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MO 13/1/42S

FOREIGN SECRETARYMILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF A UNITED GERMANY

The Chiefs of Staff have recently completed a useful paper on the military implications of a united Germany. A copy is attached.

2. The key conclusions, in paragraph 47, set out what we suggest as the objectives for the UK in the "two-plus-four" and wider NATO discussions. I took a recent opportunity to put these to Dr Stoltenberg informally. He accepted most of the points as sensible, while seeing the obvious political difficulties about sub-paragraph (k).

3. I hope you can accept these as a core element of our approach to the detailed arrangements for unification. There will doubtless be many pressures for fudges, not least from some Germans; but it is surely crucial to put in place stable security structures in this most long fought over stretch of Europe. Otherwise we shall leave even greater problems for later.

A copy of this minute goes to the Prime Minister and to Sir Robin Butler.

Ministry of Defence

17 April 1990

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
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28 March 1990

THE MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF A UNITED GERMANY

The Chiefs of Staff have taken note of the attached paper (1) as amended (2) and have agreed that it should be forwarded to the Secretary of State as a statement of their view of the Military Implications of a United Germany, with the recommendation that it be forwarded in turn to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs.



B BURNS
Captain, RN
Secretary
Chiefs of Staff Committee

Attachment:

The Military Implications of a United Germany (35 pages).

Notes:

1. Originally circulated as Attachment to DUS(P) 109/90(604) dated 20 March 1990.
2. COS 6th Meeting/90, Item 2.

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ATTACHMENT TO
SECCOS 1063/198/3
DATED 28 MAR 90

THE MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF A UNITED GERMANY

INTRODUCTION

1. It is now certain that substantial progress towards the unification of the FRG, GDR and Berlin will be achieved this year. Even though the Soviet position and security requirements are not yet clear, the military implications stemming from a unified Germany are considerable.

2. This paper is written to provide a military input to the 2 + 4 Talks¹ due to be held in Mar.

AIM

3. The aim of this paper is to examine the military implications of a united Germany.

SCOPE AND ASSUMPTIONS

4. After consideration of the political background, the paper considers the strategic factors stemming from unification. The military and operational implications which must flow from these factors are then examined. However, the paper does not:

a. Investigate any fundamental change to the nature of the North Atlantic Treaty, such as the possibility of NATO membership by erstwhile Warsaw Pact (WP) states, other than

1. FRG and GDR; US, UK France and USSR.

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b. Consider matters below the operational level of command, although clearly there will be major changes necessary at the tactical level. Consequently, the paper stops short of consideration of the force structures that may be needed.

c. Deal in any detail with the political/military transitional arrangements that will need to apply before unification or the transfer of military responsibility is complete.

d. Consider in detail maritime matters such as a changed status for the Baltic and the conduct of maritime operations there or the rights of access to the ports in the former GDR.

5. The paper assumes that a CFE Treaty will be signed and that reductions are made in line with those currently being negotiated. Further assumptions are made after the discussion of the Political Background which follows.

POLITICAL BACKGROUND

6. The rapidity of developments on German unification, together with the Federal Government's apparent unwillingness to do anything to shore up the GDR and the impression that it might press ahead with unification without fully taking into account the views of other nations involved, has given rise to public concern in other capitals that they should be consulted. Among Germany's neighbours (and Poland in particular) there is anxiety to ensure that the question of Germany's borders is finally settled as part of the unification package. The Federal Government has emphasised that unification must take place in a European context (a "European Germany rather than a German Europe") and that its membership of NATO is "irrevocable". There is, however, concern amongst the 4 Powers that their rights in

Germany should be properly respected and that the interests of others regarding accession by the GDR to the European Community should be taken into account. There is also, of course, the question of a united Germany's relationship to the NATO Alliance to be resolved; both the Soviet and GDR governments are at present pressing strongly for German "neutrality".

7. The need for a framework to regulate the external and security aspects of German unification was discussed at the meeting of Foreign Ministers in Ottawa on 12 Feb when it was agreed that a conference of the 2 Germanies and the 4 Powers should meet following the GDR elections to discuss these questions. Since then, the US have proposed that there should be consultations within NATO on security aspects of unification; these and other contacts with Allies have started.

UK POSITION

8. Ministers have agreed in outline a UK position on security aspects of unification. While accepting that German unification is a probable - and desirable - outcome, they have made clear that it must be carried through in consultation with the 4 Powers and that it must not undermine stability and security in Europe. Above all, it is thought essential that unification should take place in the context of German participation in Western institutions, and the Prime Minister has stated publicly that Germany should remain a member of NATO. However, Ministers are anxious not to arouse feelings of insecurity in the Soviet Union and accept, therefore, that German membership of NATO need not entail moving NATO forces into the present GDR in peacetime.

9. This basic framework raises many questions which will need to be addressed within the Alliance. However, it is now clear as a result of the Bush/Kohl meeting on 25 Feb that a united Germany should be a "full member of NATO" though it was acknowledged at that meeting that further consideration needed to be given to the

application of the North Atlantic Treaty to East Germany. Ministers regard the continued operation of the Integrated Military Command Structure (IMCS) in the Western part of Germany as essential. But in respect of the territory of the former GDR, NATO (or Germany alone) might undertake that:

- a. Non-German forces would not be stationed there in peacetime.
- b. The number of German forces deployed there would be subject to a numerical ceiling and would not be part of the IMCS in peacetime.
- c. There would be a transitional period permitting the orderly withdrawal of Soviet forces. This could be generous, though public opinion in East Germany might turn against them.
- d. The Soviet Union could have the right to retain a permanent inspection mission to assure themselves that the restrictions were being observed.

10. There are precedents for such self-imposed restrictions. For example, Norway does not permit the deployment of non-Norwegian troops to Finnmark in peacetime. The declaration giving effect to these new arrangements would need to be discussed in advance with the Soviet Union, but would remain an Alliance and German undertaking which could be rescinded if aggression were threatened. The terms of any such declaration would be affected by the extent to which the Alliance was committed to the defence of a unified Germany yet at the same time restricted in its activities in the former GDR. An additional consideration would be the size of Soviet forces stationed in Poland. But to make demands now on Soviet presence in Poland would be likely to provoke an undesirable reciprocal response concerning NATO's own ability to station forces.

11. In broad terms the UK envisages that the defence of former GDR territory would fall initially to any German forces stationed there, reinforced in time of crisis by other national and allied units. It has, however, been stressed that if this commitment is to be met effectively, adequate NATO command and control arrangements will be needed, together with adequate arrangements for air defence of the united Germany. At Ministerial level it has been indicated that the UK should try to avoid a Soviet droit de regard on such questions as command and control, infrastructure and limits on German forces permitted in GDR territory. The hope is that this line might offer a means of anchoring Germany permanently in the Alliance in a way which would be acceptable to the Soviet Union and would also enable US, British and other stationed forces to stay in Western Germany.

ALLIED PERSPECTIVES

12. The acceptability of stationed forces will in future depend on substantial changes to their character, size and activities. The French and Americans have taken similar positions in recent statements. Wider French views are not known at this stage, but should be taken into account not least as a means of encouraging greater French participation in NATO. In general the FRG Government has held firmly to the line that a united Germany should be a member of NATO, although Kohl has made clear his view that no NATO units and institutions should be stationed in former GDR territory. However, the FRG position on the future defence arrangements in the former GDR has still to be clarified. A statement from Bonn on 19 Feb which opposed "demilitarization" of that area, also made it clear that units of the Bundeswehr, whether assigned to NATO or not, would not be based there, but it has not answered such key questions as whether the North Atlantic Treaty is to cover the whole country or whether other German forces could be based in the former GDR. There is also no mention of the position on aircraft. These will be major issues for

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consideration in the Alliance as will the transitional arrangements for Soviet forces and the future of the present East German armed forces.

FURTHER ASSUMPTIONS

13. Since many political questions concerning the future architecture of Eastern Europe remain unanswered, it is assumed for the remainder of this paper that:

- a. A unified Germany will remain in NATO, but the question of the application of Articles 5 and 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty to the whole of the new Germany is still open.
- b. Nevertheless, Germany's (and therefore NATO's) boundary with Eastern Europe will be the Oder-Neisse line.
- c. NATO will be permitted to station forces on the current FRG's soil.
- d. A united Germany will re-affirm the FRG's commitment to remain a non-nuclear-weapon state.
- e. For the time being there are 2 options for the military posture after unification:

(1) Option A. Only German forces are allowed in the former GDR.

(2) Option B. No military forces (including the Bundeswehr) are allowed in the former GDR, though the area will not be formally "demilitarized".

RISK ASSESSMENT

14. The last few months have witnessed dramatic political

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changes in Eastern Europe. The WP is unlikely to continue as an integrated military alliance, and there is no longer any possibility of coalition warfare by the WP against NATO. The aims of individual non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) countries are unlikely to extend beyond the defences of their own boundaries and hence, increasingly, Soviet forces may have to operate or transit through a resentful or even hostile environment in Eastern Europe.

15. At present, although the Soviet Union retains massive physical military capabilities, from which unilateral cuts are only effectively removing the options of surprise and unreinforced conventional attack in Europe, in practice its conventional military threat to a united NATO has been reduced, particularly in the Central Region. Its ability to employ its force is already greatly impaired, above all by changes in Eastern Europe and the need to counter internal instability. And the JIC judge that it currently has no hostile intentions in a military sense.

16. Once a CFE agreement is implemented, the Soviet capability to launch a conventional strategic offensive will effectively be removed. A diminished offensive capability will, however, remain, enabling it to concentrate forces so that it would be able, if desired, to conduct an offensive with limited objectives. Soviet strategic nuclear capability, naval, strategic airborne and special forces, and possibly a chemical and biological weapons capability, would also remain. But continuing change in Central and Eastern Europe would be likely to interpose a buffer between the West and any Soviet conventional attack, at least in the Central region.

17. Instabilities within and, more seriously, between Eastern European countries, could, in the longer term, lead to conflict, with help being sought from other countries in the area. It is difficult to envisage circumstances in which the West would be

drawn militarily into such disputes so long as they did not directly involve a Western state (e.g. Turkey or Germany), but the possibility cannot be excluded.

18. It is difficult at this stage to predict warning times for war in the Central Region in the mid 1990s and beyond as they affect NATO in these new circumstances. "Spillage" resulting from instabilities would provide at best 48 hours warning, whereas the concentration of Soviet forces capable of mounting a limited offensive could provide 14 days warning, with some 30 days if strategic reserve forces were brought forward. Re-armament on a scale which would re-generate a conventional threat to the whole of Europe would take 5 to 8 years.

STRATEGIC FACTORS

19. Neither the possibility of German unification nor a considerably reduced risk assessment is likely to call for a change to NATO's security policy. The objectives and politically determined principles laid out in MC 14/3 and MC 312 will remain relevant. The overall aim will remain the preservation of peace and the prevention of armed conflict through deterrence and dialogue. Should this fail, the Alliance's strategic objective will still be to repel any attack and restore the status quo ante.

20. That said, and although NATO has been enlarged before without the need to alter its fundamental precepts, a premium will now be placed on the need for Alliance cohesion and the need for development of Alliance strategy to reflect considerably changed circumstances. For this reason a variety of strategic factors bear on the unification issue: the question of the Alliance area; the status of forces in the former GDR; the involvement of Alliance members; the development of Alliance strategy; CFE considerations; and the status of Berlin.

21. However, the over-riding factor in considering any changed deployment for Alliance forces will be resources. Nations will expect to make savings from CFE reductions and public opinion about the risk to Europe from the East will not tolerate any reversal of this expectation. Equally the wider burden of defence, in terms of its intrusion into citizens' lives, will become less acceptable as the perceived threat diminishes. So what follows in this paper concerning the need for the Alliance to defend a larger area should be viewed not only in terms of what is militarily desirable, but also of what goes some way to satisfying these public aspirations.

THE ALLIANCE AREA

22. In the context of extending the North Atlantic Treaty to cover GDR territory, it is worth recalling that, although NATO has maintained forward defence for largely political reasons, members' commitment in the event of an armed attack against one or more parties to the Treaty is less than definitive. Under Article 5, if an armed attack occurs against one of the Parties to the Treaty then each of the other signatories "will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area." Under Article 6 an armed attack "is deemed to include an armed attack on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America...". Thus, members would not necessarily be obliged by the Treaty to take military action to defend GDR soil at its borders, although the concept of forward defence implies that this would be required. But the clear geographic applicability in Article 6 would become difficult if Germany were to isolate the present GDR from the Alliance or not accept that NATO forces should operate therein in Transition to War (TTW) and war.

23. Militarily it is difficult to conceive of the area in the

Central Region that is closest to the threat being one from which military forces are excluded. Furthermore, WEU nations not at 2 + 4 would legitimately expect the security provisions of the Modified Brussels Treaty² to apply. Consequently, there is a clear military case for the inclusion of all German territory within the Alliance area and for Articles 5 and 6 to apply to the whole.

THE STATUS OF GERMAN FORCES

24. A united Germany will require, as now, paramilitary forces for the policing of its border. But the threat of "spillage" and even a limited offensive by the Soviet Union would be beyond the capability of such paramilitary forces alone to contain. So whilst politically understandable, "demilitarizing" the former GDR to the extent that only paramilitary forces were stationed there would run the risk of allowing any incursion to gather momentum. Given, too, that it will be politically unacceptable for non-German forces to be stationed in the former GDR, there is a military case for regular German forces to be stationed there in peacetime, both to man installations (such as those needed for air defence) and to facilitate forward deployment by Allies in a crisis. While such forces would not be part of the IMCS in peace, an integrated air defence would at least demand a very close relationship with the NATO Military Structure.

25. The future of the GDR Armed Forces will be an issue during the 2 + 4 Talks, but essentially it will be one for the Germans to resolve. Whatever the final security structure for the present GDR, it will be most important that, apart from necessary specific exclusions, Germany remains committed to the IMCS of the

2. The commitment under Article V of the Modified Brussels Treaty is more explicit about military action than the North Atlantic Treaty, but although the UK continues to be bound by its provisions, it is not applicable to the US and is not, therefore, germane to 2 + 4.

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Alliance and that the German forces remaining in the present FRG stay under NATO command. This requirement will both bind Germany to the Alliance and reassure the Soviet Union and others that the greater part of German armed forces will operate as part of a collective security structure. Without this essential cohesion, the Alliance might appear to a potential aggressor to be in political disarray, and the operational ability of its forces to present a credible defence could be in some doubt.

INVOLVEMENT OF ALLIANCE MEMBERS

26. Alliance cohesion is most evident from the military involvement of its member states. Although it may well prove difficult to convince countries such as Belgium and the Netherlands of the necessity, commitment and resolve can only be demonstrated effectively through participation by stationed forces in Alliance structures on German soil. It may be that the domestic budget difficulties of such smaller states will require considerable reductions in their forces stationed abroad. But the Alliance burden of roles and responsibilities will still need to be shared. The Alliance will, therefore, need to find a formula for participation, and may have to accept a high degree of "cadreization" in Germany.

27. Operationally, it will also be important for German forces deployed in the former GDR to become part of the IMCS in TTW within an agreed General Defence Plan (GDP). Contingency plans to achieve this should be made in peacetime, including provision of the necessary command and control arrangements.

28. The essential political and military linkage in NATO is that of the US with the European members. The US contribution to the Alliance underpins and insures the European nations on many levels. The presence of US conventional and nuclear forces in Europe will remain the necessary bulwark against Soviet adventurism, both in their representation of Superpower

conventional capability and in the concomitant provision of a range of nuclear options at both the strategic and sub-strategic levels. The eventual size of US ground forces in Europe will be as much a political as a military decision. But such is the residual capability of the Soviet Union, that US forces need to demonstrate more than a token involvement - they should probably be capable of achieving an operational effect in their own right. In practical terms this indicates the need for a corps-sized force, a corresponding air capability and forces necessary to support the substantial US commitment to reinforcement. Part of the process for ensuring continued US presence will be European readiness to share the burden of defence.

29. From the point of view of both Germany and the other Allies, a vital unifying element will be continued extended nuclear deterrence. This means that US control arrangements at the military strategic level will be essential. These arrangements, those for the command of US forces in Europe generally, and the wider American commitment to European defence are facilitated by the US filling the SACEUR appointment. It may have to be recognized in due course that, were US forces on European soil to be reduced substantially, there could be a case for a European SACEUR with an American deputy - a solution which might encourage greater French participation in Alliance structures. But now is not the time to alter the UK view that the US should retain the post of SACEUR.

DEVELOPMENT OF ALLIANCE STRATEGY

30. NATO has already recognized in the Comprehensive Concept the need for the evolution of NATO Strategy. The unification issue may accelerate the process.

31. Flexible Response. Deterrence will remain an element of war prevention in the Central Region so long as the military capability of the Soviet Union remains. Flexible Response will

remain the basis of that deterrent for it contains an adaptable yet credible riposte to the risks in an era of change and uncertainty. However, the underlying assumptions of MC 14/3 have changed and will eventually lead to a re-examination of that document. For the present it is necessary to note that:

a. The adaptability inherent in Flexible Response will underpin its continued relevance. History will continue to emphasize that, for all the much improved political and military climate in Europe, Soviet aggression cannot be discounted, and that it cannot be reliably deterred by conventional forces alone. Thus, the ultimate guarantee of US strategic nuclear capability will still be relevant, together with the essential credibility and linkage given by effective theatre nuclear and conventional forces. This in turn means that the need to underpin the credibility of extended US nuclear deterrence, by the basing of US nuclear weapons in Europe and participation by European allies in their operation, will remain essential. For were nuclear weapons not to be stationed on German soil, it would be difficult to believe that the Dutch or Italians would be prepared to accept US nuclear deployments. US nuclear weapons would then only be deployed in the UK, and such singularization, even if acceptable to the UK, could pose obvious political difficulties.

b. But the scale and nature of those forces will change, both because of political pressures and in response to a changing military situation. The change in alignment and status of the Eastern European nations, a less dense battlefield and uncertainties over the likely axis of attack, will all emphasize the importance of range and flexibility in NATO TNF. This will favour air-launched systems and (if politically possible) a Follow on to Lance (FOTL), and reduce still further the relevance of nuclear artillery. The size of NATO's TNF stockpile will also

reduce, in part because of the reduction in the Soviet threat, but also because of an increased emphasis on selective use rather than a TNF participation in general nuclear release. This will in turn impact on the scale of SACEUR's Scheduled Strike Programme and the forces required for it.

32. Forward Defence. As long as the integrity of NATO territory could be threatened, the means will have to be available to halt an attacker as close to the borders as feasible in terms of forces, space and time. So the fundamental political and military notions inherent in forward defence will remain valid. However, given that forward defence has always been important in locking the Germans into the Alliance, its new practical expression will largely depend on their attitudes to the security of the former GDR (and particularly Berlin if it becomes the new capital). Their view will be coloured by the knowledge that post-CFE the short warning scenario will be ruled out; the probability of an attack will be remote; and that the GDR will have a special military status. The Germans may well, therefore, agree that it will be reasonable for forward defence to be applied when and wherever aggression occurs. In the Central Region this will mean that there will not be a universal requirement (nor in some places will it be feasible) to place significant forces on the NATO boundary, and that it will be the capability to deploy forward with appropriate speed that becomes more descriptive of the concept of forward defence. The political imperative of forward defence will, therefore, predominate, and it will be necessary to acknowledge that there will be circumstances where a concerted Allied ground forces response forward would be delayed.

CFE CONSIDERATIONS

33. Unification will impact upon CFE in a variety of ways including:

a. The Future of GDR TLEs. Complex arguments concerning ownership etc of GDR TLEs will arise. Consideration will have to be given to adjusting the total NATO and WP entitlements under CFE; to the transfer of ownership, and physical removal of, TLEs presently owned by the GDR; and possibly to re-allocating holdings and entitlements within each alliance. All TLEs held by a united Germany in the former GDR will count against NATO entitlements. There would be no unacceptable military disadvantage if it was agreed that GDR TLEs should be passed to other WP nations to cascade as they saw fit. In any event, the question of equity over destruction costs would need to be addressed.

b. The Future of GDR Non-TLEs. The East German Navy, non-TLE elements of its Army and of its air force will be unaffected by a CFE Treaty. Some of this equipment could be of value to NATO, but the Soviet Union would be justified in being concerned that if these assets were transferred to a united Germany, the Alliance would enjoy a considerable advantage. It may, therefore, be necessary to consider their destruction. However, the future of the East German Navy needs further consideration in the wider context of the changing military balance in the Baltic, about which there are clear Soviet concerns.

c. The Continued Presence of Soviet Troops. The management of Western military strategy post-CFE will be complex as it deals with reductions, probable re-structuring on multinational lines and attends to an evolving threat. From a military point of view it will, therefore, be highly desirable to end Soviet presence in the GDR as rapidly as possible. It could also be desirable to ensure that the offensive capability of Soviet troops there was reduced rapidly. However, any attempt to stipulate that certain forces should be removed early, thereby unbalancing the Soviet force, is unlikely to be acceptable to them and would

almost certainly result in a demand in return that was unacceptable to NATO. The better solution is likely to be to ensure that the removal of Soviet troops in the GDR should be linked to the implementation programme and should ideally not extend 5 years beyond Treaty signature, although some restrictions on movement, exercising etc may be called for. In principle, such restrictions should not be so severe that they provoke Soviet calls for reciprocity by NATO in the present FRG. In practice, restrictions are more likely to be set at a high level by what is acceptable to German public opinion than by what is militarily necessary. Consequently, from a military point of view, an important objective may be the ability to identify and monitor Soviet activities rather than impose limits.

THE STATUS OF BERLIN

34. The Allied rights and responsibilities in Berlin under the Quadripartite Agreement are likely to cease at about the time the two Germanies are united, possibly by the end of 1990. The immediate consequence of this might be that the Occupation Cost Budget (OCB) borne by the FRG Government will cease to pay for a substantial part of the upkeep of Allied forces in Berlin, and in any case their very presence in Berlin would have to be negotiated with the new German Government. Given that the current legal basis for the presence of these forces will also end with the termination of the special status of Berlin, the reconciliation of their presence with our inability to station forces in the former GDR could raise difficulties with the Soviet Union. The decision to continue such a presence would have to be justified in military terms both nationally and with the German Government.

35. But any military case for continued presence will inevitably have to be seen in relation to the cost of providing it. The 1990

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OCB for maintaining the UK Garrison and other tasks in Berlin³ is £144m. The additional annual cost to the UK Defence Budget of the personnel and their war stores is £63m (90-91 prices). Given that the OCB may cease, continuing with a British military presence in Berlin will give rise to a considerable opportunity cost.

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MILITARY STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL IMPLICATIONS

MULTI-NATIONALISM

38. The premium on Alliance cohesion will heighten calls for greater Alliance co-operation and in particular the need for Alliance forces to be multi-national. Embracing the

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multi-national idea would allow those NATO members less able to provide a major military presence to contribute in a worthwhile way. Furthermore, the sensitivity in the FRG that stationed forces are those of "occupation" might, at the political level, be soothed by the transformation of the current national corps-based structure for stationed forces into an integrated multi-national force. However, such transformation is unlikely to change the German public's attitudes to the continued presence of non-German forces on their soil as they will see little change. It may, therefore, be necessary to make evident the multi-national character of forces by, amongst other things, the use of symbols such as multi-national flags and badges.

39. Apart from the obvious political attractions, there could be longer-term military advantages in terms of better use of scarce assets (such as Surveillance and Target Acquisition and deep attack weapons) and a greater degree of flexibility in their use. Multi-nationalism is already much in evidence in the case of air forces, but in any extension of the concept to ground forces a number of factors need to be borne in mind:

a. The resultant multi-national formation must be militarily effective. The lower the level of command, the greater will be the penalties incurred by differing language, doctrine, equipment and logistics - with consequent costs. Although the level at which a multi-national solution becomes inefficient will vary, it should be generally understood that at the tactical level forces are best provided on a national basis. In practice, this means that a multi-national corps (the operational level) consisting of national divisions (the tactical level) is likely to work, but that the military effectiveness of a multi-national division (the tactical level) consisting of national brigades is more questionable. There is the additional point that most reinforcement from outside Germany is organized nationally on a divisional structure

and that such divisions can be efficiently absorbed into multi-national corps. Exceptions to the general desirability of integration at corps level will, of course, occur where the task demands it. For example, the multi-national airmobile division currently under consideration in NATO is justified in terms of: the need to combine to provide extremely expensive assets which would otherwise be beyond the resources of a single nation; the fact that the division is used as an operational level resource; and the fact that by operating in the air many of the complex movement difficulties that would beset a ground based multi-national division are minimized.

b. Multi-nationalism will not be cheap to implement, though to the extent that the process encourages greater standardization and the Alliance remains in being, there could be benefits in the longer-term. To begin with, reorganization of headquarters on a multi-national basis will call for expenditure on personnel and infrastructure. Subsequently, if the concept is to work it will be necessary for the Alliance to embrace interoperability to a far greater degree than at present, especially in the area of C³I. This will emphasize the importance of European defence procurement co-operation with a consequent effect upon national defence industries. Whatever the level, the logistic tail of a multi-national formation is bound to be larger than that of its national equivalent because certain functions, notably casevac and reinforcement, must remain national.

c. Changing force structures will take time - perhaps 3 to 5 years. Military effectiveness is likely to be adversely affected during this period of change at a time when significant Soviet forces may remain in the GDR and CFE reductions to parity will still be in train.

d. National interests must play some part in the multi-national forces debate, particularly on the share-out of command appointments. Command at the operational level, which calls for a level of expertise quite different from that at the tactical, is likely to become entirely multi-national. It will be militarily advantageous for the UK to maintain such expertise if its ability to mount operations in a non-NATO context is not to be prejudiced. The UK should, therefore, retain at least one ground force operational command in the re-structured Central Region. And there is also a case, both for national reasons and for those of control of UK air assets in a NATO context, for a UK air force operational commander in Germany. Furthermore, there may be a political need to accept a greater degree of German involvement at the operational level than at present.

e. Current NATO policy on intelligence collection facilities is that these should be the concern of individual nations, not the multi-national Alliance. This fits well with the need to retain a national line of command for security reasons. There would continue to be a need for such facilities to remain under national command.

40. It may be argued that the concept of multi-nationalism should apply throughout the Alliance area. The Germans may be particularly keen to point out that they should not be "singularized" by being the only nation with a significant burden of multinational forces based on their territory. Whilst France may argue that her position is special, other Alliance members will need to be reconciled to the possibility of the concept of multinationality being applied on their own territory, particularly by the deployment there of some German forces. Such German deployments could contribute to a wider aim of ensuring that Germany accepts an appropriate share of the total defence burden, and does not enjoy disproportionately large foreign exchange benefits from stationed forces.

FORCE MIX

41. The increased warning time that will follow from the CFE reductions and the withdrawal of Soviet forces from the GDR will permit a reassessment of the balance between in-place forces and reinforcements and between forces-in-being and mobilizable forces. Detailed conclusions on the shift of emphasis can be expected from current SHAPE studies. Nevertheless, timely reaction will remain an indispensable military capability which will call for a credible level of readily available (that is regular) forces. Greater reliance on mobilizable forces could also mean that the tasks that they have to perform will be more demanding and their training needs will, in the main, only be met by regular forces. Rapid transatlantic reinforcement and resupply will remain crucial.

MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS

42. When considering the new Alliance area, the military case at 2 + 4 would include the need for NATO to make plans and preparations for the defence of the present GDR, the desirability of exercising those plans, and allowing familiarity with the topography. NATO would also wish to make provision for support forward and, ideally, would want to pre-position logistic stockpiles forward - not least for the reason (and the West must be aware of it at 2 + 4) that the Soviets could attempt to make similar arrangements with the Poles. It is recognized that such a case represents the ideal.

43. Either Option A or B (see Sub-paragraph 13.d.) poses the obvious military difficulty of rapid deployment forward as much as 300 kms to the Oder-Neisse line itself. The factors that bear on any such move would include:

- a. The extent to which politically it will be necessary to

deploy forward to demonstrate commitment and to maintain the principle of defending any country as close to its borders as possible. It may also be a political imperative to defend Berlin as the putative capital of the united Germany.

- b. The timeliness of the political decision to act.
- c. The existence or otherwise of the Bundeswehr (as part of the IMCS) in the former GDR.
- d. The extent to which deployment forward is feasible - a question where both operational and logistic considerations apply.
- e. The risk of escalating a crisis by deploying non-German forces into the former GDR during TTW.

44. Operational Considerations.

a. Ground Forces. Operationally, and without taking the political requirement into account, the ground force view would be:

(1) Deploy far forward only those forces that are strictly necessary to demonstrate commitment (the AMF(L) principle) and those which serve a sensible military purpose (such as a covering force or screen, though this decision would be dependent upon what German forces were already in the former GDR).

(2) Deploy forward with main defensive forces only as far as it is militarily desirable (and feasible in terms of affordable logistics and warning time) to go. This should mean as far as the first really suitable ground for defence. The present defensive line is dictated by the current interpretation of forward

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defence, rather than by military sense. There would, therefore, be many advantages in seeking to establish main defences further to the east on ground of NATO's own choosing. But the further East the main defensive position goes, the greater become the problems of deployment, air cover, intelligence support, logistics and an exposed Baltic flank. For despite the increased emphasis in future on in-theatre movement and rapid manoeuvre, it will still be necessary to conduct a defence (followed by the ejection of the enemy as far as the border) and not a series of large-scale meeting engagements.

b. Air Forces. The role of air forces is unlikely to change with deployment forward, though in a situation where the main defensive position is not far east of the present IGB, it will be increasingly important for air power to carry the battle forward. But several practical difficulties will arise:

(1) Foremost will be provision of an integrated air defence over former GDR territory. The best way of achieving such coverage (typically a combination of mobile SAMs, fixed installations, airborne early warning and aircraft) cannot yet be determined, but it will be essential for the Alliance to insist that air defence assets are positioned in the former GDR in peacetime with no limits on German capabilities in this area.

(2) Current arrangements reserve air policing in FRG airspace to the tripartite nations. After unification Germany within NATO would expect to police its own airspace including that of the present GDR. Transitional arrangements will be required to accommodate the activities of stationed Soviet air

forces during the period that they remain after unification.

(3) The mounting of tactical air operations⁴ would ideally require the maintenance of bases in the former GDR if the reach of aircraft is not to be severely affected. Maintaining the air bases in the GDR as FOLs/FOBs, either in NATO or German hands, would serve this purpose and should be a negotiating objective. The question of whether the German airforce can conduct low-level flying training in the former GDR should also be raised. It would be in the UK's interest to argue for it in order to relieve some of the pressure on such training in the former FRG, and because any German reluctance to support the argument could weaken their hand in arguing that the continued scale of low-level flying in the former FRG represented an unacceptable burden.

c. Naval Forces. Naval deployments need further study; but the rights should be preserved for a united Germany to deploy forces from former GDR ports and for the Navies of NATO allies to visit such ports.

45. Reconnaissance Requirements. The reductions in ground forces, the greater area to be defended and the rear positions of the main forces will all increase the importance of timely intelligence at both the strategic and operational levels. Detection of CFE circumvention will also make surveillance important if increased warning times are to be exploited. Greater attention will, therefore, need to be given to the provision of effective reconnaissance systems, which should be able to operate over former GDR territory.

4. Tactical Air Operations are likely to include counter air, air interdiction, offensive air support, operations by

46. Logistic Considerations. A key determinant of the feasibility of any deployment forward will be logistics, which is discussed in more detail at Annex B. The stricture outlined in Paragraph 21 applies particularly to the provision of additional logistic support which will be expensive; this fact will impose a major constraint on what is possible.

SUMMARY OF MILITARY OBJECTIVES

47. From a military point of view, in discussion amongst Allies on the military implications of the unification of Germany, the UK aim should be to achieve agreement on the following framework:

- a. Articles 5 and 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty extend to the whole of the united Germany.
- b. The present GDR does not become "demilitarized" to the extent that the only forces allowed are paramilitary.
- c. Regular German forces are stationed in the former GDR both to man installations and to facilitate forward deployment by the Alliance in a crisis. (These forces should be appropriate for the eventual military task, although there could be advantage if the force-level was not such as to justify the Soviet Union stationing large forces in Poland). Peacetime contingency plans should also be made for the incorporation of German forces stationed in the former GDR to become part of the IMCS in TTW within an agreed GDP.
- d. An integrated air defence is established over the united Germany.

(Footnote 4 continued from previous page)
air-delivered forces and tactical air transport.

SECRET UK EYES A

- e. German forces stationed in the present FRG are within the IMCS.
- f. Nuclear weapons, including those of the US, are retained on German soil.
- g. Significant levels of US and European forces are stationed in the present FRG. While it is accepted that no US and European forces are to be stationed in the former GDR in peacetime, this limitation should be expressed in the form of unilateral declarations by the NATO countries concerned rather than by a contractual agreement with the Soviet Union.
- h. An equitable solution is achieved concerning GDR military equipment, though NATO should be sympathetic to Soviet demands for non-TLEs to be destroyed.
- i. Soviet forces do not remain in the GDR for any longer than is necessary.
- j. Transitional arrangements allow the continued functioning of UK forces in Berlin until their subsequent orderly withdrawal.
- k. NATO is not committed to defence in strength on the Oder-Neisse line, but that the ability to deploy forward of the existing IGB is improved by ideally negotiating the right to:

- (1) Conduct exercises, albeit on a limited scale, in the GDR.
- (2) Make provision for support forward.
- (3) Make use of former military air bases in East


Germany.

48. The way in which, and the extent to which, the objectives in the previous Paragraph are pursued in negotiations at 2 + 4 will have to take account of the outcome of discussions amongst the western four (UK, US, FRG, France), legitimate Soviet interests and concerns, and, conversely, the western interest in limiting the scope of 2 + 4 talks in order to minimize Soviet droit de regard over NATO defence arrangements and dispositions.

Annexes:

- A. Intelligence Units in Berlin.
- B. Logistic Considerations at the Operational Level.

The National Archives

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ANNEX B TO
ATTACHMENT TO
SECCOS 1063/198/3
DATED 28 MAR 90

LOGISTIC CONSIDERATIONS AT THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL

The logistic implications of movement forward of the existing IGB will be influenced by the extent to which existing Soviet/NVA and other infrastructure can be used to good effect, but will also turn on:

a. German National Infrastructure.

(1) Road/Rail Network. There is a poor road/rail network on either side of the IGB. Doubtless it will be improved in time but it will impose, in its present state, severe restraints on cross-IGB logistic movement. The Elbe bridges will be a logistic bottleneck particularly during deployment. It should be remembered that a key part of the current air campaign is directed at the destruction of Soviet formations at readily identifiable choke-points in this sparse network. This is equally applicable in reverse.

(1) Ports. A full-scale defence in the former GDR will probably lead to greater reliance on Hamburg and Bremen as entry points into the theatre of operations. It might be necessary to consider using ports on the north coast of the GDR. The lines of communication (LoFC) to ports there will run through the Kiel Canal and the Baltic approaches, in themselves also vulnerable.

b. Forward Storage Sites (FSS) and Depots. Building new storage sites and depots in the former GDR will be very

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costly, even given that construction is politically acceptable. A FSS costs approximately £6M and takes 3 years to build. The UK currently has 5 FSS, 2 are under construction, and a further 3 are planned. Cost is likely to preclude re-locating many of these further East. The implications of retaining current FSS are:

(1) Greater use will have to be made of trains and barges. This will lead to greater dependence on Host Nation Support (HNS) and a possible need for more third and fourth line transport.

(2) Outloading using the assets currently available will take longer than at present.

(3) The time taken to outload over longer distances could be reduced with more assets. However, the storage sites may not have the capacity to handle more traffic; investment might have to be made to improve existing facilities.

(4) In any option involving a rapid forward move into the former GDR there will be a need to restructure and improve current logistic system so that formations are more self-sufficient and not reliant on a long and vulnerable LofC.

One way to alleviate the mal-location of FSS might be to use existing logistic facilities in Berlin rather than give them up. If this were to be politically acceptable it might have considerable military advantages but a detailed study would be required to assess feasibility. Another option might be the use of vacated Soviet/EGA installations. Neither of these options is considered further in this Annex.

c. Essential Supplies.

(1) Fuel.

(a) Any defence forward of the present main defensive position will lead to an increased fuel requirement due to the longer distances vehicles will have to travel, both in the deployment phase and along the extended LofC. This will mean more fuel and an increase in the already inadequate tanker fleet.

(b) Central European Pipeline (CEPS). NATO currently places great reliance on CEPS to meet its fuel distribution requirements. If this facility is not extended into the former GDR, then considerable investment may have to be made to increase the tanker fleet and Bulk Fuel Installations. This will be in addition to the increases at sub-paragraph (a) above. The purchase of a bigger military tanker fleet is unlikely, so reliance on HNS will be greatly increased.

(2) Ammunition. Losses in the extended LofC through enemy action, breakdown, etc, could be higher than currently envisaged (8-25% depending on the phase of the battle) and so scales will have to be increased.

(3) Equipment. Longer deployment distances will cause more breakdowns. This could lead to a requirement for:

(a) Increased War Maintenance Reserve (WMR) stocks of spares and major assemblies.

(b) Greater investment in repair and recovery

assets.

(c) Possible increase in numbers of main equipments to offset losses in the LofC during deployment

d. Logistic Operations.

(1) Warning Time. The withdrawal of Soviet forces to USSR will give longer warning. However, for options which deploy in the former GDR this will be offset by the longer time needed to deploy and outload over greater distances; so time for decision making may not be increased to the extent expected.

(2) Rear Area Security. A long LofC is particularly vulnerable to both ground and air attack. This would require considerably increased investment in rear area security.

(3) Logistic Command, Control, Communication and Information (C3I). In order to support operations forward, greater investment would have to be made in logistic command and control. For example, it may not be effective to allow logistics to continue to be a national responsibility and greater integration may have to be achieved at Army Group, MSC level and above. This would have considerable and far-reaching consequences for national defence procurement policy.