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MODUK FOR HEDLEY (SEC NATO/UK (P))

NAC, 17 APRIL: GERMANY/NATO

*Summary only,
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SUMMARY

1. FIRST FORMAL NAC CONSULTATIONS ON IMPLICATIONS FOR NATO OF GERMAN UNIFICATION. MOST ALLIES NOT YET READY TO ADDRESS DETAILED MILITARY QUESTIONS. ALL AGREED THAT UNITED GERMANY SHOULD REMAIN IN NATO AND THAT ARTICLE V SHOULD APPLY TO ALL GERMANY. NON-ONE IN FAVOUR OF DUAL MEMBERSHIP OF NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT (AS SUGGESTED BY SHEVARDNADZE). AGREEMENT THAT NATO FORCES SHOULD NOT (NOT) BE EXTENDED EASTWARDS INTO THE EX-GDR BUT NO CONSENSUS ON WHETHER THIS SHOULD BE A TEMPORARY OR PERMANENT ARRANGEMENT.

DETAIL

2. THE NAC MET ON 17 APRIL AT 1 PLUS 1 FOR THE FIRST FORMAL CONSULTATIONS ON GERMANY/NATO. PERMREPS HAVE BEEN DISCUSSING THIS ISSUE PRIVATELY IN A SERIES OF 'BRAINSTORMING' MEETINGS FOR SOME WEEKS.

3. VON PLOETZ (GERMANY) RECALLED THE FRG POSITION THAT A UNITED GERMANY SHOULD BE A MEMBER OF NATO. THE NEWLY ELECTED COALITION GOVERNMENT IN THE GDR HAD REACHED AGREEMENT ON A PROGRAMME WHICH ENDORSED MUCH OF THE FRG POSITION (ALTHOUGH WITH A NUMBER OF CONDITIONS): MEMBERSHIP OF A UNITED GERMANY IN NATO, NO EXTENSION EASTWARDS OF NATO UNITS/INSTALLATIONS TO THE TERRITORY OF THE EX-GDR. THERE REMAINED, HOWEVER, A NUMBER OF IMPORTANT DETAILS TO BE DISCUSSED WITH THE NEW GOVERNMENT IN EAST BERLIN. THE NATO ISSUE WAS THE MOST DELICATE ONE FOR THE SOVIET UNION IN THE UNIFICATION PROCESS. MOSCOW WAS STILL MAKING CONFLICTING STATEMENTS. SHEVARDNADZE'S RECENT ARTICLE FOR THE PERIODICAL 'NATO'S 16 NATIONS' (COPY BY BAG TO THE DEPARTMENT) DESERVED CLOSE STUDY. IT STOPPED SHORT OF AN OFFICIAL PROPOSAL FOR DUAL MEMBERSHIP OF THE WARSAW PACT AND NATO (WHICH THE FRG EXCLUDED). THE RUSSIANS WERE STILL TRYING TO FIND THE WAY AHEAD: THE EMPHASIS WAS ON THE BROADER ASPECTS OF

SECURITY IN EUROPE, IN PARTICULAR CSCE. SHEVARDNADZE WAS SIGNALLING THE SOVIET WISH TO PARTICIPATE CONSTRUCTIVELY IN THE BUILDING OF A DURABLE AND JUST EUROPEAN STRUCTURE AND WELCOMING U S AND CANADIAN PARTICIPATION IN THIS. SUCH A PROCESS WOULD MAKE IT EASIER FOR THE RUSSIANS TO ACCEPT GERMANY WITHIN NATO.

4. ON THE APPLICATIONS OF ARTICLES V AND VI OF THE NATO TREATY, VON PLOETZ SAID IT WOULD BE 'DESIRABLE' THAT THE PROTECTION OF NATO WAS EXTENDED TO THE WHOLE TERRITORY OF GERMANY. THE DETAIL WOULD NEED FURTHER DISCUSSION 'AS WE PROCEED'. IT WAS ENCOURAGING THAT THE FRG AND GDR GOVERNMENTS NOW SHARED THE VIEW THAT ARTICLE 23 WAS THE RIGHT COURSE TO UNITY, SINCE THIS WOULD OBTAIN THE NEED (INHERENT IN THE ARTICLE 146 ROUTE) TO RENEGOTIATE GERMAN ENTRY. IT WAS NOW IMPORTANT THAT THE TWO PLUS FOUR PROCESS GOT UNDERWAY AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THE FRG WAS SEEKING DATES FOR MEETINGS OF THE FRG AND GDR FOREIGN MINISTERS AND OF POLITICAL DIRECTORS. A MEETING OF THE TWO POLITICAL DIRECTORS WOULD BE NECESSARY BEFORE THE POLITICAL DIRECTORS OF THE TWO PLUS FOUR MET IN ADVANCE OF A TWO PLUS FOUR MINISTERIAL. THE FRG WAS ALSO PURSUING AN EARLY MEETING BETWEEN KOHL AND THE GDR PRIME MINISTER.

5. THUYSBAERT (BELGIUM) SAID DISCUSSION IN NATO SHOULD COMPLEMENT AND PRECEDE DISCUSSION IN TWO PLUS FOUR. THERE WAS A NEED TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF THE SOVIET UNION AND TO AVOID RENATIONALISATION OF SECURITY POLICY. SPECIAL REGIMES FOR THE EX-GDR RISKED BEING UNSTABLE. THERE WAS A NEED FOR GERMANY TO BE PART OF A GENERAL STRUCTURE OF SECURITY. ANY PEACE AGREEMENT SHOULD BE BILATERAL (IE BETWEEN GERMANY AND INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES) WITH A COMMON DOCUMENT ATTACHED IN THE CSCE CONTEXT. THE CSCE WOULD PLAY A STABILISING ROLE BUT COULD NOT SOLVE MILITARY/SECURITY PROBLEMS, ALTHOUGH IT HAD A ROLE TO PLAY IN THESE. NATO REMAINED INDISPENSABLE. ON ARTICLES V AND VI IT WAS DIFFICULT TO SEE THAT SOME GERMANS WOULD BE PREPARED TO SETTLE FOR LESS SECURITY THAN WAS ENJOYED BY OTHERS I.E. THEIR COUNTERPARTS IN THE EX-FRG. ANY SPECIAL REGIMES WOULD HAVE TO BE OF A TRANSITORY NATURE.

6. JACOBVITS (NETHERLANDS) SAID NATO PROTECTION SHOULD EXTEND TO THE WHOLE OF A REUNIFIED GERMANY (IE ARTICLES V AND VI SHOULD APPLY) EVEN WHILE SOVIET TROOPS REMAINED DURING A TRANSITION PERIOD: THIS IMPLIED THE NEED FOR ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE USSR ABOUT THE STATUS OF THEIR FORCES. THE ALLIES SHOULD EXCLUDE ANY IDEAS OF DUAL ALLIANCE MEMBERSHIP. BUT HE ASKED WHETHER, IF THE TWO GERMANIES MERGED, THIS WOULD NOT IMPLY THAT THE NEW COUNTRY RETAINED THE GDR'S WARSAW PACT OBLIGATIONS IN ADDITION TO THE FRG'S NATO COMMITMENTS. ON EXTENSION

OF NATO FORCES INTO THE EX-GDR, THERE WAS A NEED TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS (DURING WHICH NO NATO TROOPS WOULD BE DEPLOYED EASTWARDS AND GERMAN BORDER GUARDS WOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE NEW EASTERN BORDER) AND PERMANENT ARRANGEMENTS (WHEN IT WAS CONCEIVABLE THAT GERMANY WOULD DECIDE THAT GERMAN TROOPS COULD ALSO BE STATIONED IN THE EX-GDR). HE NOTED INCREASING TALK ABOUT THE DESIRABILITY OF NATO MULTINATIONAL FORCES. HE HOPED NO NATO MEMBER (IE THE NORTH AMERICANS) WOULD BE EXCLUDED AUTOMATICALLY, AND ASKED FOR U S AND CANADIAN VIEWS.

7. SMITH (CANADA) AGREED THAT THE MUTUAL ASSISTANCE CLAUSE SHOULD APPLY TO ALL OF GERMANY, THAT AFTER UNIFICATION NATO FORCES SHOULD NOT BE EXTENDED EAST, AND THAT SOME SOVIET TROOPS SHOULD REMAIN. BUT HE AGREED WITH JACOBOVITS THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN PERMANENT AND TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS. IF NATO TROOPS WERE PERMANENTLY EXCLUDED FROM THE EX-GDR WOULD THIS NOT RESULT IN ZONES OF UNEQUAL SECURITY WHATEVER THE LEGAL POSITION? HE ALSO URGED THE NEED FOR THE ALLIES TO PRESS AHEAD MORE QUICKLY ON CONSULTATIONS ON CSCE IN ORDER TO ADDRESS SHEVARDANDZE'S IDEAS.

8. ARAGONA (ITALY) WELCOMED DEBATE IN THE NAC IN SUPPORT OF CONSULTATIONS AT THE POLITICAL LEVEL WHICH ITALY HOPED FOR SOON. HE ENDORSED THE 'REGRETTABLE BUT REALISTIC' NEED FOR A SPECIAL TRANSITIONAL STATUS FOR THE EX-GDR. ARTICLE V SHOULD APPLY TO ALL GERMAN TERRITORY. NATO SHOULD RENOUNCE DEPLOYMENT EAST 'FOR A PERIOD'. THIS WAS NOT INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY PROVIDED THE SOVIET PRESENCE WAS ACCEPTED BY THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT AND ALL NATO COUNTRIES. HE STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF ITALIAN ASSOCIATION WITH THIS DECISION.

9. THE SECRETARY GENERAL THEN INVITED COMMENTS ON THE IMPLICATIONS OF UNITY FOR MILITARY DISPOSITIONS IN GERMANY, FOR ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS AND FOR FUTURE EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE. NO-ONE SPOKE. THE SECRETARY GENERAL SAID THAT DISCUSSION SHOULD THEREFORE BE POSTPONED UNTIL CAPITALS HAD FORMED CLEARER VIEWS.

10. I SAID THAT I HAD TAKEN CAREFUL NOTE OF THE VIEWS EXPRESSED. THE DISCUSSION HAD SUGGESTED A NUMBER OF ISSUES ON WHICH THE ALLIES WOULD NO DOUBT WISH TO TAKE A POSITION IN FUTURE DISCUSSIONS. THESE INCLUDED THE QUESTION OF HOW TO REACT TO ANY CRISIS IN THE FIVE EASTERN LAENDER DURING A TRANSITIONAL PERIOD, GIVEN THAT NO FORCES WERE TO BE DEPLOYED FORWARD: THE AIR DEFENCE ARRANGEMENTS: AND WHETHER THE ALLIANCE SHOULD SEEK CONSTRAINTS ON SOVIET FORCES DURING A TRANSITIONAL PERIOD. THE SECRETARY GENERAL CONFIRMED THAT HE

ENVISAGED A PROGRESSIVE DEEPENING OF THE DISCUSSIONS IN THE WEEKS AHEAD. SMITH (CANADA) TOLD ME AFTERWARDS THAT HE HAD IT IN MIND TO RAISE ALL THESE QUESTIONS - AND MORE - AT THE NEXT MEETING.

COMMENT

11. A SLOW START. HAVING PRESSED HARD FOR EARLY NATO CONSULTATIONS ON THE SECURITY ISSUES ARISING FROM VERIFICATION, MANY OF THE NON-FOUR ALLIES ARE EVIDENTLY HAVING DIFFICULTY IN COMING TO GRIPS WITH THE ISSUES. THIS IS, PERHAPS, NOT ALTOGETHER A SURPRISE EXCLAM. BUT FASTER FOOTWORK WILL BE REQUIRED WHEN THE TWO PLUS FOUR NEGOTIATIONS GET INTO GEAR: IN MAY ALSO BECOME MORE APPARENT ONCE THERE ARE TANGIBLE PROBLEMS TO TACKLE.

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