCESS, WHEN DEVELOPMENTS MIGHT MAKE THEM EASIER TO SOLVE. HE DID NOT BELIEVE THERE WOULD BE TIME TO NEGOTIATE A NEW MANDATE FOR CFE II. THE US WAS LOOKING AT FOLLOW ON NEGOTIATIONS WITHIN THE CURRENT MANDATE. THERE MAY BE A CFE I(A) ON TECHNICAL ISSUES AND A CFE I(B) ON MANPOWER. WESTON SAID WE WERE NOT CONVINCED THE EXISTING CFE MANDATE WOULD BE APPROPRIATE FOR NEW NEGOTIATIONS. ZOELICK SAID THERE WOULD NOT BE TIME TO NEGOTIATE A NEW MANDATE IF WE WERE TO ADDRESS SOVIET CONCERNS. THE SOVIET UNION WAS STILL TALKING ABOUT TRYING TO DEAL WITH GERMAN UNIFICATION UNDER CFE I. IF WE WERE TO PERSUADE THEM TO DROP THIS WE COULD NOT PUSH THE NEW TALKS OVER THE HORIZON. KASTRUP SAID THE FRG WAS WORKING ON IDEAS FOR VIENNA 2 WHICH THEY WOULD LAUNCH IN THE HLTF SOON. WE COULD NOT AVOID DISCUSSING THESE ISSUES ALTOGETHER IN THE TWO PLUS FOUR. THE TWO PLUS FOUR COULD GIVE GUIDELINES, POSSIBLY EVEN ON NUMBERS, AND THEN REFER THE ISSUE TO VIENNA.

10. WESTON ASKED ABOUT MILITARY FORCES IN BERLIN AFTER UNIFICATION. KASTRUP SAID THAT WOULD BE LINKED TO THE QUESTION OF SOVIET FORCES IN THE GDR BUT THAT THE FRG HAD NO POSITION. ZOELICK SAID THERE WAS NO INTENTION TO PROCEED WITH A SUBSTANTIAL DRAW DOWN OF US FORCES IN BERLIN THIS YEAR. THE COMPOSITION OF THE FORCES MIGHT HOWEVER BE CHANGED.

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